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Russia, Azerbaijan Face Lezgin Question

92US0858A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 15 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by R. Batyrshin: "The Lezghian Question as Detonator of a Fresh Conflict. Will Azerbaijan and Russia Be Able to Avoid It?"]

[Text]

Ethos

The problem of the Lezghian people is a classical example of an ethnic dead end the resolution of which, as a rule, ends in war in the name of the self-determination of the given ethos. Therefore a detailed study of the fate of Lezghians, as representatives of the people of the Caucasus, appears to be of interest.

Lezghians form one of the ancient and comparatively large nationalities in the Caucasus. The ancestors of modern Lezghians were part of the ancient country of Caucasian Albania which existed in the third century before our era on the territory of what today is Azerbaijan and South Dagestan. After the disintegration of Albania most of the Lezghians became part of the country of Lakh which disintegrated in the 13th century. After a long series of wars with the Hazara, Arabs, Mongols, Persians, and Turks in the early 18th century, the Lezghians became a part of Russia. In 1862 they were split between the Yelizavetpolskaya (Baku) region and the Samur and Kubinsk regions along the Samur River which today is the boundary between Azerbaijan and Dagestan. This division caused dissatisfaction and in 1877 practically the entire Lezghian population arose against troops of the mother country.

In 1917 land of the southern Lezghians was incorporated in the Mussavat Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan and later, in the Azerbaijan SSR. Even though in January 1921 the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR, and the All-Dagestan Constituent Assembly in December of the same year adopted a decision concerning the need to annex Lezghian land to the Dagestan Autonomous SSR, these decisions were never carried out. At present the Lezghians are living in Southern Dagestan. Another part of the Lezghians populate the northeastern part of Azerbaijan. According to official data in Dagestan there are 205,000 Lezghians, while in Azerbaijan there are 174,000 and around 90,000 are scattered over the remaining territory of the former USSR (a total of 466,000). The Lezghians are of the Muslim faith, Sunnite branch of the Shafi'ite mazhab, and partly—followers of Islam of the Shiite branch.

Unofficial data for 1991 cited in the trial issue of the magazine LEZGISTAN are as follows: in Azerbaijan—there are over 800,000 Lezghians and in Dagestan—around 250,000. Such a substantial divergence in the data is usually explained by the fact that in Azerbaijan many Lezghians are registering in the "fifth column" as Azerbaijanis, thereby avoiding obstacles to finding work,

getting apartments, entering higher educational establishments, etc. They have reasons for going that: from 1936 to 1956, in order to obtain a higher education in Azerbaijan, Lezghians, as a "nonindigenous people" had to make a one-time payment, called "lezgi pulu" (Lezghian money). In 1936 the Lezghian theater closed in Baku and there are no newspapers or radio and television programming in the Lezghian language. The native language of the Lezghians, if it is taught at all in some of the Lezghian communities in Azerbaijan, is taught as a foreign tongue.

An association of Lezghian writers called "Rikin gaf" (Heartfelt Word), which was subsequently suppressed, appeared in Kusary in 1959. The "Heartfelt Word" struggled for the restoration of the rights of the Lezghians, as well as their amalgamation and statehood. Perestroika resulted in a new phase within the Lezghian movement: on 14 June 1991 the "Sadval" ("Unity") Lezghian People's Movement was founded in the village of Belidzhi and became the most significant Lezghian organization. As its program goal "Sadval" promulgated struggle for the unification of Lezghians, standing in opposition to "the assimilation of Lezghians in Azerbaijan which reaches the level of genocide and discrimination in Dagestan." "Sadval" expressed itself in opposition to the proclamation of sovereignty by the Azerbaijan SSR and Dagestan SSR and appealed to the parliaments of the USSR and the republics to refrain from adopting sovereignty until resolution of the Lezghian problem (for the same reason that the movement expressed itself against the signing of the Federative agreement by leaders of Dagestan). Numerous appeals to the president and parliament of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan, Dagestan, and Russia followed, but remained without response with the exception of the creation of a special commission of the Supreme Soviet in Dagestan. At the same time Meshet-Turks were settled in areas occupied by Lezghian communities in Azerbaijan and, what is most important, mobilization of Lezghians began in connection with the war in Karabakh. Disintegration of the USSR further aggravated the Lezghian problem because formerly this nation was split among different territorial units of one state, whereas today the state border between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan bisects the land of the Lezghians. After that drawing of the "rigid border" became the principal obstacle in the fulfillment of a dream of a unified state of Lezghistan.

In accordance with an ukase of Boris Yeltsin concerning increased protection of southern borders of Russia sub-units of domestic forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation were deployed on 6 September in Dagestan and in other regions of northern Caucasus, which, in addition to combatting crime, were also charged with the task of closing the border. This decision by the Russian leadership is quite explainable since the border along the Samur River was "transparent" only on the side of Russia, while on the Azerbaijani side it was closed by an ukase of Abulfaz Elchibey,

president of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Simultaneously with that the leadership of the Republic of Azerbaijan adopted a decision regarding settlement of refugees from Karabakh in Lezghian regions (according to data from "Sadval" their number will amount to 105,000), which, together with the caskets of Lezghians killed in Karabakh, did not create much enthusiasm among the local population. It is not quiet in Dagestan either—"Sadval," joining with national movements of Kumyks, Avars, Lakhs and a number of other nationalities and unifying in the "Democratic Movement of Dagestan," is calling for the resignation of the Supreme Council of the republic, accusing it of corruption, disregard for interests of the people of the Republic of Dagestan, and also of engaging in "a conspiracy with Azerbaijan behind the backs of the Lezghian people." The meetings and picket lines, however, near the building of the Supreme Council of Dagestan consist only of several tens to several hundred persons (rarely—several thousand), which so far does not pose a real threat for the authorities. It is necessary to note that regions of south Dagestan where the Lezghians live, are practically devoid of industry and therefore 80 percent of the unemployed in the republic of Dagestan are Lezghians. Even though it is impossible to state that the Dagestan authorities are doing nothing for south Dagestan—the Russian "Gory" program was started on their initiative in accordance with which the government of the Russian Federation allocates significant funds for the development of mountain regions of the Republic of Dagestan, including the Lezghian regions. Jobs in south Dagestan, however, will not be appearing soon, while the dynamite of unemployed Lezghians is present even today.

The Fourth Congress of the "Sadval" National Lezghian movement took place on 5 September at Makhachkala. A clash between the moderate and radical leaders of the movement took place there. The latter (living mostly in Azerbaijan) spoke in favor of immediate creation of the state of Lezghistan, its inclusion as part of Dagestan, which must become a federation within the Russian Federation, and the taking up of arms in case of opposition by Azerbaijan. Otherwise, in the opinion of the radicals, the Lezghians are facing the fate of the Ubykh—a Dagestan people who completely vanished as an ethos. The radicals cited as an example the Azerbaijanization of the Lezghian regions and forced mobilization for the Karabakh war, as well as the rear guard detachments that followed the Lezghian soldiers and shot those who retreated while killing the wounded. The moderates supported the idea of federalization of Dagestan, but opposed extremist actions, considering it necessary to win cultural autonomy for Lezghians from the leadership of the Republic of Azerbaijan, along with "exemption" from participation in the war and a "transparent" border, while at the same time stressing that they have no claims against the Azerbaijani people but are demanding for themselves only the right to live peacefully on their land. As a result of heated discussions the moderates won: Mukhiddin Kakhriyanov, a retired "Afghani" general, became chairman of "Sadval" and is

opening a dialogue with authorities in the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation. It is difficult to expect, however, that in a situation with a permanent war, Azerbaijani leadership will pay attention to the demands of even the moderates of "Sadval," if for no other reason than the fact that, in case of success, the Lezghians will immediately be followed by Tats, Talyshins, Kurds, and Avars living in the Republic of Azerbaijan. On the other hand, the Karabakh refugees, being sent to the northeast of the republic, will hardly be gentle with the local Lezghians inevitably resulting in clashes which may rapidly develop from a local to a national conflict.

Border control and another shipment of caskets with dead Lezghian soldiers from Karabakh, or something else may serve as a catalyst precipitating a conflict. Then the simplest way out for the leadership of the Republic of Azerbaijan might be the arming of settlers using the Israeli example. It is clear that Lezghians on this side of the Samur will not limit themselves to meetings alone (two pipelines into Azerbaijan, supplying water for a significant part of the population of Baku, originate specifically at this river). The leadership of Dagestan will have to either close its eyes to this, or be overthrown by the Democratic Movement of Dagestan. All this could readily turn into a version of the Ossetian-Georgian conflict, but at present the tripartite composition of the people who are suffering, the mother country, and the elder brother (Russia) may be joined by a fourth player, who proved his power in Abkhazia—the Confederation of Mountain People of the Caucasus. The confederates will undoubtedly stand up for a fraternal people with considerable zeal if blood should start flowing in the Lezghian regions of Azerbaijan. But a second "big move" by the Confederation of Mountain People of the Caucasus, under conditions in Dagestan with its 36 nationalities, could easily separate not only this republic from Russia, but the entire northern Caucasus, delighting the entire world with the appearance of a new state—the Caucasus Confederation.

Russian-Estonian Border Difficulties Examined

924C2416A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 17 Sep 92 pp 1,3

[Article by N. Pachegina: "The Clouds, the Somber Silence—Everything Is Present Except for a State Border Between Russia and Estonia"]

[Text]

The Border

To the delight of some and the dismay of another category of Russian citizens I hasten to report that the journey to the current northwestern boundaries of our homeland is quite brief—an hour by plane to St. Petersburg, and then about half an hour to Pskov. Just as in the 14th century it goes through ancient cities of Pskov, Izborsk, and Pechora.

It has not quite been a year since Russian authorities started feeling the full seriousness of the intentions of the Estonian neighbors after they established their check points along their entire northwestern border with Russia. Although the unequivocal nature of these actions (as long as two years ago, states Viktor Zvonkov, deputy chief of the Pskov Oblast Administration, "knights" appeared at night from the other side along Estonian borders of the twenties and installed striped poles in the ground in the soil of Pskov) was clear to everyone, the government decree on organization of a border customs service in that region occurred on 4 September 1992. Much happened in that time: the not very subtle neighbors buried stakes in the asphalt thereby attempting to discourage the unremitting Russian desire to travel, there were chases after car thieves which encountered Estonian barriers, there was also lots of ferrous metal with the painfully familiar markings which was purchased from Estonia at an exorbitant price, there were long convoys with Russian oil, round timber, and non-ferrous metals heading in the direction of Tallinn. The mild-mannered Pskov and Pechora residents, which is the way Viktor Zvonkov described his countrymen, for over a year patiently observed the one-way flow of cargo. Even though they recall with regret the abundant vegetable and meat stands of Estonian peasants at the local markets, it is a firm conviction of the population of Pechera Kray that they cannot be compared with the wealth that flowed abroad. One must give their due to the authorities in Pskov and the St. Petersburg, pardon us, oblast, who, guided by the Vershagin slogan of "One feels pain for the state," attempted to the best of their ability to block this flow. In just four days and nights this year, as a result of the "Intercept" operation, personnel of the security administration of the Pskov Oblast, according to Major General Smirnov, chief of the administration, managed to intercept 49 heavy trucks without proper documentation along the routes, which were heading in the direction of Estonia, reclaiming 49 million rubles worth of raw materials and goods.

The command of the northwestern border district, whose headquarters is located next to Smolnyy, is just starting to deploy its services along the current borders. Their assimilation was initiated by border personnel even before the appearance of the ukaze issued by the president and the government of the Russian Federation on 20 July of this year. The border detachments being withdrawn out of impatient Estonia from along the border of the USSR, are arriving in Russia (according to information from Lieutenant General Vasilii Kostenko, who is responsible for the withdrawal of border troops, some 60 percent of the personnel and materiel have now been returned from the frontier posts) and confronting a lot of problems the most acute of which is housing. The commander of the frontier post on the Pskov - Riga highway, who looks like the young Okhlopkov from the film "Aleksandr Nevskiy," and his colleague, commander of the Pechera frontier post, confirmed that families thus far have been bivouacking there since there are no apartments or jobs for the wives and no schools

for the children. The frontier posts, as a rule, are situated in buildings formerly used as schools and kindergartens which are in need of major overhauling. The border personnel, however, who declared that those who remained to serve here, in Russia, are the ones who consider their profession to be the defense of their homeland, are not feeling dejected. Help for the local residents with the harvest and an "imported" pig in the yard, they say, augurs a good winter.

Far more problems were brought to light at a press conference held by the command of the northwestern border district and the executive committee of the St. Petersburg oblast, which took place on 15 September in St. Petersburg. Beside their acquisitions, the civil participants of the press conference said that the status of the border regions brought a mass of complications to these oblasts: the drug trade, prostitution, and economic crimes. Oblast authorities are highly interested in the swift deployment of border and customs services in the region. Of course, they are heartened by the allocation of 6.8 billion rubles by the government of the Russian Federation for the assimilation of the border. But from here they can clearly see that this amount is clearly insufficient. Some 320 million have already been spent on the organization of five frontier posts and customs facilities. The government is providing 80 million for the fourth quarter. So far these sums are earmarked for the provisioning of frontier posts on motor roads, while country roads along the border remain uncontrolled. It is true that both the executive authorities of the oblasts and the district command consider that a "rigid" frontier is not needed here. Even if there are concrete pillboxes facing us from the Estonian side, they say, our frontier must not include barbed wire and a plowed strip. Border personnel feel confident that many years of relations among the local populace of these regions, on both sides of the border, would not permit the fortifications to remain for very long.

Lieutenant General Vladimir Vyunov, commander of the northwestern border district, noted that despite the difficulties encountered in the withdrawal of troops from their former location, the border troops, jointly with the customs service, interdicted 633 million rubles worth of illegally exported goods. As proudly reported by the lieutenant general, of that amount some 818 tonnes of gasoline and fuel, 1,862 tonnes of industrial lubricants, 340 million rubles worth of nonferrous metals, and other products worth 53 million rubles were returned to Russia.

District specialists estimate that around 50 percent of products being exported from Russia today pass through border and customs control. Financing and participation by agencies, railways and Aeroflot, in the organization of frontier posts in the region, according to the specialists, will allow establishment of control here over all Russian exports. The commander of the border district stated that there are also many problems with border violators. A total of 400 persons were detained within a short period of time, 70 - 80 percent of whom are citizens from

third countries. This week, for instance, a Somali national was detained crossing the border near the city of Nikel, heading in the direction of Sweden. The border service, the lieutenant general stated, has neither the juridical nor material means for struggling against this type of border violator.

Vladimir Shamakov, deputy chief of the director of the northwest administration of customs control of the Russian Federation and Dmitriy Arbatskiy, director of the Department for Struggle Against Organized Crime attached to the Executive Committee of St. Petersburg, spoke about problems confronting the customs service. The shortage of customs personnel, not enough specialists, the absence of housing for them—are all important problems but the main difficulties are considered by customs personnel to be the absence of intergovernmental agreements with Estonia and lack of coordination among agencies within the Russian economy. Posts along motor roads of the northwest, which have been in operation for around a year, constitutes an achievement of the customs service.

Heart-rending stories heard within the inspection service about the craftiness and sophistication of the thieves both on the Estonian and on our side (the crooks concealed several tons of sheet copper in the back of a truck "sprinkling" it with barrels of cranberries) were corroborated by the report that powerful criminal organizations with transportation facilities, communications, and ample funds are arrayed against the customs service. The wage of a customs officer is around 3,000. Customs personnel believe that it would be feasible to expand the financing of the inspection service at the expense of sums which it saves for the government.

Pledging to keep the border "under lock and key," the command of the border district nevertheless discreetly pointed out the actual absence of a state border between Russia and Estonia since what is currently being guarded is an administrative border. The Russo-Estonian border is 437.5 kilometers long and border personnel and oblast authorities are assuming that territorial problems might occur along each one of them in the very near future.

Today they already exist along the east bank of the Narva River in the Kingiseppsk Rayon, Leningrad Oblast as well as in Pechera Rayon, of the Pskov Oblast. The position of the Estonian side with regard to questions concerning disputed border territories is well known: in connection with the proclamation of independence by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Estonia, all legal acts pertaining to the Estonian SSR belonging to the USSR and the subsequent change in the borders, were recognized as being invalid. With regard to the question of its eastern borders Estonia adheres to provisions of the Peace Treaty of 1920. The Russian leadership, however, remains silent.

Resolution on Financial Relations With Former Republics

925D0731A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 19 Sep 92 p 5

[Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation of 3 September 1992 No. 658 on Payment-Accounting and Financial-Credit Relations With States—Former Republics of the USSR]

[Text] In order to regulate payment-accounting and financial-credit relations of Russia with states of the ruble zone, stabilize monetary circulation on the basis of the ruble and provide conditions for introduction of its convertibility as well as in compliance with the agreement on measures to ensure improvement in accounting between economic organizations signed in Tashkent on 15 May 1992, member of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the government of the Russian Federation, resolves as follows:

1. To charge the State Committee of the Russian Federation for Economic Cooperation With States Belonging to the Commonwealth with coordination of actions by ministries and agencies of Russia in the preparation of draft agreements with states preserving the ruble as legal tender and the elaboration of the mechanism for extended functioning of the unified monetary system along with appropriate methods of conducting a coordinated monetary-credit policy.
 2. The State Committee of the Russian Federation for Economic Cooperation With States Belonging to the Commonwealth, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Economy of the Russian Federation, and the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation to elaborate proposals for the perfection of the payment-accounting mechanism in relations with states belonging to the Commonwealth particularly with regard to the system of currency operations and settlement of accounts with participation of physical and legal bodies—residents of the corresponding states.
 3. Working group to be created for comprehensive analysis and forecasting of the development of payment-accounting and monetary-credit relations and price formation as well as participation in negotiations with states—former republics of the USSR with regard to these questions headed by V. M. Mashchits, chairman of the State Committee of the Russian Federation for Economic Cooperation With States Belonging to the Commonwealth.
- A staff to be allocated for the head of the working group upon coordination with appropriate ministries and agencies and the work organized in close interaction with the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
4. The working group, created in accordance with this resolution, to prepare drafts of bilateral agreements:

On mutual obligations and payment-accounting relations of the Russian Federation with states which assumed obligations pertaining to participation in the ruble zone;

On mutual obligations and payment-accounting relations of the Russian Federation with states introducing a national currency.

5. Proposals concerning a system of economic measures ensuring the protection of interests of Russia to be introduced in case of refusal by states—former republics of the USSR to conclude one of the suggested agreements.

6. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation to appeal to the governments of the former republics of the USSR with a proposal to conduct negotiations in September 1992 on the question of payment-accounting and financial-credit relations with states wishing to preserve on their territory the monetary unit of the Russian Federation—the ruble, and also with states introducing their national monetary unit.

[Signed] Ye. Gaydar.

Growth of Islamic Fundamentalism Reviewed

92US0867A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 18 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by Aleksey Malashenko: "Islam in the CIS: Is It a Reality or Not. To Fight Against It Means To Recognize Its Existence"]

[Text] Islam entered the political arena at the end of 1980 and it immediately became clear that it would not be satisfied with the role of an extra. Even at that time, which seems so long ago now, one could clearly see the basic direction of the Islamic movement—the rebirth of traditions, the creation of an Islamic state, and a return to the bosom of the Islamic umma.

It was not easy to foresee this movement's potential and at the same time its limitations. Finally, it was not clear where and when it would reach its apogee. And yet it is so important for both local and Russian politicians to know all these things. (I might be mistaken but it seems that on Smolensk Square in Moscow they have a completely balanced and calm attitude toward Islam these days.)

Much has now been settled. The time is coming to sum up the preliminary results and, without drawing sweeping conclusions, see which positions the Islamic movement is holding in the CIS today.

In a certain sense this summer marked the end of the actual "perestroika period" in the development of the Muslim regions of the former USSR. In two new states—Tajikistan and Azerbaijan—noncommunist (anticommunist) forces have come to power.

In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan there has been, on the one hand, a consolidation of the ruling regimes whose

roots go back to the Communist Party establishment and, on the other, there has formed a persistent, albeit very diverse, opposition which would have been unthinkable without the followers of Islam. At the helm in Kyrgyzstan are technocrats westernized in the Russian-Soviet manner. In any case elements of a new, postcommunist system are forming in Central Asia, slowly but persistently. And only the peaceful and prosperous Turkmenistan is retaining the odd features of communist totalitarianism.

Russia has its political Islam as well. The Muslim minority here has acquired its own voice. Two years ago one of the leaders of the Islamic Revival Party [IPV] (at that time it was still Unionwide), Vali-Akhmed Sadur, announced that one of the goals of the IPV was to create in the Supreme Soviet (of the USSR) a faction analogous to the one that existed at one time in the Russian duma. These words sounded extremely ambitious in 1990, and naive as well. Today they do not especially surprise anyone.

In spite of the similarity of the processes taking place in the Muslim regions of the CIS, there is no justification for speaking of a unified Muslim movement on the scale of the former USSR. Just as one cannot speak of the rebirth of the hypothetical powerful alliance of Muslim states on Russia's southern borders. Islam's international potential has turned out to be limited.

And so attempts to organize a political Islam, to create a kind of common coordinating center, have been in vain. The Islamic movement has broken down into the various ethnic groupings. The lure of ethnic independence has prevailed over the idea of Muslim brotherhood. Which on the whole is natural. Not one of the Islamic groups or parties has wanted to submit to "outside" leadership, preferring to participate in local political life as an independent national force.

After observing the evolution of political Islam for a number of years one can with a fair amount of certainty "rank" the Muslim states according to the degree to which the Muslim religion is engaged in their political life. First prize here undoubtedly goes to Tajikistan; then comes Uzbekistan, where there is a fairly strong Islamic opposition which is apprehensive but which President Karimov was forced to reckon with. As they say in sports reportage, Kazakhstan is "breaking ahead" with its small but energetic fundamentalist-Turkic party Alashi. And bringing up the rear are Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, in which conditions have not been especially favorable for the Islamic movement, and also Azerbaijan.

The events in Tajikistan were a serious test not only for the fundamentalists there, represented by the Islamic Revival Party and smaller regional groups, but also for all of CIS (what else would you call it?) Muslim fundamentalism. The conflicts that developed there show the fundamentalists' unpreparedness to assume the burden

of government and their inability to become a consolidating principle in a nation shot through with ethnic, regional, and tribal contradictions. Even though the fundamentalists did not initiate them. The "emaciated" neocommunist regime now seems to many to be more desirable than a dozen "good fights." Incidentally, does the situation in Tajikistan not remind one of the situation of its Afghan neighbors, where the replacement of communists with fundamentalists has also caused a wave of bloodshed?

Of course, this does not mean the bankruptcy of the fundamentalist idea. It contains too serious a positive potential, which consists in the desire to find the version of social structuring which corresponds most fully to the norms, principles, and historical legacy of Islamic civilization.

...But, after all, one must be able to realize this model in a balanced and peaceful way. And that is not happening so far. And not only in Tajikistan.

Be that as it may, the fundamentalist movement has now been essentially discredited. Now the word "fundamentalism" evokes the image of the corpses on the streets of Kurgan-Tyube. Even if the fundamentalists did not start it.

The governments of the neighboring states, actively pursuing the Islamic opposition, now have in their hands trump cards which will enable them to defend themselves against almost any accusations of dictatorship and suppression of opposition. Islam Karimov's positions have been especially strengthened. A couple of weeks ago the author tried to prove to his colleagues the inevitability of an aggravation of the political standoff in Uzbekistan in the fall and even the possibility of the creation of a government coalition like the one that appeared this spring in Dushanbe. But now, although the probability of skirmishes remains, from all appearances it will be postponed.

Moreover, Islam Karimov is acting as the defender of the Uzbeks living in Tajikistan. The possibility of aggravation of the conflicts between the two states cannot be ruled out. And again in this situation Uzbekistan will require consolidation of society around a decisive president.

Islamic fundamentalism disturbs the Kazakhstan leader somewhat less than it does his Tashkent colleague. But for Nazarbayev as well the strife in Tajikistan serves as a weighty argument after his ban on Alash, which—one cannot but note—literally in the last two months has undergone an appreciable ideological evolution, and its leader Aron Atabek thinks that in the future it will be possible "to combine Islamic fundamentalism with Western democracy." A paradoxical fact is that Atabek was forced to ask for political asylum from another enemy of fundamentalism—the president of Azerbaijan, an ideologist and "practitioner" of Turkism, Abulfaz Elchibey. This asylum was granted to him. (On the eve of Atabek's move to Baku, in his Moscow apartment workers of the security service of Kazakhstan in conjunction with the

Moscow militia were conducting a search, and a representative of the Kazakhstan administration was persistently asking him himself to return to Alma-Ata.)

As for Azerbaijan, it sees Tajikistan as generally being a distant land. And the success and then the failure of the fundamentalists there had no effect on the political course of the local leadership. Elchibey simply gained another argument in favor of his hostility toward fundamentalism and in general Islam's participation in politics, which in Azerbaijan is insignificant.

Yet at the end of the 1980's it seemed that it would be Azerbaijan, where the majority of the population are Shi'ites, that would be the most favorable field for the spread of fundamentalism. At that time on the streets of Azerbaijan cities there began to appear portraits of Imam Khomeyni, the activity of the Iranian consulate increased sharply, and Islamic literature was disseminated in Baku and other cities. ...But the religious explosion never occurred. It was as though fundamentalism "dispersed" and now it is only in the very south of the republic in the regions bordering on Iran that Khomeyni's followers are active. Moreover, Islam did not become involved even in the Karabakh conflict, although there were attempts on the part of some Armenian radicals to present the Azerbaijan-Armenian conflict as a religious war.

I would say that the reasons for the weakness of the Islamites in Azerbaijan are the high level of urbanization of society, its obvious attraction to the secular Turkish model, and also the fact that it borders on Iran, whose once ultraradical fundamentalist policy "frightened" the cautious Azeris. Nor can one fail to note the circumstance that political Islam has not received support from the local intelligentsia... In general the Islamic movement in Azerbaijan did not come off, and the Azeri scholar and social activist Rafik Aliyev is right to think that the local religious-political parties have no "clearly planned strategy" and they themselves have "not put forth any independent theoreticians..."

Tajikistan is obviously not adding to their confidence in their strength and authority among the population.

It goes without saying that the catastrophe in Tajikistan will halt the already insignificant growth of the fundamentalist influence in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, whose authorities even before resolutely put a stop to any participation of Islam in politics and where up to this point not a single party or group of any importance that holds Islamic positions has been formed. (Even though one of the most respected spiritual figures of Turkmenistan, Khazretkuli Khanov, declares the need to "work for an Islamic Turkmenistan.")

Yes, today we can state that during the six perestroika years plus the year and a half of independent life in Central Asia and Azerbaijan the Islamic political movement has appeared and become an appreciable force.

The powers that be are fighting against it and hence they are recognizing it. In some places it is becoming the leading force of the opposition and in some places it is gathering strength. As before, it is strong and one must

not fail to reckon with it. But is it prepared to take on the burden of power? Is fundamentalism capable of resolving or even alleviating the conflicts that are tearing the traditional society apart?...

POLITICAL AFFAIRS

United Opposition Political Declaration

Joint Declaration of Right, Left Opposition

934C00324 Moscow DEN in Russian

No 39, 27 Sep-3 Oct 92 p 1

[Declaration of opposition forces: "We Are the Russian Resistance: A Political Declaration of the Right and Left Opposition Has Been Adopted"]

[Text] It says, inter alia

Our motherland is on the brink of political and economic collapse. The danger of famine, unemployment, civil war, and the loss of real opportunities for us, our children, and subsequent generations to occupy a worthy place among the peoples of the planet looms

The main responsibility for the ruin of Russia is borne not by interchangeable government teams but by the president of the Russian Federation, whose political mandate they are fulfilling

A consequence of this policy is the total destruction of the country's economy and the openly anti-national alliance with the international forces which, like the president of the Russian Federation also, see the liquidation of a united and strong Russian state as the basis of their unlimited power

For this reason the removal from office by the constitutional path of the anti-national and corrupt Yeltsin ruling clique is the main condition of the restoration of the national economy and the accomplishment of genuinely democratic transformations in society

The survival of the state and the revival of our motherland as a great world power cannot be based either on the purely "command" system of control of the economy which is played out, or on purely "capitalist," of the 19th century model, market relations, which is capable under the conditions of the monopoly structure of the national economy, created over decades, and the national traditions of social production of engendering merely anarchy and devastation

Consolidation of the opposition is essential primarily for the implementation of **emergency anticrisis measures**. Their actual content will depend on the degree of devastation of Russia's economy by the Yeltsin regime and will be based on the following propositions

1. The growth of social production and public consumption in the country is the priority of state economic policy

2. The relations between enterprises within the framework of the country's single national economic complex, which have been disrupted, must be restored. It is essential for this to recreate federal organs of concerted economic control

3. For the assurance of a fitting living standard of society the immediate goal of the anticrisis measures will be the restoration of the correlation of consumer prices and wages at the level prior to the August-December 1991 coup d'etat

4. The program of "wholesale" privatization being pursued under the conditions of the catastrophic decline in production and the fall in the living standard is geared to the deprivation "on legal grounds" of an overwhelming number of citizens of the country of national property and must for this reason be halted immediately

5. All forms of agrarian production should be a priority target of state investments and preferential credit geared to assurance of the growth of agricultural products in the country. The question of ownership of the land, public or private, and the forms of use, possession, and disposal of it should be decided at the state and regional level in accordance with the will of the people, on the basis of the evolved traditions of economic operation

6. Foreign economic policy should be based on precise state regulation providing for the priority provision of the populace with food and consumer goods and provision of the country's national economy with raw material, energy, and equipment

7. If Yeltsin's policy of the breakup of the national economy continues, the country could in the next few months be faced with the need for the imposition of austere measures of state distribution geared to the elimination of the danger of mass starvation and total economic ruin

In the political sphere the emergency anticrisis measures should provide for:

the restoration of the country's territorial integrity defined by the USSR Constitution, the unity of its armed forces, and defense of the rights, security, and property of the citizens

the creation of the conditions for the democratic choice of its constitutional arrangement by the entire population of the country

the exercise of genuine self-determination for all, primarily those who wish to live in a united country

freedom of choice by its inhabitants of the positions of this political force and movement or the other in respect to the future and opposition to the imposition on the country of new dictatorships which could bring it even worse disasters

The **further fate of the unified state** may be determined only by the say of the people

The opposition declares that it regards our fatherland as a great power. It has its own historical, economic, spiritual, and geopolitical interests, which determine the content and aims of **foreign policy**.

From the moment of its assumption of office constitutionally the opposition will begin to restore the system of **state social safeguards**, which had become an inalienable part of the way of life of all citizens of our country in recent decades. The right to labor, shelter, recreation, education, and health care will be guaranteed by the corresponding legislation, social policy, and economic programs.

The opposition has united in the name of **national-state salvation**. Its main mission is to ensure the nationwide, representative, and constitutional mode of expression of the wishes of all citizens of the country in respect to its sociopolitical arrangement, the principles of interstate relations, and the legal status of the individual and the state.

We believe in the rectitude of our goals.

We are convinced that our country was and will remain a great power.

We are sure that our people will emerge from the troubles in which false prophets have involved them even stronger and will realize their hopes and ideals consciously and freely.

The signatories to this document include the following people's deputies and representatives of parties, movements, and organizations: V.I. Alksnis, M.G. Astafyev, S.N. Baburin, V.P. Biryulin, E.F. Volodin, S.P. Goryacheva, V.I. Gusev, N.I. Doroshenko, I.I. Yepishcheva, G.A. Zyuganov, V.A. Ivanov, V.I. Ilyukhin, V.B. Isakov, I.V. Konstantinov, R.I. Kosolapov, A.N. Krayko, S.Yu. Kunyayev, Ye.A. Lukyanova, N.N. Lysenko, A.M. Makashov, A.S. Mitrofanov, N.A. Pavlov, A.A. Prokhanov, G.V. Sayenko, V.M. Smirnov, A.N. Sterligov, S.N. Terekhov, M.G. Titov, S.Z. Umalatova, O.A. Finko, A.A. Shabanov.

The declaration is open for signing and support by all opposition forces.

Zyuganov on Current 'Moment of Truth'

934C0032B Moscow DEN in Russian
No 39. 27 Sep 92-3 Oct 92 p 1

[Statement under the heading "Leader's Word" by Genadiy Zyuganov, chairman of the Council of National-Patriotic Forces of Russia: "Moment of Truth"]

[Text] We are all currently experiencing a moment of truth—we are finally recognizing the full extent of what has happened to the country.

The southern republics now know that for them the disintegration of the USSR has opened the way to large-scale civil war.

At enterprises throughout the former Union directors and workers are becoming unemployed.

Even after the harvest has been gathered in, the peasants feel themselves hostages in their own country.

The regular army, without accommodations and threatened by constant cutbacks, understands that it will tomorrow be deprived not only of modern equipment and weapons but leather boots even.

The intelligentsia, even the elite, is convinced that it is a prime candidate for indigence.

Honest entrepreneurs and farmers have been choked by taxes and the corruption of government officials.

The moment of truth is primarily the fact that the struggle today is by no means between democrats and conservatives but between strong state advocate-patriots and the party of betrayal.

The "Political Declaration of the Left and Right Opposition" which was adopted recently is clear evidence of this. For the first time a practicable alternative to the Yeltsin regime, based on the broadest opposition, what is more, relying on a vast social base, has been proposed.

The struggle will in the immediate future unfold in the Supreme Soviet and between the local soviets and the heads of administration and also at the plant gates and at the construction sites.

I am sure that the deputies will demand an accounting of the government and the Foreign Ministry, discussion of the situation in Abkhazia and the Baltic... Attempts are being made today in Estonia to create apartheid, essentially, and do what even the South African racists have not permitted themselves—deprive of their civil rights more than 40 percent of the population. The penultimate step on the way to making this republic a new Karabakh has thereby been taken. It is astonishing that the United Nations and the Russian Government remain silent!

The time has come to demand the most emphatic sanctions: nonrecognition of the racist state, the immediate granting of Russian citizenship to all disenfranchised persons in Estonia, and defense of their rights, property, and national dignity! It is such actions, not indulgence of the racists, which could avert the danger of an explosion.

The strong state advocate-patriots will defend the representative authorities. Although they also bear their share of responsibility for the disintegration of the country, it is their existence which affords an opportunity for the legitimate removal of the antipopular government.

It is essential to insist on an immediate meeting between the president and the opposition. Simultaneously we need to be vigilant and not yield to provocations. They are needed by those who, losing power, would like to push the country toward the adoption of emergency measures—and this also would mean the collapse of Russia. All outlying regions would flee such a center.

The workers must prevent the handover of enterprises created by the labor of several generations of Soviet people to the nouveaux riches and, together with the managers, decide their fate themselves.

The country will be saved by the unification of all healthy forces and the state instinct of the army and the law enforcement authorities for in the growing anarchic license they could prove to be the last ones capable of defending people against civil strife and gangsterism.

Salvation Front Main Task Preventing Chaos

934C0028A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 3 Oct 92 p 4

[N. Garifullina report on news conference given by Russian Unity parliamentary bloc; place and date not given: "In the Name of Salvation of the Fatherland" subtitled: "Joint Opposition News Conference"]

[Text] At a news conference of the Russian Unity parliamentary bloc Ilya Konstantinov, people's deputy of Russia, termed the fact that dozens of most authoritative people had responded to the appeal for the formation of an organizing committee of the National Salvation Front a sign of the times. Consequently, anger at policy being pursued by the president and the government has already reached crisis point, and there is a growing understanding in society of immediate and decisive actions to save the fatherland.

The hope that the members of the organizing committee would succeed not only in overcoming ideological intolerance but also in creating a unified, mass social and political organization capable of decisive purposeful actions and a vigorous struggle for power was expressed at the news conference. The National Salvation Congress scheduled for 24 October, at which the formation of the National Salvation Front will be initiated, will be an important step toward this.

"Today's authorities have no real social base. Everyone is unhappy with them. The hour of awakening, which will be followed by mass protests, has come. And the main task of the National Salvation Front will be to ensure that this does not develop into chaos and armed confrontation, as is now happening in the Caucasus," Gennadiy Zyuganov, chairman of the coordinating council of national-patriotic forces, emphasized. He also called attention to the fact that Ostankino Television and the Russian and Moscow channels and radio companies were absent from the news conference. This is not fortuitous. The leadership of the Ostankino Television Company and the corresponding organizations have not, evidently, drawn the conclusions from the June confrontation. In G. Zyuganov's opinion, all attempts to hush up, distort, and misconstrue events are totally baseless.

Letters to Yeltsin Reveal Mood of Society

924C2430A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 22 Sep 92 pp 1-2

[Article by Mikhail Mironov, chief of the letters and citizen's assistance department of the president of the Russian Federation's administration: "The President's Mail"]

[Text] Since the beginning of the year, we have received 218,000 letters addressed to the president and the government. Here is what the authors write about

Every day we receive on average up to 1,500 letters addressed to the president and the government of the Russian Federation. To deal with this information flow in a timely manner, a letters and citizen's assistance department has been created within the president's administration. Its activities are structured along three main lines: reviewing letters and petitions coming from citizens and organizations, and finding ways to resolve the matters brought up in them; meeting with citizens in person and considering their verbal petitions; and, finally, informational and analytical work: preparing for the president and the government of Russia the materials on most important problems raised in these communications.

To help envision the volume of work, I will present a few figures. During the second quarter of this year alone, we received over 80,000 verbal and written communications. Three-quarters of these are petitions, 21 percent are complaints, and about four percent are proposals.

Almost one-quarter of all mail comes in the form of letters and cables from 10 major industrial centers: Moscow, St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Volgograd, Rostov-na-Donu, Krasnodar, Perm, and Samara. Among the authors, 15 percent are war veterans and people with war-related disabilities; 13.4 percent are office workers; 7.8 percent are pensioners; 6.8 percent are workers; 2.8 percent are farmers, members of cooperatives, and entrepreneurs. There are now also such categories as unemployed—more than 600 of them wrote to us—and prisoners—1.7 percent.

Now let us look at the contents of the mail.

What are the main concerns of the authors of the letters addressed to the president and the government of the Russian Federation?

The leading subject is the strategy and tactics of the economic reform, its implementation in the different regions of the country. While evaluating the existing economic situation, the authors of the letters propose concrete ways how to find a way out of the existing situation. They note that in the circumstances of an economic and political crisis, the reform that is being implemented has not produced the expected results; that because of this, tensions are increasing in society; they voice their concerns with respect to the threat of mass unemployment, galloping price increases, and the decline in the standard of living of those working in the nonproduction sphere: science, culture, health care, education, and others. Many letters contain the demand that the government keep its promise and provide the necessary social protection for the population—and for the least well-off groups a subsistence minimum—in the course of reform implementation. "We write to you with a sense of concern for the future of the entire nation and

ask you not to turn your policy into a test for survivability," says an appeal from mothers from the city of Gatchina in Leningrad Oblast.

The government is sharply criticized for not properly foreseeing the consequences of the reforms it is conducting; for the lack, in the authors' opinion, of a well-founded program of transition to a market; for not informing the population of planned actions. They express their discontent in connection with the worsening economic conditions, excessive emphasis on the problems of turnover and distribution, the pumping up of the revenue part of the state budget, artificial weakening of solvency-supported demand and thus creating a shortage of cash and noncash credit resources. This subject, in particular, is brought up in the letters from Academicians M. Ya. Lemeshev, D.A. Chernikov, Professor V.Ye. Manevich, and others.

The letters also contain many remarks with respect to the stabilization of the financial system: strengthening the ruble, creating conditions for its convertibility, lowering taxes, and enhancing the role of banks as an instrument of managing the economy, a tool for regulating the processes of production and distribution.

In the authors' opinion, the transition to economic methods of managing the economy must be accompanied by more active work on the part of local organs of power with respect to stimulating the development of economic structures whose task is to support the viability of the regions and to meet the vital needs of the population. Authors of the letters justifiably believe that critical situations sometimes result from the fact that regional administrations do not have the means financially to support during the transition period enterprises that bring in low profits but that are vitally important for the population in the sphere of communal and consumer services, the trade sector, transportation, and local industries producing consumer goods. The expectation that the market by itself will put everything in its proper place does not always materialize, especially during a period when the market mechanism is still in the stage of formation.

Many authors believe that the priority task of the economic reform is the soonest-possible large-scale privatization of state and municipal property and the implementation of a land reform that will recognize the producer's right to the private ownership of land. The protracted search for an "ideal" way of privatization, capable of satisfying the interests of all population strata, is leading nowhere and is only putting a brake on the reform, according to many letters. The mail contains examples of "well-organized resistance to the reform," pleas to protect the interests of labor collectives, especially in the circumstances when the property is sold at an auction.

In their letters and cables, the authors quite often link further development of the market mechanisms with the real-life monopolism of producers inherited from the

past. The absolute majority of them believes that this monopolism is the main cause of the snowballing price increases. They express the opinion that it is necessary to demonopolize large state structures (concerns, trusts, etc.) and to create a competitive environment.

Many difficulties arise in the localities during the implementation of the land reform, especially in connection with refusals to allocate land and property shares. Quite often it is very difficult to get the equipment, fodder, and fertilizer, as well as credits sufficient for setting up and outfitting a farm. Allocated land lots are often inadequate to sustain commercial production; the real potential of the future farmer is not being taken into account in determining the lot size, which puts limits on the development of high-profit farms. Farmers Chernikov, Ustinov, and others from Belgorod Oblast write, for instance, that on their farms **"from the point of view of available equipment, we could work 80-100 hectares of land, but we were only allocated 10-12 hectares, and there are no prospects for increasing the size."**

The authors are in agreement that the way to resolve these problems is to transfer the land to full ownership by the farmers, and by regulating their relations with the farmers' bank through the mortgage value of the farm.

During the last few months there has been a considerable increase in the number of letters and cables on the subject of the Armed Forces, law enforcement, trade, and labor relations; there has also been an increase in the number of petitions from the citizens of the CIS states. Many authors believe that the measures currently being undertaken in the area of settling armed and interethnic conflicts are insufficient.

Among those writing on these subjects are first and foremost pensioners, the disabled, and other poorly protected and low-income individuals. They comprise more than 30 percent. The contents of the mail is indicative. About 30 percent of it are petitions related to social and housing matters, including more than 7,000 petitions asking for an improvement of housing and living conditions; almost 5,000 petitions on social security matters; 3,500 on the problems of trade; and more than 1,000 regarding health care. In the authors' opinion, most of these problems have become very acute in connection with the transition to market relations, and for many categories of individuals they have become impossible to resolve.

Letters and cables on the problems of state structure and Russian leadership policies comprised one-sixth of all mail. Many writers believe that the Russian Federation's laws and the president's edicts and decrees are often not complied with because the mechanism of their practical implementation has not been thought through, and there have been incidents of obstruction or occasionally simple incompetence on the part of local executive organs. A considerable part of the mail contained complaints against the actions of officials who do not resolve problems locally, thus forcing the people to write—

sometimes many times—to higher-level authorities about their urgent problems.

People are especially concerned with the state of law enforcement in the country. The mail brings tales of growing criminal activities against individuals, and demands to protect the population from robberies and violence. Almost every fifth letter from Voronezh and Perm Oblasts and Krasnoyarsk and Stavropol Krays contains complaints about the work of the law enforcement organs.

As compared with the first quarter, the number of communications on the subject of the Armed Forces has increased by almost 20 percent. It covers a variety of topics: matters relating to the social protection of servicemen's families, getting the Army in order, and an accelerated introduction of alternative service. The most heatedly discussed topic is the lack of preparedness for the redeployment of military units transferred under the Russian jurisdiction and the dismal status of the military personnel and their families in hot spots. Authors also are concerned with the lack of control over the security of armaments, which are fast proliferating in the regions of Russia and the CIS states.

More than 4,500 communications have been received from Russia's constituent republics. Most of those dealing with the problems of agricultural production, allocation of land lots, jobs, and labor remuneration were received from Dagestan and Bashkortan; on the organization of trade—from Buryatia and Sakha (Yakutia); on housing and other social issues—from the Republics of Karelia, Komi, and Bashkortostan; on the work of law enforcement organs—from the Komi and Mordvinian Republics.

Readers are naturally interested as to what actions have been taken in response to these communications from citizens during the first half of the year. Let us again look at the numbers.

The leadership of the government and of the president's administration, as well as their staffs, have reviewed about 19,000 communications from citizens; 22,431 cases have been sent for the consideration of local authorities; and ministries and agencies of the Russian Federation have been commissioned to take action on over 21,000 letters and cables.

A special topic is assistance to the population. This is done in the reception room of the president of the Russian Federation's administration (23 Ilyinka Street, Entrance No. 11) daily between 0900 and 1800 by specialists from the letters and citizen's assistance department and from other departments of the Russian government apparatus. Russian Federation's President B.N. Yeltsin has established a procedure whereby twice a week (Monday and Friday), citizens are received by top officials and members of the Russian Federation's government, presidential advisers, and top officials of the president's administration, and three times a week—by top officials of the bureaucratic departments.

During the second quarter alone, 7,662 people visited the reception room of the president's administration, 109 of them were received by members of the government and by presidential advisers.

Analysis of verbal petitions shows that most petitioners have come to Moscow after multiple and fruitless attempts to resolve their problems locally. Often all that the specialists dealing with citizens assistance can do is to offer explanations, since the issues brought up by petitioners fall directly under the jurisdiction of local administrations and economic managers, and can only be resolved there.

An important task for the department is to prepare informational-analytical materials for the national leadership on most topical problems. In order comprehensively and in a timely manner to analyze the letters, the department has set up a local network of personal "Letters to the President" computers, with the necessary software and technical support. The data on the results of the follow-up on the petitions received are entered into the computer daily.

In accordance with a thematic classification table that contains 20 codes and more than 300 subcodes, we can generate more than 30 reports and summaries on citizen's petitions by topics and regions for any period of time; monitor the timeliness of the follow-up; provide reference information to officials and those carrying out the follow-up; and so on. The use of generated aggregate data makes it possible to prepare timely analytical materials.

The topics of the memorandum are defined by the list of issues that are envisaged for consideration at the meetings of the Russian government and its collegium, by tasks set by the national leadership, and by the plan of the department's work for the year and the contents of the communications received. They are sent to the top officials of ministries and agencies, advisers to the president of Russia, chiefs of the government apparatus departments, and in a number of instances to the leadership of oblasts, krays, and the Russian Federation's constituent republics for their information and for use in their practical work.

Regarding some of the reasons for a considerable increase in the number of letters and petitions. They may be grouped as follows: political and legislative; economic and social issues; organizational, and the reorientation of petitioners toward the Russian structures since the abolishment of the all-Union structures. The effect of these factors on the social well-being of the population is great and multifaceted. They are the main motives behind the desire to react with extra sensitivity to the current processes and to provide a timely and involved response to them. An important role in this is played by the socio-psychological factor. Since the president of Russia was elected in general elections, the people's desire to bring their most burning questions directly to the top

national leadership seems quite natural and logical. As a result, 76 percent of the mail is addressed directly to the president.

On the other hand, the conditions created, for the first time in decades, whereby the citizens of Russia can realistically take part in forming both domestic and foreign policy, and for their civic position directly to influence the fate of the fatherland, its present and future, thus far are not being realized very well. Years of the administrative and command system and authoritarian power created a fallacious practice whereby an official of any rank, and especially the highest-ranking ones, were in essence above the law; this has created a perception among the people that an official empowered with great authority can accomplish anything—as long as they get to him and manage to get an appointment. Hence, the numerous requests to allocate out of turn a car, an apartment, a refrigerator, a voucher to a health resort, and so on. The established habit of seeing a "good uncle" is still alive today.

At the same time, many local organs used to serve simply as venues for carrying out somebody else's will; they have lost the initiative, the ability effectively and in a timely manner to deal with the emerging problems of a rural area, a settlement, or a city. Hence such a rather distrustful attitude toward them on the part of a considerable number of working people and their continuing low standing in the eyes of the people.

Unfortunately, the localities are doing an unsatisfactory job with respect to propagandizing new laws; there is a noticeably insufficient legal awareness on the part of both individuals and officials. Local organs and economic managers are used to dealing with the "plan," "gross output," etc., rather than with an individual person. "No one in the localities wants to deal with a specific person," writes A.I. Semenov, from St. Petersburg; "everyone is busy solving global problems. One gets the impression that those who have come into power do not understand, or do not want to understand, that the well-being—or, on the contrary, the lack thereof—of the nation consists in the well-being of individual people." Working people often still petition central authorities, bypassing local power structures. Many letters and petitions contain a request "not to refer the matter to local authorities," while the issue is completely within the competence of the local organs.

Analysis of responses to a control batch of letters, and the nature of complaints and petitions, provide grounds to contend that both the central organs and the local authorities on many occasions still engage in procrastination, a superficial approach toward the requests, unsatisfactory audit methods, the "office" style of dealing with complaints and petitions, and the practice of verbal replies that makes it impossible for the petitioners to appeal officials' decisions in court. One can agree with the authors of the letters when they say that the very system of dealing with working people's petitions, both in the center and in the localities, is imperfect, and that it is necessary to speed up

putting into law principles and procedures dealing with the organization of work with citizen's written and verbal communications.

Despite many negative phenomena in the economic and social sphere and in interethnic relations, the analysis of the mail shows that the president's rating is still high. The majority of letters addressed to him are constructive and written in a spirit of goodwill, and based on the belief that Russia is capable of getting out of the crisis.

Petrov To Remain Chief of Presidential Administration

924C2432A Moscow KURANTY in Russian 10 Sep 92
pp 4-5

[Interview with Yu.V. Petrov by Anatoliy Karpychev, place and date not given: "Next to the President"]

[Text] His position is unenviable. It is too closely predisposed toward the president. What he said, how he looked—all is recorded, and for this reason this proximity more often results in hostility toward him or the grievance of the service class than understanding or sympathy. He has many "friends." This spring they "let him have it," as they say, and he, Yuriy Vladimirovich Petrov—leader of the administration of the president of Russia—tendered his resignation. "Both civically and in respect to my comrades I did the right thing, I believe," he says in our interview. His adversaries have died away. The president refused to accept the resignation. So Petrov remains next to the president.

The president has known Petrov a long while, since the Sverdlovsk days. Yeltsin left for Moscow, and Petrov took his place in the party obkom [oblast committee]. Yeltsin found himself in disgrace and was kicked out of the Politburo. Petrov—a Yeltsin regular, evidently—found himself ambassador to Cuba. But every cloud has a silver lining, as they say. The diplomatic zigzag in his biography has come in very handy in his present spot—leader of the administration. He became such at the time of last year's August events.

Yeltsin's choice is understandable. He has said repeatedly that he would not care to find himself in the position of Gorbachev, who was betrayed by his associates. Is it hard working with the president? "I inquired of Petrov in the course of our conversation. 'It is very complex working with the president,' he responded. 'He has his own character, as we have also. The fact that we know one another quite well helps. And I try, generally, to work independently as much as possible.'"

He has to do a great deal of work independently—with neither days off nor travel passes. We also met by no means during working hours. Inasmuch as Yu.V. Petrov recently went to Japan for the purpose of preparing for

B.N. Yeltsin's visit, and as serious passions have developed around it, I requested that our discussion begin with the Japanese theme. Of which was there more here: political games and pressure, very tough, what is more, on the Japanese side, or objective factors, realities, as people now like to say. The Japanese, for example, have declared unequivocally that they cannot guarantee the safety of the president's visit. Extremist stunts cannot be ruled out. Such occurred during Petrov's visit to Tokyo even. Some character in a blazing vehicle showed up at the premier's residence 15 minutes prior to Yuriy Vladimirovich's arrival, thereby demonstrating his hostility toward the Russian guest.

"Yes, this happened," my interlocutor said. "The atmosphere in Japan was, indeed, complex. Although the Japanese told me that they would do everything to ensure the safety of the president and the entire delegation. Of which, as you ask, was there more here: political games or the actual situation? There was both, most likely. Various forces are attempting variously to take advantage of the problem of the Kuril Islands—both in our country, incidentally, and in Japan.

"I visited Sakhalin and the Kurils prior to my trip to Japan. Opinions differ there also. But one is predominant, in the main—it is our land, they are our islands. So if we take the problem as a whole, the positions of Russia and Japan are, if not diametrically opposite, very much at odds. They consider these islands theirs, we, ours.

[Karpychev] As far as I know, the problem is being ratcheted up by Japanese politicians, but the business world has a more composed view of it.

[Petrov] It is the politicians who are "at work" first and foremost here, of course. Four small islands for a highly developed country resolving its everyday problems normally are of no fundamental significance. At the same time, taking if only one step forward in a solution of the "northern territories" problem would for politicians mean acquiring great political capital. I cannot rule out the idea that they even postponed the elections scheduled for the middle of the year to a later date, after Yeltsin's visit, for this purpose. Very insistent pressure is coming, to speak plainly, from their side.

True, mention should be made of something else also. The position of the Japanese side is changing somewhat. Whereas earlier it demanded of the Union and then of Russia that it be given back the four islands in full without prior conditions, the talk is now about recognition of the 1956 Declaration, the transfer of two islands, and so forth. And at the same time, while in Tokyo, I heard: The problem needs to be resolved now, during the president's visit. Or one or two steps need to be taken in this direction, at least. We are responding that the president has a five-stage plan.

[Karpychev] Five steps.

[Petrov] Yes, five steps, five stages. The first stage is recognition of the problem. We have taken this step. We

are prepared to examine everything seriously. But it has to be considered, after all, that the new Russia is less than a year old. We have come in for a difficult inheritance. As in any large home, we now have to investigate this inheritance closely and to decide questions one by one.

The second stage of the president's plan is joint development of the islands. They contain quite appreciable mineral stocks. The joint production of fish products or the processing of the red algae, which is excellent source material for very valuable compounds, could be organized, for example. The Japanese do not want this under any circumstances. The third stage is demilitarization of the islands. But we believe that there should be a reciprocal move on the Japanese side. After all, firm trust can only be mutual. Is it good that there are no normal contacts even among the border guards? No, we are not in a state of war, but nor has a peace treaty yet been concluded between our countries, either. For this reason we believe that the question of demilitarization of the islands should be tied in with a particular set of confidence-building measures. We cannot simply abandon everything and leave just like that. We are, in the final analysis, the victors....

[Karpychev] And the owners....

[Petrov] Yes.... And there will be no flight from the Kurils. It should be borne in mind also that the Army today is to a large extent helping the local inhabitants in the solution of many questions, transport included. In addition, there is simply nowhere today for us to withdraw the Army. There are on Sakhalin and the mainland no vacant apartments, schools, or hospitals for an extra number of people. The construction of new bases, on the other hand, will take both time and considerable resources.

[Karpychev] The Japanese are expecting from the visit the return of the Kuril Islands. What are we expecting? It is true, they are saying over and over, In exchange for the islands we will give carte-blanche in cooperation.

[Petrov] We expect more understanding, greater trust. Quite a substantial delegation will be going to Japan. We believe that there will be an exchange of opinions on a wide range of issues, not only on the disputed territorial issue. We will insistently raise the question of an expansion of economic and cultural cooperation and tourist exchange. We would like to discuss also the subject of an easing of what are currently quite stringent visa conditions, between Sakhalin and the island of Hokkaido included. This also would, after all, enable us to travel and mix more and get to know one another better. Unfortunately, we are still, in Japan's public opinion, aggressors. They told me plainly: Despite Japan's neutrality in World War II with respect to the USSR, you attacked us in 1945 and seized the islands. I will not go into history here, who attacked whom—that is not a heavily guarded secret. Our people remember everything also. I would like to be wrong, but, having studied the

history of our relations in sufficient depth and having talked with a wide range of those who have known Japan well and for a long time, I have concluded that it is by no means the islands that are the stumbling block in the development of good-neighbor relations. This question is more complex and multifaceted.

[Karpychev] For the purpose of preparation for the visit you were preceded in Japan by Deputy Premier Poltoranin. What was the reason for so powerful a duo?

[Petrov] Each had his own mission. I was first and foremost to have worked up all the organizational-technical questions. And simultaneously to have conveyed our Russian position to Japan's official leadership. Following Poltoranin's trip, certain questions had in the mass media both in Japan and in Russia been interpreted very airily and freely. It was necessary to dot the i's. I went with particular authority granted me by the president, and I propounded his line.

[Karpychev] Yuriy Vladimirovich, you were formerly in the United States also on a preparation mission. To what, generally, does that amount, in your view?

[Petrov] It is, if I may put it this way, a political saturation of the upcoming talks and meetings. It, in turn, requires an in-depth analysis of problems, facts, and phenomena, and precise evaluations. Thus is a feeling of mutual understanding born. And most importantly—what is it we want to achieve? Why are we setting out on a lengthy journey? Aside from the official, there is also, if we may put it this way, the cognitive aspect of the visit: What, let us suppose, should the president see? While in the United States, I arranged, for example, with my hosts for a trip to a state—it was quite far from the capital, several hours' flying time. We saw there not a model but a real farm. About which we are having much to say currently. In that same state there was a splendid meeting with students of the local university. An ordinary university, not a prestige one, where one speaks with respect, where one simply treads even with respect. The possibility of familiarization with the way of life is very important both for the president and for everyone. There's something else also, you realize? Each minute of the visit has to be packed with political content. Content in general.

[Karpychev] This is how we turn a person into a political robot.

[Petrov] I would say that it is very heavy going during a visit. The president returns from trips literally worn out. He has to work on each speech, he conducts the negotiations—we, for all that, only assist; all the rest is up to him. Trips with the assignment of preparation for a visit afford an opportunity to feel out the situation and to orient the president better. This applies to the trip to Japan and South Korea also. It is with good reason that the people say: It is better to see once than to hear 10 times.

[Karpychev] Describe the trip to South Korea, if you will.

[Petrov] I was there for two days. This country is prepared for full-scale cooperation with us without any prior conditions. And this despite the fact that we have a "dark" period in our history, I refer to the Korean War; but while there, I did not get the feeling that this is in any way keeping us apart. Neither at the political nor the everyday level. When, for example, we stopped for a bite to eat and people learned that we were Russians, from Moscow, it could be seen that the attitude toward us was favorable. They would ask us questions and smile at us with pleasure. South Korea is greatly looking forward to the president's visit. We agreed to conduct a large seminar there, to which more than 50 leaders of industry, representatives of science, and entrepreneurs will come from Russia. It is anticipated that they will find specific partners for themselves, the more so in that we have selected for the trip those who are already working or who want to work with South Korea. Generally, although we are discovering this country for ourselves, the ground for normal cooperation is very good.

[Karpychev] In a word, completing the international part of the questions to you, it may be observed that personal contacts—personal diplomacy, as President Bush calls it—are of great significance.

[Petrov] Undoubtedly. After all, you meet with the people who are today's policy makers. And simultaneously we endeavor to look into the future. And this is very important.

[Karpychev] Yuriy Vladimirovich, which matters do you consider important in the activity of the president's administration?

[Petrov] The main task is to ensure the normal functioning of all the presidential structures.

[Karpychev] And how is this formula to be deciphered? What does it mean?

[Petrov] It means catering for everything—from economic through political questions. The administration incorporates the administrative system of the president and the administrative system of the government. Each of these has its own subdivisions, but there is a whole range of common departments also. The information support office, for example, is engaged in the introduction of computer technology. There is the computer center, which was inherited from the old authorities. We have quite a large clerical service—a tremendous number of documents have to be processed. There is the letters department, which receives 7,000-9,000 letters a week. There is the protocol department, which handles the preparations for visits overseas and to us. This also is part of the administration's function. In addition there is the upkeep of government buildings and installations, which also have the "habit" of aging.

[Karpychev] Some employees of your staff rank your office as political; others consider it economic. What is your opinion, Yuriy Vladimirovich, on this score?

[Petrov] I believe that this is an administrative-political office. There cannot be simply pure politics, here because there is a huge administrative wing, and it is necessary to know, represent, and control it. But the person occupying this office may not be merely an administrator. One way or another, he is a person who works for the president and works with the president. Consequently, he must be able to get his bearings well in the political situation.

[Karpychev] What demands do you make of your staff?

[Petrov] The usual ones. Professional attributes plus a commitment to the president's policy and the reforms.

[Karpychev] If this is so, why are the young people on your staff, as far as I know, grumbling that the influence on the president of the former nomenklatura is increasing? They name you, Skokov, Lobov, and others. Or is this natural: Young people and older people opposed to one another? A spirit of confrontation?

[Petrov] There has always been confrontation among people. But a somewhat simplified view, perhaps, is reflected here, in my opinion.... We have people whom I would call radical democrats. They are demanding the removal from all positions of the party and state apparatus, as they put it. These people simply do not understand that the party-state nomenklatura includes in practice leaders of all ranks and all organizations, industrial enterprises, construction projects, and so forth. When they say that the old partocrats need to be cleared out, it is more or less understandable to whom they refer—this is a smaller group of people. Removal of the party-state nomenklatura is a question of a total change of leadership. I believe that this is a destructive position and would bring to society nothing other than trouble and division. There would be a sharp exacerbation of social tension. I can promise you that. Nonetheless, a constant group of people is going around with this idea, and then you involuntarily wonder: What are they really after? Unity and consolidation in society, about which they are talking, or division and extra tension? Of course we—Petrov and Skokov and Lobov and many others—may be accused of conservatism, of whatever you like. But, after all, at least some grounds are needed for this also.... For the last two or three years I had been, for example, ambassador to Cuba, nobody knew me or the kind of views I brought to the president's team either. For the people with whom I came into contact, for the majority of them, I was an absolute stranger. This in itself guaranteed me a certain rejection. Plus, I will not deny, I have not always, most likely, made the right decisions; they have not pleased everyone.

[Karpychev] I understand that it is impossible to get into this building without a pass, and nonetheless—you admit everyone to the president?

[Petrov] No, of course not. How could I admit everyone?

[Karpychev] I am probably asking a naive question?

[Petrov] It is naive at first sight. Anyone who works in this office, if it is preserved (and it will be, I believe), and also in the office of first assistant of the president, which is currently occupied by Viktor Vasilyevich Ilyushin, anyone, by virtue of his official duties, has to "filter" both the correspondence and people coming to the president.

[Karpychev] Are there many such people?

[Petrov] Very many.

[Karpychev] Government officials, usually?

[Petrov] No, all sorts of people. Administration leaders, ministry and department officials. Each has his own grievance. But I know the president's possibilities, his work schedule, and the procedure of the solution of one question or the other. After all, the tradition of writing to the father-tsar is still alive with us, unfortunately, and the opinion, Let them know "upstairs," they will sort it out, is prevalent. So we investigate, because there is no other approach as yet, and no one has formulated one. Many people come with practicable proposals set forth in 10 pages, but for the president they need to be expounded in five lines. I do not "repel," therefore, but first and foremost advise what needs to be done and how, on the basis of the demands made by the president for the most constructive and rapid solution of the question.

Many proposals which require expert appraisal are received. I forward them to a council of experts or the ministries. The requirement is simple—each question for the report to the president must have been worked up thoroughly and comprehensively.

[Karpychev] I would like to return to your statement about your resignation, although this is in principle a stage which is past. You were, evidently, well and truly plagued at that time to have decided upon such a step⁶

[Petrov] It was a conscious step. Nor, on the other hand, had any of it been fortuitous. A campaign aimed against the partocrats was under way at that time, before the congress. Charges leveled at me followed. They were put to the president repeatedly: Petrov must go. I then thought: The president has to be allowed to work in peace. As far as I was concerned, I reasoned thus: I'll find work. It was a difficult step for me, but I believed that both civically and with respect to my comrades, I was doing the right thing.

[Karpychev] But were you not at that time betraying the president?

[Petrov] Some of those who called me at that time put it that way. Well, not that I was betraying him, perhaps, but they said: You cannot abandon the president. I, on the other hand, believed: He must himself make the final

decision. Having considered each and every thing, he himself had to say "yes" or "no." It was that kind of period. The president did not, as you know, accept my resignation.

[Karpychev] In perfecting the structure of the presidential apparatus, do we have in mind the American model, or are we seeking something of our own with regard for Russian conditions? You are familiar with the American model?

[Petrov] Yes, undoubtedly. I familiarized myself with the activity of the American president's staff especially when I was in the United States. I spoke with the leaders of various services. I was even admitted at that time to the so-called Situation Room. It was the first time that a Russian had been allowed in. We are studying the experience of other countries also. But I would like to say that all this should be borrowed, first, truly, with regard for our traditions and, second, with a view to the future. We are endeavoring to apply here all the most modern methods of administration. The president once said: Our system must be exemplary and work rapidly, precisely, and smoothly. This is what we are trying for, although not everything is coming off as yet, of course.

We have to "work" with the ministries and departments on office management. Why? There has been a great change of personnel everywhere. The old experienced employees have left, sets of instructions have changed, conditions have changed, and some people have eliminated clerical services, that is, there has come to be more demagoguery and less order. We are, therefore, collectively drawing up and correcting sets of instructions and organizing training. At the end of September we will conduct a seminar with those who work with letters and petitions in the ministries and departments. Not with business correspondence, but with the citizens' petitions and complaints.... A very important and difficult sector, but it makes it possible to catch the pulse of life better and get a sharper feel for its problems.

A certain result may now be summed up, evidently. We have succeeded, in the main, in forming the administrative system of the administration and adjusting interaction, if only within our managerial components. Not completely as yet, perhaps, much work lies ahead, but we have already begun to operate under uniform conditions.

[Karpychev] Do you not run the risk of creating more bureaucracy than is necessary?

[Petrov] I do not think so. But the point is that no state can exist without healthy bureaucracy. Bureaucraticism provides for precise and strict compliance with the rules and conditions, which are formulated to ensure that things go better, not worse. Of course, we are not talking about writing sets of instructions for every contingency. That is why we turn to specialists, who can make suggestions and help us.

[Karpychev] Yuriy Vladimirovich, everyone maintains that it will be a "hot" political fall outside here. What are your thoughts in this connection, what do you expect, for what do you hope?

[Petrov] I personally would very much like to avoid social unpleasantness. There will be difficulties, of course. But much will depend on the concerted work of all the power structures: the president and his team, the government, and the Supreme Soviet, and also on how initiative is displayed locally. We are all now operating in accordance with uniform laws, albeit imperfect as yet. But take a look: In one sphere reform-related matters are going quite well, in another, total failure. We may at this time speak about the fact that there has been a certain stabilization in the upper echelons of power here and that the task now is to involve ourselves with these questions "below." That is our job also. I believe that the administration of the president is far from formed as yet. We lack a number of political institutions in the presidential structure, for example. A civil service office is needed. We are forming an information and analysis center. It will deal with an analysis of processes and forecasts thereof, and the tracking of new trends. It will have firm ties to other such centers.

[Karpychev] Your political opponents are afraid of the so-called Boldin syndrome. That is, being next to the president, you could leave him without sufficiently full information. How do you view this?

[Petrov] I believe that those who know our system of work intimately realize that there is nothing to fear here. The point being that the president has a large number of sources of information.

[Karpychev] Seven?

[Petrov] More. I believe. Monthly trips around the country—that is one. Who could restrict what there? Potemkin villages have long since become a thing of the past. The president has always been a strict opponent of the sham. He likes to stop at the most unexpected places. That is in his blood. He would see people on his tour. "Let us stop." Letters—one further source. Analytical memos. Plus the information of the ministries and the Foreign Intelligence Service.

[Karpychev] You should add domestic sources of information.

[Petrov] Yes, he obtains information at home also, like all of us. And then take the schedule of his working day—up to six to eight meetings. I have said repeatedly that the problem today is not that there is not enough information, but that there is a great deal of it. But inasmuch as the president himself has determined the sources of information, we precisely comply with his demands. So people need have no fear—the president is getting full information.

The interview draws to a close. Yuriy Vladimirovich asks for other questions; he is prepared to answer them.

candidly, but... it is time to display moderation. On behalf of its readers, some of whose questions made up the basis of the interview, KURANTY thanks the leader of the administration of the president.

Filatov-Khasbulatov Alliance Said Over

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20-27 Sep 92 p 6

[Interview with Sergei Filatov, First Vice-Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, by Lyudmila Telen]

[Text] "A permanent member of the Security Council, Filatov is unlikely to have an independent political status. His style is of team performance, currently under Ruslan Khasbulatov's leadership." This is quoted from a July issue of MOSCOW NEWS. Hardly have two months passed when this assessment has proved to be obsolete or maybe even fallacious from the very beginning. On the eve of the autumn session of the Supreme Soviet, Sergei Filatov came forward with sharp criticism addressed to Khasbulatov. He virtually supported those democratic groups in parliament which posed the question about the need for the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet to resign.

[Telen] You have come into a direct conflict with the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and this took many by surprise. Before, you have avoided open political struggles, even with your ideological opponents, and all of a sudden you have become a party to a stiff, almost uncompromising, confrontation.

[Filatov] Regrettably, it was no longer possible to avoid this.

[Telen] But your differences with Khasbulatov came to light literally in the past ten days. Prior to this you seemed to have been allies.

[Filatov] In the main, we were allies. But differences cropped up earlier. However, at first I ascribed everything to the chairman's difficult character and overstated self-appraisal. It didn't seem to me that our contradictions would acquire a principled nature. I can quite accurately point to the time after which they started mounting—the 6th Congress of Russian People's Deputies. It is then, if you remember, that the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet headed the attack against the government. Moreover, he did all he could to foil the compromise between the executive and legislative branches. An intense search for mutually acceptable solutions was under way, but the speaker would dash them with one tactless rejoinder. Moreover, we, his deputies, found ourselves in a dubious position. Sitting on the presidium next to Khasbulatov, we kind of played the same hand with him. You can imagine how we felt. Things went to such lengths that the three of us had to meet with the President and explain our stand to him. Before the 6th Congress Yeltsin considered us—and rightly so—to be a close-knit team of like-minded colleagues. "What a team

you are, I really envy you," he would say. Now, however, we had to tell him bluntly: "Regrettably, we are not one team any longer."

[Telen] You have a reputation as a balanced and restrained person. But at that moment you for some reason chose to appeal straight to Yeltsin. Wasn't it more useful first to talk to Khasbulatov himself? Possibly in this case you would have been able not to bring contradictions to the point of an uncompromising conflict....

[Filatov] Do you really think that we went to Yeltsin behind Khasbulatov's back? Of course not. We made repeated attempts to change his tactics at the Congress.

[Telen] But the Congress still ended with a note reconciling all and sundry and you decided not to make your inner differences public. Don't you consider this to be your error? After all, you not only jeopardized your own reputation but also enabled the chairman to assert himself, believing that you would not confront him openly. Consequently, his position would be firm as before under any circumstances.

[Filatov] For a long time I believed that these contradictions could be settled peacefully. I was trying to do this and I do not regret it. I never kept silent when I disagreed with the Chairman. For a while we really managed to reach mutual understanding, and I felt I was able to influence one decision or another. This made possible the Supreme Soviet's balanced, constructive work while evading open confrontation. But then came the 6th Congress, after it there was the conflict with IZVESTIA in which I could not act as Khasbulatov's ally.

That was when confrontation between Ruslan Khasbulatov and Sergei Filatov came into the open. This happened after the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet issued an instruction on the redistribution of duties among his deputies. Filatov was stripped of many legitimate powers. The patently insulting character of this act was not particularly hidden. A day before it was made public the speaker, failing to contain himself, threatened that he would turn his first deputy into a junior one. And he was not slow in carrying out his threat.

[Telen] There are some who tie today's conflict with the personal insult that Khasbulatov's instruction contained.

[Filatov] Insult? Indeed, the resolution was insulting in both form and content. All the more so since everyone knew that its author was the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet himself. But the point is not, of course, about personal abuses. After all, we had our first sharp discussion the day before this document appeared and on account of the previous one. The question involved an instruction that turned Khasbulatov into the sole manager of the Supreme Soviet's material resources, premises, business missions abroad... Is there a need to explain what this will lead to? So at that time I told him exactly this: "You have upset the balance of power on which the parliament's normal work was predicated and

openly demonstrated that you are out for an alliance with the right. If this is so, we shall have to act accordingly." There was no doubt that the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet deliberately intended to reestablish the administrative system in parliament, not even stopping at breaking the law. He might even have deliberately demonstrated his scorn for the very essence of our claims. For example, I received from him the text of the resolution on the redistribution of duties, amended after the presidium meeting, with the following brief note on it: "Sergei Alexandrovich, as you see, your proposals and requests have been fulfilled 101 per cent. Solely for the sake of the interests of the job, my instructions not being at variance with the Constitution."

Until recently Sergei Filatov steered clear of the factions struggling to influence Yeltsin. Joining—in line with his convictions—the democratic wing of the deputies, Filatov kept aloof from factional strife. As a rule, he avoided making political declarations or taking part in street actions. His focus is strictly parliamentary work. Not only by virtue of his personality, but also because of principle, he has never laid claim to the part of "the Supreme Soviet's leadership," preferring the duties of coordinator and organizer of its activities.

[Telen] In recent days your name has been increasingly mentioned with that of the Secretary of State. Don't you fear being drawn into the old rivalry between Burbulis and Khasbulatov for political influence on the President?

[Filatov] Definite tensions do exist between these two persons, which is probably not a secret to anyone. As far as I am concerned, I have maintained, and continue to maintain, businesslike relations with both, though I must admit that the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet was pretty sensitive about my contacts with the Secretary of State.

[Telen] What was your response?

[Filatov] I simply explained that our contacts had been prompted by the interests of the job.

[Telen] You are speaking about the interests of the job, but perhaps it is exactly in the interest of the job not to aggravate the conflict in parliament—otherwise it may become paralyzed, or do you believe that the price is worth it for the Chairman to resign?

[Filatov] The danger you are speaking about really exists. But now let me ask you a question. Will the Supreme Soviet's activities be productive if the speaker continues breaking the laws and scorning the Constitution? It stands to reason that, given this turn of events, parliament will inevitably turn from a stabilizing body of authority into a source of social tensions. The right will use the rift in the Supreme Soviet's leadership and try to deflect the course chosen by the President and the government. You must understand that the question is not about inner parliamentary problems, but about the destiny of the reform. In the coming month we will have

to approve the adjusted economic programme, looming ahead is the new Constitution—not to mention the dozens of major bills that must be adopted for reform to be sustained.

[Telen] But a revolution in parliament will not simplify the situation....

[Filatov] I agree. That is why I take exception to extremist, radical actions.

[Telen] So does at least some constructive alternative exist?

[Filatov] As I see it, the only alternative is to make the Supreme Soviet workable. But on the other hand, it is absolutely impermissible to overlook the violation of legality, which are equally dangerous for the left and for the right and for those who hold positions in the Centre. Perhaps it is advisable not only to criticize these violations in parliament, but also make them known to the public at large. As we all know, the coalition reformers and some other parliamentary groups intend to call the Chairman to account and discuss the presidium's work.

[Telen] Do you believe that this pressure will make Ruslan Khasbulatov act differently and the question of his resignation will thus become moot?

[Filatov] Time will tell....

[Telen] But you must know that Khasbulatov has supporters among the deputies.

[Filatov] And his support is strong indeed. Out of political considerations, some of the deputies on the right have already come out in support of the chairman. On the day after my speech at the council of parliamentary groups their spokesmen said bluntly: "Ruslan Imranovich, if an attack has been launched against you, we shall be with you." And besides, the Chairman's apparatus, which is getting an ever greater share of authority, is a great danger. As far as I can understand, many papers pass from my desk onto Khasbulatov's. And the other day things went so far that the Committee on Mass Media was not permitted to copy a number of documents.

[Telen] All the indicators are that you are entering a period of struggle that may be both long and difficult. Doesn't this prospect worry you.

[Filatov] Yes, it does, as in the case of any normal person who wants to work calmly and productively, instead of grappling with difficulties.

[Boxed item]

MN File

Sergei Filatov, 56, is a graduate of the Moscow Institute of Power Engineering. Beginning in 1955, he worked at the Hammer and Sickle Works, where he was elected secretary of the local Komsomol organization. From 1969 until his election as a people's deputy of Russia, he

held different posts, ranging from chief engineer of a project to department head at the Tselikov All-Union Research Institute of Metallurgical Engineering. From January to November 1991 he was Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Russia. He is a Candidate of Science (Engineering) and a USSR State Prize winner in engineering.

[End boxed item]

Khasbulatov Performance Reviewed

Efforts Critized

924C24804 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 40, 30 Sep 92 p 11

[Article by Pavel Gutiontov under the general heading "Portrait of the Speaker in the Russian Interior": "What Lukyanov Could Not Manage, Khasbulatov Has Accomplished"]

[Text] In November 1905, an instructive year for Russia, Klyuchevskiy recorded in his diary the sorry observation concerning the proceedings of the Assembly of the Land: "Everyone wants to have his say, and each to convince himself of his own thoughts. So everyone is looking for himself and assembling his own confused thoughts. And although all are frightened by the general maelstrom, each thirsts only for self-satisfaction. One thing is clear: Everyone wants to master a constitutionally bold style in order to save himself the trouble of mastering constitutionally free manners."

Well, things have simply not improved, probably, in Russia since the start of the century as regards constitutionally free manners. As, however, for boldness of style, even our old constitutional process predecessors have something to learn here. In any event, the sole form of constitutional existence mastered by our deputies as yet, alas, is the head-punching street brawl. Russia had already experienced this, for that matter: The comparisons are right there on the surface—even PRAVDA, mocking what is happening at the Russian Congress, once recalled how the "most well-bred Purishkevich" tossed a glass at the "most educated Milyukov" for a crooked smirk which the latter had permitted himself during the former's speech. We will leave without comment the odd epithet which the newspaper employed in respect to the leader of the then extreme right, who is renowned in our history by no means for his breeding. But the avowed desire of entirely particular forces to confirm public opinion in the impression being created in it that democracy is, truly, merely an arena for tossing glasses—this desire may be discerned clearly today.

Tossing glasses is a most interesting occupation. It engrosses the participants (sometimes forever) and entertains the spectators (for a certain time). But when the entire service is smashed, and the fragments have to be swept up, there inevitably comes a moment when the participants in the process suddenly recall the empty shelves of the dishware stores.

This was what, in fact, Ruslan Imranovich Khasbulatov did when, in the winter of 1992, he visited the city of Ryazan, where he learned much that was of interest to himself. And drew the surprising conclusion that his compatriots were, apparently, living by no means as well as he, the speaker of parliament, encumbered, in addition to all else, by the title of economics professor, might have supposed. He has to be given his due. The professor-speaker was not of a mind to hang on to no purpose to the knowledge he had acquired in Ryazan. He thereupon met with a delegation of Italian senators, to whom he communicated the information about the price of sausage which he had just obtained and promised to immediately dismiss the Gaydar government. The assessments which Ruslan Imranovich made here of Yegor Timurovich's team greatly embarrassed the guests and confirmed in the eyes of the national, more accustomed public primarily Khasbulatov's firm reputation as a southern-style unbridled individual (first) and also (second) his increasingly manifest desire to perform an independent role in Russian politics.

Khasbulatov subsequently assiduously reinforced his new image, and however strange, what is more, once again made his second scandalous attack on his unloved government via the Italians, who, by all accounts, are henceforward fated to be the relayer of the most cherished ideas of the head of the Russian parliament. During the Sixth Russian Congress Khasbulatov's confessions became known to the newspaper LA REPUBBLICA; in these the economist-speaker termed the economist-ministers "worms" and declared First Deputy Premier Gaydar unfit even to meet with him ("let my assistant speak with him"). Reading the interview, spiteful critics, of whom more and more are gathering around Khasbulatov, immediately began to pester him with all kinds of foolish questions, to which the speaker replied with dignity that he knew nothing of any LA REPUBBLICA but graciously consented to consider there to be an Italy as such. Hereupon the people from LA REPUBBLICA took great offense and made available to those who wished to hear it a tape recording of the conversation about "worms," and it is greatly to be regretted that Ruslan Imranovich for some reason or other declined to participate in a continuation of the discussion....

The former head of a department of the Plekhanov Institute has, generally, always been distinguished by higher-than-usual vulnerability and a very jealous attitude toward the successes of his colleagues (or simply greater renown than he has had even). I recall being astonished by his statement in March 1991 at the time of a Soviet-American seminar. Presenting a paper, Khasbulatov, first, commented on the "500 days" program (which had long since been ruined) in the sense that: a) it had been written at a level of demands much lower than those which he, Khasbulatov, made of the degree work of his students; and b) its main ideas had been copied from his, Khasbulatov's, works. Such that it was unclear whether to regard Yavlinskii as an impudent plagiarist

who had read some good booklets or, on the contrary, a poor bastard deprived of an opportunity to read such books.

Now (after the speaker's unexpected election as corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences) journalists recalled that "if we are speaking of the level of Ruslan Khasbulatov's economic erudition, the opinions of his colleagues vary within the range of one postulate: No one considers him an outstanding specialist." Then, in the spring of 1991, however, times were different and not conducive to an investigation into the nuances of the biographies and characters of Russian leaders. Their confrontation with the Union authorities had acquired an increasingly dramatic coloration, and the sympathies of the democratic camp were firmly retained by Yeltsin. It was at that time, in March, that Khasbulatov emphatically took the part of Boris Nikolayevich and, leaning on his shoulder, he was able to crush the parliamentary opposition of the rest of his deputies. Ruslan Imranovich rapidly scored points, and what now everyone sees more clearly as unconcealed boorishness and lack of discipline, many people consented to consider a distinctively displayed sense of humor. And when Yeltsin's place of chairman of the Supreme Soviet fell vacant, and Khasbulatov was still unable to overcome his sole opponent—Baburin—the public at large was not alerted but incensed (or depressed) at the democrats' inability to reach accord around the sole possible (as it then seemed) candidate.

And then came the putsch, which was, I am convinced, the pinnacle of the political career of the speaker (still "acting" at that time) of parliament. In any event, the celebrated appeal "To the Citizens of Russia," with which, in fact, the resistance to the Emergency Committee-ites commenced, had been written by the hand of the "loyal Ruslan."

But when the victors embarked on a shareout of the spoils, it transpired that his share due to him, that of chairman of the Supreme Soviet, was manifestly not suitable for him. His position in the structures of the new authorities was complicated all the more by a number of exclusively personal circumstances also. Not all deputies cared for his style of publicly calling them "Volodka" and "Petka" (it is only in connection with criticism leveled at HIM that Ruslan Imranovich says: "I don't like it when the exponents of supreme power are criticized, as if being patted on the shoulder from time to time, as if they were ordinary passers-by"). Unwilling to hang onto the words of Ruslan Imranovich and put up with his whims, the press put up resistance (nor, for that matter, does the former spare the journalists and is reluctant even to see any differences between them. "For me these newspapers—be it DEN, KURANTY, or NEZAVISIMAYA—are equally destructive," Ruslan Imranovich once announced. And suggested: "Let us ultimately close down several papers: We are short of paper as it is..."). And then in addition Chechnya adopted the decision to recall its deputies from the Russian parliament (strictly speaking, Russia also did

the same in respect to its Union deputies), and Ruslan Imranovich was forced to portray matters such that precisely nothing had happened—merely the slight sound of the wind in the tree-tops. In just the same way that the speaker left without comment the less-than-handsome business of his move to quiet Shusev Street—to the apartment formerly fitted out for L.I. Brezhnev. The speaker's claims to hundreds of meters of living space require, in my view, some justification. Then the culmination of his career in any civilized parliament would inevitably have to have been the anti-Chechnya action carried out on Ruslan Imranovich's personal instructions. Not having forgiven his fellow countrymen their insult, Khasbulatov did not disdain (he does not, I repeat, meet with Gaydar—the latter is not of sufficiently high rank) to assemble in his office in the White House directors of the capital's hotels and order them (on pain of immediate dismissal) within 24 hours to have freed up rooms occupied by persons of Chechen nationality. World parliamentary practice had not hitherto encountered such experience, and the Human Rights Committee demanded that the issue of removal of the chairman from office be raised at the session. But for some reason or other his case was not even brought to the point of discussion.

Perhaps it was for this reason, incidentally, that far from everyone correctly understood either the decision of Valentin Stepankov, procurator general of Russia, to issue the speaker card No. 1 of honorary employee of the Russian Public Procurator's Office. There were compelling grounds for this—Ruslan Imranovich began his career, apparently, as a trainee investigator. The presentation of the ID coincided in time with the action brought against the speaker on the part of the newspaper IZVESTIYA, which had taken offense at the baseless opinions of it expressed by Khasbulatov.

The titled lawyer did not, for that matter, show up in court but, as is well known, made a number of efforts to respond to the newspaper, which had overstepped the mark, in a different way. It was cleverly suggested to us here that the attempt to restore to IZVESTIYA its official status of "newspaper of the representative bodies of all levels" be considered a restoration of historical justice virtually. But only PRAVDA, DEN, and GLASNOST have as yet supported parliament's disgraceful decision. The latter, specifically, observed in laudatory fashion: "What Lukyanov could not manage, Khasbulatov has accomplished."

On which I separately congratulate him also.

But these are just trifling matters.

For "were all the top officials to infringe only what I infringe, we would already have full communism"—this, according to MEGAPOLIS-EKSPRESS, is what Ruslan Khasbulatov announced at the end of May 1992. He had been prompted to this instance of candor, the newspaper claims, by a group of deputies which had proposed the creation of a special commission "for defense of the

honor and dignity" of its speaker. The sponsors had volunteered to check the objectivity of the mass media, which had in recent months been spreading much information discrediting Khasbulatov, namely: flagrant flouting of human rights, abuse of state rubles and dollars, exceeding his authority, personal immodesty, and sundry nonsense.

Ruslan Imranovich did not accept the assistance and categorically rejected the services of the self-styled advocates, "preferring," as a scathing journalist wrote, "journalistic slander to a parliamentary inquiry."

After which he deprived his deputy, Filatov, of his powers, concluded the Cheboksary truce with Yeltsin, and opened the latest session, in the course of which, it is anticipated, he will try to take the office of prime minister.

Because he has done all that he can on the parliamentary path.

Achievements Credited

924C2480B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 40, 30 Sep 92 p 11

[Article by Leonid Radzikhovskiy under the general heading "Portrait of the Speaker in the Russian Interior": "Vivat Ruslan Imranovich!"]

[Text] Plato is no my friend of mine.... But the truth is that he is firmly in his place, he will not, in any event, leave it. And, in addition, the truth is that he is the right person in this place, and it is very good that he occupies it, and it would be very bad were he to leave. Good, bad—from which viewpoint? Not from the moral, not from the ethical, not from the aesthetic. From the pragmatic.

With what pleasure I wrote about him six months ago in the article "Khasbulatism." The title indicates clearly what the article was about. Yes—I dare to say it—I unburdened my heart there and expressed as much as I was able of "a heart of sorrowful signs" and "a mind of cold observations." There still lay on Khasbulatov at that time some romantic haze, which had been created, incidentally, by the journalists themselves in 1990-1991. We invented Khasbulatov—a knight intrepid and unblemished—and, as is the custom, we enthusiastically and joyfully "stamped on" the honorable speaker for the fact that the image we had created had nothing in common with reality. The myth had one way or another to be dispelled, for that matter. Listening to Khasbulatov's pronouncements and reading about the ever increasing "quandaries" connected with him, the poor devil of a reader would pinch his arm: "I am not sleeping, am I? Is this he, 'that same' Khasbulatov? And the press explained without a twinge of embarrassment—yes, the very same, only he was always this way, he was always a Dr. Hyde whom we mistook for a Mr. Jekyll.

We no longer wish to be friends with him, to admire him even less. And what follows from this?

What could follow is a general negative precept, where any action of an unlikely character is perceived in advance with a venomous or hateful grin. Sometimes this position is perfectly sensible—when there is a replacement, when this politician is past his prime and just one thing is required of him—that he leave the branch as quickly as possible and fall to earth as gently as possible, onto the common pile of the same leaves past their prime just like him. And sometimes this position is infantile—if there is no replacement for the given politician, if he is, for all that, necessary.

We have here come to the key word in an understanding of the "Khasbulatov problem." Politician. Not thinker, not man, not preacher—politician.

Everyone will recall the celebrated "England has no permanent enemies or permanent friends, it only has permanent interests." Only England? Are things otherwise with us?

Russia needs many things at this time: distribution of land to the peasants and an extension of the reforms and new deputies since the old ones have lagged a whole era behind the times. But first and foremost Russia needs to look around itself—at Tajikistan, Georgia, and Moldavia—and, on its knees, to thank the Lord for one thing: for the fact that civil peace has been preserved in Russia. Peace—it is fragile and false and even, as Vladimir Ilich, would say, "obscene." Obscene-ultra-obscene: fat nomenklatura toms in an embrace with democratic cats licking up the cream, waving the people aside with their tails and gurgling from time to time that all that they are doing, they are doing in the name and for the good of the Russian citizen. But this is peace. And peace is maintained not by a "struggle for peace" but by the preservation of a balance of social and political forces.

Should parliament be replaced? Oh, that would be good! Only at what kind of price? At a price of the use of force? Just look at our neighbors... Now, do you see? So, not by force, right? Right. Any other way? It would be good for the people to take part in a referendum and vote for new elections, and then turn out for these elections? Gee, it sounds good! Let us, by the way, recall the recent elections in Moscow Oblast. Travkin, Prokhanov, Makashov, Chernichenko visited one constituency... How many voters turned out? I do not remember exactly, either 20 percent or 25 percent, perhaps... We are left with the final option: Let parliament "realize" and dissolve itself. Ooh, how wonderful this would be! But one wonders: What if the deputies are unwilling to give up their seats ahead of time?

There remains, consequently, parliament—the same one, with the same deputies. And they with great difficulty opted in the past between Baburin and Khasbulatov for Khasbulatov. But since that time "cunning Ruslan" has strengthened his positions to such an extent that a tank could not now shift him from the chairman's

seat. Each people deserves its ruler, and this parliament more than deserves its speaker. The normal deputy feels himself subordinate to his speaker-superior and behaves accordingly. Nor does the chairman detach himself from his collective and, while endeavoring to maintain normal relations with the "left," manifestly prefers the "right," proceeding only from one thing—a balance of forces.

Both the Supreme Soviet and its chairman are an objective reality specific to us in our perceptions. No one can now change it. There is also another reality—the president and the cabinet of ministers. Could parliament change this reality?

Yes, it could. As soon as a law on the government is finally enacted, as soon as the special powers of the president are terminated. Our constitution of today is not the constitution of a presidential republic. It is the ineffectual, hypocritical constitution of a "Soviet" sham republic, behind the back of which the CPSU ruled. The CPSU is no more, the constitution remains, and no one will revise it in the coming months, not even Oleg Rumyantsev himself. And in terms of this very bad constitution the position of both the president and the cabinet is weak and subordinate to parliament.

Tolstoy writes that Vronskiy "responded... smiling with his eyes only and twirling the ends of his moustache, so cautiously, as though, after the order in which his affairs had been put, any too bold and rapid a movement could destroy it." Yeltsin does not, as is well known, have a moustache but he also so cautiously twirled the ends of his nonexistent moustache in Cheboksary—I will guarantee you the preservation of parliament and the soviets, and you will not conduct new elections for the heads of the authorities locally. Yes, a fragile balance... It is necessary today to attempt to preserve primarily the cabinet. To say nothing of the competence of Gaydar's team, there is simply no time and there are no forces for a ministerial crisis "Italian-style," when the formation of a new cabinet takes several months (and how would you form it otherwise, given these elector-deputies? They would move against Gaydar in single formation and would fight for the juicy ministerial portfolios—yes, of course they are juicy!—separately, would fight fiercely!). Nor are any arguments necessary here: Simply imagine for a moment this picture, today's Russia without ministers, but, on the other hand, with ministerial functionaries locally! When the new ministers arrived, the ministries would, most likely, be gnawed and chewed so clean that cleaners would not be necessary.

So it is necessary for the salvation of this country (for the salvation, if it is more comprehensible to some people this way, of their trough) to preserve if only for some length of time the cabinet. Yeltsin understands this. Khasbulatov does also, I believe. He has had many interesting things to say about the "boys," but currently the preservation of the "boys" depends more on him than anyone else.

Khasbulatov needs stability: he is sitting too high. A wobbling of the ground, and he could fall together with the entire system, and very painfully. He is playing a double game, of course, as he is supposed to do: He is with a venomous smile "defending the cabinet." So of what is there more there—the venomous smile or, for all that, defense?

The venomous smile makes it known to the implacable-toward-commonsense-opposition: I am with you, the defense of these "boys" is just a game, a comedy. And the speaker's past and his tender affection for the cabinet proves this, it would seem. But that Khasbulatov (despite his undoubted rancorous nature!) has no eternal enemies, eternal friends even less (eternal Baburin-friends still less!), but only his own eternal interests—of this I have no doubt. And today the interest of preservation of his position and his authority has to be telling Khasbulatov that it is necessary to support the "status quo" with might and main. The democrats in the Supreme Soviet are too weak to be a danger to Ruslan Imranovich. They create for him alibis in the eyes of the "national patriots," attacking him and demanding his resignation—thanks to them for this! The more sharply they attack, conscientiously enumerating how many times the honorable speaker has "sinned against the truth" (this is what it is called, I believe), the more they strengthen his position. So the rear services within his Supreme Soviet are as of today strong, it would seem. There remains part two of the task: consolidating the position of the Supreme Soviet itself. And for this he should not go too far. Bringing down the government today, overturning the entire political system, and entering an "instability zone" would be too disadvantageous for Khasbulatov. He occupies too good a position on the Russian Olympus to make this Olympus a Vesuvius.

So here, it seems to me, the interests of Khasbulatov, who is profoundly not to my liking personally (I hope that this does not upset him unduly), coincide with the objective interest of everyone who lives in Russia: a breathing space, compromise, bad peace... And if to preserve peace Khasbulatov needs to show in every possible way that he is "preparing for war" with the government—all well and good. And if to preserve a bad peace the democrats need to show that they are "challenging" the speaker—splendid. Everything which works to maintain if only some stability is all to the good. If for the sake of this tomorrow the democrats and Baburin need to kiss one another, they will (if the "patriots" have the sense not to behave as ill-bred juveniles). But things have not come to this today, it would seem, today the defender of stability is "true-to-his-own-interests Ruslan," who is maneuvering relentlessly.

Russia does not have eternal friends, eternal enemies, or even eternal speakers of parliament. It has only an eternal interest—that of civil peace. And if today Khasbulatov is helping preserve this peace—vivat Khasbulatov!

Political Parties Gear-Up for Fall Season

924C2483B Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
29 Sep 92 p 1

[Article by Lyubov Tsukanova under the rubric "In Society": "Some Sow Ideas, Others Reap the Fruits: Social and Political Life Has Its Own Work Calendar"]

[Text] According to this calendar fall is not the fall but just the opposite—spring. Politicians are waking up from the summer "hibernation," warming up their muscles, and testing their vocal chords. The opening of the season is logically tied to the start of the session of the Supreme Soviet, and it is understandable that in the last two weeks not only the main political forces in parliament but also prominent parties and social movements have given voice. The "Civil Union" actively presented a political declaration. The RDDR [Russian Movement for Democratic Reform], the Republican Party of Russia, and the Socialist Labor Party have held briefings and press conferences. The regular congress of Kadets (KDP-PNS) [Constitutional-Democratic Party-People's Freedom Party] and the plenum of "Democratic Russia" have passed.

The first and logical question after a lengthy pause is: what is new? The second, and equally interesting one is: what is old?

The "Civil Union" [GS] prepared most of what is new, judging from everything. First is an anticrisis program with a concrete economic mechanism for its realization which the GS intends to "put on the president's table" in the coming days. The GS, which considers itself not the opposition but a "normal political movement which acts from positions of radical reform" (A. Rutskoy's words), has candidates who are prepared to replace "certain" members of the present cabinet—in the opinion of N. Travkin, chairman of the DPR [Democratic Party of Russia], Burbulis, Chubays, Nechayev, and Kozyrev should leave. The names of the contenders from the GS for seats in the Government remain a secret, but there are unlikely to be any surprises here. Just as, incidentally, there are unlikely to be in the program itself, the essence of which, to judge from the last statement of Aleksandr Vladislavlev in NG [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA], is state support of enterprises of the military-industrial complex. The "Civil Union" acquiring an ally in parliament can most likely be considered more significant news: the "Democratic Center" bloc (the "Left Center," the "Nonparty Deputies," and "Free Russia") joined the "Change-New Politics" faction, which even before shared the GS's ideas. As was said at the press conference, "There is a proposal" from the "Workers' Union" too. Thus the "Civil Union" has acquired a strong lever of influence in parliament, which is already apparent in its blocking of extreme decisions during the session's first days. p73

The GS program is 90-percent coincident with the program of the Socialist Workers' Party, or at least that is what party co-chairman I. Rybkin announced. Members

of this party make up two-thirds of the parliamentary faction "Communists of Russia." If it is taken into account that the "Communists of Russia" are members of the opposition bloc "Russian Unity," which is trying to achieve the resignation of the Government and the impeachment of the president, it may be assumed that it is precisely this question which accounts for the 10-percent "disparity" with the GS. But the SPT [Socialist Workers' Party] recently announced that it did not intend "to topple the leaders." Does that mean that there is no unity in "Russian Unity" or are the SPT leaders deceiving us when they say that they do not support the "slapdash political discord" in parliament? In any case the socialists recently assured journalists that they are abandoning the Bolshevik principle, "The worse things get, the better it is," and intend to cooperate with the Government, proposing their own variants for resolving complex questions. In light of that they are for the "decisive reorganization" of the cabinet and its reinforcement with "professionals of the highest class."

The Kadets, whose congress was at the end of last week, are also against the principle "The worse things get, the better it is," although they are more radically inclined than the socialists—they advocate the resignation of the president and the Government, since they approve neither the economic policy nor the foreign policy being conducted by this cabinet. That is the old stuff, so to speak. What is new in the party's policy is the idea of a provisional government together with the idea of a Constitutional Assembly. The program is risky, to put it mildly, if certain historical parallels are carried through. Or is the KDP-PNS counting on being the one which is able, at the height of the chaos, to pronounce the cherished phrase, "There is such a party"?

Among the new old ideas which have surfaced in recent days is not only the Constitutional Assembly (there is talk of that in the Russian Movement for Democratic Reform) but also a referendum on the question of private ownership of land. Three sociopolitical organizations are prepared right away to start a campaign for it—the Republican Party of Russia, the RDDR, and "Democratic Russia." The fate of the two preceding referendums which opposing political forces fought for (one, provisionally speaking, was for a presidential republic and the other for the recall of the president) is unknown to the public. Either the necessary number of votes could not be gathered or the initiators sounded the retreat based on political circumstances. It is not ruled out that the referendum on private ownership of land will suffer the same fate. Incidentally, this plebiscite may have a "mate" too—the association of communists (CPSU of S. Skvortsov) intends to initiate a referendum on abolishing free prices. Despite the fact that these two planned nation-wide polls are substantially more concrete and "closer to the body" than the previous ones, there is still no certainty that the Russians will show interest in them. All the other actions of the political parties and movements calculated for the participation of the masses are also problematical. So stability in society nowadays

depends precisely on the executive power and on whether it can and wants to expand these citizen opportunities for self-determination in all spheres of life or, under pressure from the right and the left, will reduce them to nothing.

Rumyantsev Forced Out of SDPR Leadership

924C2464A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 23 Sep 92 p 2

[Unattributed article: "Rumyantsev Expelled"]

[Text] A plenary session of the SDPR [Social Democratic Party of the Russian Federation] Board has adopted a decision to expel Oleg Rumyantsev from the party leadership. The presumed motive is a struggle among a group of people to preserve their own leading positions in the party.

In this connection, a statement signed by members of the board and "rank and file party members" has been distributed within the SDPR. It asserts, among other things, that the "adopted decision could cause the party's subsequent collapse... It is shortsighted to assume that by expelling Oleg Rumyantsev from the party leadership, it will be possible to deprive him of authority in the SDPR."

Kadets, Economic Freedom Party Announce Alliance

924C2464B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 23 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Yuliya Berezovskaya: "Kadets (Zolotarev's) Join Forces With Borovoy"]

[Text] Viktor Zolotarev's Constitutional Democrats Party [CDP] held a press conference and press cocktail party on Monday. Journalists were informed of a pending alliance between the CDP and Konstantin Borovoy's Economic Freedom Party [EFP]. Viktor Zolotarev said that the two liberal parties, although they have different histories, memberships, degrees of influence, and material capabilities, nonetheless have programs that substantially coincide, and this has allowed them to begin an organizational convergence. The CDP, which has nearly 600 active members in Russia, will become an autonomous part of the EFP. The new form of unity, which is closer than the usual political bloc, does not mean, however, that the parties are merging. The CDP will maintain its status as a juridical person. A mechanism for dual membership will be devised, and joint supreme bodies are to be created.

The CDP sees Borovoy's party as a center for the consolidation of liberal political forces. In predicting the outcome of the next parliamentary elections, the Kadets have no doubt that the Civic Alliance will win, and that second place will go to the coalition of liberal parties. As for subsequent elections, in the opinion of the CDP's

theoreticians, by that time society will have matured for liberal ideas, and consistent liberals have every chance of winning first place.

Future of Communist Parties Examined

924C2456A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 5 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Anna Ostapchuk: "There Is No One Left To Defend the CPSU: The Communists' Attorneys Are Preoccupied With the Revival of the Russian Communist Party"]

[Text] The defenders of the Communist Party in the Constitutional Court are no longer discussing the revival of the CPSU. Two of their open letters to the president of the Russian Federation, requesting the suspension of the well-known ukases, effectively propose the reconstitution of the Communist Party of Russia, the establishment of which was cut short by the events in August.

The Communists argue that the Communist Party of Russia was not registered and therefore could not have been banned. By the same token, according to the authors of the letters, it did not have time to commit any sins against the Russian leadership. They cite procuracy reports of the absence of any evidence that the Russian party structures tried to sabotage the president's July ukase "evicting" the party committees from enterprises and establishments. During the August events, committees supporting the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] were set up in some regions—"with some participation by party organs or specific officials"—but they never took any actual steps, and therefore "all of the criminal proceedings against them were dismissed for lack of evidence"; between August and November "no Russian procurator responding to the inquiries of people's deputies could report a single incident of unlawful activity by the party structures." Therefore, in the first place, the Russian Communist Party did not even exist when the ukases were published and, in the second place, as far as Yeltsin is concerned, "it is innocent of any wrongdoing."

We have to remember that much of the legal and organizational work in defense of Communist petitions in the Constitutional Court today is being performed by the "godfathers" of the Russian Communist Party: the people who came up with the ideas for its program and charter last year, organized the plenum, and made the arrangements for the congress. Ivan Osadchiy, the head of a group of Communist experts who was once a member of the organizing committee of the Russian Communist Party, had this to say: "We were working behind the Politburo's back, and some Central Committee secretaries were terrified of getting into a fight with Gorbachev, who, it seemed to them, was 'protecting' the Communist Party. Actually, they changed their minds often. Sometimes they would ask me in confidence: 'Well, you people must be planning something anyway...?' In any case, the Central Committee plenum

of the RSFSR Communist Party was held under the influence of the prevailing tendency toward the establishment of Russian governmental and public institutions, and the preparations for a special congress began."

The revival of the CPSU, Osadchiy believes, is impossible now "for territorial and political reasons: When we gathered at the conference of representatives of communist and socialist parties in August, our comrades from other republics had this request: 'Please do not mention our names in any document on united action. Otherwise, we will be banned at home.'"

Besides this, the completely unauthorized groups enlisting support for the restoration of the CPSU and the organization of general party congresses are playing a destructive role. There are already four of them, and soon there will be more. Their "popularity" is attested to by communist folklore: Because one of the "CPSU's" is "headed" by "Coordinating Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee" Sergey Skvortsov, the CPSU is also known here as the "Communist Party of Sergey Skvortsov."

The granting of party status to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, according to its ideologists, will not create any additional problems for the Russian Government. "The main issue is property," Osadchiy said, "but if the ukases are suspended, we will turn everything that once belonged to the party over to the public and will claim only an insignificant portion—the bare necessities for our work: three to five rooms, for example, in the Russian Sociopolitical Center, one or two typewriters, and three telephones. We will also need the funds for reregistration and the congress. If the public is afraid that party officials will take charge of Old Square again, we can assure everyone that this will not happen: They could not be driven there even with a whip. The Russian secretaries who are working with us are Kuptsov, Zyuganov, and two or three others, and the Union secretaries are young men who came to the Central Committee a month before the putsch. They also number no more than five. There are another 5-7 (out of 78) first secretaries of rayons. The rest have not shown any interest in this and have even avoided calling any attention to themselves."

Meanwhile, there has been some stagnation in the process of communist party organization: Some of the parties which have made their presence known are extremely small and their membership figures are not rising. The ones that might be described as more or less serious forces, the Russian Communist Workers Party (RKRП) and the Socialist Labor Party (SPT), representing the two main currents ("orthodox" and "reformist"), have been marked by increasingly acute conflicts, both external—between the parties—and internal—among the leaders and between the leaders and the "party masses."

According to the advocates of the revival of the Russian Federation Communist Party, the party's lack of growth

is not due to the loss of confidence in communist ideas: "The Communists are not turning in their membership cards; the Communists are waiting." Even they, however, do not know exactly how many are waiting—millions, thousands, or hundreds.

Territorial associations of Communists seem to have a more promising future. In particular, the North Ossetian, Bashkortostan, and Kuban communist organizations have already been registered. The possibility of their autonomous political existence seems relatively strong for one simple reason: This movement is taking place within the channels of genuine centrifugal tendencies, just as the establishment of the RSFSR Communist Party once did.

We do not know how Yeltsin will react to the open letters, but some steps have already been taken to unite the Russian Communists. The statement in the president's November ukase on the impermissibility of the defamation and harassment of Communists has served as the legal grounds for this. Far-reaching conclusions have been drawn from the statement (this is an excerpt from one of the open letters) "If this is the case, then they must be given a chance to make use of their constitutional freedom to form organizations and take concerted action in pursuit of their goals.... All of the Russian Communists, united in a single organization—this is what the RSFSR Communist Party represents today." Actually, things have not reached this point yet. Representatives of political and communist parties and associations at a recent conference, however, reached an agreement on the establishment of a Russian Advisory-Coordinating Council (Roskomsovet) to organize concerted action by the Communists of Russia. This was achieved following heated arguments between the supporters of the "purity of ranks" and the "Sturm und Drang" theory, like Viktor Anpilov, and the more moderate party leaders taking a constitutional stance. The Roskomsovet working group includes representatives of the "Communists of Russia" deputy faction, the public association known as "In Defense of Communist Rights," and the leaders of all of the new parties, with the exception of Nina Andreyeva's VKPB.

Roskomsovet's immediate plans include preparations for the joint celebration of the 75th anniversary of October, the organization of a conference of economists to draft a program for emergence from the economic crisis, and the preparations for joint political actions "in defense of the social interests of the laboring public."

Of course, we have to remember that several councils of this kind were established in the past and did not achieve anything, and no one today can say that the present council will be more viable and effective than they were. If it also fails (which is almost guaranteed if there is a negative response to the open letters), the "Tulkin-Anpilov line" will prevail on the left flank, and we will have the kind of communist opposition that will not pay any attention to the "occupation" government or the "occupation" laws.

Romanov Heiress Said Seeking Permanent Return
924C2456B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Sep 92 p 6

[Interview with Nikolay Nikolayevich Lukyanov, head of Russian Monarchist Center, by Aleksandr Shundrin; date and place not given: "The All-Russian Monarchist Center Is Loyal to the Romanovs; the Grand Duchess Will Not Move to Russia Without Guarantees"]

[Text] The All-Russian Monarchist Center was established recently at the first monarchist congress. Its leader is Nikolay Lukyanov, chairman of the board of the Moscow Monarchist Center.

[Shundrin] Nikolay Nikolayevich, what does the VMTs [All-Russian Monarchist Center] plan to do? What are its immediate goals, objectives, and prospects?

[Lukyanov] The main goal is to achieve official status. We are monarchist-legitimists and we want the legal heir of the House of Romanov to be returned to the Russian throne. We have remained loyal to the oath to serve the Romanovs forever, an oath the Russian people took at the Assembly of the Land in 1613, and to the Law of Succession of Paul I and the dynastic acts of Grand Duke Vladimir Kirillovich of 1976, 1981, and 1989. Today Grand Duchess Mariya Vladimirovna is the heir to the throne.

[Shundrin] Other members of the Romanov family disagree. Nikolay Romanovich Romanov was declared the "head of the House of Romanov" in Paris.

[Lukyanov] Nikolay Romanovich, just as the other members of the family, have no right of succession because they are the products of morganatic marriages. All of these "pretenders" bear the title of Romanov-princes, which was granted to them back in the 1920s by Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich. We respect them in this status.

[Shundrin] How will the center conduct its financial operations?

[Lukyanov] We expect support from business groups in the center of Russia. Besides this, we have received some assistance from the Order of the Russian Empire Society, which is active in the United States. We are also working with the Gentry Assembly and the Cossacks.

[Shundrin] And with Brumel?

[Lukyanov] Certainly not. At first we responded to his statements on the official level. Now we have stopped, because there is no need to "cast pearls before swine."

[Shundrin] There have been rumors that the grand duchess is moving back to Russia. Is this true?

[Lukyanov] The future of Russia will be decided here, and there is no question that Her Imperial Highness and her family must move back here, but we have to

remember that this will require certain security guarantees and a whole group of important conditions.

DEN Movement Holds First Meeting

924C2456C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 4 Sep 92 p 6

[Article by Ivan Kozhany: "'Your Main Duty Is To Multiply,' Aleksandr Prokhanov Told His Associates at the First Meeting of the DEN Movement"]

[Text] The meeting was held on 2 September in the editorial offices of the newspaper of the same name on Tsvetnoy Boulevard. No one laughed at Prokhanov's joke, probably because his listeners took the command seriously.

The opposition clearly knows that it could not get a million people to gather in Manezhnyy Square today and has made the move to detailed and painstaking work among the masses. The members of the new movement are newspaper subscribers who filled out a special questionnaire in a recent issue. According to the organizers, they number around 1,000, including around 300 in the capital. Around 100 were invited to the meeting. According to the organizers, the movement should not have a rigid structure and a fixed membership yet, but even spiritual opposition clearly needs some kind of structure for work on immediate, purely practical assignments (the distribution of newspapers, the organization of pickets in front of "hangouts" in Moscow—McDonald's, for example, the drafting of petitions to the mayor, etc.).

In a brief but impassioned speech, Aleksandr Prokhanov called upon his listeners to defend the Russian people. "We have retreated in silence for too long.... Your house is burning, and you must save it," he declared.

After Prokhanov's address, Nikolay Anisin, one of the DEN editors, took the floor. He explained the projected structure of the movement: contacts by telephone and mail, meetings, and instructive conventions.

The still emerging movement was an instant success. RUSSKOYE VOSKRESENIYE called for the defense of its editor, and the Russian Communal Union asked everyone to go back to Ostankino on 15 September. Someone in the room asked exactly how many questionnaires had been returned to the editors, because every single person can make a difference.

The organizational part of the meeting did not last long, however, and the comrades-in-arms went their separate ways after they had exchanged telephone numbers and paid for their badges.

Rutskoy on Agriculture Sector, Politics

934C00014 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 37, Oct 92 pp 1-2

[Interview with A. Rutskoy, vice president of Russia, by N. Zhelnorova; place and date not given: "I Am a Centrist, Strong-State Advocate, and Liberal"]

[Text]

Work

[Zhelnorova] You once said about yourself: "I am a king with no clothes." Are you now a king without or with clothes?

[Rutskoy] This was said as a joke. I now have specific and very interesting work. But at first it was, indeed, difficult: "putting" an engineer-pilot in agriculture was somewhat depressing. At the session of the Supreme Soviet when this decision of the president was announced, laughter rolled through the hall, much as if at Khazanov's witticisms.

[Zhelnorova] But could you have declined this agrarian service? And have proposed that you take on the army, defense, conversion, that is, that to which you are close in spirit?

[Rutskoy] I will say frankly that since I am a graduate of three top military institutions (with distinction), I asked to be given an opportunity for involvement in the reform of the armed forces, conversion of the military-industrial complex, and inspections. These commissions were given me at the first stage. But then, after my trip to Novosibirsk and Barnaul, which the newspapers called "the military pilot's Siberian row," all these commissions were taken away from me.

[Zhelnorova] What need had you of this Siberian row?

[Rutskoy] In my election campaign I had promised the Siberians that I would come to see them in six months. I kept my word and saw that not only had nothing in the region improved but had sharply deteriorated even. It was then that I spoke very critically.

[Zhelnorova] It is naive to think that anything would change in six months. The agrarian cause became your "personal affair" seven months ago. And there has been virtually no improvement either, only a deterioration. Land may, as before, be purchased only for bribes, and the prices of agricultural equipment are incredible. And your command has not facilitated the acquisition of land, and you have not even banged your shoe on the lectern, like Khrushchev, to draw attention to the countryside.

[Rutskoy] Banging a shoe is inappropriate for a political leader. I do not understand the words "return" and "give." There has to be a system in everything. The economy should be controlled not by the soviets but by finances. It is not the case that "nothing has been done." The elaboration of the documents on the Land Bank of

Russia has been completed. This will create a system of control of the land resources, which will "work" for the peasant and the social appearance of the countryside.

[Zhelnorova] If you spin around just one idea, and it does not come off, you will once again find yourself a "king with no clothes," like Khrushchev with his corn.

[Rutskoy] Corn and the Land Bank are, for all that, very different things. The founders of the Land Bank, in a district, for example, will be all the land users of the district. And it is through this bank that they will conclude contracts and obtain (on surety!) credit and securities for their property. This will discipline a person since he will have to pay back the credit (today the sharpest have built houses for themselves on agricultural loans, producing neither meat nor corn. The Land Bank would not allow this). If the land is intended for agriculture, the certificate also will be agricultural, and the bank will not permit the land to be used other than as intended. All taxes will remain in this bank, and the entire profit will accumulate here, and working capital, that is, the budget of the agricultural district, will be created. At the same time the bank will defend the right of ownership. The kolkhozes and sovkhoses will receive a collective certificate, and on each farm everyone will receive a share certificate.

Subsequently the peasant could leave and take his share with him, he could associate—this is his business. But the main thing is that we are creating a mechanism of the attraction of credit and investment to this sector because mortgage law will begin to operate here. Today a farmer comes and asks for credit, but on the strength of what can he be given it?

[Zhelnorova] And if the farmer suddenly changes his mind about being a farmer?

[Rutskoy] Very simple. Having acquired land, the farmer has upgraded it and built something and then has decided to sell it. He goes to the bank and presents his certificate, and the difference between the cost basis and current value of the land is assessed for him. He pockets the money and is free. And the bank looks for a new owner.

[Zhelnorova] Even splendid ideas have not been put into practice with us, unfortunately.

[Rutskoy] I am a military man and have always provided for alternatives. One such is a reduction in agricultural losses (now up to 50 percent). We would then reduce the area of cultivated land and cut back on energy resources and human forces and would allocate the finances thus released for implementation of the reform itself.

The next step would be the creation of large-scale processing centers. Some R350 million are needed for the creation of a processing complex. It cannot be purchased alone. Does it make sense to break up the kolkhozes and

sovkhozes if we could on the basis of them—matching our possibilities, not our desires—create such complexes?

[Zheleznorova] As in the good old days of stagnation, you have come to be shown touring kolkhozes and sovkhozes. You—wearing a smart suit, with stylish moustache—are standing among hogs. What are you doing there?

[Rutskoy] The secret of the smart suits is simple: out of old army habit I press them every morning.

These tours make good sense. I take with me scientists, who write agrarian programs and do so frequently in pseudo-scientific language. I then ask them: Will these peasants understand your unintelligible articles and speeches? They will not; consequently, boys, let's rework it. We have to convince people and make them think as we do and, consequently, to speak to them in a common language. On the trips I argue with people and try out my ideas on them in order to fine-tune them subsequently.

[Zheleznorova] Do you not confer on agrarian matters with rural ideologist Ligachev?

[Rutskoy] No, of course not. Forecasting and analysis should not be confused with ideology.

[Zheleznorova] Your image today is such that everyone needs you. Some would like to make you speaker, others, head of a "shadow cabinet," yet others, premier. What is your attitude toward this?

[Rutskoy] I have no intention of heading any cabinet. I am a centrist, a strong-state advocate. I want to show people that what we need is not shock but liberal reform, given strong authorities.

Politics

[Zheleznorova] Your political credo?

[Rutskoy] I am a liberal.

[Zheleznorova] What does your heart want?

[Rutskoy] That Russia get up from its knees and become a state, not an evil empire, and that man become a personality and that he live not under the influence of fear but respecting the law and authority. That we cease continually creating difficulties and then fighting them and that we cease fearing the word "patriot" and a display of love for the fatherland. That we begin to show the soundness of the reforms not to the West but to our own people.

[Zheleznorova] Volitskiy, Travkin, and you are in the same boat—the Civic Union. You are all so different, and when it comes to it, I believe, none of you will want to yield leadership to another.

[Rutskoy] Our purpose is not to seize power or gain the leadership. I like this office—vice president. I am 45 years old. I have been elected to this office for four years,

and if there is one more term, I will be 54. In these nine years, if God so allots me them, I will have become more mature and will have learned how to understand both situations and people better. So time is on my side. Today my goal is to become a person holding the same views as my people, primarily the fact that no one will give us any other motherland.

[Zheleznorova] Is it the Civic Union's idea to pass along the center, like Christ on the water, without getting its feet wet?

[Rutskoy] Any extreme vectors today could create the conditions for civil war. And the purpose of our Union is to prevent it, prevent the country from falling apart, and orient the reforms toward liberalism.

[Zheleznorova] You once called yourself vice president-special messenger. Yet power is not given, it is taken. Give a person an inch, and he takes a yard, but what about you?

[Rutskoy] I said that our constitution envisages this office as a special messenger. And as far as power is concerned, I do not want two authorities because, as distinct from some of the present leaders, I have commanded to the point of stupor, progressing from regular pilot to deputy army commander.

[Zheleznorova] How long, according to your forecasts, will this government hold on?

[Rutskoy] Unless it understands that it needs to reorient itself from radicalism and shock therapy toward liberalism, not long.

[Zheleznorova] Is some alliance with the present government possible for the Civic Union?

[Rutskoy] Gaydar's words to the effect that he does not intend to cooperate with the centrists were published overseas recently. I said in conversation with him recently: "Our 'center' program is being developed by your classmates, your teacher is in charge of it, watch out, Yegor, perhaps they are right also!" You cannot jump in the water without knowing how deep it is. So with our reform also. Mixing with people, I have heard normal human argument, to which our democratic government is unreceptive for some reason or other. People cannot be dispensed with, otherwise they will take to the streets—to Anpilov.

Some people see these mass meetings and protests as the action of certain political leaders. No! Political leaders join up with these, yes, but people go to mass protest meetings as a consequence of their social position.

So only the authorities that fulfill their promises may be respected.

Himself

[Zhelnorova] How do you manage, given the most strenuous work, judging by what you say, to maintain such a fresh appearance and good spirits?

[Rutskoy] After 10 in the evening I "thrash around" at tennis four times a week. And each morning I run 3-4 km.

[Zhelnorova] How much do you earn as vice president?

[Rutskoy] I earn R19,000, after taxes, R14,000.

[Zhelnorova] Do you have land, a truck garden?

[Rutskoy] Of course, at the official dacha, where I live, we have plowed 10 hundredths of land, and everything grows there—cucumbers, tomatoes, carrots, beets, and greens. Although it is dark when I get home, I go around with the hose and water. I am viewed as an oddity. But, on the other hand, we have all our own food and do not go to the market.

[Zhelnorova] How do you help your mother?

[Rutskoy] She is now retired. And my brother Misha, he is deputy chief of the Internal Affairs Administration in Kursk, and I send her cash. He R1,000, I, R2,000. Plus the pension. Mama says that she has enough.

[Zhelnorova] You have, I know, two children. Do you argue with them about politics, about your work? How does the younger generation evaluate you?

[Rutskoy] We argue constantly. One son is 21 years old, he is at the Medical Institute—an outstanding student all round; the second is 18, he is at the Financial and was formerly at the Suvorov School. Neither smokes nor drinks. They meet girls in "moderation"—only on Saturdays. On Sundays they learn English.

The younger is a fervent strong-state advocate. He quotes Pikul the same as I—"The Golden Calf." He is incensed at humanitarian aid: We are destroying our own wealth and soliciting charity! He is an analyst by nature.

The elder is a humanist, a physician, somewhat of a demagogue, it is true. They have endless arguments about strong-state sovereignty. The younger is for it, the elder believes that there is nothing about it to regret.

[Zhelnorova] How much money in your family goes on food?

[Rutskoy] Almost all of it. As with many of my friends also. We wear clothes which we purchased previously. I served in Germany and bought suits, shoes, and shirts there.

[Zhelnorova] And the reforms started.

[Rutskoy] It was as though I had a presentiment of these times and ordered my wife: Lyusya, buy clothing. This alone is helping since today's prices are wholly beyond our reach.

[Zhelnorova] Are you happy at home?

[Rutskoy] Yes, although I am a nuisance. My wife believes that as I get older I will become a pain in the neck.

[Zhelnorova] What is your sign?

[Rutskoy] Virgo.

[Zhelnorova] We learned recently that our president prefers cognac. Yourself?

[Rutskoy] In moderation, a little vodka is better. Especially after the baths.

[Zhelnorova] Power not only gives a person something, it takes away also. What has it taken from you?

[Rutskoy] I have lost time of my own—for reading, movies, the theater. When my wife kicks up a fuss, only then do I go. There is simply no time!

Ostankino TV Broadcasting Policy Reviewed

924C2471A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Sep 92
Morning Edition p 7

[Article by Vladimir Tsvetov, RTR political observer: "Unified Television Space: Is It Possible in Our Political Situation?"]

[Text] "In connection with the speech televised over the 'Ostankino' television channel, presented by president of sovereign republic A., who did not sufficiently illuminate the character of mutual relations with our sovereign state, and keeping in mind that we also bear certain expenditures for maintaining the 'Ostankino' television channel, I ask you, Mr. Yakovlev, to make arrangements for televising my rebuttal.

[Signed] President of sovereign state B."

"In connection with the rebuttal televised over the television channel 'Ostankino,' presented by president of sovereign state B, who gave a wrongful interpretation of the policy of our sovereign republic and distorted the essence of my words, and keeping in mind the fact that we continue to bear expenses for maintaining the 'Ostankino' television channel, I ask you, Mr. Yakovlev, to make arrangements for televising my repeat presentation.

[Signed] President of sovereign republic A."

"In connection with the regular presentation over television channel 'Ostankino' by president of sovereign republic A., who lied about the actions of our sovereign state and allowed hostile attacks against me personally as president, and keeping in mind that..." and so forth, and

so on, until both presidents refused to contribute funds to the "Ostankino" budget and "blue helmets" had to be sent to the border area between the "sovereign republic" and the "sovereign state."

Obviously, I am exaggerating the possible consequences of the planned changeover of the "Ostankino" television company to a certain CIS TV. However, if the character of broadcasting does not change radically, we cannot exclude such an outcome of the practical embodiment of the clear, noble, but naive effort to preserve the last ties between the former USSR republics. The expression "last ties" belongs to Yegor Vladimirovich Yakovlev, the chairman of "Ostankino." In other words, he himself, in essence, has predetermined the unenviable future of his own idea. After all, "last" means that there is nothing after that, that after that comes—emptiness.

Someone aptly noted that only true gentlemen undertake hopeless deeds. Ye. Yakovlev has brilliantly confirmed this fact. Although, it is true, there is no sacrifice in his gentleman's action. Ye. Yakovlev possesses a trait common to all Russian gentlemen-intellectuals: Their desire for general good suppresses their interest in the truth. And the truth consists of the fact that the avalanche of disintegration of the former USSR cannot be stopped, and that state structures of the CIS type are no more than hastily erected barriers to slow the rate of the landslide. It is unlikely that Ye. Yakovlev does not understand that holding back the falling rocks merely postpones the end of the avalanche. However, his sincere desire of good for all motivates him to set out in search of the Blue Bird of Happiness.

The reality is such that in inter-ethnic conflicts raging along the borders of Russia, the Russians are one of the suffering parties, who by the will of fate have found themselves beyond the boundaries of their native land. Russia, of course, must assume the responsibility for the life, human dignity and civil and economic rights of these Russians, and exhibit firmness in regard to the governments which are applying discriminatory measures to them.

Naturally, the Russian authorities, as participants in the pool of donors to "Ostankino," will want to use this television channel to announce their firmness and to keep up the spirits of the Russians living on territories gripped by inter-ethnic conflicts. It is not difficult to imagine what the response reaction will be, primarily of those who really do discriminate against the Russians. The Russian accusations will, first of all, be refuted with emphasized proud indignation. Secondly, Russia will receive an equally emphatic indignant accusation of imperial ambitions.

All this will splash out into the air over the television channel "Ostankino." And instead of a means for bringing the sovereign states—the former USSR republics—closer together, "Ostankino" will invariably turn into an implement of discord between them. That is the worst case. In the best case, however, the television

channel will cease its existence due to the refusal of the donor countries who have been offended by Russia to finance it.

It is not difficult to note that the so-called "statesmen" are gaining force in Russia—an amorphous social formation consisting of right-wing extremists who still think about the 1914 boundaries of the Russian empire, as well as completely sober-minded politicians who rightly believe that Russia is not simply a collection of Russians, but rather a state which respects the rights of other peoples and demands respect for itself.

The history of political movements has shown that the character of social formation, which consists of varied elements, is determined by its most backward part. This is why people who quite recently have shown themselves to be enemies of the Soviet empire are today inclined toward viewing the new independent states on the territory of the former USSR as Russian ancestral lands. The reaction of the "Ostankino" television audience in the new states neighboring Russia to broadcasts in which such an ideology of the "statesmen" is expressed, is quite obvious. And there can be no doubt that such television broadcasts will appear on the air. Otherwise, why should Russia spend money for maintaining "Ostankino"?

The "Ostankino" television broadcasts, which will reflect the political positions of the current authorities in the new states, will not add good will to the feelings of Russians regarding them. Nor will they bring tolerance to the internal political struggle within Russia itself. Is it so incredible for protesters to appear around the walls of "Ostankino", carrying signs which, instead of "television," might read "Dushanbevision" or "Bakuvision" following the anti-communist declarations of Tajik and Azerbaijani leaders broadcast over the "Ostankino" channel? In turn, will the reaction of Russians who oppose the red-and-brown be favorable as they watch television broadcasts from the communist totalitarian Turkmenistan?

The Russian right-left opposition, speaking out against the government of Boris Yeltsin, has received air time on the "Ostankino" television channel. Can we exclude the possibility that after "Ostankino" turns into CIS TV, air time will be requested, for example, by the Turkist fundamentalist party "Alash," which is in opposition to the president of Kazakhstan, or the "Birlik" movement, which opposes the Uzbek president?

There is logic in the request. Those funds which Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan allocate for the support of "Ostankino" come from taxes which have been collected also from the members of "Al-sha" and "Birlika." However, the possible response reactions by the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will also be logical. They will stop financing "Ostankino," which gives the broadest possible tribune to their political enemies. The dissatisfaction of these presidents will also indirectly affect the government of Russia, since the "Ostankino"

television channel will still be associated for a long time with the Russian authorities.

The regular question arises. How to retain the "Ostankino" television company, which has highly professional creative cadres and the most powerful technical means in Russia, with a benefit to society, if it becomes CIS TV?

Since everyone has gotten used to the idea that foreign governments may also be supporters of "Ostankino," why not develop the idea a bit farther. Would it be possible to get foreign entrepreneurs as patrons instead—"nearby" as well as "far away" ones?

Little by little, the market economy is paving a road for itself on the territory of the former USSR. One-sixth of the earth's land will in the future be turned into a virgin and very lucrative market. Those who want to affirm themselves on it—and there are many of them among foreign entrepreneurs—may become joint owners of "Ostankino" together with Russian businessmen. It is a conviction as old as capitalism itself. Advertising—the mover of trade—is all-powerful, because it is the truth. And then "Ostankino" will become a television company independent of any influences except common sense, which is contained in market relations.

The content of the broadcasting will change sharply. Television films and movies, sporting events and concerts, plays from world-renowned theatres and television games for a worldwide audience—this is what "Ostankino" will offer to its television viewers. Specifically, Ye. Yakovlev has already begun moving in this direction, having announced the priority of entertainment programs and television films such as "The Rush Also Cry" over political broadcasts. No power will dare deprive its country's population of the "Ostankino" television show, because the local entrepreneurs, who have become co-owners of the television channel, will not allow it.

But what about preserving ties between the former USSR republics? "Ostankino" will fulfill the role of a connecting link, but only to the degree in which, for example, the television channel "Eurosport" does, which is received in all the Western European countries. And when the avalanche of destruction finally buries the former Soviet empire, when the new states, having fully tasted independence, will themselves want to form a unified space—whether it be a ruble, raw material, banking, informational or any other—that is what "Ostankino" will take on the significance of a reliable connecting link, since it will not lose either its cadres or its technical capacities. And long, boring inter-governmental negotiations will not be required. The question will be resolved quickly and in the best way. Life itself, economic and political expediency, perceived by the new states as an objective social necessity, will give "Ostankino" its connecting role.

The heroes in Metterlink's play never found the blue bird, and ultimately gave up looking for it, satisfied with what surrounded them. And, it seems, they did the right thing.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Russian Deputies Sue Tatarstan's Supsov Chairman

924C2468 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 24 Sep 92 p. 1

[Article by Radik Batyrshin: "Tatarstan Deputies Take Offense at Speakers and Go to Russian Supreme Court for Truth"]

[Text] On September 23, the Judicial Collegium of the Russian Supreme Court heard an appeal against a ruling by the Republic of Tatarstan Supreme Court on a suit filed to refute slanderous information and to defend the honor and dignity of Tatarstan People's Deputies Ivan Grachov, Ildus Sultanov, M. Igut Khafizov, and Aleksandr Shtanin. The defendant was Republic of Tatarstan Supreme Soviet Chairman Farid Mukhametshin.

The background of the civil suit is rather unusual. During the proceedings of the eighth session of the Tatarstan Supreme Soviet, many letters were received, as usual. They included a request that certain People's Deputies not be allowed to speak a number of times, among them Grachov, Sultanov, Shtanin, and Khafizov. The anonymous letter writer said he was making the request because he had repeatedly seen them in an intoxicated state, etc. Mukhametshin decided to post the letter on the bulletin board for messages sent to the session. The Deputies named in the anonymous letter considered the parliamentary speaker's decision to have defamed their honor and dignity, and during the session Farid Mukhametshin publicly apologized to the Deputies. The latter considered that insufficient and filed a civil suit in the republic Supreme Court. The Tatarstan Supreme Court ruled that the dispute had been settled by the public apology. Then Grachov, Sultanov, Shtanin, and Khafizov filed an appeal with the Russian Federation Supreme Court. The incident is noteworthy in that these Deputies are leaders of the pro-Russian opposition in the republic parliament and periodically criticize the Tatarstan authorities for striving for sovereignty, engaging in "nationalism," and so forth.

"These Deputies are looking for any way in which to influence my centrist position," Farid Mukhametshin told an NG correspondent, "and they are trying to turn this civil suit into a political trial." At the same time, the speaker of Tatarstan's parliament emphasized, "We are moving toward a rule-of-law society in which all disputes are supposed to be resolved by legal means." In response to the NG correspondent's question, "Does the Russian Supreme Court have the authority to hear this suit considering that Tatarstan considers itself a sovereign

state?". Mukhametshin answered no. "But these Deputies are citizens of not only Tatarstan, but also Russia, and if the matter is confined solely to the ruling of the republic Supreme Court, they might feel that their rights have been violated," said the Republic of Tatarstan Supreme Soviet chairman. "Let the Russian Supreme Soviet have the final say."

The Russian Supreme Soviet ruled that the decision handed down by its colleagues in Tatarstan was legitimate.

Tatar Position in Negotiations With Russia Viewed

924C2453C Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Sep 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by Igor Kharichev, political scientist: "Tatarstan Would Like To Combine the Uncombinable: Leave the Union but Remain Within It"]

[Text] On 15 September Russian President Boris Yeltsin received Tatarstan President Mintimer Sheymiyev in the Kremlin.

Among the questions discussed at the meeting was progress in the preparation of a treaty between Russia and Tatarstan. In view of the existence of disagreements on this question, the official delegations of Russia and Tatarstan have been charged with continuing the work on coordinating the treaty's text.

"Special attention," said Mintimer Sheymiyev to an ITAR-TASS correspondent, "was paid to progress in preparing the bilateral agreement. Many points of views held in common were found, but there are also differences. They touch primarily on which matters relate to the exclusive jurisdiction of Tatarstan and which to that of Russia, and how to solve them on the basis of joint action."

Mintimer Sheymiyev thinks that the bilateral agreement between Russia and Tatarstan can be signed this year.

The leadership of the republic, which has not signed the Federation Treaty, is seeking persistently to conclude a separate bilateral treaty between federal organs of power and Tatarstan. The negotiations between the Russian Federation and Tatarstan, which have been going on for a month now, have been dedicated to prepare it for signing. The meetings of the Russian and Tatarstan delegations have become so customary that it seems as if they had started a long time ago. Incidentally, their end is near, and according to plans the treaty should be signed in September.

Reports about the routine rounds of negotiations between the Russian and Tatarstan delegations have been of a calm and businesslike nature. But for thoughtful people it will come as no surprise that an extremely, extremely complicated situation is concealed by these reports. And the trouble lies not at all in the fact

that the negotiating processes has for a long time resembled the tightening of a rope. The essence of the conflict is deeper than simply an attempt to get more power than the other side will agree to concede. "Tatarstan's policy undoubtedly is a change in the republic's status with regard to the Russian Federation," Vasily Likachev, Vice-President of Tatarstan and leader of the republic's delegation at the negotiations, said in an interview. "But those who said that Tatarstan wants to separate from Russia, and, moreover, to ruin the federation, are not right."

It sounds reassuring. But here is how, for example, the Tatarstan delegation formulates the republic's powers in paragraph 7 which corresponds to Article 1 of its own version of the treaty's draft: "The Republic of Tatarstan will enter into relationships with foreign states, conclude international treaties, and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives...." But to establish one's own embassy in other countries—is de jure a prerogative of an independent state, which cannot be a part of any federation.

Here is paragraph 14: "The Republic of Tatarstan independently formulates its own state budget and executes an independent tax policy. In order to realize joint special-purpose programs to implement the powers of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan, withholdings of financial resources are made on the basis of mutual agreements." In this connection, it is worth saying that Tatarstan deducts into the federal budget about 4.5 billion rubles [R], receiving on the order of 6 billion through the pension fund.

Paragraph 10 states that Tatarstan independently participates in payment of the debt of the former USSR, paragraph 12 that the republic has a right to its share of the former USSR's gold reserve and diamond inventory. By including these articles in the treaty, the Tatarstan leadership actually wants to get the same status that independent states—former Union republics—now have. It should be emphasized that the principles that will secure Tatarstan's full independence have been retained in one form or another in all the versions of the treaty drafts that the Tatar side has proposed. And while these are just drafts, they completely reflect definite strivings.

There is nothing unnatural about the Tatarstan leadership's strivings to assert the republic's full independence. In this case it is necessary to talk about it frankly and not mask one's intentions with a bouquet of assurances of the opposite.

It goes without saying that decentralization is vitally necessary not only for preserving the state integrity of the Russian Federation but also for executing the reforms. In developed states the economy is the private affair of the citizen (the state does not control it, it only regulates it). In ordinary countries most problems are resolved locally (including those few, but basic, problems whose solution is the prerogative of federal or central organs of power).

And the Federal Treaty enables decentralization, it is necessary only to execute it. If we speak about Germany, we say that there is a single state and unified federal customs duties. At the same time, the above-mentioned draft of the treaty states in paragraph 5 of Article 1 that Tatarstan has its own citizenship and that dual citizenship is permitted in the republic, that is, a citizen of Tatarstan cannot be a citizen of the Russian Federation [sic], and paragraph 9 should secure for Tatarstan the right to establish its own customs duties. So it is that here one talk only about a confederation and that by greatly stretching the point.

It is curious that, during the negotiations, the Tatar delegation has supported in all the treaty drafts paragraphs that would permit Tatarstan to enjoy the advantages given by staying in the federation. For example, allowing the regime duty-free movement of transport equipment, freight, and passengers for all types of transport, including that shipped by a third party, including those outside the Russian Federation—a paragraph which, considering Russia's vast expanse, augurs enormous advantages for Tatarstan. But Tatarstan's leadership should realize that it is impossible to combine the pluses of full independence with the no less weighty pluses of staying within the Russian Federation.

One must not leave the Russian Federation and, in so doing, act as if it had not left it. Tatarstan's full independence should lead unambiguously lead to the republic's exit from the Russian Federation, with all the consequences that ensue from it. In this case, all the orders placed by the Russian government with Tatarstan's enterprises should be annulled, not at all in revenge for the departure, but because economic relations with foreign states are built upon a different basis, taking into account primarily one's own interests. The nature of all relationships should be changed—they should become interstate relationships—although this does not mean that Russia will break off cultural or other contacts with a completely independent Tatarstan. But different customs duties, a different tax system, and actual living conditions or terms of management will dictate the introduction of customs posts, and, in time, possibly also to the establishment of a state-border system between the Russian Federation and Tatarstan. And this is that reality that the republic's leadership should consider.

Tatarstan has the right to full state independence. However, the people of the republic should have their say. The results of the referendum that was held on 21 March 1992 cannot be considered as a true basis for asserting independence, and even the republic's leadership explained on the eve of the referendum that it was not a matter of leaving the Russian Federation. Only if a new referendum that states the relationship between acquiring full state independence and Tatarstan's departure from Russia yields a positive result will the republic's leadership have both the juridical and moral right to consistently follow the line of asserting state independence. And for now, one must consider that, according to

surveys of public opinion, about 60 percent of Tatarstan's residents are against leaving Russia.

Caucasian Mountain People's Chairman Arrest Viewed

924C2468B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 24 Sep 92 p 1

[Article by Liana Minasyan: "CCMP Chairman Arrested; Consequences Could Be Unpredictable"]

[Text] Yuriy Shanibov, chairman of the Confederation of Caucasus Mountain Peoples (CCMP), against whom the Russian Procuracy has instituted criminal proceedings, has been arrested on a warrant issued by Kabardino-Balkaria Prosecutor Eduard Denisov. As Khaudi Sheriyev, a spokesman for the Kabardino Peoples Congress, reported from Nalchik, Yu. Shanibov's apartment was searched this morning. Unidentified persons took Yu. Shanibov to the building of the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic Ministry of Security, where he was questioned. The case is being handled by six investigators of the Russian Ministry of Security who are in Nalchik.

Yesterday evening, Deputies to the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic Supreme Soviet who support the Congress and the CCMP were to have gathered in the congress building to discuss the situation and to formulate a decision.

In Moscow, Russian Supreme Soviet Deputy Mokhammadin Tumov and Kabardino Peoples Congress representative Yuriy Kalmykov are trying to arrange a meeting with Russian Procurator General Valentin Stepankov.

In Nalchik and Maykop, people are gathering for a rally. No information from other cities is available. In the opinion of a CCMP representative in Grozny, Yu. Shanibov's arrest will have the most unpredictable consequences. The CCMP will work for Yu. Shanibov's release. For the time being, the confederation intends to limit itself to picketing and holding rallies.

Confederation of Mountain People Official on Local Conflicts

924C2452A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Sep 92
Morning Edition p 3

[Interview with Khadzhi-Murat Ibragimbeyli, vice president of the All-Russia Association of Small Nations (former autonomous areas), by IZVESTIYA correspondent Irina Dementyeva, place and date not given: "There Is No Little Blood: Once Again Worrisome Days in the Northern Caucasus"]

[Text] The situation in the Northern Caucasus is presenting the national policy of the Russian Federation with problems which are no less pressing than those which proved to be fatal to the states within the Soviet Union. The reason, we may recall, is the irreparable

errors committed by the former Union center in places such as Tbilisi, Baku, and Vilnius. And although today those who are moaning for the Union accuse everyone other than themselves for the tragedy of the collapse of the fatherland, history will not forget the culprit: imperial diktat. What made Russia's policy in the first year of freedom essentially different from that of the former Union was the fact that, so far, no irreparable errors were made. However, the tension has not vanished and, as in the past, the danger remains great. That is why precise knowledge of the real situation, attention, and consideration are needed. IZVESTIYA deems it its duty to open its pages to any substantive information and to the expression of all viewpoints. In this issue IZVESTIYA correspondent Irina Dementyeva talks with Khadzhi-Murat Ibragimbeyli, professor, doctor of historical sciences, member of the presidential council of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, chairman of the Committee for National Consensus of the KGNK [Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus] parliament, and vice president of the All-Russian Association of Small Nations (former autonomous areas).

[Dementyeva] I must admit that there are times when a journalist must discuss a topic which is not of journalistic interest or based on political consideration, but on simple fear. It would be terrible for someone's stupidity or cynical calculations to result in an armed conflict in the Northern Caucasus, with a single possible outcome: a major and protracted war, which would spread beyond the Caucasus. What leads you, respected Khadzhi-Murat, military historian, a Muscovite, and a scientist, to become involved in politics? You could sit back and write your books.

[Khadzhi-Murat] I shall answer as a scientist to a journalist, a military person to a civilian, and a man to a woman: fear! Naturally, as an Avar, I am familiar with the history of the peoples of that unique mountain pass linking Europe to Asia, and with its national features and customs. I understand the memory of its people and their historical destiny which, as a rule, has been tragic. And whereas it is difficult to predict the behavior of an individual, all that a historian or simply an experienced person should ask himself is the following: what would happen if a certain action is taken affecting the Avars, Ingush, Karachay, Adyg or Balkar (it is impossible to enumerate all peoples of the Caucasus?), what would they do? What would the reaction of Christian Georgia and Armenia be? Of Muslim Azerbaijan? What kind of actions would have interested Iran, Turkey, or Saudi Arabia take? What about our new Western friends? And what would Russia become if the former democrat Stankevich or Vice President Rutskoy would like to display their national character hobnobbing with foreigners? Is the adoption of a new (!) ideology worth shedding the blood needed for ensuring its birth?

[Dementyeva] I recall our previous discussion before the Abkhaz events. At that time the word "Caucasus" was

crowding news reports: "Caucasic investigations," "Caucasic performances," "individuals of Caucasian nationality,"... It seemed as though the exclusive concern of not only Moscow, Petersburg or Rostov but even of the small cities in Russia was to get rid of their Chechens or Azerbaijanis, considered to be the source of all difficulties! The Caucasus itself seemed to be hidden behind an information curtain. In times past, exiled officer Bestuzhev-Marlinskiy accused Russian society of knowing more about Scotland, thanks to Walter Scott, than about its own Caucasus. It seems that today as well, our domestic "Walter Scotts" have quite successfully instilled in the Russian mind to perceive the topic of the Caucasus exclusively in a gangsterly interpretation. However, over there, behind the wall of the Caucasus, and, incidentally, behind the walls of the Kremlin, something is taking place and it is not only a search for ideology that is driving Russian politicians. Why is it, then that when efforts are being made to stabilize the situation in the Northern Caucasus...

[Khadzhi-Murat] Yet another stabilizing action follows? Yes, delayed action mines have been laid in various spots. Some of them had already set by engineers from the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and even the VKP(b) Central Committee.

[Dementyeva] Who is laying such mines now? And where are they "ticking" most loudly? At that time, toward the end of July, you had confidentially answered: Ingushetiya and Nazrak. Then Abkhaziya exploded...

[Khadzhi-Murat] The epicenter may shift. Abkhaziya is not the Northern Caucasus or Russia. However, as we can already see today, even an explosion in their vicinity could result in the blow up of the entire area. I would qualify such events not as dramatic but as catastrophic. The present tragedy affects not only the peoples of the Caucasus but also all of Russia.

[Dementyeva] Professor, you are a noted personality in the Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus. As we know, in connection with the Abkhaz events, the minister of justice called upon Russia's prosecutor general to instigate a criminal case against the confederation, on the assumption that the very existence of such an organization violates the Russian Constitution...

[Khadzhi-Murat] No more than the existence of the CIS or any other commonwealth of nations, the purpose and meaning of which is the desire for self-preservation on the basis of human rights and the principles of equality and social justice. No single constitution, whether of the old Union or the new Russian one contains articles prohibiting the peoples from uniting for peaceful purposes. I assume that the criminal case you asked about, assuming that it is instigated, will have no legal follow-up, as the lawyers say.

However, allow me, in turn, to ask you why mention the Constitution the moment it applies to small nations, but not in the case of big ones? Our confederation is one year

old. It includes 16 nations; why is it that so far no one has even conceived of accusing it of being unconstitutional, for instance when its volunteers were defending Tskhinvali against that same Georgia? Incidentally, the confederation is also providing material assistance. Why is it that today the response of the Caucasus, and the noble and just reaction of the Adygey, Cherkess, Kabard, and Chechens to the appeal of the Abkhaz people (who are members of the confederation) are triggering so much indignation in our third estate? And why is it that no one is indignant at the organization of a militarized movement, frankly speaking, such as that of the Cossacks?

I would like to ask the respected Vice President Rutskoy, Russian Federation Deputy Minister Kondratyev, or Martynov, the ataman of the Union of Russian Cossacks, why did they need Cossack units consisting, let us say, of motorized infantry regiments, airborne brigades, and helicopter units? Are you reviving the way of life of the Cossacks? Do revive it. But what type of Cossack system has ever included anti-aircraft artillery or helicopters? Last May, on the basis of all sorts of ukases and resolutions, according to a directive promulgated by Yarov more than five Cossack regiments were created. What kind of law-governed democratic regime and what type of federation do we have the right to dream about if rightlessness for some and total permissiveness for other are being promoted from high on up?

[Dementyeva] However, the efforts of the confederation forcefully to intervene in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, regardless of the noble impulse to justify them, presume the use of some kind of armed forces which are not part of the Russian Army. What are those forces? Other than the Chechen guard, there is no other....

[Khadzhi-Murat] The Chechen Republic has refused to allow the use of its forces. President Dudayev criticized the sending of armed men to Abkhaziyi and refused weapons to volunteers (in my view, the strict observance of international law will not help the Chechen Republic avoid having a problem with Russia, and while discussing Abkhaziyi with Shevardnadze, Yeltsin did not forget the Chechens even for a minute). As to the volunteers, the participation of Kuban and Don Cossacks in the Dniester conflict also constitutes interference in the affairs of a sovereign state. At that time the Russian parliament remained silent, and the Ministry of Justice and the prosecutor's office avoided to answer the question of the right were the Cossacks had to participate in this bloodshed by killing others and turning its own children into orphans.

[Dementyeva] Nonetheless, the involvement of the mountain people in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict is dangerously worsening relations between Russia and Georgia. Georgia, as Moldova in the past, has the right to object to any interference in its internal affairs.

[Khadzhi-Murat] Despite all agreements, however, it is not withdrawing forces but, conversely, it is introducing into the area of military operations thousands of so-called volunteers.

[Dementyeva] Still, what was the political and military role which the confederation played in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict?

[Khadzhi-Murat] Confederation volunteers helped the Abkhaz to withstand until the start of the talks on 3 September. Whatever Shevardnadze, the famous diplomat, may be saying, the purposes and intentions of the regime in Tbilisi have been made clear not by words but by actions: to destroy the Abkhaz Republic (when entering Sukhumi, the first thing they did was to remove the flag and the state seal from the building of the Supreme Soviet) and to provide a final solution to the Abkhaz problem by physical means, by reducing the number of Abkhaz (publicly, on television, Karkarashvili, the commander of the Georgian forces, announced that if there was resistance he was prepared to destroy literally the entire Abkhaz population); the third assignment, although considered the first by some members of the National Guard, seemed to have been to rob what they considered to be a prosperous maritime population.

As to the political role.... Well, I entirely share the assessment of events in Abkhaziyi made by the Confederation of Mountain Peoples and the International Cherkess Association and Republic, and the Northern Caucasus region, which expressed their indignation and concern over the introduction of Georgian forces into the territory of the Abkhaz Republic.

[Dementyeva] I understand and fully sympathize with the struggle of the Abkhaz for their survival, but I cannot help but question the timeliness of some decisions made by the Abkhaz parliament prior to the invasion. Georgia itself is going through a difficult time, and a clash between two currents was noticeable within Georgian society and leadership: democratic development versus a military-dictatorial trend. By contributing to the strengthening of democracy in Georgia, Abkhaziyi ensured for itself a sensible and well-wishing partner in the future talks. Dictatorships and hard times have always resorted to the threat of Abkhaz patriotism in order to whip up the national patriotic enthusiasm of the Georgian population. Let us recall that the 9 April 1989 Tbilisi tragedy ended with an anti-Abkhaz meeting initially started by Patiashvili, over which he subsequently lost control.

Politically, Abkhaziyi did not benefit. The international community clearly became tired of your internal quarrels and the events in distant and strange Abkhaziyi were looked upon almost indifferently through the lens of the Yugoslav wreckage. Political support on the part of the North Caucasian republics also fell below expectations. Why?

[Khadzhi-Murat] Yes, the position assumed by the leaders of the republics, krais, and oblasts in the Northern Caucasus toward Abkhaziyi is striking because of its duplicity and lack of principles. Two weeks prior to the signing of the final document of the Moscow meeting in Armavir, they called for the immediate withdrawal of Georgian

forces from Abkhaziya. Yet, having gathered in Moscow to sign the bilateral agreement (and not the trilateral agreement as had been announced, for the leader of Abkhaziya signed it among "others"), those same individuals, having failed to make any kind of assessment of the events and assist the two high contracting parties, were concerned above all with "Georgian integrity," and set as their prime task the "disbanding and removing out of Abkhaziya and even preventing the entry into Abkhaziya of illegal armed formations and groups. As to Georgia, its Armed Forces were to remain inside the conflict zone but should not exceed the "agreed upon (!) level." I shall abstain from assessing the value of this document, for life itself gave it a quick rating: there is shooting in Abkhaziya. As to the participants in the conference from the Northern Caucasus, let their actions be judged by their own nations. They went so far as to beg Yeltsin to proclaim a state of emergency throughout the entire Northern Caucasus! To the honor of the Russian president, he firmly rejected this suggestion.

But why should anyone be surprised? In North Ossetiya, Kabardino-Balkariya, Karachayevo-Cherkessiya, and in Dagestan those same people who ruled five to seven years ago have remained in power. Only their titles that have changed. First and second secretaries of republic, oblast, and rayon committees disappeared; they have been replaced by presidents, heads of administrations, etc. Leaf through a telephone directory and you will come across those same names, including former prosecutors and chiefs of KGB and MVD administrations, oblast court chairmen, and so on. In Karachayevo-Cherkessiya, 46 out of the 52 leading officials fall into said categories; in Kabardino-Balkariya the same applies to 80 percent of the members of parliament.

[Dementyeva] They feed themselves out of "three sources, three components." If not from home, from their republic, they go to Moscow; if not from Moscow, they find assignments abroad.

[Khadzhi-Murat] In Chechnya, as it calls itself now, everything developed differently although.... What do you think, where are the deposed former chiefs, however you may be describing the Chechen revolution, where are the former chiefs who were rejected by the people? They are in Moscow! They are under the wing of the Russian leadership. They have been given apartments, they are members of prestigious committees, and they travel overseas.

[Dementyeva] In the Chechen Republic, however, there are new people in power but the faults of the regime remain unchanged. A parliament was elected. They elected the president who is the embodiment of the popular dream: a general (every Chechen male is an undrafted military man), not spoiled by bribery, not involved in corruption.... But then what? The first thing was to create a guard, to allow everyone to bear arms, to surround oneself with a loyal "team," to create multiple-layer security agencies, and to clash with the intelligentsia. Could it be then that cadres do not solve all

problems? Also, could it be that at one point we were able to create a unique administrative-command system which did not depend on individual wisens and which could, regardless of any division, retain its qualities, its strength or its weakness? Thus, the set of monumental buildings on Luban Square, architecturally resembling the Berlin Chancellery, has it changed even over a single square centimeter its original purpose? The USSR KGB surrendered its premises and all of its personnel to the Security Service of the Russian Federation. However, it would be difficult to believe that it did not pass along to it all its pre-coup functions.

[Khadzhi-Murat] It is not excluded that some methods of influence applied by this department in the Northern Caucasus have been retained. The helplessness of the system is manifested in its organic inability to master the democratic and legal forms of life and in its unceremonious and scornful attitude toward the objectives of the people.

As to Russia, its main error may be its aspiration to resolve political and national problems with the use of force. Perhaps that may have been what shortsighted boosters of the state were relying on. They thought that it is possible to prevent the breakdown of the Federation by shedding a little blood. However, there is no such thing as shedding a little blood. An empire but not peace can be built on the blood of unfortunate people. We already had an empire. I am confident that KGB intrigues are not necessary for ensuring Russia's preservation. An accord can be signed with the Chechen Republic without pounding on the table. However, in order to achieve this one must suppress the Derzhinskii syndrome and not treat the peoples of the Caucasus like savage natives or threaten small children and law enforcement officials with the Chechen.

[Dementyeva] Currently, almost one year after the effort to institute a state of emergency in the newly established Chechen Republic, an effort which, luckily, failed, and after Russia was saved by the Russian parliament from bloodshed and shame, does it seem to you that disparate and seemingly random events concerning Chechnya seem to follow some kind of logical sequence?

[Khadzhi-Murat] Naturally: first was the failed economic blockade, the bank blockade, the demand for the establishment of a Cossack-Vaynakh Republic, and the Sunzhenskiy Cossack Okrug, and the increased activities of Cossack organizations along the Republic's borders. Unidentified hostile people were waging undeclared war. Therefore, Dudayev had reasons to be nervous. Even the recognition by the Russian parliament by the Ingush Republic within Russia, on 4 July, should be considered, in a sense, a destabilizing factor.

[Dementyeva] However, this is the implementation of an old Ingush dream, unexpectedly obtaining something

which others were unable to attain even with war: the right of a nation to self-determination. One should be pleased together with the Ingush people.

[Khadzhi-Murat] Naturally, but they were given a republic without territory, without a capital, and without legitimate authorities or an organized economy of any kind, but also with an obsolete and deliberately confused quarrel with North Ossetiya on the issue of Prigorodnyy Rayon. A single spark there would blow everything up. As you know, these age-old Ingush territories (one-half of Ingushetiya!), following the 1944 exile of the native population, were turned over to North Ossetiya and have not been returned to this day, although the Law on the Rehabilitation of Repressed Nations clearly stipulates in its sixth "territorial" point that the victimized Republic will be restored within its 1944 boundaries. But why should this amaze us if MVD Lieutenant General Anatoliy Anikiyev (!) himself, as chairman of the Commission of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities in charge of repressed and deported peoples, deems expedient to... postpone and even totally void the law on the rehabilitation of these nations....

However, it is precisely in the Caucasus that an agreement can be reached, for the traditions of joint peaceful co-existence remain strong in that area. Had it not been for the anti-Ingush propaganda and policy promoted in Moscow by A. Dzasokhov, an influential CPSU Central Committee secretary and former first secretary of the North Ossetian Obkom, the simple people would have long reached agreement. At the ninth session of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, for the first time the Ossetian delegation acknowledged the legitimacy of the Ingush territorial demands and all that it asked was to be given some time to implement them.

The new Republic does not have a head of administration but a "governor general" was literally appointed for it from up high, i.e., as early as July, General of the Army V. Yermakov (one more general, specialist in repressing nations!) landed on the military airfield, as representative of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, accompanied by soldiers. Before they could even understand what was happening, the Ingush had to arm themselves....

[Dementyeva] There is no reason to be concerned by the authority issue. Unquestionably, I sympathize with the selfless Ingush intellectuals, former dissidents, dreamers, and lovers of their people. However, I feel no goodwill whatsoever when I think of the crowd of officials waiting impatiently for new positions to open in this new governmental formation. The nomenclature does not recognize any international frontiers when it becomes a question of protecting the old and creating new positions.

[Khadzhi-Murat] It seems to me that the Russian Supreme Soviet was not concerned with Ingush officials or, in general, with Ingushetiya. It is no accident that the Law on the Creation of the Ingush Republic does not mention the issue of Prigorodnyy Rayon. Conversely, we can see in it the intention to promote a clash between

peoples which are very close to each other, of Ingush vs. Chechen. So far they lived together and now there will be a border dividing them. The Russian Federation Supreme Soviet has retained the right to draw a line of demarcation between them thereby, as we already said, setting in the center of the Northern Caucasus a charge to be exploded by remote control. [Dementyeva] So that by pushing a button undermine a stubborn Chechen Republic?

[Khadzhi-Murat] Yes. All indications to this effect exist.

[Dementyeva] Does this mean that you are having yet another state of emergency?

[Khadzhi-Murat] I do not know, but there is a threat in the air. Unfortunately, even the bloodshed in Abkhaziya was merely a pretext. It was a pretext for instituting an actual blockade of Chechnya. In the areas bordering the Chechen Republic, the Don Internal Forces Division was introduced into Dagestan; armed forces were sent into Kabardino-Balkariya; a spetsnaz regiment was transferred from Novocherkassk to Gudermesskiy Rayon in Chechnya; the Vladikavkaz Cossack Regiment, three military schools, and individual subunits of the Dzerzhinskiy Division were transferred to Prigorodnyy Rayon. As of 5 September, on the eve of the first anniversary of independence, Russia blockaded Groznyy Airport.

[Dementyeva] We still remember Gorbachev's blockade of Lithuania.... [Khadzhi-Murat] I am holding in my hand the minutes of the Moscow meeting of the heads of the republics of the Caucasus, which was held on 3 September. In discussing the need to disarm illegally armed formations (not referring to the "Mkedrioni") the president of Russia blabs out the following:

"On our side, we undertake and today we also discuss the taking of steps on the territory of the republics of the Northern Caucasus to disarm such formations existing on the territory of the Russian south, adjacent to the Caucasus, because such formations are being raised there as well. We include Chechnya. At this point I shall not reveal the measures we have planned...."

[Dementyeva] Details about those measures were provided by the ministers of security and internal affairs and Russia's prosecutor general at a working meeting which was held in Pyatigorsk where, according to press reports, the law-enforcement authorities of the Russian Federation "noting the need for adopting, in accordance with the current legislation, most decisive measures to block attempts at establishing anti-constitutional power structures, to legalize illegal armed formations, and to foment interethnic discord." What do they intend to put an end to? If there is a confederation, what is this "power structure" and why are such large numbers of troops necessary? And if....

[Khadzhi-Murat] I hope that the president realizes that all the peoples of the Northern Caucasus will stand up in

support of Chechnya. Democracy in Russia will die with the very first shot fired in such a war.

Shanibov's Daughter Describes Apartment Search

924C2472B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 Sep 92 pp 1-2

[Report by Natalya Pachegina: "Whole of North Caucasus Alarmed by the Disappearance of the President of the KGNK: The Chairman of the Congress of the Kabardin People Accuses Moscow of a Lack of a Nationalities Policy"]

[Text] The circumstances of the disappearance on 23 September in Nalchik of Musa Shanibov, president of the KGNK (Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the North Caucasus) and the details connected with this compel the assumption that the president of the KGNK has been arrested and is being held in solitary confinement pending trial. As your NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent has learned from telephone conversations with Shanibov's daughter and the leadership of the Congress of the Kabardin People, where Shanibov is a notable figure, they are all still in the dark as to the KGNK leader's fate.

The morning of the day before yesterday, Shanibov had been summoned, as Congress headquarters said, for a discussion by Major General Khachim Shogenov, minister of internal affairs of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic. None of the KGNK president's associates, his bodyguard included, was worried, since they know of the friendly relations between them. On the way to the republic MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], Shanibov's car was stopped by persons unknown, but "looking like," according to eyewitnesses, investigators from the Public Prosecutor's Office of Russia. It is well known in Nalchik that a group of officers of the Public Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Security and the MVD of Russia has been at work in the republic for more than two weeks now. The purpose of their official assignment is an investigation pertaining to the fact of the institution by the Public Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation of criminal proceedings against the leadership of the KGNK. This unregistered, it has transpired, public organization is being charged with crimes specified by Articles 70, 74, 126, and 218 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation: public calls for the perpetration of terrorist actions and sabotage, a violation of national equality, the taking of hostages, and the illegal use of weapons.

That same day, Shanibov's daughter said, at noon approximately, people in civilian clothes entered the president's apartment. There were, according to Madina Shanibova, about six or seven of them. They were supported by two militia officers. Without introducing themselves, the "guests" presented a search warrant signed, as Madina said, by some Russian name. The reasons for the search, contained in the wording, evidently, did not stick in her mind. To his daughter's

question as to where Shanibov was, the visitors first responded evasively and then said that he was being detained. In obedience to familial feelings, Madina expressed a protest and attempted to prevent the search. When, however, remembering that a search had to be performed in the presence of witnesses, she demanded that the visitors comply with the law, the latter offered her the company of the two militia officers stamping around with nothing to do outside the apartment. Madina was refractory and attempted to call KKN [Congress of the Kabardin People] headquarters. The telephone was then snatched away from her. Immediately upon a signal to begin the search, the "guests" dispersed around the rooms, and so there was no chance of controlling what they did, Madina said, and she suspected that in such a situation papers and weapons which were, possibly, to have been "found" during the search could have been planted, because the guests were, she observed, carrying bags. During the lengthy negotiations with the visitors, two of whom, as Shanibov's daughter ascertained, were representatives of the Russian Public Prosecutor's Office, her husband entered the apartment. When, however, he attempted to leave to notify the Congress headquarters of what had happened, they would not let him out. And then, Madina said, she made a dash for the balcony and began to call loudly to her neighbors. One of the visitors, roughly twisting her arm, tried to pull her back into the apartment. She managed to jump across the balcony onto the roof of the porch, and in five minutes she was at KKN headquarters (it is nearby). Her fellow countrymen rushed immediately by car and on foot to the members of Shanibov's household. Thus, Madina said, they managed to prevent the search.

Your NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent was told yesterday in the headquarters of the Congress of the Kabardin People that on the day that the KGNK president disappeared, toward evening, the headquarters of the KKN was visited by Shogenov, minister of internal affairs of the republic, who held talks with the leadership of the Congress, but he did not notify them of Shanibov's fate either. The next day, according to some figures, 1,500 persons, according to others, 5,000-6,000 persons, gathered in the square in front of the House of Soviets building. Buses, trucks and personal motor transport from various areas of Kabarda and Balkaria have been arriving in the city for a mass meeting organized by the KKN, demanding the release of the president of the KGNK and the leader of the Kabardin people. The whole of the North Caucasus, your NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA was told, is in the grip of anxiety over the disappearance, more, the detention, it is believed here, of Shanibov. Delegations of representatives from Abkhazia and Chechnya have already come to Nalchik. The entire city square, where sympathizers had gathered in the drenching rain, was ringed by the militia, reinforced by several armored personnel carriers. Those at the meeting, however, were not, on the assurance of members of KKN headquarters, armed.

It was said in Congress headquarters that such a fate could befall Yuriy Kalmykov, chairman of the KKN also.

As on previous days, the response in the Kabardino-Balkaria Public Prosecutor's Office (your NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent had been calling there for two days to talk with Radik Savin, leader of the group of Russian investigators, but he very cleverly avoided an interview) was: "The leadership is busy; the Russian group is on assignment."

Rostov Cossacks Seek Statehood

924C2468C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 24 Sep 92 p 2

[POSTFAKTUM item: "Cossacks Dream of Statehood"]

[Text] A Cossack group has proposed that the Rostov Oblast Soviet work for the reestablishment of the "Great Don Host" has an independent state. The proposal is contained in a program drawn up last week by an oblast Soviet working group charged with drafting documents to rehabilitate the Cossacks. Among other options, it is proposed that Rostov Oblast be converted into a Don Autonomous Oblast within the Russian Federation, or that the Don Soviet Republic within the ROF, [expansion unknown] which was proclaimed in March 1918, be reestablished.

The Cossacks propose that Rostov Oblast's existing administrative division be abolished and that a territorial administration system of a Don Host Oblast be instituted. This would entail the establishment of traditional forms of Cossack self-administration, such as Cossack circles and hetman boards, and local government bodies would be renamed in keeping with national traditions. A Cossack police force would be created to maintain order. The working group is recommending that these proposals be taken into account in the process of drafting an oblast charter. It is suggested that the proposals be implemented during a two-year transition period.

Attitudes of, Toward Don Cossacks Polled

924C2482A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 9 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Vadim Ogurtsov under the rubric "Commentary: In the Mirror of Sociology": "The Cossack Don Region: Myths and Reality"]

[Text] Cossackdom is rising up out of nonexistence. After the bloody terror, the attempt to destroy the identity of the Cossacks, and decades of oblivion. The Cossacks are gradually washing the tar of slander from their history and putting their real heroes on a pedestal. They are assembling the traditions and customs based on the tales of the old people and memoirs from abroad.

It is unlikely that there is a person in Rus, even among the most hard-line "formers," who would protest against the moral essence of the presidential ukases on rehabilitation of repressed peoples and Cossackdom. But the intentions of certain impatient heirs of its glorious history are at times alarming. Because the great and lesser Cossack assemblies have been boiling with frenzied talk about the former borders of the oblast of the Don Host and ataman rule, about restoration of the Republic of the Don and communal land use, and about their own right to punish and pardon, declare mobilization, and give their blessing to volunteers for the armed resistance zones. Even the notions of a contemporary Cossackdom are very vague and contradictory in public opinion.

The Russian sociological service, Monitoring, under the leadership of Igor Yakovenko, just completed a study of the Cossackdom which is being reborn. It was done at the order of the Don representative of the president of Russia, Vladimir Zubkov. It is curious that the oblast administration "could find no possibility" of subsidizing this work, while in endless foreign travels the "Don leaders and deputies" have spent considerable amounts of money.

The mass poll whose results were used to draw the conclusions encompassed 800 residents of the 5 largest cities and 5 rural rayons of the oblast. In addition the leaders of the Cossack movement and leaders of the administration and councils of representatives of science and the press answered the questions. A corresponding analysis was done by the central and local press.

How Many of Them Are There and Where Have They Been Driven?

The answer to this question is of fundamental importance, since the present leaders of the Don Cossacks seem to assert time and again with their behavior and decisions that it is precisely Cossacks who make up a large part of the Don's population, so far exceeding "all the rest" that, because of the insignificance of the latter, it is not even necessary to listen to their opinions.

But just how many Cossacks are there? In 1916 they made up 42.3 percent of the Don population. Ten years later it was 20 percent, which was the result of the bloody disbandment of the Cossacks and their loss of status as a social class.

The only ways sociologists today can define a Cossack are by blood origin, the opinion of the person himself, and the opinion of those around him. So to the question "Do you consider yourself a member of Cossackdom," only 28 percent of those polled answered affirmatively, 60 percent gave a definite no, and the rest said "it is difficult for me to answer."

Taking into account the exploratory character of the study, the conclusion can be drawn that the 28 percent estimate can be viewed only as a working hypothesis. It reflects a fact of social consciousness more than a fact of

people's practical activity and behavior. At the same time sociologists note that those people tend to be older and less educated. In terms of type of occupation there are 10 percent more peasants, 12 percent fewer white-collar workers and engineering and technical personnel, 7 percent more pensioners, and 6 percent fewer students in Cossackdom. There are roughly the same number of workers and entrepreneurs in Cossackdom and in the rest of the oblast's population. It is interesting that of the people who consider themselves Cossacks 51 percent are urban-dwellers.

Rebirth: Is It Good or Bad?

This question is also a very controversial one. And every unusual event in Cossack life, whether it is the forced expulsion of Chechens from the Cossack village of Romanovskaya or the openly announced claim to supreme power, merely intensifies this controversy. It is perhaps because of that that only 40.8 percent of the population has a positive attitude toward the rebirth of Cossackdom. True, another 18.5 percent consider it "more positive than negative." And the corresponding figures for the attitude of the Cossacks themselves are 67.3 percent and 19.9 percent, while for the so-called non-Cossacks the figures are 26.7 percent and 16.9 percent. As we can see, such fundamental discrepancies in views may certainly be the source of a certain tension in the region. Obviously Cossacks perceive themselves as a real community brought about by objective factors: blood relationship, having lived in lands populated by Cossacks, the spiritual influence of Cossackdom, and the need for protection from external and internal threats. But non-Cossacks consider Cossackdom a sham community based on external, temporary, or random factors: fashion, influence of relatives, possible oppression, struggle for power, and circumstances of the moment.

The Collapse of the Myth

Some politicians were betting on the Cossacks in order to strengthen their position in the bitter dispute over private ownership of land. In order to confirm this it is sufficient to glance through the stenographic reports of Russia's congresses, where the Don "formers" with the rank of deputies unanimously voted against it. Or recall their agitation and propaganda in the election districts where they warn against the "selling out of Russia and the rebirth of Cossackdom."

On the eve of the 1917 revolution the Cossacks, who made up 42.3 percent of the Don population, owned 64.5 percent of the land; "indigenous peasants," who made up one-quarter of the population, had only 3.9 percent of the land, landholders—15 percent, and Kalmyks—3.8 percent, while the Host reserve was 18.8 percent. Even today one of the most widespread myths is that Cossacks are almost without exception against private ownership of land. It turns out nothing of the kind. Of them 70.8 percent are "for" it and only 14.6 percent are "against" it. The opinion of non-Cossacks is slightly different—the corresponding figures are 81.2 percent

and 8.1 percent. In short, the entire population of Rostov Oblast fairly unanimously supports private ownership of land.

Of course, this does not remove the contradictions of real land use and land organization, it merely establishes a fact of social consciousness. But that fact is very weighty given the present political struggle and economic reform.

Opinions on Power

Up until now the impertinent, unlawful decisions of the Cossack assemblies and the "correspondence" in fairly categorical tones with the president himself have been before the public. It is no surprise that the character of Cossackdom which is being reborn is too "hot-tempered" to think things through first and then make up orders and plans for state reorganization. It is very likely that that will indeed happen when the movement puts forth not only "squadron commanders" but also wise strategists, who will not have to spend their time rescinding rashly prepared orders.

But for now, in response to the question of sympathy for Russia's political figures, 22.1 percent of the Don's entire population expressed support for President Yeltsin and 20.7 percent—for Vice President Rutskoy. And then come Gavdar with 4.9 percent, Sobchak with 4.4 percent, Khasbulatov with 3.2 percent, and Zhirnovskiy with 2.4 percent. But as for the Cossacks, their attitude toward these same leaders is different: the corresponding figures were 20.5 percent, 26.9 percent, 4.1 percent, 3.5 percent, 2.9 percent, and 3.5 percent. In other words, the trend of the last half year, a leveling out of ratings for Yeltsin and Rutskoy, is being further developed among Don Cossackdom. It calls Vice President Rutskoy the top leader.

But when the question was raised of support for politicians, 50 percent of the Cossacks were Rutskoy supporters while 33 percent were Yeltsin supporters. Among non-Cossacks the scale was balanced at 46 percent. In short, while on the whole, despite its heterogeneity and the variety of attitudes toward the president, the population all the same is inclined to support him to a great degree, most Cossacks clearly support the vice president. However, the researchers note that the relatively unknown character of the top oblast leaders is a problem. It is the same among the Cossacks as among the population as a whole.

How Is the Path 'More Beaten Down and Easier'?

Almost more than anything else the central newspapers have accused Cossackdom of being reactionary and openly festering the main reforms. Most likely because the liberal intelligentsia still apparently perceive it as a deadly opponent of any democratic transformations. The stereotyped image of the Cossack from Soviet history textbooks has an effect: a man on horseback, whip in hand, furiously beating proletarians who are demanding freedom.

But just what did the barometer of sociology show when it asked what path Russia should take? Yet another myth crashed to the ground: 53.6 percent of the Cossacks and 53.9 percent of the non-Cossacks are firmly convinced that Russia should follow "its own, special path of development." And only 13.1 percent and 25 percent are prepared to turn to the paths of other continents and countries. And Cossacks advise the authorities first of all to stop speculation—56.7 percent, provide social protection of the population—45 percent, stop the growth in crime—38.6 percent, and preserve the integrity of Russia—36.6 percent. But these precepts are typical of the non-Cossack population, which in addition adds human rights, private property, and entrepreneurship to the main problems.

When We Say 'Party' We Mean...

No matter where public opinion polls are conducted and no matter which social groups they encompass, with enviable constancy they register the growing antiparty sentiments of Russians. As they say, having scalded themselves on communist milk, now people blow on the water of all the other political groups. The people of the Don are no exception either. But the parties exist and the elections based on party rolls will obviously come.

But what if the elections were set for tomorrow? Judging from the answers, the Don Region would vote for the candidates from the People's Party of Free Russia (Rutskoy's party)—28.1 percent of the Cossacks and 21.9 percent of the rest of the population. And, naturally, 42.1 percent and 10.1 percent, respectively, voted for those nominated by the "Union of Cossacks." And the sympathies of the Cossacks belong to the rest of the parties in the following order: Demrossiya [Democratic Russia]—11.1 percent (18.5 percent for non-Cossacks); Russian Communist Workers' Party—3.2 percent (3.7 percent for non-Cossacks); Democratic Party of Russia—7 percent (12 percent); "Working Russia"—5.8 percent (7.3 percent); the Socialist Party—5.3 percent (7.3 percent); the Republican Party—4.1 percent (4.8 percent); the Russian National Assembly—3.5 percent (3.1 percent); and the Social Democratic Party—2.3 percent (2.8 percent). As we can see, the only parties which have a share of support from the residents of Rostov Oblast higher than their share of rejection are Rutskoy's party (the NPSR [People's Party of Free Russia]) and the Demrossiya movement. In addition the Cossacks are inclined to support their own party.

Of course, Cossack organizations do not have a distinct pre-election program yet and the competitiveness of the public leaders and unity in Cossack institutions are not high, but the Cossack organizations, it seems, might not come in last in the coming elections.

Farewell, the Trumpet Calls...

Cossackdom is formed of a system of three organizational elements: military service-land holding—

self-government. Without them or without even one of them the rebirth of Cossackdom becomes like ethnic folklore.

So then are the Cossack formations to be created anew? "Yes" was the answer of 55.1 percent of the Cossacks and only 19.7 percent of the rest of the population.

Just what kind of military service do the Don people prefer for their sons? Of the Cossacks 39.8 percent and of the rest of the population 63.2 percent are for a voluntary, contract service; 26.9 percent and 26.1 percent are for the present draft-type service; 26.9 percent and 3.7 percent are for service in the Cossack host. Although it is difficult to imagine a "cavalry of the atomic age."

Just what role is given to Cossack formations? One out of three residents of Rostov Oblast and one out of two Cossacks believe the main mission is to protect Russia's borders. One out of four Rostov Oblast residents and one out of three Cossacks see the need for Cossack troops to maintain public order.

The introduction of ataman rule where the ataman of the Don Host would become the head of executive power is a fairly tough question. Of the Cossacks 50.9 percent voted for it; of the non-Cossacks—15.3 percent. The idea of reviving the Don Cossack Republic is even more controversial. Answering "for" and having it as a part of the Russian Federation were 59.1 percent and 23.3 percent, respectively, as a self-supporting, independent state the respective figures were 4.7 percent and 2.3 percent. Obviously, most of the population rejects the idea of ataman rule and a Cossack republic. However, the predominance of these sentiments among the Cossacks is an important feature of political consciousness.

So, let us give a basic summary. First of all, Cossackdom which is being reborn is very significant in terms of its scale in the eyes of experts both in terms of numbers—close to a million people—and in terms of the number of sympathizers. The bearers of Cossack self-consciousness are represented almost equally in all the main social groups. Despite the popular opinion, the non-Cossack population still has a fairly loyal attitude toward the process of the rebirth of Cossackdom, although tangles of fairly tough contradictions can already be seen.

The Cossacks' political consciousness is distinguished by great definiteness, rigidity, and an orientation to forceful methods of resolving problems. But Cossackdom itself has a great deal of weight and influence in the oblast and under certain conditions may lay claim to power in the next elections if its representatives win. Accusations of conservatism and failure to accept private ownership of land, judging from everything, are groundless.

However, it is obvious that Cossackdom is by no means being reborn in the form in which it existed before 1917. The process of birth of a—in many respects—new social community is underway, one which has preserved a certain genetic, spiritual tie with Cossackdom. There is no longer the Orthodox religion feature. Most Cossacks

are not prepared to take on obligations and restrictions which would change their present way of life. In a certain sense a gigantic historical trap has been formed—millions of people have found themselves in the role of the hero of the famous novel who slept lethargically for seven decades and awoke to find himself in a world where different laws ruled.

On the other hand, as sociologists assert, Cossackdom as a traditional form of self-defense of the Russian population draws the most active part of the people and holds strong potential for the renewal of the nation and society as a whole.

But just what are the variants of state policy in regard to Cossackdom? If it is perceived as a factor of political instability and as an archaism, and, since a policy of prohibitions is impossible today, to try to turn its activity to the cultural-historical channel by restricting the status of Cossack organizations to the framework of social ones will most likely mean the increasing confrontation of Cossackdom with the authorities.

If we treat the constructive orientation (entrepreneurship, private farming, protection of the environment, and the rebirth of cultural-historical and domestic traditions) and the destructive orientation (a desire for power and conversion into an armed political party ready to seize power, including in a nonconstitutional way) differently, then a result like the first one is possible.

But what if Cossackdom is not divided into "good" and "bad"? If all illegal actions are simply suppressed and prosecuted under the law? Then Cossackdom must be divided on a completely different basis into those who are prepared to enter special relations with the state which are somewhat mindful of class ones and those who as Cossacks by blood and soul and by virtue of their self-consciousness certainly do not intend to change. This second group, which is more numerous, cannot be the object of any state or legal regulation. As for the first group, here the need arises to precisely enumerate the rights and obligations of the state, the Cossack, and the Cossack organization, which in this case would cease to be a social one and become an element of the state structure.

This is obviously the paradoxical result of the entire thousand-year history of Cossackdom: having originated as antistate outlaws, Cossackdom is gradually becoming one of the pillars of the All-Russian State, very specifically and rigidly fitted in the state structure on the principle of "the Cossack is in service to the state and the state provides free use of land and tax benefits to the Cossack." It is precisely these interrelations which sociologists recommend be made the foundation in formulating a program for the rebirth of Cossackdom.

Tuva: Conditions Not Yet Right for Sovereignty

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in Russian 23 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by Vitaliy Portnikov: "Tuva Will Not Announce Its Independence: Conditions Are Not Yet Right for This"]

[Text] Last Saturday, the head of the world's Buddhists, Dalai Lama XIV, who had come to Kyzyl for the first time in the entire history of Tuva, ceremoniously blessed the new republic's state flag in the central square. This was a blue, white and gold banner ratified by the session of the Tuva Supreme Soviet shortly prior to this event. The deputies also ratified an emblem: A depiction of a horesman galloping on a background of a five-leaved flower in the rays of a rising sun. Down to the most minute detail, this emblem is reminiscent of the seal of the Tuva People's Republic (TPR)—an independent state which existed here in 1921-1944.

It is true, Tuva's statehood was a rather specific phenomenon. Already the first article of its first constitution stated that "in international relations the republic acts under the patronage of Soviet Russia." However, this same article noted that Tuva is a "free state, not dependent on anyone in its domestic affairs." It is no accident that from the very start of existence of independent Tuva there was a battle between the country's leadership and the ruling Tuva People's Revolutionary Party (TPRP) not for life, but for death between politicians who understood the specifics of the Tuva people's way of life, and those who wanted to thoughtlessly copy the building of socialism in the Stalinist manner. The skirmish ended with victory for the group headed by Salchak Toka who had received his education in Moscow, and with the beginning of mass repressions—so as not to be left behind the "great neighbor." In August of 1944, Toka's grouping annexed the country to the Soviet Union with rights of an autonomous oblast (and later a republic) of the RSFSR. The "Tuva Stalin" continued to rule successfully until his death in 1974.

They implemented collectivization in Tuva, and in doing so completely undermined the already unbrilliant economy of the republic. New population from beyond the Sayan poured into the industrial enterprises which were being built. Tuva became a backward subsidized outskirts of the Union, fully dependent on handouts from the center and incapable of maintaining an adequate living standard for the population. One in every four people in Tuva today has been convicted, and former prisoners are, obviously, a significant factor in the political and economic life of the republic. The non-declining birth rate (63 percent of the residents are under 30 years of age) has led to the emergence of a vagrant social strata—young people aimlessly wandering about Kyzyl, reassuring themselves with alcohol or drugs. In this situation, the memory of the lost statehood is reborn. Of course, this statehood was not the model of democracy—a single-party system and retention of feudal orders.

Nevertheless, it was sufficiently close to the traditions of the people—at least before Salchak Toka seized power—and left at least prospective possibilities for maneuvering between its neighbors—the Soviet Union and Mongolia.

The ranks of the proponents of a possible referendum on Tuva's right to secede from the Russian Federation are growing. The People's Party of Sovereign Tuva, which holds more centrist positions, has joined the People's Front "Khostug Tyva" ("Free Tuva") in proclaiming this slogan. Yet at the same time, Tuva does not have a single serious politician or a single political organization which would speak out in favor of secession itself. We are speaking of securing this right in the new constitution (it is absent in the proposed draft). Separation itself, however, would mean full economic collapse in today's conditions. The present leaders of Tuva understand this fact perfectly well. The president of the republic, Sherigool Oorzhak, an experienced economic manager who holds centrist positions, and the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Kaadyr-ool Vichelday, one of the first democrats in Tuva, see the possibilities of developing Tuva's sovereignty within the framework of the Federative Agreement. The draft of the new constitution defines Tuva as a state which enters into the make-up of the Russian Federation on the basis of this document.

Another question: Is an independent Tuva possible in general? Theoretically, "ceremonially,"—yes. I believe that if the Tuva Supreme Soviet wanted to hold a referendum on the question of independence, it could easily get the necessary majority. However, it is not only the economic conditions which are lacking for this independence. The political conditions are also lacking. The democratic forces in the republic are too weak, while the working parliament is a haven for former party workers. The discussion about the fate of a monument to Salchak Toka in the center of Kyzyl has become a "litmus test" on this question. In the course of this discussion, deputies from the former nomenclature expressed their love for the shadow of the organizer of mass repressions and adopted the decision to preserve the statue in its former place. The Tuva ex-communists, it seems, could not proclaim independence even out of a sense of self-preservation.

The conditions for possible restoration of Tuva statehood outside the Russian Federation are concealed in the regional placement of forces. It is not even a matter of Mongolia (although the new Mongolia, evidently, would very much like to have a "buffer" state between itself and Russia, much more so than did the Mongolia of Salchak Toka's political twin, Khorlogyn Choybal-san). Simply speaking, efforts at sovereignization of the Russian republics, which the center is forced to meet halfway, will lead sooner or later (most likely sooner) to granting analogous rights to the krais and oblasts, to strengthening of the regions and weakening of the center. This tendency may be stopped by only one method from the sphere of non-scientific fantasy: To "separate" at once all the potentially dissatisfied republics, and on the remaining territory to create a unitarian independent

state for a certain time. But since such a possibility is not foreseen, for Kyzyl the ties with Krasnoyarsk or Novosibirsk are much more important than any gestures from Moscow. Because Moscow is (excuse us, but the market is coming) in the last phase of thoughtless disposition of Russia's economic resources. It may very well be that for the Siberian regions, simply by some economic considerations, it will be more profitable to have contacts with an independent Tuva, a country with legislation adapted to their needs, than to support a poverty-stricken republic. For the time being, however, Tuva has found itself among the regions which have signed the "Siberian Agreement"—a document promising the creation of an authoritative economic, and in the future perhaps also political, Siberian regional union.

Deputy Views Tuva's Draft Constitution

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 in Russian 17 Sep 92 p. 2

[Article by Chikit-Dorzhu Ondar, People's Deputy of the Russian Federation and of the Republic of Tuva: "The Khural Returns to Tuva"]

[Text] On 16 September the Supreme Soviet of Tuva proceeded to examine the draft of a constitution for their republic.

One of the authors of the draft, Chikit-Dorzhu Ondar, People's Deputy of the Russian Federation and of the Republic of Tuva, gives an opinion about this document.

A proclamation of the Tuvian ASSR Supreme Soviet in December 1990 about the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Soviet Republic of Tuva was the juridical basis for preparing the new constitution (the Basic Law) of the new republic. In this connection, a Constitutional Committee was formed which included people's deputies of the Supreme Soviet of Tuva from among some of the best trained and most experienced jurists, social scientists, historians, philologists, economists, and other specialists. Right away the question arose: Can the Tuvian Constitutional Commission independently, by its own efforts, cope with preparation of a new Basic Law? The brief "experiment" showed that it would be difficult to do so without "outside" help. Therefore we invited specialists experienced in constitutional law to consult with and advise members of the commission.

Nevertheless, because a group of experts was created, the chairman of the republic's Constitutional Commission had to listen to many reproaches: again, they said, Mongush asks Ivan to write a draft of the Constitution. Those who spoke this way clearly overrated their potential and did not understand that the specialists were not at all invited to write the draft Constitution but to give consultation and extend qualified professional assistance, and that preparation of the draft of the Basic Law is a direct and indirect task of the Constitutional Commission itself and no one will take that task away from it. Life has proved our correctness.

However, entirely unexpected and unpleasant for many was the opinion that there was no need to make all that fuss, we should return to the Constitution of the Tuvianian Arat Republic that was adopted back in 1932 and which operated within Tuva until its entry into the Soviet Union, that is, until 1944. Those who advocate such a course apparently do not understand completely the essence of the legal consequences that ensue from such a solution, and if they did understand, then they did not give complete consideration to responsibility for the eventual fate of Tuva's people.

A return to the 1932 Constitution would mean essentially the restoration in Tuva of a form of state power and control that was ethnocratic in nature and dictatorial in content. In those times the Presidium of the Malyy Khural (nowadays the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet) actually ruled the country. With no separation of powers and no movement toward a state ruled by law, it would not be possible to hold a conversation, for Article 32 of the Constitution said that the Presidium of the Malyy Khural supervises the government (!) on local and other questions and communicates with the appropriate institutions through the government, but directly on extraordinarily important questions. A situation would arise under which the Basic Law would come into clear contradiction with the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Soviet Republic of Tuva, which states clearly the striving of the republic's people to build a state that is democratic and ruled by law, and to go forward to an open civilian society.

During the new turn in their history, the people of Tuva could find themselves in that same feudal-patriarchal dead end, the exit from which it tried to find (and let us be candid—not always successfully) in Union with their mighty northern neighbor.

Preparation and adoption of the new Constitution is the realistic way out of the difficult situation in which the republic has found itself, together with the whole country. Turning, in this connection, to the Basic Law of the Tuvianian Republic, I dwell only on the basic features that characterize the look of the new Constitution.

I note first of all that the Constitutional Commission has not tried to create some kind of superoriginal draft of the Constitution. Being based on the Declaration of the republic's state sovereignty, we have tried to produce a document that is consistent, substantive, and harmonious from the point of view of juristic techniques, and which actually, and not just in words, can become our Basic Law. It is not up to us to judge how successful we have been. The draft has started its life. It is difficult to say how its principles will be received by the republic's society and the new leadership of the Supreme Soviet and by the new staff of the Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, it can be said with full justification that it is a basis and it is completely sound.

The draft of the Constitution has eschewed ideology, but not in the sense that there is no barrier to ideology of any

kind. It would seem that there cannot be any at all. For the Constitution by its very nature bears on political rights and is not purely juridical in character. It is my understanding that eschewing ideology is a deliverance of the Basic Law from the dictates and monopoly of any ideology, a conversion to real pluralism, an augmentation of the institutions and norms of the Constitution by the spirit of civilian society and the ideals of a state ruled by law. This is what constitutes the ideology of the Basic Law of the Republic of Tuva.

We have not set before us the "superrevolutionary" task of breaking up and discarding on the dump heap of history everything that was "gained" while we were part of the Soviet Union. This policy will lead us out of the dead end. That which has not stood the test of history and has brought harm undoubtedly should be decisively rejected. However, that which has demonstrated its survivability should be retained. Not necessarily in its previous form but in a reformed version that is applicable to the goals and tasks of the modern era of the Republic of Tuva's development. Let us say that the Tuvianian people have from time immemorial solved their main problems together, in concert, at khurals and other assemblies. In this regard the Soviets' system came to our republic, and to give it up would be to commit the deepest of errors. But the Soviets' reform has been visible in the introductions into the republic of an institution that is familiar and close to the Tuvianian people, the "khural" (the translation into Russian is "soviet" or "meeting"). In this connection, the concept of the khural has been introduced into the draft instead of the "council" concept. However, one need not think that this is purely a terminological operation. Not at all. The question is that of augmenting the khural system by a content that is adequate for its function. We did not manage to accomplish this task completely, and the Constitutional Commission still faces hard work.

The draft of the Constitution ascribes great importance to the problem of delineating power between the organs of state power of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tuva.

The draft has worked out legal guarantees of the republic's sovereignty, and a mechanism for resolving constitutional legality in collisions between federal and republic organs of state power and administration has been proposed. All this is based not upon some kind of ambition of nationalistic patriotism to strive for completely sovereignty but upon a healthy understanding that a legitimate relationship should be mutual, both to the state sovereignty of Russia—a federated state within which Tuva lies—and to Tuva's state sovereignty. For this purpose, Article 7 of the draft establishes that not only the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Tuva possess supremacy within the republic but also that the Constitution of the Russian Federation and its legislative acts that have been adopted in accordance with the powers delegated to Russia by the Republic of Tuva also possess the highest juridical force within the republic.

Now we must augment the institutions and norms of the draft of the Constitutions with a nationality content. The Basic Law should not be a mirror image of the Constitution of the Russian Federation but its counterpart, as it has been up until now.

Situation in Kabardino-Balkariya Viewed

924C24834 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 30 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by A. Yevtushenko under the rubric "Reporting in the Issue": "Shanibov in the Underground, Kabarda on the Square"]

[Text] "Free Yuriy Shanibov!" chanted the crowd of active men on the approach to the House of Soviets of Kabardino-Balkariya on Sunday. The crowd passed the first line of local militia virtually unchecked. And immediately ran into the shields and truncheons of the special forces. They responded with a hail of stones. The soldiers, unable to hold back the onslaught, retreated into the building. And then, obeying someone's orders, the civilians began to assault the House of Soviets.

"As soon as we approached the doors, shots rang out from the windows of the building. From the square where the rally was going on came: 'They killed a woman!'" recalls A. Beyukanov, a participant in the events and member of the ispolkom of the Congress of the Kabardian People. "My comrades and I ran to the woman who had fallen. The bullet had hit her in the head. Now the military are trying to put the responsibility for innocent blood on us."

For now it is difficult to say which of the sides fired the first shot. According to the assertion of one of the aides to the president of the KBR [Kabardino-Balkar Republic], the automatic rifles which the soldiers of the subunits of the Russian military troops had were loaded with blanks. But the columns of the House of Soviets are covered with the marks of bullets which in fact came from the soldiers' side of the building. But then the numerous holes in the windows appeared to be the trails of bullets which had come from the square.

For now one thing is clear: This past Sunday blood flowed in the most stable, calm republic of the Northern Caucasus. And although it has long been clear where things were heading, the calls of certain speakers for calm were drowned in the loud cries of "Freedom or death!" "Down with President Kokov and his government!" "Down with the Russian flag on our House of Soviets!" and the like. Passions were heated up by the lack of information on the whereabouts and status of Yu. Shanibov, the leader of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples, who had been arrested by the Russian authorities.

"We consider what happened as just one thing—an armed attempt to seize power," said one of the republic ministers who wished to remain anonymous (the request not to give names is very popular in the president's circle). Yes, Shanibov's arrest by the procurator's office

of the Russian Federation was a clear tactical error based on ignorance of local conditions. And although the republic's leadership is not involved in this in any way, the opposition in the person of the Congress of the Kabardian People has managed to transfer to us the wave of public indignation which was in fact provoked by this."

The boarded-up windows of the House of Soviets, the barricaded corridors, and the extended fire hoses reinforce the minister's words. But it is relatively calm on the square for now.

And in fact there no longer seems to be any reason for the people to fight against the president. According to official data, two of the three fundamental demands of the ralliers have essentially been met: representatives of the Congress of the Kabardian People have gone to Rostov to pick up Shanibov, who has supposedly been released. The chairman of the Congress, Yu. Kalmykov, was granted air time on local television. The only thing that is unclear right now is why the Russian soldiers are guarding the presidential residence. But people say that the soldiers are not subordinate either to the president or to the minister of the republic's MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. However the open-ended rally on the square which is demanding the resignation of the president and the government of the republic continues. Just as the blockade of the Rostov-Baku highway and Nalchik airport continues. And the announcement of the deputy chairman of the Congress of the Kabardian People, Zh. Gubachikov, sounded altogether sensational:

"The information that Shanibov was released is a lie," he said to me yesterday. "Shanibov is in fact in Nalchik now. But no one released him. He escaped from under guard in Rostov-na-Donu and is in a secret apartment."

Neither side will predict the development of events in Kabardino-Balkariya.

Kabardin Official on Shanibov Affair

924C2472C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 Sep 92 p 2

[Report by Mariya Lisina: "Whole of the North Caucasus Alarmed by the Disappearance of the President of the KGNK"]

[Text] Concerned for the fate of Musa Shanibov, Yuriy Kalmykov, chairman of the Congress of the Kabardin People, got in touch with the minister of internal affairs of Kabardino-Balkaria, who declared that he did not know the whereabouts of the president of the KGNK [Confederation of Mountain People of the North Caucasus].

Shanibov has been incarcerated, Kalmykov said, and the authorities are providing no explanation, even to members of the republic's Supreme Soviet. The deputies saw President Kokov, who promised to talk to the leaders of the Russian investigating group, but the latter replied

that they would be busy with their own business and had no intention of paying any attention to public actions.

Shanibov is deputy chairman of the Congress of the Kabardin People and simultaneously president of the KGNK, but Kalmykov intends to defend him for the added reason that he considers Shanibov a person who is honest and disinterestedly devoted to the cause of the people and to whose name the nomenklatura is allergic.

Shanibov made injudicious remarks, Yuriy Kalmykov observed, and, in particular, at the time of the Abkhaz events he and Soslambekov, chairman of the KGNK parliament, adopted a statement which contained two unacceptable and impermissible points which were damaging to both themselves and the Confederation, which were "seized on" with great pleasure: Tbilisi was declared a disaster zone, and Georgians on the territory of North Caucasus, hostages of the Confederation. But they were not realized. There were, on the other hand, no fighters of the Confederation in Abkhazia, only volunteers. Kalmykov, as president of the International Cherkesskaya Association, had also called for volunteers, believing that, in accordance with the rules of international law, volunteers are not an unlawful phenomenon and that international law condemns only mercenaries. Money, which was handed over to Abkhaz representatives, was collected. The Confederation, in Kalmykov's opinion, was engaged in a noble cause, and it does not have its own army formations.

"There is a fact which both astonishes and angers us," Kalmykov observed. "The Russian leadership did not object to volunteers in the Dniester region. But when it was a question of Abkhazia, the reaction was much more strongly worded. If the Georgian military leadership carries out its threats against the Abkhaz, the Congress of the Kabardin People and the International Cherkesskaya Association will once again find volunteers. We will not back off and will help," the chairman said.

Kalmykov observed that if another ill-conceived, short-sighted action against Shanibov has been inspired by the center, it will only set the population of the North Caucasus republics against the Federal Treaty.

The commitment to the region of Russian troops, who are behaving improperly toward the local populace, has only complicated the situation. These are in fact state of emergency conditions. The Congress of the Kabardin People has resolved that these formations be withdrawn from Kabardino-Balkaria, although the leaders of the North Caucasus republics are prepared for the imposition of a state of emergency with pleasure.

We will demand at the meeting in Nalchik the immediate release of Shanibov and the withdrawal from the region of the Russian special forces, inasmuch as the Kabardin volunteers have returned in organized fashion, not having brought with them a single weapon—such was our demand, Kalmykov said. Their entire armament was left in Abkhazia, in accordance with the final

Moscow treaty. The presence of the troops today, however, is inflaming the atmosphere and exasperating the population.

I do not understand, Kalmykov observed, why Russia's democratic leadership is putting the emphasis on the nomenklatura forces in the republics of the North Caucasus, not on the national democratic movements. The question of the leadership of the republic, which allowed, paying no heed to the Declaration of Sovereignty, Shanibov to be arrested, will be raised also.

Makharadze Discusses Bilateral Relations in Bashkortostan

924C24724 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 Sep 92 p 3

[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA report: "Bashkortostan"]

[Text] On 23 September Murtaza Rakhimov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Bashkortostan, received a working delegation of the Russian Federation, headed by Makharadze, deputy premier of the Russian Federation, which had come to Ufa for the third round of negotiations on the preparation of a bilateral treaty.

In conversation with members of the Russian delegation, Rakhimov emphasized that the bilateral treaty should be based on the fundamental provisions of the Declaration on State Sovereignty and the Federal Treaty. Makharadze set forth the position of the working delegation of the Russian Federation on individual matters which would be discussed at the negotiations. He observed that a basic problem was the delineation of property.

A joint session of the working delegations of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Bashkortostan for preparation of a treaty governing the fundamentals of the relations of the republic and the Republic of Bashkortostan was held on 23 September. Draft agreements between the Government of the Russian Federation and Bashkortostan on a delineation of authority in the sphere of the environment and the use of natural resources and international and foreign economic relations and others, which had been prepared by joint working groups, were discussed at the session. A draft agreement between the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and the National Bank of the Republic of Bashkortostan was discussed.

Smolensk Administration Head Supports Corrupt Protege

924C24534 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 17 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by Ivan Pyrkh (Smolensk): "How He Did Love the 'Volga'"]

[Text] Political development in the Smolensk area in recent years has been rather contradictory, but not as

wild as in other Russian regions. This is explained primarily by the weakness of the local democrats. In the local soviets the partyrats' victory was absolute—officials of various ranks and sorts occupied 70-80 percent of the deputies' seats. The oblast soviet, for a long time prior to the GKChP [State Committee for the Extraordinary Situation], approved the oblast extraordinary situation as an organized enemy of the President of Russia and as a reckless opposition to B. Yeltsin's elections, and it wanted to institute the GKChP. To everyone else, the system kept a bunch of scoundrels in their supervisory positions.

When "August" happened last year and when the President of Russia began to name oblast administration chiefs, most Smolenskers sighed with relief: well, finally the Augean stables will be cleaned and honorable and orderly people will come to governmental and economic power. By the way, the desire to see conscientious and orderly people in authority is probably the strongest desire of all in our people. And most likely this characteristic comes from a thirst for fairness. The Smolenskers expected much from V. Fateyev, who was appointed chief of administration, including replacement of the team, based on more worthy people.

I shall not judge the range of professionalism of those selected for V. Fateyev's team, even more so the degree of professionalism of its members, but one thing undoubtedly catches the eye: the personnel chosen by him, or in any case an extremely substantial proportion of them, came from the old organs of power that were established by CPSU committees. Among the chiefs of administration of rayons and cities, let's say, more than half are former rayon and city party committees secretaries and rayon ispolkom chairmen and their deputies. You ask: what of it? Indeed, it is important that people be orderly and know how to work well.

Be that as it may, many of the appointments nevertheless provoked very strong surprise, bewilderment, and outrage.

For example, when N. Zhvats, former First Secretary of the Pochinkovskiy CPSU rayon committee, received the responsible post administrator of the oblast administration. The man is autocratic, he ruined the fate of several in the rayon, thereby winning a bitter reputation among Pochinkovskiy's people.

But perhaps the most egregious hullabaloo in the oblast was associated with the name of V. Baltser, former general director of the Roslavl Agroindustrial Combine, who was removed from his post as rayon administrator for abuse of his official position. The oblast authorities transferred him at once to Smolensk, and V. Fateyev appointed the worker who had compromised himself deputy director of the agricultural department. Meanwhile, this figure, in three years of supervising the Roslavl Agroindustrial Combine, had inflicted on agriculture and the rayon's processing industry irreparable harm.

By the way, on 5 March of this year, my article in ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA was dedicated to this manager and his tricks. Together with the inspection report of inspection, it lay on V. Fateyev's desk. And in a few weeks the Roslavl interrayon prosecutor A. Kakhlyukov, sent to the oblast administration an official notification in which he reported that the prosecutor had "brought a criminal suit in regard to cases of abuse of official position" by officials of the APK [agroindustrial combine].

What kind of reaction followed on the part of V. Fateyev? An extremely original one. Speaking on oblast radio in answer to a listener's specific question about the case, he advised V. Baltser to bring a suit to court against the author and ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA. He explained further to his audience that only a court can determine whether the first deputy director of the agricultural department is guilty. The oblast head, a smart man, knew well that the article in question was primarily about morals, in other words, about the immorality and lack of conscience of the one whom he undertook to defend.

V. Baltser, as if nothing had happened, continued to be around V. Fateyev, to occupy a high post, and to go about the oblast and teach people how to live and how to till the soil and to manage.

But meanwhile, ever newer and newer facts have come to light that rounded out consequently the picture of V. Baltser's activity, from which can be judged what enormous harm he has caused the rayon's economy and how much property he has snatched, as is said, from the hands of the people. Here is one of them. In shipping raw leather from Roslavl to the Austrian company Agromark at domestic wholesale market prices, that is, at below-away prices and not at world prices, for almost three years, he thereby created for the Austrian company a basis for prosperity. Moreover, in May of last year he found that there was an alleged shortfall of \$1,874,000 worth of raw leather in shipments to this firm by the Roslavl Meat Combine, and he personally ordered that the shortfall be made up. Thus this was a gift to foreign beneficiaries! And judging by everything, it was not unselfish. In February of last year, let's say, he took a Volga car away from Kaluzhskiy Sovkhoz, which was subordinate to him, and handed it over to the joint-stock company Istok. Right now the sovkhos's director V. Figursov is sounding the alarm for its return, but he has not received it. The manager of Istok does not answer and defends his refusal by saying that there was between him and Baltser a completed deal, as a result of which he had "earned" the Volga.

There is a story also about another Volga.

At the end of July a brand new car, the latest model, which, it is said, would bring a million and a half on the black market, arrived at the oblast administration's agricultural department from Nizhny Novgorod. Right at that moment, neither sooner nor later, V. Baltser

wanted to go to Moscow. And although there were many cars in the garage, he still went in the new Volga which had not been registered yet at the GAI [State Automobile Inspectorate], did not have license plates, or the appropriate documents, even for the motor, and, of course, it could not lawfully leave the garage. V. Baltser, having gone through fire, water, and tight spots, knew full well, it stands to reason, all these fine points but nevertheless set out for the capital. In Moscow this car was "stolen" from him. And—for the ending: the militia refused to search for it, since it had not been registered, and therefore there was nothing to look for.

What opinion will the people have about the administration if V. Baltser occupies a key post in its ranks? What words does the chief, V. Fateyev, merit if he protects this man? And there are no eloquent judgments or arguments, none of the most loyal words uttered over the radio or at meetings and conferences about V. Fateyev's revolutionary spirit, that would ennoble authority in the eyes of Smolenskers if even the smallest number of such people as V. Baltser are allowed to have it.

Oblast Soviet Head on Volgograd Reforms

924C24764 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 40, 30 Sep 92 p 12

[Interview with Aleksandr Morozov, chairman of the Volgograd Oblast soviet and former head of the faculty of theoretical physics and prorector of Volgograd State University, by Andrey Filippov, place and date not given. "Who Has More Money Has Great Responsibility. Leaving the World of Stars and Galaxies. Theoretical Physicist Ends Up in the Chair of the Speaker of the Regional Parliament. What Is the Result of This Experiment of the Voters?"]

[Text] Right after Nizhny Novgorod, Volgograd Oblast joined the regional economic experiment. Simultaneously, the Russian government announced the shift of the center of gravity of economic power to the regions. How does local authority, specifically the person of the chairman of the Volgograd Oblast soviet, feel about this shift?

Before he arrived on the political arena, Aleksandr Morozov worked as the head of the faculty of theoretical physics and prorector of Volgograd State University. Prior to this, he defended his candidate's dissertation (at the Institute of Space Exploration of the USSR Academy of Sciences), and afterwards, a doctoral dissertation on astrophysics at Leningrad State University. His favorite work remains the theory of the spiral structure of the galaxy and, while working on it back in the 1970's, the 30-year-old physicist discovered a new type of hydrodynamic instability. His theoretical predictions were confirmed by experimenters in physics. His last years in science were spent in the creation of a package of programs of mathematical modelling of ecological systems. Which, translated into understandable language means: Now, a computer working according to this program will

correctly indicate the enterprise whose discharges into the atmosphere have poisoned mushrooms in the surrounding area. And even in a given specific glade. Or it will say when women in childbirth and nursing mothers who live near a steel mill should put on respirators and gas masks. The program also has a thoroughly unique capability. For example, it will make it possible to determine the areas of acid rain, and the state of health of soils and crops and of surface and subterranean reservoirs.

Scientists have become accustomed to complaining that their programs and projects are rejected by the authorities. But now, God himself, or more correctly, the will of the voters, has brought authority and science together in one person. From the world of galaxies and stars, convection processes and computers, the 48-year-old doctor of physical and mathematical sciences, at the behest of the voters, enters the world of Cossacks with stripes and sabers, orthodox Stalinists and pro-American democrats, radicals, Christians, centrists, and neutrals. And we talk with him about life and authority.

According to the new terminology, the chairman of the oblast soviet is the speaker of the local parliament. Moreover, there is everything in Volgograd Oblast, so that it looks like a small state. A population of more than 2.5 million people. A developed industry. Good agriculture, a "sugar sorghum" program is being developed to acquire the scarce product from sugar cane. It would seem, live and be happy, but here there are reforms and various crises. For example, cash has disappeared during the innovations.

[Filippov] Will you not, following the example of the Nizhny Novgorod region, take Gaydar's government to court? Will you not issue, in the example of that same region, your own Volgograd currency?

[Morozov] The cash situation is a direct consequence of that actual confiscatory monetary reform that was camouflaged under the liberalization of prices that the government conducted at the beginning of January. And its erroneous forecast relative to the scale of the increase in prices. The government, apparently, expects less egoism of the producers, without taking into account the extremely monopolized structure of our economy and the April (1991) experiment of the Pavlov increase in prices. But now, as can be seen, the crisis with cash has begun to decline—finally, large bills have been printed. One of the curious consequences of this reform is that small metallic change has disappeared.

The judicial action against the government for wage indebtedness is natural and even necessary as a precedent. However, it is hardly likely that it will be effective—a trial is not a quick affair.

But the introduction of the "Volgograds," regional money and local currency, is at variance with the federal treaty that was signed in March. Local loans are another matter, but it is more natural to conduct them under specific programs in whose implementation an appreciable part of the region's population will be interested.

[Filippov] Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev has come out with an initiative to make the ruble a national currency. If the CIS countries do not support him, then only he and Yeltsin will do this. In your opinion, how will such a step affect the oblast?

[Morozov] Nazarbayev's proposal, given a coordinated economic policy of the CIS countries, could strengthen the ruble. Of course, this could only accrue to the benefit of our oblast, as well as to all other regions.

[Filippov] Your forecasts: Where will we be within a year? How will Volgograd Oblast be developing?

[Morozov] Within a year?! The short-term forecasts of the Russian government are not coming true. In any case, the slump in the economy will continue until January, inasmuch as federal tax policy is still immutable and does not stimulate investments of capital in production.

But the capabilities of the oblast budget are extremely small. And references to the effect that everything is being done properly in the center, but local authorities are impeding reforms, are unfounded. For if the regions can at best avail themselves of one-third and the center—of two-thirds of the budget finances, then that is also their share of responsibility for reforms. Who has more money also has great responsibility.

And more. Too sharp an increase in the federal budget in comparison with regional budgets will in greater and greater measure switch oblasts to the role of petitioners—the main problem in the mutual relations of regional and federal authorities.

[Filippov] Besides finances, personnel—especially managerial personnel—have always been a subject of debate of the center and of the provinces...

[Morozov] Great concern is caused by Yeltsin's recent edict, according to which the head of administration of an oblast can be removed by the president at the request of his representative. Under such psychological pressure, it is hardly likely that it will be possible to count on the stable work of the regional executive authorities.

But not everything is that bad. For example, the Supreme Soviet, after the signing of the federal treaty, sends drafts of all laws with proposals to make comments on them....

[Filippov] How is privatization going in the oblasts? Is the people's property falling into the hands of the mafia?

[Morozov] Privatization here, as in all of Russia, began to gather speed only in the second half of the year. Of the installations that belong to small privatization, over a thousand, 300 already have new owners, and they are privatized at more than 1.4 billion. Thereby, the annual oblast privatization program is implemented in the financial plan. It is true that only about one-third of this sum has been entered into the budget yet.

Right after Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast, the working group of an international financial corporation started to work here. Its task is to polish the technology of "small" privatization: of stores, public catering enterprises, etc.

But it is much more difficult with large enterprises. Their shares of stock can be purchased both for cash and for privatized checks. But in any case, the purchaser of shares of stock is only a small co-owner, on whom little will depend and who, owing to this, critically needs concise and easily understandable information about the financial condition of the enterprise. But in Russia, the situation in this matter is still bad. In addition, under conditions of the virtual absence of a secondary market in securities, the purchaser of shares of stock becomes something like their hostage. This is dangerous in the event of the possible bankruptcy of an enterprise.

The issuance of privatized 10,000-ruble [R] checks is a very important step, but it lags somewhat behind the massive formation of joint-stock enterprises. It would be better to "reverse" them in timing.

But the mafia, if I am not mistaken, is that part of business in an economic sense that does not pay taxes. And this is the sphere of jurisdiction of tax inspections and law enforcement organs.

[Filippov] If you were asked to form a government, who would you include in it?

[Morozov] I will not even mentally think about the formation of a government, inasmuch as I understand that a complete replacement of the government now would mean the loss of administration of the country's economy for at least several months. And a corresponding drag on the economic reform which is just now starting.

[Filippov] Are the strong and weak sides of the president affecting the reforms?

[Morozov] The essence of the problem is elsewhere—in the extreme "monarchism" of our consciousness. We ascribe all achievements and failures to the number one person without fail. Meanwhile, there are groups and social elements whose interests determine reality.

But the picture of the contemporary Russian politician has not formed itself yet. Speaking in the language of the last century, *raznochintsy* [self-employed plebeians] have invaded the political arena. And, apparently, a stable establishment will set in only after several electoral campaigns.

Russian Finns Not Yet Rehabilitated

924C2479A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Sep 92
Morning Edition p 3

[Article by E. Kiuru, deputy chairman of the Karelian Ingermanlandish Union of Finns: "Russian Finns Are Still Not Rehabilitated"]

[Text] The Ingermandish Finns have tried long and hard to gain justice and restoration of their civil rights, which beginning in 1930 have harshly and heartlessly been violated.

On 4 March 1930, the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] Leningrad Obkom [oblast committee] Buro adopted a resolution on deporting the local population from the border areas, in order to "ensure the security of the border next to Leningrad." The local population living along the border with Finland was comprised of Finns, who had lived there since the 13th Century. This action violated the promise of the Soviet government given to Finland in connection with the peace agreement concluded in 1920—to preserve the conditions of national-cultural development of the Ingermanlandish Finns. Yet at that time, tens of national Finnish rural soviets had been created, and even one national rayon. There were 322 Finnish-language schools, an agricultural vocational school, a Finnish language department at the Gertsen Pedagogical Institute, and a Finnish working faculty at the university. There were houses of culture and theatrical studios serving the 200,000 members of the Finnish population in Leningrad Oblast. There were Finnish-language journals and newspapers being published. A Finnish book publication had operated in Leningrad since 1934.

The Ingermanlandish population was primarily rural. There were 500 Finnish kolkhozes [collective farms] operating in the oblast. To a significant degree, they supplied Leningrad with potatoes and vegetables, as well as fresh milk.

That is how it was. But what about today? The lands where these people worked are deserted due to erosion, overgrown with weeds and forest. The villages have been erased from the face of the earth. Within a 24-hour period in 1935, over 22,000 persons were displaced from the former Finnish national Kuybazovskiy Rayon, thus destroying over 100 villages. Other Finnish villages disintegrated gradually, when they found themselves without their former masters after the war.

After the 25 March 1935 order by the NKVD [People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs], "On Clearing the Border Zone of Leningrad Oblast and Karelia of Swindlers and Anti-Soviet Elements in the Order of Repression," the final destruction of Finnish culture followed in 1937. At one stroke, the Finnish language was "closed," and any activity in this "fascist language" was banned. Finnish schools were immediately changed over to use of the Russian language, and when after winter vacation the students returned to class, there was a surprise waiting for them: Their new teacher did not understand Finnish, while many of the students could not speak Russian.

But even these repressions seemed to be not enough for the leaders of that time. I will cite certain documents of the USSR State Committee on Defense and the Leningrad Front Military Soviet, which turned life upside down not only for the Finns: "On Removal from the

Active Army of Military Servicemen of Finnish Nationality and Their Transfer to NKVD Work Colonies" (in other words—concentration camps), dated 3 April 1942; "On Mandatory Evacuation of the German and Finnish Population From Border Regions of Leningrad," dated 26 August 1942; "On Exile of Socially Dangerous Elements From Leningrad and Its Outlying Areas," dated 9 July 1942.

And here are the verdicts issued by the regime's supreme powers: "On Relocating Permanently Repressed Peoples and Forbidding Them to Leave Exile" (USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Ukase of 26 November 1948); "On Prohibiting Finns From Settling in Areas of Their Former Habitation in Leningrad and Leningrad Oblast" (USSR Council of Ministers directive of 7 May 1947).

On the basis of these and other documents, real genocide was committed in regard to the Finns and many other peoples. These laws, unlike current ones, were carried out zealously and instantaneously. Not only those who in the first hours of the war had gone as volunteers in defense of the Homeland, but even Heroes of the Soviet Union were "plucked" from the army.

To this day, Finns are still not recognized as an unlawfully repressed people. However, Finland has announced that all Ingermanlandish Finns may return to the homeland of the forefathers and receive the right of citizenship there. And the people went, because their fathers and grandfathers are not accepted in their own homeland, and the non-existent guilt has still not been removed from them.

Vladimir Oblast Soviet Chair, Administration Head Relations Viewed

924C2479B Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 8 Sep 92 p 4

[Interview with V. Kalyagin, newly elected chairman of the Soviet of People's Deputies, and Yu. Vlasov, Vladimir Oblast head of administration, conducted by Olga Kondratyeva: "The Winds of Change at the Olympus of Power; From Confrontation to Mutual Understanding—That Is the Path Travelled by the Head of Administration and Chairman of the Soviet in Vladimir Oblast"]

[Text] The RSFSR Presidential Ukase of 25 September 1991 appointed Yu. Vlasov as head of administration of Vladimir Oblast. Prior to this, Vlasov served as deputy chairman of the Vladimir gorispolkom [city executive committee]. He is a graduate of the Moscow Institute of Management, a candidate in economic sciences, and a specialist in innovative organization of management structures.

On 20 November 1991, the 7th Session of the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies elected candidate in juridical sciences and VGPI [All-Union State Planning Institute] docent V. Kalyagin as the soviet's new chairman. V.

Kalyagin completed the historical-philosophical faculty at Gorky University and has taught at the Saratov Law Institute.

Sometimes they come out of the White House together. As a rule, late. The building, as the Capitol, stands on a hill—there is an abundance of them in Vladimir. The descent down the stairs is long and splendid. On the way, they light up a smoke and exchange meaningless phrases. The long, often tormenting talks take place not while walking, but in the offices. Once they spent an entire Sunday engaged in such conversation.

The biographies of these two men, lighting up a smoke in the wind, have much in common. About five years ago they came to the oblast at almost the same time from different regions. Varangians? Maybe so. Each of them takes the problems of local life closer to heart than many native residents. Both are candidates of science, hand in hand they have passed the school of political struggle as people's deputies of the oblast soviet. They headed the deputy democratic group, "Obnovleniye" ["Renewal"] and together, like Iif and Petrov, wrote its program. And now, in the Fall of last year, one of the two was appointed president of the oblast main administration, and the other—a bit later—was elected chairman of the oblast soviet. The former announced his categorical intent to build capitalism in the oblast, the latter—a bit less categorically ("it is not a question of 'in one stroke,' but of how the people live"), but just as firmly—his desire to lead the people toward communism.

These intentions took them to opposite sides of the barrier. That very same one to which duellers of noble calling came, aiming their pistols at the heart of their enemy. The duel of oblast leaders came down to a constant appraisal of each other's actions as opposing the cause of reform. And the brunt of it went to... Understandably, to whom? Of course, to the bearer of the communist ideal. "He should keep quiet," his friends criticized him, wishing him well. Many spears were broken before the two first persons of Vladimir Oblast not only evaluated the benefit of mutual cooperation (in the depths of their soul they understood this from the very first day), but also found means toward this cooperation which suited both of them.

I immediately remembered the surnames of the "fathers" of the oblast. One has the same name as a champion weightlifter, the other—the same name as a popular artist. Vlasov and Kalyagin.

The Market Grows Up From Lack of Freedom

V. Kalyagin is on vacation, but every two or three days he comes in to work. It is true, today he left for about two hours and then again appeared in his office by evening.

"Well, I am building a house. I started it last summer," Kalyagin shrugged guiltily. "The scenery is beautiful, there is a forest and a river nearby. Except that the house stands at the foothill. It is an open area, and the wind blows all the time."

[Correspondent] I do not remember whose diary I read it in: How terrible it would be if suddenly there were no wind in the world!

[Kalyagin] I used to live without wind. In Altay, in ruin. The village was located in a crevice between the mountains. The air was heavy and stagnant. It was hard to breathe.

[Correspondent] How do you feel in your capacity as chairman of the oblast soviet? Is there a breeze blowing? Is it not blowing you off your feet?

[Kalyagin] For the present day, we, the leaders of the local organs of power, are hostages of the government which has proclaimed a course toward the market economy. For now, we are not building a market, but rather pulling the country into colonial dependence. We thought that, having proclaimed freedom as our first step, we would receive abundance as our second. But that is not so! The market is formed under conditions of economic and political lack of freedom, latently destroying it. It is weakening this lack of freedom slowly but surely, irreversibly. An indicator of this process is the increased satisfaction with life by the broad strata of the population. For example, a worker is gaining ever greater economic independence, even if at first it is illusory. Let us take the repeal of serfdom in Russia. Yes, times dependent relations were retained, in essence the same feudal dependence. The same, but already different. With each decade of reform, the peasant became economically and politically freer. There was a perspective, a correctly defined tendency.

But now—there is no light at the end of the tunnel! Domestic capital, speculative in its essence, grows out of commercial structures. Yet a normal, full-fledged capital market grows only out of a commodity market. Having hatched a small group of rich people, we will thereby not create a class of producers. Our typical businessman will never be re-forged into a producer. He has a different psychology. He has learned "300 honest ways of taking away money" at the level of Ostap Bender. Will he rush into production, when the standard of profit in middleman operations is much higher than in production?

You know the biblical parable about how Christ and his apostles crossed the Hefsiman Strait—"by sea, or by land?" I like the anecdotal version: The apostles pass along the word that the apostle Peter is sinking deeper and deeper into the water, and is starting to swallow water and drown. "Tell him not to show off," Christ said sternly. "Let him go like all the rest—along the rocks." That is how we must enter the world economy—along the rocks, like the other countries. Yet we once again, how many times now, are going by a "different path."

As a result, the government is managing a country which in reality does not exist, and therefore its actions are not adequate to the situation. We continually hear that the country is in an economic crisis. I believe this crisis does

not exist, but rather there is a socio-political crisis which the authorities are trying to resolve by economic methods.

[Correspondent] Tell us, what do you fear the most?

[Kalyagin] The government, by its clumsy policy reminiscent of a dreadnought in a carp pond, is provoking a rise to power by other people. Since in our society, unlike the Western, there is an absence of social differentiation, an upsurge of public indignation will lead not to the supremacy of a new social strata, but to general anarchy. And anarchy will end in only one thing—the supremacy of the “strong hand,” which will begin to grab, put in prison and execute. But I would say that this is not the most frightening thing. Some people should have been put away long ago. There are some wretched people that only a bullet will cure. And in this sense the “strong hand” will correspond fully to the aspirations of the majority of the population who yearn for order and for stability, even if it is in the poor man’s variant. For order they will forgive the jails and the repressions, and even the execution of innocent victims. The nostalgia for Stalinist times which has flared up reflects quite persistent sentiments. It is not so much the voluntaristic, violent and unbridled sanitation of society that is frightening, as its zero economic result. On the wave of meetings, once again people will come to power who are unversed in economics. The “strong hand” is incapable of solving economic problems. The process of reformation of society will be stopped for several generations. Decades later, the same accursed questions will arise, with which we are battling today. Well, so it turns out that my grandchildren will also not see a good life? It is against this that all my essence rises up.

[Correspondent] Do you believe in the victory of reforms?

[Kalyagin] I would like to see this victory, but I do not have absolute faith in it. Our chaotic, Brownian wandering in the economic darkness is far from a clearly charted course toward the market economy. No sooner do we, the local authorities, achieve relative stability in the oblast, than our dear government shatters us with some new decision, to whose consequences we must again adapt through incredible effort. Sometimes I want to shrug the whole thing off: Forget it, fellows, I will deal with my doctoral work. Or I will write to the department, even that is better. We have all grown tired of the senseless struggle. But as long as I am at this post, my task is not to allow an explosion of public indignation in the oblast.

[Correspondent] But you cannot transplant the matters of Vladimir to the Moon? If there are social tensions growing in society as a whole, they will inevitably also grow here. Is it possible to have a quiet haven in one individually isolated region?

[Kalyagin] We are trying to develop an oblast program for economic stability and relaxation of social tensions. However, most of all we need a specific blueprint of

work at the local sites. For example, we must get to the bottom of things at each enterprise which stands on the brink of bankruptcy. Sometimes in order to correct matters it is enough to replace the director.

[Correspondent] What is behind your stubborn adherence to the communist ideal?

[Kalyagin] My faith in it. Elemental communist views appeared in society very long ago and were objectively founded. On one hand, these views reflect the reaction of certain strata to the imperfection inherent in any social system, and on the other—in the process of development of society, such ideas basic to the communist teaching are affirmed as growth in the level of socialization of production, and the acceleration of state control over production and consumption. Let us take ecology. Without the intervention of the state organs, mankind would be cast into an ecological catastrophe.

[Correspondent] Why, in your opinion, is the ordinary person indifferent to the process of reformation?

[Kalyagin] The reforms are not addressed at anything specific. They are implemented at the level of slogans. That is why there is no integration into the human psychology. We have still not departed from the “stagnant” habit of affixing labels: “democrats,” “partocrats,” “red-brown”... And then what?

[Correspondent] How do you evaluate the effectiveness of work of the oblast soviet?

[Kalyagin] To my deep satisfaction, most of the deputies are “centrists.” There are no extremists. A well thought-out approach predominates. First of all, the deputies have stopped thinking in abstract categories. At first they all rushed to solve global problems. No one wanted to deal with everyday tasks. In short, many were “concerned about Honduras,” but never got down to the situation with rubbish collection in the streets. I will say one thing: The cavalry charge in the implementation of reforms has come to a standstill. We must return to the initial positions and begin the siege. The members of the soviet understand this.

[Correspondent] Is there an objective basis for the contradictions between the soviet and the administration?

[Kalyagin] I believe there is. The separation of powers is based on the differentiation of social interests. In reality, such categorical separation does not exist in any country in the world. Moreover, this is difficult to implement here with our social uniformity—along the vector of pauperization—of the overwhelming majority of the population. Nevertheless, we are trying to resolve the basic questions jointly with the administration, although it is inevitable that we see the problems under a different angle of sight. On the other hand, as a result the problem looms larger, it seems...

No Use in Blaming It on Moscow

Yuriy Vlasov is very serious. He is 31 years old. Yet he has considerable experience in administrative work behind him. And so in his position as "governor" he took a firm grasp of matters.

[Correspondent] What is one of your most serious difficulties?

[Vlasov] The "scissors" [disparity] in volumes of industrial and agricultural production. By the level of industrial production, the oblast is in sixth place among 90 krais and oblasts of Russia. At the same time, only 5 percent of the population lives in rural areas. Yet how much land has "gone" to Moscow residents for dachas [summer homes]? As a result, in December of last year we found ourselves in a catastrophic situation—there was no food. But we had concluded direct agreements on deliveries with other oblasts and freed the prices on bread and milk. We swam out of it. Yet today Vladimir is one of the cheapest oblasts, plus it has a relatively favorable situation with its enterprises. The average wage is from 4,000 to 5,000 rubles (R). Our oblast is the only one where the entire urban population has received land plots of 15 sotoks. Speaking on oblast television, I told my fellow countrymen: Whoever did not get land, come straight to me. But no one came. If there was some confusion, it was only with the local authorities who did not want to share the land. At the meetings of the Soviet we resolve all controversial questions. For example, changes in the oblast budget are made only through the soviet. It meets weekly, from morning until late evening. The minor soviet is very helpful in the work of the administration. We understand, however, that in the eyes of the people we answer for everything together. They do not distinguish between us. We get together with Kalyagin—each with his deputies—and resolve all the acute questions prior to the meetings of the minor soviet and the administrative planning sessions. Speaking on television, I always stress that the oblast administration resolves all questions in conjunction with the Soviet of People's Deputies.

[Correspondent] But what about...

[Vlasov] I understand. You are referring to the conflicts with Kalyagin. I will not hide the fact, they did occur. Each one of us was eager for battle, and took much upon himself to achieve a specific result sooner. We acted in an ambitious manner—I as well as he.

Our differences are behind us, although we had and will continue to have work-related conflicts. But this is not so terrible. We have already developed a mechanism for removing contradictions.

A sore point for us is the "defense industry." Our oblast is the most militarized in the number of weapons produced per capita of the population. A paradoxical situation has been created: The defense plant warehouses are full of weapons, since the state does not have the funds to buy them. Yet it will not allow them to be sold in order

to pay the workers their wages. We have proposed opening a trade-industrial center near Suzdal for the sale of military technology under the control of the state. We would agree to take rubles as well as currency. We hope that our proposal will be accepted.

We would like to economically "uplift" the oblast, utilizing its specifics. Vladimir is fully capable of becoming a Mecca of Russian tourism. There is a plan to build a Moscow-Vladimir highway. Recently, Italians came here and ratified a plan for a "five star" hotel. It was the well-known firm, "Watt International," and we would do the building. We have also reached an agreement with a Canadian firm for building meat processing combines in the oblast.

We are creating an oblast expert-rescue group. We are going to "throw" it at the sinking enterprises for the purpose of developing programs of saving them from crisis. If this does not help—we will declare the enterprise bankrupt. But first we will try to help it. Only we ourselves, through our own efforts, can save our plants and factories—and all of them now are under oblast ownership. We should not count on Moscow. The Ministry of Industry will not be able to really help the thousands of Russian enterprises. We will teach our industrialists to work under conditions of a market economy. And not just our industrialists. Recently we were visited by the Irish, who related to us experience in creating credit unions. This is one of the variants of organizing self-help for the population.

Credit-finance centers have been created in the oblast as a variant of self-help for enterprises. Commercial organizations give credit on municipal property.

Recently, Kalyagin and I visited one of the Chinese provinces, where we made an agreement on cooperation. We will trade, jointly build enterprises, and the Chinese workers will work at our kolkhozes—for rubles, of course. We became acquainted with China's experience in forming a market economy.

Yes, I would like there to be a master on Vladimir's land. If this is called "building capitalism," then I am building capitalism.

Instead of a Postscript

Here we may place the period, but I will allow myself to give a resume.

The history of mutual relations between the oblast's first persons is both curious and instructive. Entirely realistic circumstances took the heads of the soviet and the administration away from mutual understanding. In this case, the difference in ideological views played by far not the leading role, as might appear at first glance. Ultimately, both, regardless of their labels, wanted one thing: To make the oblast if not prosperous, then at least economically and socially stable. Yet the difference "in the stroke" comes, in my opinion, from absolutization of

different aspects of the same process: To one the form of ownership is "dearer," and to the other—the level of its socialization

Other reasons turned out to be more important: The absence of a well-developed mechanism of democratic power, as well as the age difference—almost a generation, which gave rise to a different perception of reality. Vlasov is an optimist. Not only because of his youth. He "builds capitalism," and along this path we have not yet had time to gain experience. Kalyagin, as any well-informed optimist, has retrained himself to be a pessimist. Their all too honest attitude toward their responsibilities also brought them to opposite sides of the barrier. In the interests of the cause, one's neighbor could not get away with anything. Yet in today's confusion, just try to figure out which step is right and which is wrong. Both men were surrounded by some who wanted to warm their hands on the conflict, those who liked to fish in murky water. Although there were also many who understood the danger of opposition.

Do we need to list everything? It is something else that is important: Both came to their senses in time and understood that if they do not stop trying to teach each other the way of truth, they will not be able to protect the oblast from crisis. Then it will be too late to get to the bottom of things. And in the eyes of the people, the soviets and the administration of all levels are indivisible, like two sides of a post-perestroika ten-kopek piece. Recently Kalyagin went to visit his relatives in the rayon center, and right away he was surrounded by peasants: "Why does the bath cost a quarter?" Kalyagin tried to explain to them that this was the business of the local authorities. He could not dictate to them. Yet they, brought up by a party which answered for the sputnik in space as well as for the hole in the sewer line, did not believe him. "Oh, no. You will not squirm out of it. You are the master in the oblast, so answer for everything!"

And so they are answering—for everything and together

Governor Updates Nizhny Novgorod Reforms

934C0002A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 37, Oct 92 p 3

[Interview with Boris Nemtsov, governor of Nizhny Novgorod, by A. Uglanov; place and date not given. "Advice to Those Who Blame Others"]

[Text] As is usual here, politics makes some people nauseous, while others approve. In order to understand it from the standpoint of a practical person we turned to the governor of Nizhny Novgorod, Boris Nemtsov.

[Uglanov] Boris Yefimovich, in Moscow a discussion is under way about the fate of the vouchers. Some people are foaming at the mouth, others are cursing.

[Nemtsov] In the past 10 years 3,000 large enterprises have been privatized worldwide. Of these, about 150 have been successful. There are 46,000 large enterprises

in Russia. It is physically impossible to privatize them in one year, even unsuccessfully.

So throughout the country even small-scale privatization is proceeding badly. The authorities are still not yet prepared to capitalize major plants. We have 3.7 million people in the oblast. Consequently, there are vouchers worth 37 billion rubles [R]. And federally owned fixed capital is worth about R20 billion. This being the case, major enterprises cannot be capitalized immediately. It is totally absurd.

Thus, it is necessary to add land to the sphere of the vouchers, which should be paid for, say, 60 percent by vouchers and 40 percent is cash.

[Uglanov] It is fine, of course, to talk about land, but the corps of deputies of Russia, where the "kolkhoz and sovkhos barons" are still stirring up trouble, is hardly likely to permit land to be put into market circulation.

[Nemtsov] For this it is necessary to announce as soon as possible that for most people the voucher is the only chance to buy land. It is not difficult to guess what kind of pressure will start to be applied to the deputies.

[Uglanov] That may not happen. Many people believe that communism destroyed any sense of ownership in people.

[Nemtsov] I am convinced totally to the contrary. People have been yearning for ownership.

[Uglanov] The ban on holding elections for governors, mayors, and all the other representatives of executive power lasts only until 1 December. What should happen?

[Nemtsov] I myself favor elections because without them nomenklatura structures and an insurmountable desire to please the bosses will emerge. But on the other hand, the authorities will stop working during the election campaign.

In my opinion one compromise is to announce the date of elections for, say, autumn next year.

[Uglanov] And finally, what is needed for the reforms to move ahead anyway, despite the madness that is being created in Moscow?

[Nemtsov] The first thing is agreement between the legislative and executive powers on the basic political principles of the reforms—the need for privatization, land reform, and antitrust activity.

[Uglanov] But for many people these concepts are abstractions, like Brezhnev's "chemicalization" and "automation."

[Nemtsov] This year we have received more than R1 billion from privatization. Thanks largely to this money twice as many new schools have been commissioned, 60,000 square meters of housing handed over, and 1,500 kilometers of roads built from new or repaired, which is

something we never got close to before, and the inventory of public transport has been enlarged by 120 buses. Yield from grain crops was 21 quintals to the hectare against 12 or 13 quintals previously.

When I arrived in the administration there were \$2,100 in the coffers, but today we have earned and used almost 13 million.

Second, there is the agreement between the organs of power and the prosecutor's office. When the prosecutor's office has a choice between an edict and a vague law, its political position becomes decisive.

Third, there is the clear position of the court of arbitration, which resolves disputes during privatization.

And fourth, there is sociopolitical stability in the region.

We have 48 rayons in the oblast. In 60 percent of them the reforms are moving at top speed, while in others nothing is happening. The reason is that these four factors are not working together.

Unfortunately, in the top leadership they fail to recognize that the absence of even one factor blocks reform. It is very feeble at the same time to conclude that there is sabotage. In fact, as they used to say, do not blame others for your own faults. It is somewhat coarse, but it does reflect the essence of the matter.

Moscow Government Foreign Investment Noted

924C2475A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 40, 30 Sep 92 p 13

[Article by Anatoliy Rubinov: "Something From Our Correspondence—the Secret of the 'Russian Village' in America"]

[Text] Having become leaders, some of our new democrats have begun to resemble proud, inaccessible aristocrats. The people (demos!), probably, are no longer necessary to them, and even the mayor of the largest city, staring directly into the camera, reported that he does not meet with the people... Well, it is not his habit. Apparently, there is no further need for the voter, and the life of the people can be seen very well from a speeding automobile, especially any kind of imported one, bought with dollars or German marks.

The more minor leaders follow the example of the major leaders, and they adopt their tone and manner. However, you can judge for yourselves by the editorial correspondence in connection with our purchase of land in the United States to set up a "recreation area." This is a follow-up; the beginning was published in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA (27 May 1992).

"To the chairman of the board of the Mosinzhstroy [Moscow Engineering Construction] association, A.A. Stroyev

"Dear Andrey Alekseyevich"

"In the spring of this year, the press carried information that the Perestroyka joint venture acquired 1,200 hectares of land in the United States and will erect a 'Russian village' there in the Russian, Irish, and Swiss styles. Since it was known that 45 percent of the Perestroyka charter fund belongs to the Moscow municipality, the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA editorial office asked the mayor of the city, who was G.Kh. Popov at that time, for an explanation of questions that were unclear.

"These were the questions:

1. All told, how much did this purchase—in dollars—cost the municipality, and how much will the construction of 1,000 cottages cost?
2. According to what article of the city budget was the purchase effected?
3. For whom are the cottages in the American recreation area intended?

"Unfortunately, the mayor declined to answer directly, citing the fact that 'the municipality does not interfere in the activity of the Perestroyka enterprise,' and he assured the newspaper that 'more detailed information can be acquired in the Perestroyka joint venture.

"The editorial office had to publish correspondence in the newspaper under the headline 'The Fate of the American Prairies Is in Our Hands!' The newspaper publicly turned to you, Andrey Alekseyevich. Thanking you in advance, the editorial office asked you to answer these questions, inasmuch as the mayor deemed it impossible to interfere, because the controlling block of shares does not belong to the municipality.

"Unfortunately, the editorial office and the readers who showed an interest in the use of currency belonging to Moscow taxpayers did not receive an answer from you.

"The editorial office is once again compelled to ask these three questions. In addition to the fact that you are the chairman of the board and the president of Perestroyka, you also continue to hold the post of manager of Perestroyka's chief partner, Mosinzhstroy (this is what a press release of the joint enterprise states), which is financed from the capital budget. It probably would be superfluous to explain that the public at large in any country has a right to know for what the money of the taxpayers is being spent. In the United States, for example, the municipality of New York does not make a secret of its expenditures and income.

"You will agree, Andrey Alekseyevich, that the editorial staff, without interfering in the commercial secrets of the Russian-American enterprise, has a right, however, to ask a question about the fate of those 45 percent of an unknown sum of money which is the combined property of millions of Muscovites.

"Respectfully,

"Anatoly Rubinov, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA columnist.

"P.S. In connection with the editorial office's inability to contact you by telephone, the letter is being sent to two addresses that are somewhat similar—Moscow, Malaya Bronnaya Street, 156—Mosinzhstroy, and "Perestrojka Joint Venture, Malaja Bronnaja 156 Moskow, Russia."

Imagine, the letter was successful! On the very next day, A.A. Stroyev, the chairman himself of the board of the joint venture phoned—he is the president and the chairman of the board of the association, and he kindly informed us that answers had already been given to all of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA'S questions. But where are they? Perhaps the incorrigible post office has let us down again? Oh no, the post office is not to blame here. It turns out that the chairman answered twice and the president once to questions from LITERATURNAYA GAZETA... to the newspaper KOMMERSANT. Is it not true, this is so logical for an entrepreneur of the upper international class: One newspaper asked, and the answer was given to another one. In clarifying his logic, the president intelligibly explained: The fact is that he does not read LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, but, of course, he knew what kind of questions it had asked him publicly, because he had been told about them by an acquaintance correspondent of KOMMERSANT who reads LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, and he came to him with the exact questions of a friendly publication.

And in several days, A.A. Stroyev sent this exhaustive answer of the Mosinzhstroy association.

"To the Editorial Office of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA

"For A.Z. Rubinov.

"I am sending you a copy of the article, 'Perestrojka Which Is Building a Russian Village in America,' published in the newspaper KOMMERSANT in June 1992. This article, which came out after your publication in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA of 'The Fate of the American Prairies Is in Our Hands!' gives to all interested readers, in my opinion, sufficiently full information on this project.

"If this material, nevertheless, leaves you unclear about some things, I, of course, am ready to meet with you and talk in greater detail both about the project in the United States and about the main investment projects of the joint venture Perestrojka in Moscow, which today amounts to many tens of millions of dollars.

"As for your questions concerning the use of municipal funds, I can assure you and your readers that not one kopek and not one cent of the city budget or of the state budget has been spent or is being spent on one project of the Perestrojka joint enterprise. On the contrary, all told, for the full three years of its activity, the Perestrojka joint enterprise has already spent about \$4 million just on the technical re-equipping of municipal

organizations of the city of Moscow. Incidentally, the 35,000-person collective Mosinzhstroy has been operating on self-financing since January 1987, and not only is it not dipping into the funds of the city budget but, on the contrary, annually contributes tens of millions of rubles to the budget.

"[Signed] Chairman of the Board of the Association Mosinzhstroy A.A. Stroyev."

And, indeed, A.A. Stroyev sent a xeroxed copy of the article from KOMMERSANT. Probably, so that LITERATURNAYA GAZETA would reproduce half a million copies and distribute them to its readers. I find it hard to believe that the chairman and the president expected that LITERATURNAYA GAZETA would reprint the long, self-praising note from KOMMERSANT, which does not answer even one of the urgently asked questions. It talks there about "the large and most successfully operating company in the real estate field," about the visit of A.A. Stroyev to the United States, about the "expansion of ties in the direction of Japan," and about the "examination of two alternative ways of developing projects." This is also probably very interesting to Moscow's taxpayers, but they probably are more concerned about the fate of the ever-increasing taxes levied on them.

As for the problem of Perestrojka and A.A. Stroyev himself, the office already has an abundance of materials. Perestrojka twice sent a glossy, sky-blue folder with an invitation to a presentation during working hours. A tour was offered and immediately after it "an outdoor buffet [furшет]" (1000-1130 hours). To be honest, at first we were scared away by a buffet at the height of the working day and later the pile of enthusiastic materials sent by A.A. Stroyev about A.A. Stroyev and his tireless activity. Materials carefully translated from English, accompanied by xeroxed copies from American newspapers to show authenticity, talk about the fact that Stroyev is a "shark of socialism," that "he wears expensive and smart suits," that "he loves to eat good food and dine in style," that he speaks English fluently, and without an accent, that, while he heads Mosinzhstroy in Moscow, he flies to Atlanta every month, and that, in fact, Mosinzhstroy, on the whole, is the main partner of the Perestrojka joint enterprise, and not at all the other way around. The basic partnership turns out to be very profitable for the Russian-American enterprise: Owing to his connections in the Moscow city soviet, he "knows how to obtain all of the authorizing documents from the Moscow government," A.A. Stroyev achieved this owing to the fact that "the chief architect of the city is a member of the board of the joint enterprise," and that is why "he also found the buildings that the joint enterprise needed.

The chairman-president compiled a dossier about himself, reproduced it, and translated it into Russian, apparently, counting on the fact that the reader would assess the measure of his enterprise. A.A. Stroyev is a persistent person. Stroyev said to his American partner, who

wanted to "significantly multiply the status of his family": "If you want to work here—do business with me." But he reported another time that "to manage anything means first to be a good actor," and, while dreaming of the profession of film director, he at one time "reluctantly" (this is precisely what is written) enrolled in the construction institute.

However, we will not make a severe judgment about a manager who, although "reluctantly," achieved considerable heights in the construction business and is sitting firmly in two managerial chairs simultaneously. Perhaps this is not entirely legal, but it definitely is convenient. Can there really be any doubt that the manager of Mosinzhstroy will deny anything to the manager of Perestroyka, because he will be helping himself? Even the architectural administration, after receiving seven per cent income from Perestroyka, is favorably disposed to merge with it...

Perhaps the venture is excellent, but it is nonetheless difficult to forget at the same time the principal decision of the Russian government, which was recently involved with a similar seating in two chairs at the same time by V. Gromyko, the deputy minister of health services. This person is also an active figure conducting the general management of Russian medicine, and simultaneously extremely successfully heading joint enterprises as well. He was even helped to work better: He was freed of no end of ministerial troubles. Malicious tongues assert that the former deputy minister was not surprised by the stringency: He had prepared an emergency exit for himself. And he was simply helped to go through it.

The former deputy minister, probably, knew the edict of the president "On the Fight against Corruption in the System of State Service," which prohibits "employees of the state apparatus from taking part in administrations of joint-stock limited liability companies and associations...." There is no doubt that he was familiar also with the instructions of the first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet and the first deputy chairman of the Russian government "On Measures to Put a Stop to Cases of the Participation of Officials of Organs of State Authority and the Administrations of Private Enterprise Activity."

Probably, these documents are also familiar to A.A. Stroyev? So why is he giving us so much information for reflection, giving up information which—we know this—is of such interest to our readers about the fate of the Moscow share? Why does he not respond to the questions that were raised right off? Only out of disrespect for LITERATURNAYA GAZETA and its many readers?

However, an answer did come to one question: It turns out that Mosinzhstroy never uses the finances of the municipality; it lives by self-financing, and, to the contrary, annually contributes tens of millions of rubles to the city budget. If this is the case, then let Mosinzhstroy as much as possible "engage in the construction of roads,

tunnels, bridges, water supply, and the production of building materials." The fact that Mosinzhstroy is doing this was reported by the newspaper THE NEW YORK TIMES, but A.A. Stroyev sent this questionable information both in the English original and translated into the Russian language. But up until now, Muscovites had thought that another department—the Mosavtodor [Moscow Automobile Road Construction]—was engaged in road construction, that water supply was engaged in by a third department, and building materials production, by a fourth!

I do not doubt in the least that, in propagandizing his own achievements, our very important manager is telling the truth and nothing but the truth, but I, in the presence of my colleagues from IZVESTIYA and OGONEK, nonetheless asked Yu.M. Luzhkov, the new mayor:

"Where is the mayor's office putting the money that the Moscow budget previously gave to Mosinzhstroy for the construction of engineering structures?"

"Where?"—Yuriy Mikhaylovich asked with surprise. "We are giving Mosinzhstroy money as we did. Through the Mosinzhstroy association. Ask them—they will name the exact figure for you, call them up."

I followed the mayor's advice, phoned Mosinzhstroy, to the chief of the planning-financial administration. However, the chief displayed vigilance.

"We, of course, finance Mosinzhstroy, but I will not tell you over the telephone how much money we give them. How do I know who you are, and whether you are who you say you are?"

It seems that not every Muscovite has the right to know where the money is going that is made up of taxes that the Muscovites pay...

What is happening is a variant of the old runaround. So who will answer the three questions about the fate of the money of the Moscow taxpayer?

Moscow's Central Okrug Prefect Details Plan for Rebuilding City

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in Russian 22 Aug 92 pp 1, 6

[Article by Aleksandr Muzykantskiy, prefect of the Central Okrug, under the rubric, "Position": "The Authorities and the City's Residents Should Rebuild Moscow Together: There will be no selling off of the city center, neither cheaply nor expensively"]

[Text] In its last issue NG [NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA] printed an article by prominent literary figure Vladimir Lakshin, who called attention to the danger of selling off the historical center of Moscow under the pretext of rebuilding it. V. Lakshin asserts that such plans already exist in regard to the Zamoskvorechye district. Today the prefect of the Central Okrug, Aleksandr Muzykantskiy, expresses his viewpoint on the problem raised.

An Alarming Sign

The letter to NG by the widely known Vladimir Yakovlevich Lakshin, whom I respect deeply, is a very serious and alarming sign.

Obviously, the situation has reached the critical point beyond which the level of misunderstanding between Moscow residents and the city administration creates a situation where any work to do reconstruction and restoration in the center, to create normal human conditions for the 600,000 people who live there, and to preserve and save what can still be preserved and saved will prove to be impossible. And this would be a catastrophe both for the center's residents and for Muscovites too.

Problems of the Longed-For Center

So let us try to work things out together.

The general situation: the monuments of history and architecture are decaying, being destroyed, and becoming "ruins" (a special term has even appeared). More than 500 buildings in the center have been officially declared unsuitable for habitation, but nevertheless Muscovites continue to live in them, sometimes two-three families in each building.

The reconstruction of a large number of institutions of culture which are the pride of the capital is encountering enormous problems: from the Bolshoy Theater and Museum imeni A. S. Pushkin to M. Bulgakov's home and the Razumovskiy Palace.

Now I would like to say a few more words about something which is not so clearly evident.

For several decades the center of Moscow was an object of fierce expansion on the part of administrative structures of various levels of weight and caliber—from the CPSU Central Committee to various dwarf offices and branches which by fair means or foul set up in the center without having anything in common either with it or with Moscow.

This process, only in a slightly different form, is underway even now. New administrative structures have taken the place of the old ones and countless numbers of committees and commissions, associations, and corporations are being created. The modest representations of the former Union republics are becoming full-fledged embassies, and representations of the all-Russian republics are being organized, and recently even representations of individual oblasts of Russia under the government. All this demands more and more space, which Moscow must offer once again. And again it is for free, again as part of fulfilling the latest administrative decree. Such, they say, is the burden of a capital's functions.

But there is a very long ways to go before we see compensation payments for fulfilling these functions, payments which are provided for throughout the civilized world.

First they must be stipulated in the Law on the Capital, and then the compensation payments themselves must be found. But people simply do not think about that now. When our diplomats headed by Minister A. Kozyrev divides up the buildings of embassies and missions of the former USSR in the capitals of the world with his colleagues from the nearby foreign countries, it does not come into the heads of any of the participants in these constructive negotiations that Moscow long ago paid for all these buildings and parcels of land in Paris, Rome, Vienna, and Tokyo by handing over several hundred of its best buildings for foreign embassies, missions, consulates, and residences.

There is also the problem of the capital construction complex, which in the last decade has been almost completely reoriented to mass construction on vacant land outside the city center and experienced the crisis of the late 1980s but preserved its economic potential and personnel and ensured the introduction of 3 million square meters of living space both in 1991 and in 1992. But this construction complex lost the possibility of large-scale work in the center. To do this it now has neither the appropriate know-how, nor the equipment, nor the personnel.

There is also the problem of financing. Those enormous amounts of capital which must be enlisted in the work to reconstruct the center will, of course, no longer be allocated as "centralized capital investments."

And there is yet another problem, perhaps the most important one. This is the problem of the interrelations of the city authorities and the residents. And as a part of this there are the authorities' interrelations with the intelligentsia, whose clannish feature is not to reach agreement, not to trust, and not to support any actions of any government. And to continue to hold out against them (the authorities) a little longer.

But it is absolutely clear that the program of reconstruction of the center of Moscow can be successfully realized only with the support of its residents and participation in its development and realization by the broadest strata of the capital community.

A New Approach

And so in such conditions the government of Moscow proclaims that next year, 1993, will be the year in which large-scale work is launched to reconstruct the center. What is this? The latest propaganda campaign? What will the "confidence in success" be based upon this time? For such programs have been advanced more than once in the last decade. And not one of them has been realized.

A fundamental feature of the new approach to the long-standing problem stems from the new economic conditions, or perhaps rather from the new economic trends. All the programs for reconstructing the center of Moscow which were being adopted before were formulated based on fundamental administrative-command

principles. They envisioned the allocation of centralized capital investments and material resources and the monopoly of the general planner and the general contractor. From there came problem-solving methods based on mass resettlement of residents from the center, moving them out of whole blocks, and then mass-scale reconstruction work in the empty apartments. These programs were not in fact realized, but traces of the first stage of their fulfillment are now seen everywhere in the center in the empty buildings, half settled ones, and half abandoned ones which are a dismal feature of the Moscow city landscape.

And these programs were not realized for simple reasons. Centralized capital investments in the necessary amounts did not appear, a monopoly state general contractor was not found, and the most important thing—native Muscovites who were residents of the center did not agree to leave. Sociological surveys even now show that no more than 15-20 percent of the people who live there today have agreed to leave the center and move to the new developments. The rest of the native residents of the Moscow center who have lived there their whole lives, often for several generations, do not want to move to the new rayons. And that is their right, which cannot be disregarded.

The awareness of these new, fundamental, and long-term factors demanded the formulation of a new Moscow government policy in regard to the reconstruction of the center. This was done in the decree No 217 of the Moscow government from October of last year. Here, in brief, are its fundamental provisions:

- reconstruction of the center must be done in an integrated manner, that is, reconstruction of old and construction of new objects of the social and cultural sphere, above all housing, must be carried out at the same time as or even ahead of the reconstruction and construction of new hotels, offices, and other commercial sites;
- reconstruction of the center must be done in the interests of its residents. And those residents who wish to continue living in the center must have that possibility. In other words, they receive modern well-appointed housing with the right of privatization in the same block and possibly in the same building where they now live;
- in order to organize the process of reconstruction special organs of administration must be set up—reconstruction directorates which should be directly involved in the technical aspect of the process, including organization of nonstate investments both domestic and foreign which will be used to realize both the commercial and the social parts of the program.

There Is Money for Reconstruction

The last point perhaps needs additional commentary. There will not be budget money in amounts which even approach the sums needed for reconstruction in the

foreseeable future (and in principle there obviously should not be in a normally organized economy). But the necessary capital is already in the private, nonstate sector. A week does not pass where at least 10 representatives of firms do not come to Moscow authorities with proposals to invest their money in reconstruction and in Moscow real estate. And the challenge is to organize a normal, civilized process of attracting private investments for reconstruction and to decentralize and simplify it intelligently.

This work is more difficult than it may appear at first glance. This is precisely because of the centralization and complication of the normative documents now regulating the investment process and the lack of experience with work in the new economic conditions. Nonetheless experience is gradually being accumulated.

The 'Ostozhenka' Test Range

A group of young, talented architects who created an independent nonstate architectural workshop have formulated a plan for the comprehensive reconstruction of the Ostozhenka microrayon. There is no place in this article for detailed discussion of the merits of this plan. I will merely say that the plan envisions a comprehensive program of restoration and reconstruction and is based on detailed historical-architectural study of this remarkable section of the historical center.

We want to create and test the mechanisms stated in decree No 217 using Ostozhenka as an example. A general directorate for reconstruction of Ostozhenka has now been set up. Meetings with residents have been held and architects, leaders of the administration of the Central Okrug, and Premier Yu. M. Luzhkov participated in them. A whole series of decrees of the Moscow government have been adopted on stopping the allocation of parcels of land, transferring objects in the microrayon to a lease basis without consent of the directors, and removing a number of enterprises whose existence on the microrayon's territory is not in keeping with the reconstruction plan (including removing a number of organizations which are part of the Moscow Construction Committee system; there has been no similar decision in recent times at all). Finally, the decision has been made to build three residential buildings in the microrayon at the expense of the city budget as the first impetus which will initiate the entire process. The conclusion of a contract with residents guaranteeing their rights during and after reconstruction has been envisioned.

The press has repeatedly reported on the plan and every resident can become familiar with it and obtain answers to all questions: the doors of the architectural workshop are always open. An enormous amount of work has been done with potential investors and they are waiting in line for the right to participate in the project.

A Threatened Plan

But even so alarm at the fate of the project and at the fate of everything which it stands for is not diminishing. Some people very much want to declare even this plan the latest sell-out, a struggle for tasty morsels of Moscow territory, and the object of a deal between criminal businessmen and corrupt authorities, and the victim once again to be Moscow residents.

But the writer Anatoliy Ivanov was not ashamed to say all this on behalf of all residents of Ostozhenka and threaten self-immolation if the reconstruction begins anyway. Things are good for the writer: he and his wife live in Ostozhenka in an individual, six-room apartment and he certainly does not need reconstruction personally. But how many character traits—I no longer know what kind—does a person have to have to say this on behalf of all residents, including those who have lived their entire lives in communal apartments, of which there are more than 2,000 here?

Reconstruction of Zamoskvorechye Must Not Be Postponed

And now, after such a long but necessary introduction I can move on to the main topic of V. Ya. Lakshin's letter.

Yes, Zamoskvorechye, Pyatnitskaya, and Yakimanka and the lanes near them really are a miraculously preserved part of old Moscow. This part was "luckier" in some sense than others: it was not selected as the site of a demonstration of the might of the communist order and a place was not cleared here for something like the Palace of Congresses or the high-rise building in Zaryadye. Here in these lanes prestigious brick high-rises were not built, as happened in the Arbat (an exception is the block of modern industrially-produced residential buildings in Polyanka). Here the coloring and atmosphere of old Moscow at the turn of the century has been preserved to a significant degree. But look at this part of Moscow a little more closely. Walk along the Kadash-evskiy Lanes and Kadashevskiy Embankment and look at the underground entrance structures with the letter "M", which has not deceived anyone for a long time, on the iron gates, which were placed in Odyanka and literally in the courtyard of the Tretyakov. And try to ask yourself the question: is it possible not to think and not to plan the reconstruction of these miraculously preserved corners of old Moscow? Can this be postponed for later, until better times?

Undoubtedly Zamoskvorechye is a unique cultural and historical property, but it is also a place where about 42,000 Muscovites live, and of them almost half live in communal apartments. There are 170 residential buildings here which have been condemned and declared unsuitable for habitation. And here I am in complete agreement with V. Ya. Lakshin, most of these residents will not agree to move anywhere else.

Historical Monuments Are Inviolable

Can reconstruction be carried out so as to keep historical monuments from disappearing and to give new life to objects of culture, while at the same time creating human conditions for the Muscovites who live there? Yes, it can. But in this certainty of mine I am, unfortunately, relying more on the experience of reconstruction of other European cities and on the experience of formulating a plan for reconstruction of other sections of the Moscow center. Because there is no detailed plan for reconstruction of Zamoskvorechye. We face an enormous amount of work. First to develop a concept of the reconstruction. And here historians and architects, specialists, and the public should have the decisive word.

One can argue about whether Pyatnitskaya was a commercial street or it was a "bedroom district" and each morning the population of Zamoskvorechye (both salespeople and customers) went off to the other bank of the Moscow River to sell things.

In my opinion, speaking in modern language, the functional saturation of the buildings along Pyatnitskaya Street suggests a more highly developed infrastructure.

Building No. 1 is Russian Wines and belonged to P. A. and P. P. Smirnov. Building No. 3, Candy Factory and Grocery Goods (Shcherbakov and sons), is a factory and store. Building No. 5 held the Tobacco Store of P. P. Pokrovskiy; the Clock store of Tsygin; and the Rogov and Company Trading House. Building No. 7 was the D. I. Fillipov bakery, the P. P. Knyazev "Mignon" Store, and the Dry-Salt Goods Store of Makarov. Building No. 9 was Babkin's Notions Goods (the numbering of the buildings is the present numbering; information is for 1910-1913). It is similar in other near-by streets and lanes too. Here were the First Pyatnitskaya Clinic, the Kizilshteyn surgery clinic, and Setkin women's illnesses clinic, the Fedotov carpentry establishment, I. V. Balashov's second-hand store, and so on and so forth.

I am not certain whether the historical material is sufficient to speak of the commercial make-up of the former Pyatnitskaya Street, but just don't describe the present Moscow leadership as an assembly of ignoramuses and fools who, to please the greedy interests of the "new conquistadors," are prepared to "make everything have the same function," remove old private homes from protection and tear them down, and build whatever they want in their place. I have been working in the Moscow leadership for a total of 2 years and I do not remember one case of the removal of any monument from state protection. On the contrary, decisions on newly identified monuments of history and architecture and on their inclusion in the state register and placement under protection follow one after another.

Necessary Explanations

And now I want to speak also of what and who it was that especially badly frightened V. Ya. Lakshin and of the "comrades with limited responsibility." I first found out

about the plans to create a Zamoskvorechye TOO [expansion not given] in early spring of this year. Svetlana Bestuzheva, the prominent art critic known to many for her many years of experience in television broadcasts devoted to innovations in art, called me and asked me to come to the office of the director of the Tretyakov Gallery, Yu. K. Korolev: he would have a group of our business people there who were prepared to help the Tretyakov. The Gallery had to be saved, money was gone, the workers had left, and if it wasn't helped immediately, all the 15 years of efforts would be in vain. That was the approximate sense of the conversation.

The next day a meeting was held at the Tretyakov. The business people made business proposals. They were prepared to immediately offer the 15 million dollars needed to finish the restoration of the Tretyakov Gallery on very preferential conditions. And they also expressed their desire to participate in the reconstruction of the Zamoskvorechye, but merely as investors on commercial conditions. There were several more meetings at that time (with the participation of journalists and television) in which the details of the agreement were discussed and a protocol of intent was signed between the managers of the firms and the territorial administration of Zamoskvorechye. But the events concerning the reconstruction of the Tretyakov developed in their own way. After President B. N. Yeltsin's visit to the Tretyakov the required sums were found (or rather promised) in the state budget. The need for Zamoskvorechye to participate in the financing of restoration disappeared. The desire of the firms to participate in the Zamoskvorechye reconstruction program remains. The reconstruction itself remains to be done and is becoming increasingly urgent. In these conditions the partnership that had been formed prepared the document which caused the emotional reaction of V. Ya. Lakshin.

Regarding that I can say the following. First, it is wrong that all that remained to do was get the signature of Yu. M. Luzhkov, and then the document would come out. I, for example, did not become familiar with the document until I was preparing these notes, even though according to the plan I was supposed to submit it to the government. In addition, the draft document does really raise some fundamental objections and in the form presented cannot possibly be accepted.

First, as follows from what was said above, at this stage we should be speaking of developing the concept of reconstruction, and it would be better for this work to be done on a contract basis rather than give the job to one creative workshop.

Secondly, the transfer of the Zamoskvorechye TOO buildings and structures to economic management does not at all stem from the general concept of the reconstruction and should not be done, while the transfer of the parcels of land to economic management has certainly not been envisioned by any legislation.

Thirdly, the Zamoskvorechye TOO cannot be, despite its economic potential, the only monopoly (general) investor in all Zamoskvorechye. This partnership must be enlisted along with other possible investors on competitive conditions and in complete accord with the decree No. 217 of the Moscow government.

I have other, less significant comments. But even in this far-from-complete text V. Ya. Lakshin did not note, or perhaps did not want to note, many fundamental features:

- the Zamoskvorechye TOO reconstructs freed buildings not only "for its own needs" but carries out construction and reconstruction of the housing and nonhousing fund, utility systems, and the fund for resettlement of residents (on the territory of Zamoskvorechye!);
- reconciliation of the concept of developing a preserve zone is done with the City Construction Commission and the Council on State Control and Protection and Use of Monuments of History and Architecture;
- the transfer to a "49-year lease" is envisioned only for those spaces which are "equivalent to the capital invested in the reconstruction of the housing and nonhousing fund and utility systems," and this equivalent share will be determined for individual contracts;
- and finally, the general economic and legal conditions for realizing the project will be determined by the individual contract, which the TOO and the territorial administration still have to conclude.

And for all the rest—OMON, residents driven out, and destroyed private residences, construction of every kind of thing for private needs—these are the fantasy of an author working on the principle "The more terrible it is, the faster it will be believed."

We Must Work Together

And so what remains, if we try to sum up in brief.

First: the situation is such that reconstruction of the center must not be put off "for later" in the hope that the problem will somehow resolve itself.

Second: the new economic situation where construction would cease to be a state monopoly and the architect would cease to be a state functionary is creating new conditions for realizing this program. We are speaking not of the sale and plundering but of the civilized enlistment of state and for the most part nonstate capital investments in the reconstruction programs.

Third: the Moscow center reconstruction program by virtue of its importance can and should be resolved with observance of a whole set of special conditions, given the indispensable participation of the broad public itself, and given the residents' interest and supportive attitude toward it and consideration of their interests first of all. We aspire to an open and honest policy and are open to cooperation and to any form of public monitoring. Let it

be, for example, the Supervision Council of Zamoskvorechye (incidentally, such an organ was set up in Ostozhenka). And let this council be made up of respected people who understand what Zamoskvorechye means for Moscow. And I propose to one of these people—V. Ya. Lakshin—that he head this council and organize its work. For my own part, I can promise complete cooperation.

Head of New St Petersburg Directorate Interviewed

924C2440A St. Petersburg SANKT PETERBURGSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 4 Sep 92 p 5

[Interview with A. A. Smirnov, head of the Directorate of Administrative Organs of the Mayor's Office of St. Petersburg, by V. Volkov, press-center of the Mayor's Office—Special to SANKT PETERBURGSKIYE VEDOMOSTI: "We Will Not Permit Unlimited Crime"; place and date not specified; last paragraph is an editorial note]

[Text] The time of dilettantes is passing, the time of the professional is beginning. The appointment of Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Smirnov as chief of the recently-created Directorate of Administrative Organs of the Mayor's Office has become the next confirmation of this reassuring trend. An experienced state security officer, he is acquainted with the difficult problems which today confront the law enforcement organs of the city by more than hearsay. Since 1983, during several years, A. A. Smirnov worked in the service of the Administration of the KGB, which exposed corruption in the organs of the militia and solved counterespionage problems in a number of subdivisions of the Ministry of Defense. Continuing to acquaint the residents of St. Petersburg with the heads and the activity of the basic subdivisions of the mayor's office, we asked A. A. Smirnov to tell us about how the directorate of administrative organs was created and about the goals and methods of its work.

[V. Volkov] Having presented a new official, it is accepted practice to report, if only briefly, basic landmarks of his biography. I do not see any necessity to break this tradition and I ask you to tell about yourself: Where are you from by birth, where did you study, what was your line of work before your appointment to your present post?

[Smirnov] I am a native of Leningrad, after school I worked at a plant, served in the army, and then I studied in the day division of the Faculty of Law of Leningrad State University. In 1976, on the basis of allocation, I was sent to go through service in the Leningrad Administration of the KGB, where I went through all the levels from ordinary staff member to head of the Department for the Struggle Against Corruption and Organized Crime in the sphere of the economy.

In the elections of 1990 I became a people's deputy of the rayon Soviet, then I was elected to membership in the Small Soviet and as deputy chairman of the Legal

Commission. Thus, I am acquainted in practice with the work of the representative organs of power.

In May of this year, I received an offer from Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Sobchak to head the Directorate of Administrative Organs being newly created. Since 20 years of military service gave me the right to transfer into the reserve and since I saw that in the new job I can more effectively apply my professional knowledge and life experience, I accepted this offer.

[V. Volkov] However, in spite of your undoubted professionalism in the matter of protection of state security, and, perhaps, precisely "thanks to" it, your confirmation in the post, as well as the creation of the Directorate of Administrative Organs itself did not go through without serious resistance of some members of the Small Soviet of the City Soviet. What is the reason for their resistance?

[Smirnov] In the repeal of the order "On the Formation of the Directorate of Administrative Organs," the members of the Small Soviet acted, this is worthwhile noting, in accordance with the letter of the law. In particular, the statute concerning the structural subdivision of the mayor's office is confirmed by the City Soviet. This was not done.

Although the problem is not so simple. It is well known that the mayor asked the City Soviet to transfer the confirmation of the plan for the administration of St. Petersburg to the first quarter of 1993 and at that time to confirm the statute on the structural subdivisions. I am convinced, and, I think, you will agree with me, that the repeal of the order could be avoided by having proposed to the mayor's office to bring the order in conformity with the law. At the end of July, the statute "On the Directorate of Administrative Organs" was referred to the Small Soviet for review and confirmation. Unfortunately, the question of the confirmation of the statute was not entered on the agenda before the "holidays."

You have put the question quite correctly. I am perturbed by the fact that what is really being examined is the resistance of some members of the Small Soviet in regard to the creation of the Directorate of Administrative Organs. What is the reason for such a position?

I have received information to the effect that some deputies are afraid of an increase in the mayor's power owing to the creation of this structure. But, you see, executive power must be strong. Some members of the Small Soviet for some reason see in the new structure a return to the old. In particular, an analogy is made with the Department of Administrative Organs that existed in the former CPSU obkom. But, you know, this is absurd. In its time, the public organization which the party was assumed state functions, but the Directorate of Administrative Organs is a structural subdivision of the mayor's office. It is worthwhile to note that there are also

members of the Small Soviet and deputies of the City Soviet who actively support the creation of the Directorate.

The mayor made use of the powers given to him by the law and on 30 July issued a new order "On the Directorate of Administrative Organs," and the statute on it, as I have noted above, is in the City Soviet and is awaiting confirmation. As far as I, as head of the Directorate, am concerned, I have been appointed to this post by the mayor, and confirmation by the Small Soviet in this case is not required.

[V. Volkov] What is the Directorate of Administrative Organs of the mayor's office called upon to do?

[Smirnov] The creation and activity of the Directorate of Administrative Organs is exclusively within the limits of Russian legislation presently in force and those measures to strengthen the legal order and public safety that are being carried out by the president and government of the republic. Proceeding from the task put before the mayor's office—to guarantee the effective interaction of the administrative organs: Procuracy, internal affairs, federal security, and organs of military administration of the Leningrad Military District, internal and border troops, as well as customs and tax inspection—the Directorate was formed within its limits.

Moreover, life itself increasingly insistently demands the consolidation of efforts in the matter of the struggle against crime.

Comparatively recently, the mayor's office received a government document which calls attention to the fact that an extraordinarily unfavorable situation conducive to crime has developed. The president and the government, disturbed by the growth of violations of the law, have ordered the organs of executive power, jointly with the administrative organs, to examine the operational situation and to think out and take decisive measures for its stabilization. The document especially indicates that the guarantee of the protection of the person and the rights of citizens is one of the main obligations of the organs of state power. As you understand, the Directorate of Administrative Organs has been charged with the work on the realization of the instruction of the government.

I would like to cite one example. Recently there has been an increase in anonymous calls of an extremist character in various departments—with the threat of the execution of explosions in targets in St. Petersburg. In the measures to secure the search for explosive devices, large forces are taking part—these are the organs of the militia, the internal troops, the federal security organs, sub-units of civil defense and the military district, and various services of the city economy. But in practice, there were no coordinated actions between them, the system of notification did not work clearly. And here the heads of a number of the above-listed services turned to the mayor's office with the request to hold coordination

meetings on this question, a study group was created, which has prepared an appropriate draft order.

The function of the Directorate includes also the creation of a precise system for receiving information materials from the administrative organs for reports to the mayor's office and the adoption, on their basis, of balanced and well thought-out decisions. I would like to underscore especially that the Directorate considers one of its basic functions to be the extension of assistance to law enforcement organs in the solution of social and consumer problems and in the provision of materials and equipment.

[Volkov] It is strange that it was precisely the granting to your Directorate of the right to coordinate the work of the administrative law enforcement organs which called forth sharp objections on the part of some members of the Small Soviet. . . .

[Smirnov] As a matter of fact, part of the deputies of the Petrograd [as published] Soviet believes that the mayor's office should not decide the question of coordination. In their opinion, this is the job of the procuracy. Such a point of view is incorrect in principle, for according to legislation presently in force, the coordination of the operations of the law enforcement and administrative organs is not a task of the procuracy.

Coordination is the coordination of activity, and nothing more. Under the chairmanship of the mayor, a working meeting of the heads of the administrative organs of the city was held. At this meeting all those present unanimously expressed their support for the creation, in the structure of the city government, of an organ securing the coordination of the activity at the level at which it concerns the guarantee of law and order on the territory of St. Petersburg.

[Volkov] One of the main functions of the departments of administrative organs was the selection and placement of personnel in the law enforcement organs. Does your administration have such a right?

[Smirnov] No, we will not interfere in the personnel policy of the law enforcement organs. Their heads themselves should decide with whom they want to work, and they are not obliged to obtain our approval for the appointments they make. At the same time, the Directorate will inform the mayor's office about new appointments and personnel transfers, as well as about personnel policy in general. As the head of executive power, the mayor must have exhaustive information on these questions. If these or those administrative organs operate ineffectively and the reason for this is an unfavorable personnel situation, the mayor has the right and even the duty to turn to the heads of the corresponding republic ministries and departments and call their attention to the necessity of correcting the situation.

[Volkov] In many letters which the mayor's office receives from the town-dwellers there is reference to the extremely alarming state of affairs in the sphere of the

struggle against crime and in the guarantee of the personal security of citizens. What could you say in regard to this, proceeding from the information that is at the disposal of your Directorate? What do you propose to do?

[Smirnov] It is no secret to anyone that our economy finds itself in a deep crisis. The growth of crime is a derivative of economic problems. The fall in the standard of living stimulates the growth of street crime, especially among young people. The imperfection of economic legislation, the instability and imbalance of the economy create the soil for the flourishing of organized crime groupings. It goes without saying, people living in cities suffer from street crimes most of all. What is the reason for the lack of effectiveness in the struggle against it? Above all, it is to be found in the understaffing of the patrol and point-duty service. In the words of one of the heads of the Main Administration of Internal Affairs, now a militiaman on point-duty has duty in a 12 kilometer sector. Investigation finds itself in a very difficult situation. Some investigators are handling 80 criminal cases simultaneously.

For this reason, the activity of the Directorate of Administrative Organs began with a search for organizational and material reserves to improve the work of the law enforcement organs.

The mayor's office will extend concrete practical assistance to the Main Administration of Internal Affairs in the creation of subunits of militia motor vehicle patrols, which can fully take under control the central districts of St. Petersburg. At the present time, a battalion of patrol and point-duty service, created at the expense of funds from the local budget, is operating in the city. In the future, it is planned to create, on the basis of the battalion, a regiment of patrol and point-duty service, as the result of which the Main Administration of Internal Affairs will have another mobile sub-unit of the OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachments]-type.

Jointly with the deputy chief of the Main Administration of Internal Affairs and the head of the Criminal Investigation Service, Maj Gen Petrov, measures have been examined that are aimed at the improvement of the situation in investigation and bringing the personnel of the investigation subunits up to full strength.

For the struggle against law violations in suburban trains in the Northwest Administration of Internal Affairs in transportation, a battalion has been created whose duty details accompany the electric trains. In the composition of the battalion is an operational response company, which will act in accordance with the principle of OMON and in the case of the development of an especially difficult situation will come to the assistance of the patrol details. By order of the mayor, a building on the Robespierre Embankment has been allotted for the quartering of the battalion.

As all the people living in the city, the workers of the law enforcement and administrative organs and the servicemen of the internal troops this year have experienced significant problems with the payment of wages because of the cash crisis. For a long time, the staff members of OMON could not obtain their wages—people who operate in especially difficult and dangerous situations and frequently risk their life. An analogous problem was also encountered by the administration of internal troops, whose subunits secure the protection of the corrective-labor institutions and other important state objects. The heads of OMON and the administration of internal troops turned to the Directorate of Administrative Organs with the request to help them. The mayor's office succeeded in solving this question sufficiently quickly.

The fire situation in the city and oblast remains extremely difficult. The direct damage from fires has already come to R43 million, and if the indirect losses from missed advantages are taken into account, the losses are calculated at a sum of R660 million.

[Volkov] As far as I know, your Directorate has the right to submit a petition about the decoration of staff members of the law enforcement organs who have especially distinguished themselves?

[Smirnov] This is part of our duties. One of the last examples: By order of the mayor of 30 July, gratitude was declared and large monetary bonuses were paid to a large group of staff members of the Main Administration of Internal Organs for courage and determination manifested during the arrest of armed criminals and for high professionalism in putting a stop to the activity of organized criminal formations.

[Volkov] Now it has already become clear to everybody that the hopes for a quick way out of the socioeconomic crisis were not justified. A difficult fall lies ahead of us and a difficult winter. In what direction will the crime-conducive situation develop in St. Petersburg? Do the administrative organs with which your Directorate cooperates have sufficient forces to prevent its sharp complication?

[Smirnov] According to our prognosis, the growth of crime is expected, and the crime-conducive situation in the city will become further complicated in the future. The trouble in the economic sphere, as I have already said earlier, continues to be the chief reason for this. The least stable part of the unemployed, whose number has a clear tendency to increase, will become a significant reserve for the replenishment of the criminal sphere.

From the "hot" spots on the territory of the former Soviet Union, above all from the Transcaucasus and the Dniester Region, more and more firearms are entering St. Petersburg, which are accumulating in the hands of various types of criminal groupings. In a certain sense, although very insignificantly, the growth of law violations is also being influenced by the impending partial amnesty, which was declared by the Ukase of the President.

On its part, the mayor's office in the most intent manner is following the trials that are taking place in this sphere of the life of the city. Recently alone, two working meetings with the heads of the law enforcement organs have been held, which are aimed at the weakening of the crime-conducive situation. In November it is planned to conduct an expanded collegium of the mayor's office, which is specially devoted to the whole complex of the problems of the struggle against crime in St. Petersburg. We will not allow unlimited crime in St. Petersburg; of this the residents of the city can be fully convinced.

In publishing this, in our view, interesting discussion, we want to accompany it with a small note. Any structural reorganizations, collegiums, sessions, and meetings are good only when their results reach the immediate executors and are transformed into real deeds. Precisely this is the basis of our common hope. The situation with the protection of the constitutional rights of citizens, as is indicated by the report of the city's procurator to the chairman of the City Soviet and the mayor's office, which was published in yesterday's issue of our paper, is unsatisfactory. And, perhaps, it is worthwhile to move what is projected for October and November to the nearest deadlines!

Leningrad Oblast Administration Head Interviewed

924C2440B St. Petersburg NEVSKOYE VREMYA
in Russian 3 Sep 92 p 1

[Interview with Aleksandr Belyakov, head of the administration of Leningrad Oblast, by Maksim Shabalin, correspondent of SANKT PETERBURGSKIYE VEDOMOSTI: "The Crowd Does Not Solve Anything"; place and date not specified]

[Text] The Coordination Council for Collective Actions of the Workers of the Agro-Industrial Complex decided to conduct the next protest action on 15 September throughout Russia.

"It would be best if the peasant movement would come to an end with this action of ours. I do not even want to conjecture what will be if the government again will not satisfy our requirements. On the development of the agrarian sector will depend the fate of all progressive transformations—and let us be frank—the survival of the Russian population," declared the chairman of the Coordination Council, Mikhail Lapshin.

In connection with such an alarming development of events, our correspondent met with the head of the administration of Leningrad Oblast, Aleksandr Belyakov.

[Shabalin] Aleksandr Semenovich, how legitimate and justified, in your view, are the demands of the peasants?

[Belyakov] Of course, their agitation is somewhat justified. For example, if a resolution is adopted by the government on subsidies for purchased products, then it must be carried out. The debt to the agricultural workers [agrariki] of the oblast for the products already sold

comes to about R800 million rubles. The second aspect: Our trade absolutely does not pay money for the commodity it receives from the rural producers, although it sells it to the population. This debt for the oblast amounts to approximately another billion. And it turns out: The abused and reabused sovkhoses are operating with a profit—they are owed more than they. But in fact—they are bankrupt. From this point of view, the demands of the peasants are quite legitimate.

But to insist on firm procurement prices for products—that is yesterday. The market is the market. Let us suppose our [producers] today offer potatoes for R25 per kilogram, and in Bryansk Oblast these potatoes go for R12. The officials in charge of state procurements, naturally, will buy them there. This is a normal market. The agricultural unions need to sit down at the negotiation table with buyers, and not with state organs.

There is a mass of justified demands, but I am categorically opposed to such a form of expression of protest as the strike. Do you remember the pickets of 5 August? ... The crowd never decides anything. Shouts, unfounded accusations—this must not be. Especially as we are solving many questions today: We are allotting credits for the purchase of vegetables for the needs of the oblast, advantageous credit has been received from the government for the purchase of feeds and fuel. This comes to hundreds of millions of rubles. We need to make use of them. The time is coming for normal economic relations, and what is needed is not to strike, but to learn to live in the market. To lead people into a square—this does not require much intellect.

[Shabalin] And nevertheless the decision of the Second Congress has actually not been implemented, the value-added tax on agricultural products has not been abolished.

[Belyakov] I am also a supporter of the reduction of the value-added tax, but this does not mean that this can be done today. The same congress that decided to allot 15 percent of the national income to agriculture adopted a program of radical economic reforms, thereby having allowed the introduction of the value-added tax. And, of course, it is not the oblast administration which may lower the tax or decide the use of these 15 percent.

Things are really difficult for the peasantry. This year they were not lucky with the weather—drought, less feed, disorders in relations with the procurement organizations, with the processing industry.

I understand very well: Our sovkhoses were oriented not to engage in the production of cereals. But in the spring and winter we persuaded people to sow as many more cereals as possible in order for us to have our own feed. In the farms where the directors felt the situation keenly,

they sowed and obtained a harvest, and they will have feed. In others, they hoped for state deliveries. Those who so desire can solve their problems.

And when they say that a milkmaid makes R2,000 a month—this is absurd. Given normal work and normal milk yields, there is no such wage in agriculture. It is much higher.

[Shabalín] There is or there should not be?

[Belyakov] No. R3,000 is the minimum. They only consider the pay and advance. But various payments, increments, which in agriculture are more than the wages? They are for some reason forgotten.

A union of peasants, which defends their interests, is indeed needed. But now the strike movement is organized by the old system of system of trade unions that has become obsolete, by virtually the same party structure. And they do this exclusively for self-preservation. They do not go into production, they do not solve the questions there that need to be solved, defending the rights of the workers. They splash out emotions in the streets, they lead people astray in order to divert their attention from themselves and to switch it to the regime. Thus the illusion of the necessity of these trade unions is created. But this is elementary fraud of the people.

[Shabalín] There exists the opinion that the meeting of the operational staff for bringing in the harvest and the meeting of the heads of the administrations in the office of Vice President Rutskoy are extremely reminiscent of the old partkhozaktiv [party economic activists].

[Belyakov] I was present a number of times at such meetings and I want to say that there can be no talk of any reports about successes. This is a thing of the past. Today they only talk about shortcomings alone. Although it would not be a bad thing to propagandize good, positive experience. Come down: Close to Petersburg, on the outskirts of the city the Krasnyy Oktyabr Sovkhoz. And look what kind of a potato harvest they have. 50 tonnes of per hectare. Why not tell about this?

But, moreover, during the spring 2,000 tonnes of the highest-quality cereal seeds were not redeemed. They were lost. And who did not redeem them? Those who today go on strike and say that they do not have feed. We also recommended to all to buy the Dutch potatoe, which produces a fine yield. So of what does the guilt of the administration consist? This is an old pro-communist tradition: To find the guilty one in one thing or another. No one wants to search for the dragon in himself.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Gaydar-Strauss Conversations Viewed

924C2466A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 8 Aug 92 p 3

[Article by Yelena Pestrukhina, MEGAPOLIS-EXPRESS correspondent: "Gaydar Drinks With the Ambassador"]

[Text] According to the reports of the American weekly BUSINESS WEEK, every three weeks, a "stocky young Russian in a grey suit"—Yegor Gaydar—comes to the private residence of the U.S. ambassador to Russia, Robert Strauss. Over a glass or two of whiskey, the friends relax and discuss the problems of power and business, and here the prime minister receives valuable advice. So, Gaydar went to the recent high-level meeting in Washington only after Strauss had explained to him that not showing up because of a heavy work load would be a big mistake. It was Strauss who instructed Yeltsin before his speech to the American Congress. The ambassador "has already begun to coax the three conservative ministers whom Yeltsin recently brought into his government"... At the same time, he "is careful not to create the impression of arrogant patronage." He tells anecdotes about squabbles and frequent quarrels of American bureaucrats with Congress and the president.

Despite the fact that the ambassador's work is going well, he intends to leave Moscow. The 18-hour work day is hard on him, and his age is catching up with him.

Lukin, Simes on Russian-Americans' Political Clout

924C2467A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 36, 6-13 Sep 92 p 12

[New York interview by MOSCOW NEWS correspondent Dmitriy Radyshevskiy with Vladimir Lukin, Russian ambassador to the United States, and Dmitri Simes, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace counselor.]

[Text] [MOSCOW NEWS] Is there a Russian lobby in the U.S., a politically active Russian community?

[Lukin] The Russian community is different from all others in that it is Russian.

[MOSCOW NEWS] Russian or of Russia?

[Lukin] This is also a big question. Take Brighton Beach. In regard to Russia this community is increasingly becoming that "of Russia." While in Russia chauvinism is on the rise, here in America it is being erased in every way. But this doesn't mean at all that the Russian community in the U.S. is moving to a great cohesion. While there are no ideological differences between its members, there are still squabbles about who came to America first and why.

Despite the great number of Russians in America—there are at least 60,000 of them in San Francisco alone—they are disunited.

[Simes] I repeatedly wrote in the American newspapers that the Baltic states have the right to independence, and they will win it. I didn't receive a single letter from any Russian organization in America that felt hurt over the idea.

Then I wrote a story for THE NEW YORK TIMES on Russian-American relations saying that Ukraine was on the whole acting a bit cocky and that it shouldn't talk too much about the Russian imperialism and more about its own violated pledges. While my story was coached in respectful tones towards Ukraine, THE NEW YORK TIMES received 800 letters from indignant Ukrainians in America. The Carnegie Endowment, where I work, too was inundated with such letters showing that the Ukrainian community is powerful.

They called for early elections of a senator in Pennsylvania. The candidate from the Republican Party lost by a 1.5 per cent margin. The White House statisticians say most of those votes were denied by the American Ukrainians.

At the time of elections in states with big Ukrainian population like Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Illinois and, to a lesser degree, New York, it is important to take account of their mood. Upsetting the Ukrainian community in America today is much more dangerous than tackling the Congress of Russian Americans.

The Russian community, as a political force, is disorganized in America.

Those people from Russia, who have achieved something, are as a rule Americans of Jewish extraction. They are still not integrated into the organizations of American Russians. They are attracted to Russia but they do not speak out for Russian interests.

There we have a paradoxical situation: Most people who came from the former USSR are from Russia but their voice is weaker than that of the people from the "out-laying areas."

As regards "an internal lobby," Russia is unprotected inside America. They say that "external policy in America is internal policy," i.e., local policy. It originates in every state or district where they elect congressmen. And it is safer to act against Russia at this level than against Ukraine or even, say, Latvia. This makes Russia loser right from the start in American discussions about relations with the states of the ex-USSR.

[MOSCOW NEWS] Can the new Russian Ambassador change this situation?

[Simes] The most important thing has been done: the embassy now recognizes Russia's former citizens as

people to be reckoned with. This is psychologically important for those people, who are trying to determine their own identity.

The Russian embassy can play a big role in starting a dialogue between the numerous Russian emigrants, who are still reserved and hostile to each other.

[Lukin] There was an idea to establish Russian Houses around America to expose America to the Russian culture. It was supported also by President Yeltsin. But when we came to the brass tacks, we discovered, that we had no funds, no premises, and no personnel. There used to be a magazine called SOVIET LIFE, which circulated in America. It was also known as Soviet Kaif. It died a natural death when state subsidies were cut off while officially it was published by APN. There's still the building and a couple of those who published it. They don't know what to do, but are reluctant to go home. In the meantime, Novosti is going through numerous changes and doesn't want to hear anything about establishing a Russian House in the building.

The community can see that Russia is unable to do even as little as to provide a building, to which American Russians' could go.

The idea can't be implemented even if the Russian President supports it. There is no government policy in regards to the Russian community. What we have are political gestures and the absence of a policy.

Generally speaking I would like to see American Russians play an active role in Russia. What could be done is to appoint one or two authoritative American Russian ministers or heads of state committees. Like they did in Armenia and in the Baltic states.

Double citizenship should be a reality, not just an idea.

[Simes] American charities, corporations and other official organizations are having problems with the Russian bureaucracy so much so that I would like to paraphrase the words of President Kennedy who said: "Ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country." It seems to me that Russian bureaucrats say in dealing with foreigners: "Ask not what you can do for my country, ask what you can do for me, and now, and preferably in hard currency."

This leaves a very bitter taste. The idea of Russian Houses is just one example of what one runs against in trying to help Russia, be it the Russian Ambassador or American foundations. If this keeps up, the great Russia will be regarded here as a Third World country.

The right in Russia are offended by hearing Russia being equated to Upper Volta. But why not, if Russian bureaucrats only take bribes while remaining totally indifferent to their country's future which is so typical of bureaucrats in the Third World.

It's about time that a natural selection on the basis of political efficiency is being carried out in your country. The country deserves it. And the people too!

Russian UN Observer in Yugoslavia Interviewed

924C2466B Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 11 Sep 92 p 1

[Interview with Valeriy Pavlov, Russian UN observer in Yugoslavia, conducted by N. Smirnova: "Why Does the UN Need Our Investigators?"]

[Text] Just three months ago he was investigating murders as an official of the Moscow Criminal Investigations. Today he is a UN observer in Yugoslavia, stationed at one of the UN international policing stations. Our militia has begun to participate in such activity of the UN peacekeeping forces quite recently.

"What do I have to engage in?", Valeriy Pavlov repeats our question. "We observe the activity of the local militia, the adherence to human rights, and the proper distribution of humanitarian aid. We help people find their relatives. After all, they are living here in isolation due to the military actions. An independent trip for them, for a distance of 30 kilometers, for example, is an unrealistic thing. We control the process of turning in weapons. However, it is true, this is proceeding very slowly. Practically all the residents are armed. It is still a long time to a final peace, I believe. Do we investigate criminal cases? No. If the local residents come to us with requests, for example, about robberies, we direct the appropriate document to the local law enforcement organs and watch to see that it is reviewed in a precise and timely manner."

[Correspondent] Does crime in the Balkans differ from, say, crime in Moscow?

[Pavlov] As strange as it may seem, there are much fewer purely criminal offenses. Thefts, robberies—those are a rare occurrence. Murder—that is quite out of line. In the three months that I have served here (there are several villages in the district), there has been only one murder due to drunkenness. The people in Europe are more law abiding than in Moscow, more polite. In Belgrade the motorists do not take the mirrors off of their cars, and there is no militia in the banks. In the evenings it is very quiet. There are no drunks.

[Correspondent] Your subdivision is located practically in the war zone. Have you had occasion to participate in combat actions?

[Pavlov] No. Our job is to observe and report on the situation. UN policemen do not carry weapons. Only helmets and bulletproof vests.

[Correspondents] How were Russian militiamen accepted at the UN international policing station?

[Pavlov] Normally. They entrust us with the most complex work. I, for example, am a group leader.

[Correspondent] Have you gained anything useful in a purely professional plane from your foreign colleagues?

[Pavlov] More information on the level of their technical provision. Otherwise, it seems, we in no way yield to them. Sometimes we even surpass them in terms of organization of matters and experience. In general, the work load of our investigator and a foreign one is not comparable. Also, I believe that the structure of Russian law enforcement organs is often better developed. As one Danish colleague told me, their police inspector fulfills the functions of a sectorial inspector. He deals with all cases requiring different qualifications.

[Correspondent] And how do Western policemen view the physical training of our fellows?

[Pavlov] At least during the cross-country runs we are not dragging at the "tail."

[Correspondent] Much is being said today about the Russian mafia abroad. What are your observations as a Moscow criminal investigator?

[Pavlov] I do not have the full information. I can say only that in the bars the prostitutes are almost all Russian. The Polish police complain about the Chechen mafia.

[Correspondent] Will your experience as a UN observer come in handy for you when you return to work at the MUR [Moscow Criminal Investigations Section] next year?

[Pavlov] Possibly. However, I repeat, by his training the Russian investigator yields in no way to foreign policemen.

USSR Debt Burdening Russia's Trade Efforts

924A2062A Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian
26 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by Yuriy Yevgenyevich Gromushkin, economic advisor to the minister of foreign economic ties and responsible secretary of the Interstate Council on Supervision of Debt Servicing and Asset Use, under the rubric "Finances": "The 'Zero' Variant: Will Russia Bear the Debt Burden Alone?"]

[Text] Debts, especially if they are big ones, complicate the life not only of individual people but of states and sometimes of a whole group of countries. The former Soviet republics are in such a situation. Perhaps no analogies can be found in history to the situation where more than 10 independent countries are bound by a single foreign debt. Yes, that is the heavy financial legacy left to them from the Soviet Union which broke up into pieces. But how should what was borrowed be repaid? From each one individually or all together?

I remind you that in October of last year the Memorandum of Mutual Understanding Regarding the Debt to Foreign Creditors of the USSR and Its Legal Successors

came into being. This document is known as the Memorandum on Joint Responsibility. It became part of agreements with Western creditors—the Paris and London clubs—on deferred foreign debt payments. The document envisions that all the republics other than the Baltics are jointly responsible for paying them off. That is, if some of the debtors refuse to reimburse the debts, the creditor has the right to appeal to all the legal successors and demand that they be fully repaid by any joint defendant. Internal relations between them become secondary.

Then in December of last year, eight of the former republics reached agreement on succession regarding the Union's foreign debt and assets. Russia accounted for 61.34 percent of both, Ukraine—16.37 percent, Belarus—4.13 percent, Uzbekistan—3.27 percent, Kazakhstan—3.86 percent, and so on. Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Ukraine signed the treaty. Azerbaijan, the Baltic countries, Moldova, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan did not sign. However, Moldova and Turkmenistan put their signatures on the Memorandum.

It seemed that consensus had been reached and we could calmly begin to carry out the agreements. Life, however, showed that the real thing is much more complicated than the plans outlined. Vneshekonombank [Foreign Economic Bank] was authorized to manage the debt and opened accounts for the former republics into which they were to pay money to pay off the debt. Almost a year has passed but almost all the accounts are empty. Up to now only Russia has transferred money. From January through August 1.158 billion dollars was paid.

So joint responsibility exists de-jure. But de-facto Russia is bearing the debt burden alone. And the mechanism which was developed for settling the other countries' accounts remains on paper. Meanwhile the year's deferment which Western creditors granted us is ending. In addition, we must meet with them every 90 days in order to confirm the deferment for the next three months. This is of course very inconvenient for us, and we are trying to get a longer agreement on reorganizing the debt: spread out all the payments for a certain number of years, including an exemption period during which only the interest must be paid.

So now the most important thing for us is reaching such a multiple-year agreement. Our creditors agree with this idea too. Among coming matters to be coordinated are relations among the republics of the former Union. Joint responsibility is suspended for practical purposes. What is the solution? First of all we should admit that joint defendants cannot, as was proposed earlier, fulfill their obligations and that since the Memorandum was signed none of them other than Russia has really participated in paying the debt. So corrections will have to be made in the agreement with the Paris Club.

Just what are these corrections? Russia proposes to assume payment of the entire foreign debt of the former

USSR itself. In exchange the sovereign republics transfer to Russia their part of the assets that used to belong to the Union. For the debts and assets are divided among everyone in accordance with the particular share of the particular country. So the former republics are given a choice—either to pay off their part punctually, or to give up the assets due them but not to pay on the debts. They certainly cannot be allowed to not pay off the debt and at the same time own the assets!

This variant has been called the "zero" variant. Others are possible. But in any case many of our partners believe that there may prove to be more assets than debts, and so they want to carefully calculate and verify the balance. Of course such a desire is completely legal. The only thing is that the matter should not be dragged out. Russia has already signed appropriate agreements on the "zero" variant with Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan.

Suppose that it is accepted by everyone. Then our interrelations with the West change and the agreement with it will be built on a completely different legal basis. The Russian Federation will play the main role. Then even in the near future the debt requirements of the creditors can be oriented to its real possibilities. According to our estimates, if the debt is deferred for several years Russia could pay off roughly 2-3 billion dollars a year. If the preliminary work is completed by 30 September, when the next 90-day break ends, substantive negotiations can be conducted with the West on concluding a realistically feasible average-term agreement. If not, we will have to wait another three months and continue preparations.

Such an agreement involves a great many obligations. The debtor is obligated to follow unflinchingly the schedule of payments which are not subject to the eased debt burden. Otherwise the consequences may be most unpleasant: a drastic complication of relations with international financial organizations and foreign creditors, even to the point of no access to foreign resources. In other words, the new agreements with the London and Paris clubs must be based on real evaluations of the potential for mobilizing country resources to service the debt. A qualitatively new situation is being created where the obligations assumed must be precisely and punctually fulfilled rather than playing at joint responsibility.

Business Lawyer on Possible Legal Competition From West

924A2064A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 23 Sep 92 p 4

[Article by Aleksandr Buyevich, lawyer, under the heading "Opinion": "Lawyers for Business: Can Russian Defenders Compete With Their Western Colleagues Under the New Conditions?"]

[Text] During the perestroika process in Russia there appeared the first foreign legal firms providing legal aid

to clients in connection with their operations, first in the USSR and now in the CIS countries. Western legal firms were for our country a completely new and heretofore unknown entity. However, that does not mean that Russia had no lawyers or does not have any now. The legal profession in Russia was and remains one of its most prestigious. There are many examples of brilliant work by Russian lawyers, and I do not intend to debate here the necessity of my colleagues' traditional methods. However, existence under totalitarian conditions could not help but leave its imprint on the legal profession as well.

While fully realizing the controversial nature of what I have said and not claiming to be able to cover the topic completely, I would like to briefly list the effects which years of rule by the communists had on our lawyers:

- a decline in the prestige and effectiveness of lawyers' work as part of the judicial process;
- poorer skills on the part of lawyers;
- elimination, or perhaps self-elimination, of lawyers from services relative to commercial activities, not to mention capitalist business, as the absence of such a thing all these years is too obvious to mention;
- less internal professional competition among lawyers.

In terms of organization the things I have listed resulted in the legal profession virtually ceasing to develop as a corporate entity. Though members of regional boards and legal consultation offices, in actuality lawyers worked alone. The lack of a market and the small number of practicing jurists in the country made it unnecessary to seek new organizational forms in order to attract clients. This stagnant existence made the legal profession incapable of properly providing legal services for emerging Russian private business, not to mention the foreign businesses entering the country. I do not wish to exaggerate, but this situation in the private legal profession did contribute to the overall legal chaos that exists in this country.

It was under these conditions that the first Western legal firms began operating in the Russian market. How did their work differ from that of "our" lawyers? The simplest and probably most correct answer to that would be in every way. Concerned about attracting more clients, their legal firms are respectable even in outward appearance: office personnel dress well and neatly, and their offices are attractive and properly set up for productive work. Thought is given to the firm's name and its sign. Even on points like those no detail is too trivial for these firms.

Yet for a legal firm the definitive thing is its actual presentation and actions. In order to make those actions effective and hence competitive, a legal firm brings together many specialists in order to achieve a common objective. A firm may have various specialists. At the highest level are the partners in the firm, who work with

the firm and own its property. It is not required, though it does sometimes happen, that partners in the firm enjoy equal rights. Partners regulate relations among themselves with a partnership agreement which also sets forth the extent of each partner's rights in the firm. The next but not the final level is that of the so-called associates, i.e. lawyers who work for the firm on a contractual basis but are not partners. And, finally, there are the paralegals—lawyers' assistants who perform legal tasks of an auxiliary nature. They are usually law students. A legal firm also includes office personnel: secretaries, accountants, file clerks, etc. It is quite clear that a firm thus structured can organize its work quite flexibly, dividing up the partners, associates and paralegals into working groups depending on their professionals preferences, abilities and areas of specialization. Furthermore, and this is very significant, a firm can allocate the necessary number of jurists to work on a specific project.

Quality in the work of each jurist is achieved not only through specialists' sound theoretical training and competition with other firms, but also through the principle of a firm's responsibility to its clients. If a firm makes a mistake it bears full liability, including compensation to the client for all losses incurred as a result of the error. Naturally this principle, advertised by a firm, is highly attractive to potential clients, since in effect it serves as a form of additional insurance.

Naturally, even with excellently organized auxiliary services the decisive consideration in any assessment of the success of a firm's work is the quality of its lawyers' knowledge and their ability to apply that knowledge practically. The principle of teamwork mentioned above consists of work on a specific project being assigned to a group of specialists whose efforts are focused on achieving a single end result. As a rule such a group is headed by a partner in the firm who bears primary responsibility for the correctness of work by the entire group and oversees internal interaction within the group.

A few words about payment for a firm's services. Usually a firm will use the hourly fee system to pay its lawyers. The fee for one hour of work by a specific lawyer is based on that lawyer's experience and qualifications. For instance, an hour of work by a partner in the firm could cost \$500 or more, while an associate's rate would naturally be more modest.

What are the chances for Russian lawyers who, by a quirk of fate, have found themselves faced with this sort of competition and, quite frankly, have proved unprepared for it? It is very unpleasant to hear from foreign businessmen stories of poor-quality or inept work by my Russian colleagues. Unfortunately, such complaints are innumerable. It must be stated that the reputation of our lawyers has been greatly undermined. Clearly some of the blame for that falls to the legal cooperatives, which frivolously and unscrupulously call themselves lawyers. In any event, lawyers who serve businesses and want to help service not only their own clients but foreign ones as well should start by considering that sad fact.

What can be done? Is there no chance of competing with foreign legal firms? Is there anything that a Russian lawyer can use to counter unified professionalism and—naturally also a major consideration—unified and very substantial capital?

While not making any claim to definitive knowledge, I would like to note the following:

- we know how the system works, and we know how normative acts are interpreted and applied in practice;
- we have been in legal practice in our country longer than Western jurists;
- we know judicial and arbitration proceedings, and thus far retain something of a monopoly in them;
- we work in Russia, and Russian is our native language;
- we must work on ourselves and improve the level of our conscientiousness and accuracy;
- we must know a foreign language;

—we must realize that when doing a job for a client nothing is trivial, and that we exist for the client, not the other way around (right now there is no real competition, for many reasons, but competition is not far off, and those who realize that before the rest do will definitely come out ahead);

—we should engage in "dumping," i.e. take advantage of the fact that our homegrown companies are not yet in a position to pay for the services of Western legal firms at their customary rates, and that many foreign businessmen would have no objection to saving some money on legal services;

—we must study foreign practices;

—we must pay much more attention to our public appearances and social contacts.

Most likely only through a combination of all the things listed above will we be able to be competitive and effective. Little things count, and we must work on them.

POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Kravchuk Attack on Chornovil Assessed

92UN20684 Kiev NEZAVISIMOST in Ukrainian
4 Sep 92 p 6

[Article by G. Bursov: "Vyacheslav, Are You Not Right? Instead of an Afterword for the World Forum of Ukrainians"]

[Text] From the very beginning, the World Forum of Ukrainians deviated from the plans of its organizers. Mr. Yuriy Shymko, president of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians, was the first to violate the program. Instead of the humanities person, Mikola Zhulynskyy, who was in the chair, the representative of the diaspora invited those in the auditorium to pray.

The awaited greetings by the president of Ukraine turned into an almost one-hour speech. However, it was not this violation of the time limit that was the most interesting, but rather a violation, if you will, of international norms for communication between the supreme personality of the state and the people (it was broadcast live on TV).

The foreboding of a scandal became apparent in the very first minutes of Leonid Kravchuk's presentation. The same Chornovil could be discerned behind metaphorical expressions.

"We understand some leaders of the opposition. These are people with intellect and temperament, and actually, singing is what nightingales are all about. For them, playing at being leaders and recognition by the people are the meaning, we might say, the sense of their lives. I have no doubt that these people are devoted to Ukraine. To be sure, being wrapped up in their own singing, they very often do not act to benefit the cause. Time has proven that many of those who were good destroyers have turned out to be unfit as builders... Some of the extremists who bill themselves as democrats call for a struggle against the Ukraine we already have at present... They call for building a different Ukraine and, in essence, provoke confrontation.

"Well, nobody has banned anybody else from fighting for power by civilized methods, within the confines of laws in effect. But why should the existing democratic movement be destroyed to this end, the movement which, I repeat, could become a unifying force? *We cannot but recall [lines] from Shevchenko: "Having thrown up his hands, one wonders why the apostle of truth and science is not coming."* (The emphasized words have been inserted into the official text after it was read by the president from the podium, by clever intellectuals from the RATAU [Radio and Telegraph Agency of Ukraine]—I beg your pardon, the UKRINFORM. Was it to add color, or what?—note by G. Bursov). At this forum of Ukrainians, I would like to emphasize that Mr. Chornovil is to blame the most for splitting Rukh

(shouting, noise on the floor). It is a great... (shouting, noise from the floor). *Be so kind as to talk a little, and I will listen."*

M. Zhulynskyy: Gentlemen! Gentlemen! I ask that you be patient and quiet.

(The emphasized words were removed from the stenographic record by specialists from the UKRINFORM who have had many years of experience cooperating with the Ideological Department of the Communist Party of Ukraine Central Committee—note by G. Bursov).

"It is a great pity that it was exactly he, one of the well-known defenders of rights and fighters for a new Ukraine, who took this step. I would like to say that this is no longer just a mistake. This is something more than a mistake. *Let us reflect together.* I would like to dwell on this aspect somewhat." (Noise, shouting, drowning out the speaker with applause... This improvisation by delegates and guests of the forum, who disagreed with the president, lasted 30 seconds).

M. Zhulynskyy: "Quiet, please."

"Truth must be spoken in this auditorium, whether some people like it or not... (Clapping, noise from the floor). *I would ask that these arguments be heard* because this is not about issues of minor significance. Mr. Chornovil is an uncommon figure, and not the least of Ukrainians. I value his *experience*, his struggle, and his talents, but by now, he is already harming Ukraine... (drowning out with clapping). This is true. Let us agree on this. Why do the former Communist Party and Youth Communist League newspapers quote a political prisoner precisely, rather than a former secretary of the Central Committee? (Shouting from the floor: "We are not at a Politburo meeting!") *This is so.* I enlarged on this, here, *I enlarged on this* only in order to address all of us with a request: There is Ukraine before us, and the people of Ukraine rather than our own political ambitions. Political struggle may take anyone very far. We would like reasonable people to stop. This is all." (Eight seconds of applause).

We will move right on to theses from the presentation of Cochairman of the People's Rukh of Ukraine Vyacheslav Chornovil in order to focus the attention of the reader. He was given the floor at the end of the meeting. By then, the president was already absent.

"It is premature to celebrate. We still do not have a Ukrainian state which is politically, economically, and spiritually independent. We merely have an outline of it, unstable foundations on which we are yet to build the house of a truly independent, truly democratic Ukraine...

"The policy of economic retrogression, restricting reforms, tax banditry, arbitrary growth of prices, privatization by the nomenklatura, and the merger of the mafia and state structures has already brought about the

mass impoverishment of the population and mass disenchantment. Look at the faces of our citizens who are oppressed by poverty, and you will not see on their faces the joy of a celebration, the joy of a victory won.

"This is why our forum will also make sense if it does not proceed to the victorious drum roll, but rather under the slogan: 'Ukraine is in danger! Let us save it together!' (Applause).

"...Opposition is a norm of the civilized development of the state, it is a cleansing stream of lively criticism, a guarantee against the transformation of a society into an ossified authoritarian system, a threat of which is built even into the draft new Constitution of Ukraine.

"They do not like the opposition, it does not let them live worry-free. Hence, a campaign of attacks against the Rukh.

"...We do not intend to transform ourselves into a political party of the Bolshevik type. We will continue to be the People's Rukh of Ukraine—a broad-based, mass organization of the people. (Applause).

"Rukh was and is a generator of new ideas and a coordinator on their implementation. Here is only a brief enumeration of extensive campaigns which Rukh has initiated and coordinated recently: a campaign for the immediate withdrawal from the CIS as a new imperial structure (applause); a campaign for the resignation of an antipeople government and the formation of a government of national confidence (applause); the collection of signatures in favor of holding a referendum on the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet and the election of a new parliament on a multi-party basis (applause); the demand to adopt, as soon as possible, a new election law and hold direct elections for the chairmen of cities, villages, and settlements (applause); the preparation of cadres and the creation of shadow power structures at all levels—from a rural administration to the government of the state; criticism of the draft new Constitution and the demand to have the Constitution adopted by the new composition of the parliament or a constitutional assembly (applause), control over agrarian reform and privatization at the local level (applause), preparation of a social trial of the Communist Party and Communist ideology (prolonged, thunderous applause). At present, Rukh is the largest sociopolitical force in Ukraine which is prepared to fight for power, in a bloc with other democratic organizations, against the nomenklatura, which is bringing about the demise of the Ukrainian state. (Applause).

"I... would like to address the Western diaspora. Yours is the honor and the glory for having preserved our spiritual values and our ideals of statehood under the conditions of communist imperial terror in Ukraine (applause). We are very grateful to you for restraining the repressive machinery of totalitarianism through extensive international campaigns of support for Ukrainian political prisoners and for, perhaps, saving many a human life (applause). Thank you for assisting, including

through financing, in the establishment of our public institutions, Rukh in particular, and the holding of significant public events, especially the 1 December referendum.

"...The Communist Party majority in our Supreme Soviet (this majority has not disappeared; we should not delude ourselves) removed from the law on associations of citizens a point on the financial support of the state to such associations. Naturally, they do not need state funds themselves, because they have tucked away the millions of the party, and now sit in the same opulent offices, except under different signs (prolonged applause). ...The government is squandering millions of dollars and billions of rubles. As authoritative experts calculate, the Black Sea Shipping Line alone (do not confuse this with the military Black Sea Fleet) has inflicted on Ukraine losses going into several hundred million dollars after the declaration of independence.

"I think that it does make a difference for all of us, the Ukrainians here and the Ukrainians there, what kind of a Ukrainian state we are building. I think that you do not subscribe to the completely erroneous and altogether harmful, criminal slogan: "The state first, and democracy next." Let us build together a truly independent and truly democratic Ukrainian state (applause)..."

We should note that the audience at the forum was qualitatively different from that at the rallies, because the delegates and guests were selected in a most thorough manner. The part representing Ukraine consisted of Ukrainians selected by the state administrations of oblasts. Before being picked for the forum, representatives of Western and Eastern communities abroad were cooked for several months in a cauldron of sorts. The democratic gentlemen from the organizational committee, who are already known to us, acted as executive cooks... The cooking took a long time, but, as the forum showed, the stew came out not quite to the liking of the president's team.

Let us try to figure out the arguments of Leonid Kravchuk and his opponent.

In the lobby of the forum, we succeeded in detaining for five minutes Mr. Ivan Dzyuba, president of the Republic Association of Ukrainian Studies Specialists, whose presentation immediately following the speech of the president was altogether overwhelmingly balanced and profoundly statesmanlike. Most importantly, it reminded many people of Ivan the way he was a quarter of a century ago.

[Bursov] Why was your report, "Ukraine on the Path of Creating Statehood," so strikingly different from the presentation by our president, the topic of which was supposed to be the same?

The intellectual Dzyuba, an extremely cultured person, wrapped it up modestly: "I felt like a free man; I said

what I wanted, whereas the president is always constrained. From this point of view, he has fewer opportunities."

[Bursov] Do you think that the team of the president failed him by slipping the topic "Chornovil—enemy of the people" into the text of the speech?

[Dzyuba] This was very unproductive and unnecessary. I was stung and shocked. I was pained because, had it not been for this, it would have been quite an ordinary speech in every other aspect. The response would have been normal. Certainly, he was greeted with respect, as the president ought to be greeted. Everything was normal until such time as they heard from him this unproductive and actually unpresidential thing. This happened unexpectedly, incomprehensibly, without justification or even substantiation...

It is not the point that Chornovil was seen off with a long standing ovation, whereas the president... After all, the president himself helped Chornovil; by his speech, the president put him in a very advantageous situation...

People's Deputy of Ukraine Les Tanyuk:

[Bursov] Perhaps, the obstruction to which the president was subjected by the delegates and guests of the forum may have been caused by Leonid Makarovych reading the text of the report right from the podium and relying on his aides. He has always maintained such balance that he was called "cunning" in the former capital, Moscow, for a reason. In our times, this is virtually synonymous with wisdom.

[Tanyuk] Undoubtedly, this was not an action of Kravchuk himself. He is a reasonable man, and he would not have gone for it had he not been persuaded that the forum had been put together in such a way that people who do not approve of his policies had not ended up there. Certainly, they had persuaded him that if he said that, here, it would be a very great present, a rallying point, and a disgrace for his political opponent. It happened precisely the other way around. It is not strange that the audience responded in this manner. In a normal, civilized country, Reagan or, say, Bush would have fired those who prepared the report for him for building this, so to say, concept so unreasonably and with such disregard for psychology. The forum is not the place to name specific things and names. This is the same as the reference by I. Drach, when he spoke, to a monument to Lenin in Kobelyaki that had supposedly been erected. He had confused it somewhat, because on that day they had actually removed the monument to Lenin in Kobelyaki. There is a small difference between plus and minus. Generally, the forum is not the place to raise small-caliber matters if we are to discuss the statehood of Ukraine and the transfer of powers from one president to another. This is some kind of political farmstead...

Kravchuk's report, and especially Dzyuba's report, made a very painful impression on me. What Dzyuba stated

should have been the program of the president. Had Leonid Makarovych spoken the way Dzyuba did, it would have been easy to understand who is president in this state.

My greatest fear was that Chornovil would make the same mistake as the president, and would begin to attack him personally in return. Thank God, he does not have aides who prepare speeches; he spoke in a structured, strategic, and purposeful manner. I was surprised that one of the prominent leaders, head of Rukh, head of the opposition, had not been invited to the organizational committee. Had he been there, much unpleasantness would not have happened, including what you are asking about.

[Bursov] Did the election campaign of Vyacheslav Chornovil begin at the forum?

[Tanyuk] I think so. Kravchuk intended to mount a campaign to encroach upon the potential and rights of the opposition. However, since this produced the opposite result, we may only thank Leonid Makarovych for giving the people an opportunity to see who is who in this real world...

Cochairman of the People's Rukh of Ukraine
Vyacheslav Chornovil:

[Bursov] Why does Kravchuk consider Chornovil to be the greatest danger to Ukraine?

[Chornovil] Not to Ukraine. The greatest danger is to his class. Let us recall who brought Kravchuk to power. The former Communist Party, which held all key positions. The fact that the Communist Party does not exist formally does not mean anything yet. This structure has great positions, especially in the provinces. Look at those appointed representatives of the president; there is no logic. Rukh members, democrats should not have necessarily been appointed; they could have installed good managers. But no, they brought in secretaries of oblast and rayon committees, people who are not economic functionaries but rather the party nomenklatura. They are precisely the ones who ensured his victory. Kravchuk is afraid that this structure, on which he leans, will be shaken. He does not have, or know about, other structures.

He has attempted to draw some people away from the national-democratic forces; this boiled down to several persons. There is a struggle for power. The new class of party and soviet bureaucracy does not wish to give up its positions rather than its principles.

It looks like the scenario of an instigated split among the national-democratic forces is being played out again. The president is a highly experienced propagandist and agitator. He has a service which has discovered people on whom it is the easiest to rely. They serviced the party ideologically in the past as well, whereas now they are displaying patriotism. They have embarked on such

factionous work. I believe that the greatest role in this matter belongs to Pavlychko.

All kinds of false versions about me were disseminated on a mass scale in several oblasts during the presidential campaign, in particular, about me wanting to take away the retirement benefits of the people and have their children maintain them, or send them to old-age homes. At the time, they managed to do it in two or three oblasts only; at present, it is throughout Ukraine. I have received notifications from all 25 oblasts. Lies are being spread on a mass scale. I think that professionals from the SBU [Security Service of Ukraine] who have many years of experience head this campaign. Opposition is not needed, and it is unpleasant.

Moroz Argues Against Parliament Dissolution

92UN2142A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian
15 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by Aleksandr Moroz, people's deputy of Ukraine and chairman of the Socialist Party of Ukraine, under the "Politics and Us" heading: "Who Needs the Dissolution of the Supreme Soviet and Why?"]

[Text] Aleksandr Moroz is, it may be said, a most interesting author of GOLOS UKRAINY if only because his articles in our paper always evoke an urge to argue, take exception, and discuss. There is no doubt that this article of his also will evoke a desire to cross opinions with Aleksandr Moroz.

We make the pages of the newspaper of the Supreme Soviet available to all people's deputies of Ukraine who write to us and to as large a number of the electorate as forces and space in the newspaper allow. It stands to reason that responsibility for the tone of the articles and for the facts presented here is borne by the authors.

So Aleksandr Moroz has the floor.

The first part of the question in the title might seem superfluous. Whoever is not entirely indifferent to social processes knows the sponsors of the removal of the Supreme Soviet from the political arena. He knows them by name and as the leaders of various groupings. Although in their canvassing material they themselves are inclined to hide behind impersonal "action groups" and "committees."

Why, though, is so "noble" and "revolutionary" a cause... anonymous? The explanation that there are, allegedly, many of us is unconvincing. Many organizations, but the people are one and the same. And there are not that many of them. If we set aside the political mimicry, they are all, in fact, a thinned-out Rukh, which, other goals notwithstanding, is endeavoring in this way to prove its influence and imitating a capacity for finding ways out of the crisis.

The Republican Party attempted to demonstrate its separate position, but the details put it in a bind. It did

not sign the common statement on the need for the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet but made its account available for "voluntary" donations. However, the issue lies elsewhere, it would seem. Those who created the party's finance capital had little interest in political nuances. Business circles gave money for a specific common cause, in a particular interpretation. For its present use a pretext was needed. It was found: There would be a profit side, the expenditure would be justified also. And who would compare them? If, on the other hand, the entire action were to be successful, it could be reported at the congress: We, as you can see, made material provision. And if it were to be unsuccessful, then... we did not, after all, support it.

This is conjecture, of course, although not all that abstract. How accurate it is, we will soon see.

All the sponsors could be named personally although not all became such of their own volition. The attitude toward them only of V. Chornovil, perhaps, has been unerring. Both at the start of the activity of the Supreme Soviet, when he sensed the rejection of his views, and later, when it was not he who played first fiddle in the opposition. And mostly after 1 December, when his power, which was so close, beckoned, but did not come to hand. And, in addition, his recent comrades in arms so thanked him at parting for the results of his leadership in the oblast that one divined in the words and applause the joy of separation.

Other names are heard alongside his. At times they disagree with him in some respects, at times they fully support him. But in order to bring down the Supreme Soviet, trifling matters have to be jettisoned. The calculation is based merely on unity.

And the calculation is, in addition, based on the electorate of Ukraine. They, truly, dislike a Supreme Soviet of this kind. But different people invest the words of this kind with opposite meaning. Some would like to have a parliament made up of their fellow thinkers, others, of theirs. The majority of the population would like simply to see in the hall of sessions people who not only make laws but also set an example to all in standard of behavior, debate, and decisionmaking.

Unfortunately, there is no such composition. Nor will there ever be. The standard of the legislative process will undoubtedly grow, but there is no point expecting unanimity. Nor is it necessary. But protecting people from the intolerance, acrimony, and hostility which are sometimes predominant in the hall and, at times, from outwardly tedious uniform procedure is. People of the same opinion as myself insisted on this two years ago even. Accomplishing this is easy—stop carrying all meetings on television. I repeat, this when this is to our disadvantage inasmuch as coverage of the meetings is virtually the sole opportunity for us socialists to get our ideas across to people. But for the sake of harmony in society and the curbing of intemperate passions we should stop airing our political linen in front of a

multimillion audience. One or two hours of television coverage or radio broadcasts would be sufficient for the audience.

The professionalism of parliament, on the other hand, has grown noticeably in the two years. The legal level of a considerable part of it, with over 200 prescriptive enactments, has passed a substantial test, overseas included. Losing such professionalism now, when it is most needed, would make no sense.

Consequently, there are no objective grounds for insisting on the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet. Obviously, the demands of motley sponsors of a "democratic" strain conceal other motives. We will try to examine them. But first let us analyze the content of the main complaints about the legislative body.

The main one, already well and truly bedraggled, is that **the Supreme Soviet is blocking the reforms**. At least two questions arise. What kind of reforms has it blocked? Who presented the motions in respect to the "blocked" reforms?

All the legislative instruments necessary for a reform of the economy (the laws on property and privatization, the group of laws on land, foreign investments, and enterprise, and many others) and the building of the state (on the army, the customs service, the financial system, the security service, citizenship) and for the reform of the political structure of society (on public associations, the local soviets...) and the laws connected with people's social protection, environmental safety, the development of education and culture, guarantees of freedom of worship, and other spheres of the life of society have, it turns out, been enacted. And pretty good laws they are, it should be said. Why they are not working as we might wish is another matter. But this is a separate subject. Separate for each law, although there is a general reason also—the all-around crisis.

Who, though, was the author of the legislative instruments of the reform cycle? There are among the authors, it turns out, virtually no sponsors of the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet, as a rule. V. Filenko, who is trying out leadership in various political groups and who at a town meeting made it understood to its participants that he "now knows what to do," has spoken at the sessions more often than not on procedural matters. It would altogether not become V. Chornovil to display insistence in this connection inasmuch as he has missed the majority of Supreme Soviet meetings, apparently. Considerable numbers of the sponsors are rendering account of their deputy's activity more overseas than in their constituencies. There are among them also many of those who, having forgotten the primary calling of the deputy, are using their mandate for interparty feuding and for a struggle for power, cruising around Ukraine and beyond. Were their conscience to prompt these people to relinquish their deputy's authority, their intention would be justified, understandable, and opportune. But what has this got to do with the other deputies, who

are working conscientiously in commissions, not fixing themselves up in commercial or semicommercial structures and not tying the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet to the acquisition (finally) of Kiev residential accommodation?

The issue lies elsewhere, of course. This is understood by each sober-minded individual. After all, it looks ridiculous: One day elevating to the heights of memorable significance the adoption of the Act of Independence and the Declaration of Sovereignty and then asserting the "unworthiness" of this Supreme Soviet as regards the content of the acts. As though it was not it which adopted them. The argument concerning the need for the creation of a new parliament "on a multiparty basis" because this one, you see, was elected to the diktat of the Communist Party sounds just as baseless.

Of course, elections will not be conducted in Ukraine on a multiparty basis any time soon, if we are talking about a civilized multiparty approach. Today the influence of the parties on the elections will spread on the basis of the resources spent on the campaign or of the proximity of the candidates to the structures of power. For this reason the present electoral law should take account of this reality, **making provision for the citizens' free expression**, and the special suffrage of the production outfits is possible also.

Finally, there was a test of strength without the diktat of one party at the time of the election of the president. His election was confirmation of the people's **nonsupport** for another candidate together with the forces which backed him. Now those same forces are once again pulling people into yet another election campaign. Did the recent results of the voting teach them nothing? I find it hard to believe, for there are still many intelligent, experienced people among them. It is not elections of a new parliament that they want. They want the liquidation of this Supreme Soviet.

They are in a hurry also because the time has come to answer for what they have "done" in various spheres. And they do not want to. They promised prosperity, but the result is beggary. They expected the burgeoning of distinctive cultures, but we remain at the wide-pants level. They aspired to the truth, but we have a distortion of history. They wanted the friendship of the **peoples** of Ukraine, but groupings of a profascist persuasion, for which, according to a recent speech of one of their ringleaders, "bloodshed cannot be avoided," are growing here and there. The latter are candid even. In addition to those quoted earlier the following words were heard on 6 August at a meeting of nationalists in Lvov, in premises kindly made available by the local Rukh office, in the presence of foreign guests (clearly of a fascist persuasion) and some people's deputies: "It is now easy for us to **break up the Supreme Soviet and seize power**." Or "We need to test all officers for the possibility of their continuance in the Ukrainian Army. Foreigners are preponderant: Russian is heard on the streets of

Lvov...." And so forth. So perhaps the electorate's hopes coincide with the intentions of these referendum **activists**?

Their influence is noticeable in the economy also, despite the fact that they remain aloof from production matters. But the severance of economic relations occurred with their most active participation together with their colleagues in Russia and elsewhere. It should be noted that they coordinated their destructive actions well. Their arsenal included mass-meeting changes in the organs of power, political strikes with "fortuitously" identical demands, a simultaneous witch hunt among opponents, the methodical destruction of the armed forces, and the extermination of internationalism. And simultaneous delight in the prosperity in the times of the father-tsar destroyed by the "bloodthirsty Bolsheviks."

Quite so, but it was not the Bolsheviks who toppled the tsar. There was, obviously, a reason. October had been accomplished altogether bloodlessly. They started neither the civil war nor the intervention, and ascribing millions of casualties to them is dishonest. In addition, few participants in **these** events are still living. But who will answer for the present bloodshed and the present casualties of civil wars? Where now are these pseudo-democrats, who ignited the safety fuse of Karabakh and then of other regions? If everything is, generally, clear as regards the Nobel Peace Prize winner, the American German himself, why is the voice of those who hailed his "new thinking" (for export use) and stoked national contradictions at various points of the former Union not being raised? They are silent. A cat knows whose meat it has eaten, that is why it is miaowing at ancient history and looking to make capital from Bogdan, Peter, Ulyanov.... They remain silent about Stalin because he has been condemned by the communists and because, as I was told in conversation with a Galician worker, "they are themselves the same as Stalin."

Yes, the Supreme Soviet is impeding certain reforms. It contains mostly people who know production and real life. They understand the consequences of the undoing of fixed capital in the guise of "fair privatization" and are capable of preventing a cave-in. This is the root of the contradiction. The sponsors of the referendum need to **completely destroy the structure of the economy** inasmuch as in its present form it is unsuitable for transfer to the new capitalists, and they are unwilling to denationalize and debureaucratize it in favor of the work force and for the sake of production efficiency. Because then more **socialist** principles would be preserved inasmuch as man would retain collectivist sentiments.

Let us pick up the verbatim record of meetings of the session and publications on various mass meetings and the congresses of many parties. Free prices (given monopoly production), the breakup of the collective farms, scope for commerce, the creation of their support—the middle class. This is the concept of the content of the reforms of those organizing them.

These "reforms" are already in action. There is confirmation on the store shelves, in the crowds of beggars, the orgy of profiteering with its inevitable crime, in the showcases of movie theaters, and in the forced decline in the numbers of livestock and the understandable consequences in the wake of this. And a "middle class" is taking shape. It will not contain those who with their protests are seeking an improvement in life.

Let the strikers think about this when the "ra-ra revolutionaries" stick political slogans on their just demands. It is not you, not your problems which bother them. They need you as a **means of struggle for power**, for the system which is portrayed in their programs, where you are simply not assigned a place. After all, it is surely no accident that no party, except the Socialist Party, has proposed a specific way of surmounting the crisis. When the market is not denied and private property can function and the role of the state for maintaining **order**, which is needed by all, is upheld. And, what is most important, people's employment, the activity of the enterprises, and support for those in need of protection are guaranteed.

Nowhere have we insisted that our authorship be put on show. It is important that account be taken of the actual conditions. And when, now, official circles and state advisers (even from the ranks of foreign specialists) are starting to reiterate the importance of the preservation of economic relations with Russia and other states of the CIS, this is perceived with understanding. Even recently such an objective requirement was debunked as encroachment on independence, and except by specialists there was no mention of this even by those who understood full well the Manilovism of an abrupt turn-about from East to West.

The discussion at the session of the draft constitution has been used and will be used again as an argument to discredit the Supreme Soviet. They say how. D. Pavlychko declared that as soon as the proposed draft "mis-carries" at the session, they (representatives of the Congress of Democratic Forces—a modification of Rukh created for a formal support for the president inasmuch as the position of the leader of Rukh by no means coincided with the L. Kravchuk's intentions of relying on the "consolidators" of society) will, for all that, dissolve the Supreme Soviet.

So what are the sponsors of the referendum endeavoring to obtain from the hands of the people? **Authorization for dictatorship**. Judging by various pronouncements of the president, such a version attracts even him, at times. When you have a rigid structure of power from top to bottom in the form of a state administration, the possibility of making changes immediately, to the ovation of an obliging press, appears tempting. The leadership of the Supreme Soviet even is hesitating at times over such a version. That a new parliament could not be created in a year or two is understandable. People are sick of petty politicking. But the Presidium would remain. And there would be less responsibility—no Supreme Soviet, and

work to be done, seemingly. And fighting, in time, for new deputy's seats would be easier: say what you will, "keepers of the flame."

The president's entourage and members of the Congress of Democratic Forces whom we all know would be suited by his sole leadership also. He would one day do as they suggest, they would one day be giving orders, citing him.... Where, pray, is the edict on the obligatoriness in the components of power of representatives of Rukh? There is none, but they are in key positions even in districts where their "personnel" can be counted on the fingers of one hand, and there is no room left for sticking ideological patches on any of them, what is more. They are directing, teaching, evaluating. Where is the official demand for the demolition of monuments and memorial signs? When in Borshevo and the Ternopol region people began on the site of the tank battles to pull down from its pedestal the tank of the liberator-army, the authorities referred to a directive of the president. There was none such. But tripping him up, as, say, with the "one state-one church" proposition, is convenient. Let him try and extricate himself and explain why even in the diaspora there is a variety of creeds, and one does not preclude the other. And, in addition, they are getting by without the advice of V. Chervoniya or O. Gudyma.

But what is most dangerous is dictatorship with the temptation in one step to sweep the No. 1 from office and head a **prepared mechanism of authoritarian power**. It is not hard to foresee what this would culminate in for Ukraine. There are sufficient examples. One such is Georgian. This version has long been "on the minds" of the sponsors of the referendum. Even when Z. Gamsakhurdia was being smoked out of Tbilisi by fire and blood, none of our "democrats" even among those who had been friends with him in places not that far away rose to the defense of a president who had been elected almost unanimously.

Who

No answer is needed

Watch people, the Georgian, Tajik, Azerbaijani... news

Latest Political Developments Surveyed

921 A21374 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Sep 92 p. 2

[Article by Viktor Drozd under the "Ukraine: Political Landscape" rubric: "Clash at the Power Pie: In Which Everyone Is Participating Except the People"]

[Text] This present summer Ukraine served out the time of the harvesting season somehow imperceptibly and minutely. Whereas earlier the entire republic would follow the harvesting, empathizing with the villagers, now it might have seemed that the only persons employed are those engaged in political infighting, tearing down memorials, being moved by festivals of song commemorating anniversaries.

CHAFF FOR THE "SOWER AND GUARDIAN"

When the country people were completing preparations for the harvesting campaign, the outcome of the political reaping within the republic Supreme Soviet was already predetermined: The second attempt by the national democrats in six months to bring down the V. Fokin government had foundered.

Why do they so dislike both the premier and the vast majority of his ministers? To take the critics at their word, their cup of patience spilled over with the sudden increase in food prices. At the same time, it is true, the government was reminded of the "glance back at Moscow," the delay in the economic reforms and the slowdown in the state reconstitution of Ukraine. Adducing these arguments, the national democrats, as always, dissembled somewhat. It was ascertained that they also had had a hand in the price increases. They hoped, evidently, that while the people were sorting out who was right and who to blame, they would be able on the wave of tumultuous anger to sweep away the cabinet. If not in full, V. Fokin without fail.

But heavy storms do not last long. The row raised by the national democrats was no more than a play for the public. They are beside themselves over the fact that they simply cannot carry out the social mandate of the fledgling national bourgeoisie and the diaspora weary with waiting for its shining hour—the immediate introduction in Ukraine of private property and the division of people into rich and poor.

On paper everything was proceeding smoothly for the National Democrats. Going for broke, they obviously assumed that if the Ukrainian people had remained silent when, taking refuge in the former's wishes, they had pulled down the USSR and the former had not set up camp outside the Supreme Soviet after the ban on the Communist Party, the "abolition" of socialism and the change of symbols and, even more, had spoken virtually unanimously in favor of Ukraine's independence, then do, consequently, what you like, the toiling plowman will suffer in silence. Consequently, if we lean on it just a little harder, the cabinet will collapse. It was for the sake of this (counting on the gullible) that all the eloquence was cast on the altar. The orators' ardor was further stoked by the fact that the highway promised prior to independence has led not to prospective beauty but a three-fork intersection: end of eating, end of clothing, end of living.... Nonetheless, the National Democrats philosophize: The scarcities, they would have us believe, are further caused by the fact that the government is making a poor job of introducing the experience of the FRG, the Republic of Korea and... Chile.

True, having smelled up close the clouds of the "civilized world," some of the people's elect have convinced themselves that the cat has washed himself long since, but there are still no guests. Yes, Ukraine has been recognized, embassies have been exchanged, and high-ranking visitors have been dazzled by the official smiles but they

are by no means in a hurry to bestow in accordance with category No. 1 financial and technological munificence, but are endeavoring to palm off what is of no use to themselves....

Nonetheless.... The music has been ordered and paid for. For this reason the leaders of the National Democrats and journalists obedient to them are leaning over backward if only to pull onto Ukraine a bourgeois tail coat.

Breathing scorn for the past, the National Democrats have not learned that for millions of people of the USSR socialism and Soviet power are by no means a hollow sound but their life. It cannot be retrieved or rewritten, and the memory of what was harsh and shining therein cannot be killed. And meeting with the electorate, members of parliament have with disquiet understood that attempts to fool the "sower and guardian" with chaff are enjoying no particular success.

TOWARD THE "WESTERN SHORE?"

In the year since the proclamation of independence the national democratic movement of Ukraine has laid bare even more the heterogeneousness of its ranks, which was pronounced even earlier also, which is in itself natural when it comes to a question of sharing the power pie. Many of the movement's activists have with pleasure substituted for the mass meetings which brought them celebrity and deputy's seats the comfort of offices. Some have hit upon the "building of capitalism" for themselves personally. And those with both would unfailingly like something or other: be it a watermelon or pickled cucumbers. But full power—precisely. They have parted company only in arguments concerning the ways to acquire it.

Nonetheless, the "divorces" and "marriages" among the National Democrats have been brought about mainly by the poverty of their political and economic philosophy. It is becoming increasingly obvious that they cannot offer Ukraine anything other than a hastily and ineptly copied capitalism promising the republic (in the most advantageous situation for it) only a repetition of the stale news of world history. Inasmuch as it has not yet been possible to turn Ukraine toward capitalism in a cavalry charge the National Democrats have decided that all failures have resulted from the fact that things are not in order in their own home. They have begun to sort out relations. The "moderates" have preferred to operate "more gently"—the alder is bent by degrees. Dominant influences, which matured in silence, engendered "New Ukraine"—an alliance of politicians and entrepreneurs.

Then Rukh [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroika] was abandoned by its "year-old children." The new national democratic parties, not having shared out the dollars tossed them by the diaspora, rebelled against the inordinate ambitions of a cochairman of Rukh—V. Chornovil. Rukh is for them now cross-eyed and speech-impaired. They are embarrassed by the awkward manners of their "parent," who performed the dirty work on

the legalization and formation of the national democratic movement in Ukraine.

A role in the division of Rukh was also performed by commonplace jealousy: Why, it is said, is the president not concealing his liking merely for this movement and distributing portfolios only to its representatives? (How can we fail to recall here the joke of my fellow countrymen: Wherever there are two Ukrainians, there are three chieftains.) And the president has, by all accounts, heard the whispering of the jealous men. Although I. Kravchuk was not brought to power by the National Democrats by any means, he is being forced to reckon with them. For this reason the president declared a readiness to rely on a new support (instead of that of Rukh, which has become unpopular and unreliable). Only just having emerged, the Congress of National Democratic Forces (CNDF) volunteered to assume this role.

The leaders of the "moderates" are agreeing to a "divorce" with Rukh merely as a blind. Each pine tree is audible to its forest. The blood relationship of the national democrats, which is more eloquent than the verbal slaps, is confirmed by the documents adopted by the CNDF. With the infrequent exception, they confirm goals which are programmatic for all the parties which have formed the CNDF. The authorities have declared unequivocal support for the CNDF also. Having sensed that it could be left without its share of the pie, the previously vehement opposition New Ukraine also has swapped anger for charity. Its leaders recently publicly declared support for the government.

It is hard to say at this time how soon children from the marriage of the authorities and the "moderate" National Democrats will appear, but one thing is clear: If it appears to the CNDF that it is moving too slowly toward the cherished goal (power and control of the economy), it will not be shy about cringing before Rukh, organizing on behalf of the people "general disobedience, picket strikes. Meanwhile, however, the "moderates" are biding their time. For the time being it makes no sense for them assuming responsibility for the situation which has been created in Ukraine (not without their participation). It is more profitable to them to castigate ministers for "devotion to the policy of Moscow," to argue, to make a noise.

And these tactics are also supported by the tactical consciousness of the National Democrats. They are, in an almost repeating step by step (with a slight delay) the motion of their fellow thinkers in Russia (as, prior to this, in the Baltic). They are in the same way brandishing the "red-brown" threat and demanding that the Communist Party of the Ukraine be put on trial and that the Socialist Party be banned. But they are intimidating and giving the signal primarily to their "own people." And the "family" feuding, unite and penetrate all corners of power as quickly as possible.

IS OUR "OWN WAY" POSSIBLE?

People are now intoning with increasing frequency: Ukraine must become self-reliant. But each is interpreting this in his own way. The Socialist Party of Ukraine proposed that the president, the Supreme Soviet, and the government build as quickly as possible the wrecked economic bridges with all countries of the CIS, introduce the partial government contract and price control, and simultaneously prepare the economy for the market. Virtually the same is being said also, with his characteristic certainty, by no means for the first time by V. Simonenko, the new first deputy premier: It is essential to incorporate in the zone of Ukraine's economic interests the former CEMA countries, the immediate transition to the market is contraindicated for Ukraine and the state sector has far from exhausted its possibilities. Certain leading overseas scholars are no less insistent either. You should not, they suggest, in deference to the IMF **"resolutely break everything down into smaller units and privatize everything for the generality of people psychologically reject private property, otherwise you could easily end up begging, you need to formulate 'your own social-market economy' in accordance with national traditions and mentality (my emphasis—V.D.)."**

Why not its "own way" for Ukraine? Why not graft onto national roots with regard for the mentality and present position of Ukraine all that is best from world practice, the USSR included, not shield ourselves from the fruits of the human intellect by ideological blinders?

Understandably, living in the world community and being free of it is impossible. But does Ukraine's independence consist of giving itself over of its own accord to the mercy of world capital? Reality is such, however, that for the sake of a place in the "civilized world" Ukraine will be forced to accept the rules of the game which are dictated to it (and this is already happening) by the strong of this world. Is this our "own way" as the National Democrats understand it?

Politicians do not profess a dual position just for the sake of it, of course. Oh, how reluctant are those who promised their fellow countrymen, following the proclamation of independence, paradise virtually to appear less than a year later before their fellow citizens in the fairy tale attire of the naked king. All the more doggedly are the national democrats pushing Ukraine toward "transformation of the socioeconomic system." But no one would undertake to say with full confidence: Was it such a farfetched that the Ukrainian people were expecting in solving a year ago the independent cornfield?

National Unity Government Seen as Solution to Political Tension

9/11/92, Kiev *VECHERNIY KIYEV* in Russian
11 Sept 92 p. 2

[Article by M. Levitskiy, associate of NASHE SLOVO weekly periodical in Warsaw and member of Ukrainian

Republican Party since 1990: "Viewpoint of an URP Member. On the Threshold of Fall"]

[Text] The young Ukrainian state had to undergo another test and shock in the course of its establishment. That undoubtedly was the strike of 2 and 3 September which involved part of railway and aviation transport systems and some of the shafts in the coal and ore mining industry. The free trade unions called for a strike. According to its leaders the main reason for the "permanent strike" was a failure of the government commission to accept their economic demands, the principal one of which pertained to wages. The head of the government considered them as absurd and provocative. Their fulfillment would have exceeded the meager possibilities of the Ukrainian state budget. In addition to that they were aimed at a narrow strata of workers, as mentioned in the documents submitted by trade union leaders—members of the free trade unions. Other categories of the population were ignored. Whether this was done consciously or not, the satisfaction of these demands, even if the budget permitted it, would have injected an atmosphere of instability and tension in an explosive labor strata with a low national-patriotic consciousness. In their package of demands the free trade unions also included other points, mainly of an economic nature, which would aggravate the budget crisis even more. Therefore there is an entire series of reasons to assume that this was a strictly political act aimed at the destabilization of the economy. That is also evidenced by the fact that on 1 September, when it was known that at present it is impossible to comply with trade union demands and sign the wage rate agreement, a package of political demands was set forth in the evening which was in consonance with the political program of Rukh and "New Ukraine." Was that really fortuitous?

The idea of a strike found its greatest support in Kiev, Sevastopol, and Donbass. The strike, however, did not acquire an anticipated massive character. The majority of workers failed to support this action. Railway workers from other regions of Ukraine, who arrived in the capital of Ukraine, were prepared to ease the tense situation that developed on the Kiev Railway. Military air controllers were to replace civilian ones.

In addition to that, in order to eliminate tension, the president agreed to satisfy some of the demands presented to him on the first day of the strike. In particular he guaranteed that negotiations would be conducted in the future concerning wage rate agreements while the organizers and participants of the strike would not be held liable.

The president's guarantee not to hold initiators of the strike liable caused a misunderstanding in certain political circles. After all the strike had an antigovernmental character since in two days of idleness the losses of the railway system are measured in hundreds of millions of rubles, and losses of the airlines—in tens of millions of rubles and hundreds of thousands of dollars.

As we see the strike found support only among an insignificant segment of the workers. Most of the political forces also condemn it. Circles of scientists and military personnel likewise condemned the strike.

One of the conditions for stopping the strike was the allocation of live air time on Ukrainian television for leaders of free trade unions. Ukrainian leaders agreed to that without the slightest hesitation. I personally regard that as politically promising. The multi-million television audience in Ukraine had the opportunity of seeing those who are presently striving to reach the crest of political life in Ukraine. Moreover the leaders of free trade unions do not speak Ukrainian and demonstrated the nonconstructive nature of their demands without attempting an objective analysis of the current situation. In other words—the lack of a state line of thought, the presence of emotions, and, to a certain degree, a discrediting of political demands of "New Ukraine" and Rukh concerning the resignation of the government and self-dismissal of the Supreme Council.

The two-day strike revealed many facts requiring more profound comprehension. One of the leaders, for instance, promulgated the following demand: either all of the demands set forth by trade union leaders will be satisfied, or the main branches of the economy will remain on strike until all organs of power, including the president, resign. In other words the strike leaders were striving for a self-liquidation of Ukrainian statehood.

It is not difficult to understand that before the Ukrainian government was confronted with concrete demands, appropriate "consultations" were conducted with political forces positioned backstage of the strike. Taking into account the fact that these strange "demands" were promulgated by a representative of Donbass, and realizing the complicated political palette of this region, it is possible to say with safety that antigovernment forces are behind the strikers. All the more since the strike in Ukraine coincided in time with the new wave of activity by Russian government and diplomatic circles aimed at the creation of a new state structure on the basis of CIS. Further grounds for such reasoning are provided by the fact that recently such strike action in Russia was liquidated quite readily. The fact that Ukrainian strikers did not draw appropriate conclusions from it, cannot be ascribed to lack of information or naivete. Rather that was a conscious, and in some cases, a cynical step directed at kindling a political situation before the start of the session of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, designed to create tension and intensify it further by complicating the economic situation. Here we come again to the previously expressed assertion that the demands of the strikers are consonant with the demands of ultraradical political groups, that is, the circle has closed, but the analysis must be conducted on another plane. How constructive is the position of the radicals for the building of statehood?

So far it is dominated by a tendency toward total rejection of all that is old rather than toward the building

of something new. There are constant appeals for complete renovation of all organs of power. At the same time the radicals refer to the political legacy of leaders of the national-liberation movement of the forties-fifties, as if not knowing that, by the statements of witnesses, Roman Shushkevich at one time said: when we win, acquire the government, we will have to involve the old cadres in its building.

The interpretation of the strike by the mass media was varied. In particular, after military air controllers assumed their posts, the Russian television and its supporting newspapers in Ukraine carried reports of the type: "Several catastrophes due to incompetence were narrowly avoided." "Ostankino" was apparently interested in the delivery of just such information from Ukraine because it was specifically then that Marshal Shaposhnikov, commander of the CIS strategic forces was attempting to subordinate under his command, that is Russian command, the strategic forces deployed in Ukraine.

In my view there is another peculiarity in the context of the coverage of the strike. The reports on the strike mentioned nothing about the attitude of the socialist party or "New Ukraine" toward it. The Rukh leadership in a restrained fashion expressed itself about the lack of feasibility of conducting it at present, just prior to the session of the Supreme Council. This, it seems, means that in principle it favors the tormenting of the current emaciated economy by the strikers. The declaration by Rukh leadership deserves attention also because it appeared on the air on 3 September in the afternoon, that is when it was already known that the action with the strike has been lost. Such a position has precedents in history.

The question inevitably arises here: in the name of what are the above named forces prepared to allow the economy of Ukraine to be torn apart by strikes and anarchy? Leaders of "New Ukraine" and Rukh believe that the principal fault for the present economic position of Ukraine lies with the government and the Supreme Council and are demanding the resignation of these organs. The government is being accused of incompetence. While the Supreme Council—that it is purportedly a legislative organ of another nonexistent state of Ukrainian SSR. This strictly populist declaration does not withstand criticism since on 24 August 1991 the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, having proclaimed an independent state, thereby altered its status. It is another matter that people who did not vote for the independence of Ukraine, are sitting in the highest legislative organ of Ukraine. In addition to everything else, they are now introducing a number of initiatives aimed at the weakening of Ukrainian statehood. The removal of these people from the parliament would significantly improve the health of the parliament while enhancing its working ability. What is most important is that the many millions in funds that must be allocated by Ukrainian industrialists (under Rukh auspices) for preparations for the referendum could be utilized to prove

promising purposes. In addition to that the appeals for early dismissal of the Supreme Council are placing great responsibility on their authors for the qualitative composition of a new highest legislative organ of the state. At present quite a few people are surfacing in political life with a cynical attitude toward Ukrainian independence on the wave of the general economic impoverishment of most of the population.

A significant portion of Ukrainian society currently identifies the present situation in the state directly with the activity of the government of Mister Fokin. The extent to which these accusations by the broad circles are justified—must be determined by political scientists and economic commentators, and not by publicists.

The leadership of Rukh and "Independent Ukraine" are systematically accusing the Cabinet of Ministers of incompetence. Their documents state that they and 20 other organizations, forming the coalition, will be striving for the resignation of the government by all means, including radical ones. The experience of recent years has indicated that radical means must be understood to be acts of disobedience and strikes. Is it possible to equate such a position with the lofty words about patriotism?

It is also necessary to take a look at the question of mutual relations between leaders of individual political forces and the state structures in a somewhat different light. At present the authorities are being criticized by the Messrs. Filenko and Chornovil in a very active manner and on a great propagandistically informational scale, even though until just recently they occupied different positions. But let us look back in order to see a lot that is interesting. Chairman of "New Ukraine," armiya in parliament, for along time stood apart from the political struggle against the communist regime and attempted to convince his colleagues supporting statehood, who challenged the communist system without compromise, that it is necessary to engage in democratization inside the party. The utopian nature of this position became clear in August 1991. Currently, in front of selfless, systematic work, he assumed the position of militant radicalism.

As far as Chornovil is concerned, any criticism of power structures should begin with himself. After all, for a two-year period he managed the Lvov Oblast, and heading its executive structures. In that time, according to commentators, the Mafia sector of the economy developed with the greatest vigor. The main credo of Mr. Chornovil at that time was a stake in old cadres in the executive structures. That produced considerable criticism in the political circles of the city of Lvov. The criticism leveled by the opposition was regarded by Chornovil as neotalitarianism. Where is the consistency here?

Questions of the political fall, and perhaps a hot one, is presently in Ukraine. There will be opposition between the anniversary of the 50th anniversary of the UPA

[Ukrainska Povstanska Armiya—Ukrainian Insurrection Army] as well as other patriotic measures stick like a bone in its throat) and government and the radical forces. There will probably be attempts to again generate a wave of strikes.

All this will apparently be reflected on political stability in the Ukrainian government. Political self-restraint and farsightedness are needed in order to preserve it. It appears that almost the only way out of the tense situation may be the creation of a government with national trust. Certainly not because it would operate more effectively than the current one, but in order to eliminate the atmosphere of tension and mutual accusations. The next few days will show what path will be selected by the politicians and the president.

From the Editor. In presenting his comments in our newspaper, Mr. Levitskiy makes a reservation: "The views expressed in the article are not a reflection of the position of any one of the political forces, but my own understanding of the political reality in Ukraine." It is true, certain assertions by the author appear highly subjective to anyone who has been attentively following the development of political events since the start of Gorbachev's policy of "glasnost and perestroika." But it is all the more interesting for our readers to acquaint themselves with such a viewpoint as well.

Diaspora Officers Seek Ways To Serve in Ukraine

AU0210145992 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYIN
in Ukrainian 18 Sep 92 p 2

[Report signed "S.T.": "Marching to the President's Reception Room"]

[Text] There are two unions of Ukrainian officers. The first—the Union of Officers of Ukraine—unites officers of the national Armed Forces while the second—the Union of Officers of the Ukrainian Diaspora (UOUD)—is a much smaller organization that deals with problems of Ukrainian servicemen serving in armies of other states. The vast majority of the UOUD members have a common objective: to serve in the army of their people.

Let us consider some figures. At present, 180,000 servicemen are stationed in Ukraine. The needs of the future Ukrainian army are limited to between 220,000 and 400,000 servicemen, among whom only 100,000 must be officers. In addition, 300,000 Ukrainian servicemen are presently doing their service outside Ukraine.

Consequently, there are more than enough people wishing to serve in the Ukrainian Army. It is logical that preference will be given to Ukrainian citizens. However, no less logical is the fact that the most competent professionals, irrespective of their address in the former Union, must serve in our army. (Provided, of course, that the foreign applicants are of Ukrainian origin.)

It is precisely this second logic that has led the UOUD to suggest new ways of selecting people for service in the Armed Forces. Namely—to create the Main Attestation and Competition Commission [MACC], which would annually conduct strict examinations for officers: Those who pass such examinations will be allowed to continue their service and those who do not will have to vacate their places for others, even for those still serving in CIS armies. Incidentally, they must also be able to pass the MACC examinations.

"The defense minister has generally expressed his approval of the proposals submitted by the Union of Officers of the Ukrainian Diaspora," says Colonel O. Slyusarev, chairman of the UOUD. "However, the relevant documents have not yet been adopted."

On 21 September, at 1100, officers of the diaspora will hold a rally at Independence Square [in Kiev], and at 1800, they will swear allegiance to Ukraine. The next day, after taking the oath, they will solemnly march through Khreshchatyk to the Presidential Residence and the Ministry of Defense. Having marched to the ministry, Slyusarev's composite regiment will ask: What will the Ukrainian state do with the army of those officers who were not lucky enough to get a Ukrainian residence permit [propyska]?

Peasants Union Officially Registered in Crimea

AU0210124992 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
18 Sep 92 p 1

[Commentary by Volodymyr Prytula: "There is Such a Union"]

[Text] The Peasants' Union of the Crimea has become the second public organization, after the Union of Communists, that has been officially registered in the autonomous republic. It mainly unites chairmen of collective farms and directors of state farms of the peninsula, and not common village laborers. Receiving the registration certificate from the hands of L. Lamanina, deputy chief of the Crimean Republic's Justice Administration, the union's leader O. Drobotov, who is chairman of the Lenin collective farm in Simferopol Rayon, told those present about prospects for the peasants' movement in general, and for the Peasants' Union, in particular. These prospects do not seem to be bad at all. No competition is felt on the part of farmers, including individual ones and kulaks. Therefore, taking into account the mass collectivization of the entire village population of the autonomous republic (one-half of all Crimeans) and its essential dependence upon the collective and state farm authorities, the Peasants' Union may count upon acceptable and pleasant results at forthcoming elections.

Case for Non-Nuclear Status Argued

92UN2136A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
10 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by V. Boreyko, member of Large and Small Councils of "Zeleniy Svit" Ukrainian Ecological Association, PRAVDA UKRAINY observer for Ecology: "I Want a Mace With Nuclear Stuffing! How Certain Politicians View Sovereign Ukraine in Today's World"]

[Text] A young lad in a brown shirt at the peace forum of Ukrainians was distributing leaflets bearing a symbol sadly reminiscent of the spider-like swastika. The Ukrainian social nationalist party, taking advantage of the moment, demanded rejection of the concept of a non-nuclear status for Ukraine.

We will leave it on the conscience of the organizers of the forum that they did not halt the distribution of the leaflets with the fascist symbology. I think that people, who have not lost their historical memory, will draw the appropriate conclusions from that fact on their own.

Who thinks that one Chernobyl is not enough?

Unfortunately the officials of the social nationalist parts of Ukraine and delegates to the III World Conference of Ukrainian Youth Organizations are not alone in wishing for an atomic bludgeon. Not so long ago activists of the Ukrainian National Assembly came to the building of the Supreme Council carrying slogans such as: "Let Moscow Be The First to Disarm," demanding the preservation of not only strategic but tactical nuclear weapons. The Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party, recently created by Stepan Khmara, considers refusal by the country to destroy nuclear stores as a demand in its program.

"We will eat the lard ourselves, share the army with friends, and give the atomic bomb to enemies," was a headline in the glib POST POSTUM newspaper in Lvov.

"We cannot be left without nuclear weapons, since Ukraine will not be respected," is constantly repeated like an incantation by GOLOS UKRAYINY, ZAVYILNU UKRAYINU, NARODNA GAZETA, and MOLODA GAZETA, which, at the same time reprint materials by practically the same authors.

The "nuclear disease" afflicts not only the leaders of Ukrainian Republican Party and Rukh, but also many deputies both in the democratic and in the "participatory" camps.

What is surprising is not only the absence of necessary knowledge and logic among these people, but also the fact that it is possible in general to want a "military atom" in a country which not so long ago suffered through a tragedy involving its twin—"the peaceful atom"? Could it be that the desire to stand out, to remain in the public view, even if with dubious appeals, outweighs common sense and concern for the fate of our own and neighboring countries? After all the "atomic"

bludgeon is not a Cossack mace, and it is highly dangerous to swing it around. It is true, my opponents do believe otherwise.

V. Miroshnichenko and M. Pookopchenko of VECHERNIY KIYEV ask: "Why must we reject nuclear missile weaponry when we have at our disposal uranium mines, high-capacity plants for the production of missiles, and skilled workers and engineers?"

Well, let us debate.

Cut your coat according to your cloth

It is important to remember this piece of folk wisdom since in order to become a nuclear power it is necessary to have a lot of what Ukraine does not possess and that it will hardly be acquiring in the near future. Let us say, nuclear bomb testing ranges. All of the members of the nuclear club have them. We do not, and there is nowhere to put them. Nuclear warheads must be retested every five to seven years. Otherwise they turn into junk. We do not have a plant for the destruction of atomic weapons. The proposal made by one official to build it in the vicinity of Chernobyl produced Homeric laughter in the West.

Yes, we do have uranium mines, but uranium must also be enriched and that is done in the Urals.

Yes, certain types of missiles are produced at the Dnepropetrovsk Yuzhnyy Machine Building plant, but the cycle there is not a complete one. Without the cooperation of Russia and Kazakhstan it can be used in a war, perhaps, in a kindergarten. Ukraine, of course, does have skilled workers and specialists, but the most highly skilled nuclear specialists are still in closed Russian cities of Arzamas and Chelyabinsk. Therefore to have an atomic bomb in the pocket and to be a true nuclear power, as they say in Odessa—are two big differences.

Here is another serious argument: Where will the money come from? Again—from science, culture, social security, public health... Or perhaps the activists of the Ukrainian social nationalist party have surplus billions in a Swiss bank account? Therefore would it not be better to distribute it to victims of Chernobyl and the Afghans to whom the country is still in debt?

We will threaten the Swede from here

It is necessary to confess that we, "the green ones," are alarmed by the campaign initiated by the national patriots urging the creation of a powerful army in Ukraine with nuclear weapons. Why are these activists not attracted to the example of Japan, Italy, and many Scandinavian countries where the military-industrial complex clearly recognizes its position as not being a prestigious one, while the standard of living of the population is constantly rising.

More than that, if certain hurrah-patriots want to have superhigh powered weapons in Ukraine, why are they emphasizing nuclear "toys?" Leaf through any foreign

military magazine and you will understand that it is much more advantageous to have really modern weaponry which is laser technology and highly accurate weapons.

Yes, and how advantageous are wars these days? Just look around yourself, esteemed leaders of Rukh, the Ukrainian Republican Party, and the Conservative Republican Party. Karabakh, Yugoslavia, and the Dniester region indicate that resolution of conflicts by military means is a dead end.

"Atomic weapons make it possible to lower expenditures on an army," the opponents insist.

Yes, in theory that is so. At this point I recall the "low cost" of the atomic electric power stations which, at one time, was insistently proclaimed to the public by engineers advocating atomic power. It is a similar analogy! By themselves atomic electric power stations are rather cheap, but if various safety features are added such as storage of waste materials, the ecological infrastructure—they cost a pretty penny. It is the same with the "army atom." Plants for processing of obsolete nuclear equipment alone cost plenty.

Soviet means the most unreliable

It is important to remember that the nuclear missile monster, created in the USSR, just as, by the way, the rest of the military and civilian technology, was created for the most part in a slipshod manner. This means that even in storage it will pose a threat to the people and the environment in Ukraine.

The RS-22 and RS-12M mobile-based missiles are very dangerous for the population. There have been ten recorded cases involving the capsizing of such missiles. There were ample premises for an explosion. According to the estimates made by military expert P. G. Belov, the probability of an accident with an individual nuclear warhead is one out of a hundred.

The transportation of these installations is reminiscent of circus stunts performed while wearing a blindfold. They were transported in the hours of darkness, strictly along the middle of the road with a transverse angle of not more than five degrees and wind velocities not exceeding 25 meters per second. By the way the barbaric destruction of these giants by means of explosion at Kapustnyy Yar (Russia) caused considerable damage to the environment due to the acid rains and the fallout of long-lasting aluminum oxides and minute glass fiber particles.

Here is another example. In 1988 the military tipped over a railway tank car with rocket fuel on an approach to a bridge over the Volga below Yaroslavl. It was a miracle that this muck failed to reach the river.

Let us take look at our strategic military facility—Derazhnya in Khmel'nitskiy region. SS-19 nuclear missiles were transported there and an inspection determined that they were "incomplete." They were made

poorly, difficult to control, and aimed at the wrong "enemy." It was necessary to make urgent adjustments on the spot, right in the silos. A combat "surface-to-air" missile was accidentally launched in the fall of 1991 from an air defense missile installation in the Svetlovodsk Rayon of Kirovograd Oblast due to a mistake made by the personnel. After travelling one kilometer it crashed at an intersection on the Kremenchug road severely wounding several soldiers. Thank God it did not have a nuclear stuffing.

On 12 May 1988 there was an explosion at one of the "post office box" plants in Pavlodar which produces missile engines for the SS-24 and SS-25. Its consequences are still classified.

We were on the verge of a colossal tragedy when a fire occurred at the strategic bomber base at Bobruysk (Belarus) in May of 1984. Warehouses with "surface-to-air" missiles were going up and the administration buildings were on fire. Fortunately fire did not reach "the army atom." It is possible to go on and on citing such examples.

It is necessary to add that nuclear missile and bomb bases in Ukraine are in rather heavily populated areas—around Kiev, Cherkassy, and in Nikolayevsk and Khmelnytsk oblasts. Created in an atmosphere of absolute secrecy, without any control by environmental protection and public health organs, they represent the greatest polluters of the environment and a potential threat to the local populace.

In the USA atomic missiles are hidden in sparsely populated rocky mountains, in our case, however, they are practically on top of the marketplaces. So, are we going to tempt fate and proudly call ourselves "a nuclear power"?

I have already written in PRAVDA UKRAINY what the subsurface water is like near the nuclear bomber base close to the small city of Uzin in Kiev Oblast. Kerosene, not water, is found in the peasant wells there. How did our public react to this? One of the principal guilty parties in this ecological misfortune, General Bashkirov, commander of the Uzin Division, was recently made an honorary Cossack. It is also a pity that ecology remained at the level of a pre-election program in the case of Mr. Chornovil, the Cossack hetman. Which, by the way, is the way it is with many others who were elected by the people.

In the fifties and seventies Professor A. Marey's radiological group was working in the Polessk region. Its conclusions are unsettling: nuclear detonations in Novaya Zemlya and the Semipalatinsk testing range (and perhaps some others) caused soil contamination in Ukraine and Belarus. The scientists established that as long ago as the sixties (a quarter century before Chernobyl) the contamination of milk of Polesye region cows with Cesium-137 exceeded the average value by a factor of 50 (!), and that of meat—by a factor of four. Mushrooms, fish, and wild fowl also "glowed." It is interesting

that the configuration of the radioactive patch resembled the one at Chernobyl... No preventative measures were undertaken at that time.

Ukraine is covered with nuclear boils. Five atomic electric power stations, five strategic nuclear weapons bases, an unknown number of tactical weapons bases, and ten "post office box" plants working with the "military atom," traces left by Chernobyl and the nuclear detonation for "peaceful purposes" in Donbass, a mass of nuclear waste disposal sites (there are several of them in Kiev alone), and uranium mines near Kirovograd which extend over hundreds of kilometers.

Some believe that is not enough.

Possession of nuclear weapons is criminal. Declaring its status as a non-nuclear power, Ukraine could appeal to the UN with a proposal for the total destruction of "the military atom."

The RESPUBLIKA newspaper recently published results of some curious sociological studies. For the most part well educated and mature citizens expressed opposition to the nuclear "bludgeon" in Ukraine—members of the intelligentsia, pensioners, students, and skilled workers. While most of the students in technical and vocational schools, workers and employees with a low skill level and those without an education, on the contrary, are "nuclear" supporters.

Whose views and mood is reflected by leaders of the influential social-political organizations, certain newspapers, and the popular peoples deputies? The cultured segments or the lumpen, the Sharikovs, generally speaking?

Photo captions: The SS-25 nuclear missile is rather unstable while being transported; The SS-24 intercontinental ballistic missile is transported by rail. A self-propelled cannon hurls the nuclear shell over a distance of 30 kilometers; The TU-95 nuclear bomber.

Tatars Protest Failure To Meet Needs

92UN2147A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 17 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Skachko: "Crimean Tatars Have Appealed to the Ukrainian Government and Parliament But No Reply Has Been Received So Far"]

[Text] Representatives of the Crimean Tatar Medjlis came to Kiev in order to hand Ukrainian Prime Minister Vitold Fokin a letter and a statement from the medjlis presidium entitled "On Solving the Problems of the Return and Settlement of the Crimean Tatars in the Crimea." These items blame the Ukrainian leadership and the Crimean authorities. In particular, the letter contains the following assertion: "Despite the fact that Ukraine's budget for the return of the Crimean Tatars in 1992 provided for an allocation of more than 3 billion rubles, the situation which has evolved is extremely

serious. Taking advantage of the utter lack of monitoring controls on the part of the Ukrainian government, the Crimean authorities have spent and are spending the allocated funds for other purposes. At the same time, tens of thousands of families, which have managed—in the face of all manner of obstacles—to return to their homeland have turned out to be in a hopeless, impasse-type situation because of a lack of the elementary conditions for settlement.” The authors of this letter conclude that “the existing situation, along with the fact the Crimean authorities are ignoring the rights of the Crimean Tatars (e.g., a refusal to grant them plots of land, excluding them from the process of privatization, etc.), is actually leading to a disruption of the sociopolitical situation in the Crimea.” In the opinion of the authors of this letter, a special session of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers must be held with participation by representatives from the mejlis in order to review all the practical matters pertaining to the return of the Crimean Tatars.

In its statement the mejlis presidium cites the following facts: By May 1992 some 42,000 Crimean-Tatar families, amounting to a total of 173,000 persons, had returned to the Crimea. Of these, only 13,000 families have been settled. And of those which have been settled, only 606 families have received housing constructed by means of the budgetary funds allocated for this purpose. The remaining ones have either purchased housing by themselves or are continuing to live in dormitories. As of 1 May of the present year, 26,000 plots of land had been allocated to the Crimean Tatars; and in the overwhelming majority of the cases this was done only under powerful pressure from the returnees. Only one school and a kindergarten have been built using the funds allocated for the Crimean Tatars. The Crimean-Tatar National Theater and other creative collectives do not have any space.

Of all the Crimean Tatars, only 44,000 persons have been placed in jobs—most of whom are not working in their own fields of specialization. The remainder are not employed at all.

Of the 200 million rubles allocated in 1991, 40 percent went into developing the material base of various Crimean construction and industrial organizations. During the present year funds are also being used unsystematically and are scarcely going at all for satisfying the needs of the Crimean Tatars.

The cause of the situation which has evolved is considered by the authors of the statement to be the actions conducted by the Committee on the Affairs of Deported Peoples, which was formed under the Crimean Republic's Council of Ministers, and personally by Lentun Bezaziyev, deputy chairman of the Crimean government, who all-too-frequently makes use of the funds allocated for the needs of the Crimean Tatars for creating structures in opposition to the mejlis.

The Crimean-Tatar Mejlis has appealed to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Permanent Commission on the Affairs of Deported Peoples with proposals to conduct a comprehensive checkup on the financial and economic activities of the Crimean Committee on the Affairs of Deported Peoples, as well as to examine, consider, and approve—within the briefest possible period of time—a program for the state-sponsored return and settlement of the Crimean Tatars in the Crimea, and to request from the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet 70-percent compensation of the cost of individual housing for the Crimean Tatars, to work out a procedure to either return or pay compensation for the personal property and real estate confiscated during the 1944 deportations. But the mejlis considers the principal condition of carrying out its proposed measures to be according itself the status of the highest representative organ of the Crimean-Tatar people and holding consultations with it on all matters pertaining to the Crimean Tatars. So far no reply has been received from the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Cabinet of Ministers.

Peoples Deputy Living Conditions Described

92UN2138A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
12 Sep 92 p 2

[Interview with G. I. Bondarenko, administrator of Supreme Council of Ukraine, by A. Sokol, PRAVDA UKRAINY parliamentary observer; place and date not given: “How Do You Live, Peoples Deputy. Not Worse and Not Better Than Others”]

[Text] We are speaking about deputies of the highest rank, about Ukrainian legislators. They are talked about in different ways nowadays. Often there are reproachful exclamations: “Managed to get into power!” There is also indignation. With our generally impoverished life—benefits and privileges! Do they exist, these notorious privileges? I spoke about that with G. I. Bondarenko, administrator of the Supreme Council of Ukraine.

[Sokol] Grigoriy Ivanovich! All of us are greatly influenced by our salary therefore it is a legitimate question to ask: how much does a deputy get?

[Bondarenko] First of all it is necessary to say that not all deputies are salaried in the Supreme Council, but only those who work there on a permanent basis.

[Sokol] How many of such deputies are there?

[Bondarenko] Around 200, with a total of 450. The monthly salary of the deputies, which I mentioned, comes to 8,050 rubles. Committee chairmen, naturally, get more—11,090 rubles. If these amounts are compared with the earnings of other categories of workers—not even the miners—the result will turn out to be surprising: the deputies get much less than what is paid in many enterprises and organizations. I am not even mentioning commercial structures.

Those who remained at their former work after becoming deputies, and they constitute a majority, naturally, do not receive a salary at the Supreme Council. They are paid 1,900 rubles monthly for expenses connected with their activities as deputies—for organizational services, preparation of documents, office supplies, postage, etc.

[Sokol] Where do the peoples deputies of Ukraine live? Are all of them provided with an apartment in Kiev, how comfortable are such living quarters?

[Bondarenko] Those who come only to attend parliamentary sessions stay in hotels "Natsionalnaya," "Kiyev," "Moskva," and "Ukraina." Rooms are paid for by the Supreme Council. Deputies working on a permanent basis have permanent residences. Some 130 apartments have been allocated for them.

[Sokol] What are the buildings where the deputies live like? What districts are they in?

[Bondarenko] They are ordinary buildings. The same kind as those built for Kiev residents. One building is located on Panas Mirnyy Street, another one is on Prirechnaya. One cannot call these prestige locations. Prirechnaya Street is in Obolon, an area which many call "the bedroom" of Kiev.

[Sokol] Parquet floors?

[Bondarenko] Not everywhere. On Prirechnaya—linoleum, on Panas Mirnyy—parquet. I will say quite frankly: many deputies accepted the keys without particular enthusiasm. They were probably hoping for something better. After all, everyone wants that.

[Sokol] How do they live in the hotels? Where do they eat?

[Bondarenko] We all know about hotel life—no matter what kind of a room it is, after a week one wants to go home. If it is an economy room, one does not even want to go in. The comfort of Soviet hotels is well known. But there is no way out. We have to use what we have.

In that regard the deputies have a lot of complaints. Their dissatisfaction is understandable. Hotel cafeterias have sausage and tea, tea and sausage. Morning and night, every day. Lunches are not much better: the Supreme Council does not even have an appropriate room for use as a cafeteria. There is a small one for office personnel. It is used by the deputies as well. Journalists are acquainted with its "convenience:" together with the deputies they often have to wait for a seat with a fully loaded tray in hand.

The prices for food products are the same as everywhere. The editor of VECHERNIY KIYEV interviewed me with regard to that. In his presence I ordered a menu from the cafeteria and the buffet. These menus were published later in the newspaper. Kiev residents did not see any delicacies on them. Even if they were there hardly anyone who would be ordering them. Caviar is

sold by Kiev gourmet shops but there are no crowds: as they say, current prices "sting."

[Sokol] How much per diem do the deputies receive?

[Bondarenko] A hundred rubles—the same amount as all those on temporary assignment. But this is paid when a session is under way, and only to those who do not live permanently in Kiev.

[Sokol] Through what channels are the cafeteria and buffet you named supplied?

[Bondarenko] Through the usual ones. At the expense of city funds and in part deliveries are made by the "Chayka" subsidiary farm at the same prices as those charged in the city. Any sort of special deliveries are simply excluded. Whatever is supplied to the cafeterias and cafes in Kiev also comes to us.

[Sokol] Do you think that includes everything?

[Bondarenko] Yes.

[Sokol] Why is it impossible to have a cup of coffee at the parliamentary buffet like on Kreshchatik—out of a coffee urn? Only instant coffee is available?

[Bondarenko] We do have shortcomings. We will be doing away with them.

[Sokol] A deputy's life today appears unattractive. What will it be like in the future? The draft of a new constitution envisages a professional parliament—the deputies will be working in it on a permanent basis. Appropriate conditions are needed.

[Bondarenko] The Supreme Council will determine what will happen in the future—possibly at the forthcoming fall-winter session. One thing is clear: the deputies need normal, nonhotel living conditions. It seems to me that a legislator with his family, who is not from Kiev, must be provided with comfortable housing in Kiev. But on a temporary basis, for the period when the deputies are at work. The state is obligated to make certain that the out-of-town individual, chosen by the people, has good conditions both for work and for living as well. But I am stressing that this is my personal opinion.

[Sokol] Grigoriy Ivanovich, in our conversation we did not mention special stores and special rations—that around which there was only recently a lot of heated debate bringing about today's indignation.

[Bondarenko] There are no special stores or special rations.

[Sokol] What about special sales, pre-holiday services?

[Bondarenko] That also does not exist. But I understand your insistence.

Clothing and shoe sales were organized for the deputies in the fall of last year. Quite a lot has been written about

that in the press including some things that are not true and, more than that, some malicious lies as well.

At that time I was not yet working in the Supreme Council system but have reliable information: the goods for sale were the same ones sold in the stores of Kiev at the same price charged at all the stores. There was one difference: they stood in the line for deputies and not in the public line. I will say quite frankly, the wish to organize special sales were voiced this year as well. The deputies are also human. Trade services are offered even at present, enterprises, thanks to barter, have a lot of imports. It was decided not to make a mistake again, not to provide grounds for regular fabrications and gossip.

[Sokol] How is the transportation problem handled? The deputies do travel a lot.

[Bondarenko] They utilize their right to free travel on airlines, trains, ships.

[Sokol] How about Kiev? Is there a large pool of black "Volga" limousines which now have somehow been forgotten?

[Bondarenko] Personal automobiles are assigned only to members of the Presidium of the Supreme Council. Deputies have the right to call for transportation. But inasmuch as the garage has only 15 automobiles for dispatch, it is difficult to count on transportation. RAF buses are used to handle the arrival of deputies for a session and their departure.

In addition to that the deputy must also travel in his election district. Such travel is quite extensive. In civilized countries he receives appropriate money for that purpose. In our case this question has not been resolved. Last year passenger autos were sold for personal use of the deputies. Some 352 orders were received and 329 automobiles were found but the remaining 23 never arrived. These automobiles were received in addition to the funds allocated for Ukraine. Those on the waiting list, however, did not suffer. But this initiative, as you know, acquired a scandalous nature. I will not go into a discussion of this but will only mention the following. Part of the deputies still did not decide to buy a car. That is first. Secondly their personal transportation (and not 329 autos but a considerably larger number) is constantly used for trips through the election districts. That is confirmed by official documents.

[Sokol] Do the deputies use state summer homes?

[Bondarenko] Only certain members of the Presidium utilize facilities at the "Pushcha Voditsa" Rest Home of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Garden plots have been allocated this year for residents of Kiev. But not all those desiring these plots have received them yet. Some of those receiving the plots, are refusing them: they lack the funds for assimilating them.

[Sokol] Where do the peoples deputies receive medical treatment? Where do they take their rest?

[Bondarenko] All are assigned to the treatment - health restoration association of the Cabinet of Ministers. On physicians' advice they are issued passes with prepayment of 30 percent of their cost.

[Sokol] But that is a privilege?

[Bondarenko] This may be interpreted in various ways. Enterprises also have their own polyclinics, rest homes, and sanatoriums, sometimes even better ones than the government. If all of that is used by the worker, employee, or a manager no one calls it a privilege. Why is the question posed in that way in the case of the peoples deputy, a member of the government?

Talk of privileges, it seems to me, occurs because our lives are so meager.

Conflict Between Orthodox Religious Confessions in Kherson Viewed

92UN2161A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian
8 Sep 92 p 7

[Interview with Bishop Illarion of Kherson and Tavriysk and with Viktor Panchenko, head of the religious affairs division of the oblast state administration, by Ivan Kalinichenko, GOLOS UKRAINY personal correspondent; in Kherson, date not given: "Two Bishops Served..."]

[Text] The wave of religious conflicts has reached "quiet" Kherson. A group of members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate, who support newly appointed Bishop Spiridon, tried to take over the Cathedral of the Holy Ghost. Their plans were frustrated by priests and laymen from the administrative offices of Bishop Illarion of Kherson and Tavriysk.

Our correspondent spoke with Bishop Illarion and other persons involved in the incident.

[Kalinichenko] Bishop Illarion, when you came to Kherson Oblast from Ivano-Frankovsk, you jumped from the frying pan into the fire, as the saying goes. On 28 June of this year the Ukrainian Radio Liberty program explained the details of the conflict in your former place of employment and reported that the pro-Moscow clergymen under your jurisdiction had tried to take valuable property out of the church there. Now things in Kherson are heating up as well.

[Illarion] First I will tell you about Ivano-Frankovsk. The conflicts there occurred after I had released Orest Levitskiy, secretary of my administration, from his duties. Why? He insisted that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was the direct successor of the church of St. Andrew and did not carry out my instructions. I feel no need to keep heretics on my staff. The secretary brought suit against me in a people's court. As far as I know, it also heard complaints that we were taking property out of the church—rugs, chandeliers, and so forth. I categorically denied the accusations, because I released all of

this property by the terms of an official act. I have entrusted the court case to my attorney.

In Kherson the attempts to take over the cathedral and administration were unsuccessful, as you know. I was in Kiev at the time of the invasion. I know that three priests were hurt. In particular, Father Mikhail had to be taken to the hospital because of the injuries he had suffered. The demonstration was probably organized by Bishop Spiridon, who was appointed in my place by Metropolitan Filaret. I recognize neither the defrocked Filaret nor the newborn bishop. In general, I want to say that politicians and journalists are showing a great deal of interest in religious affairs now, but it would be better for them to keep their noses out of church affairs. It is none of their business. We know how we should live, how we should hold services, and how we should appoint people to the highest offices.

[Kalinichenko] You are right, but no one is trying to interfere in the church's internal affairs. Is it not true, however, that the Russian Orthodox Church and its former constituent, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, always supported the government—tsarist or communist? This has been characteristic of the Orthodox hierarchy for centuries. Why is it that today, now that an autonomous Ukrainian state is being built and is doing everything within its power to return the churches to the religious communities and establish peace between different religions, part of the church hierarchy in Ukraine is taking the opposite approach? Can you, as a man, as a Ukrainian by birth, really believe that there can be an independent state without an independent church?

[Illarion] I am not against an independent Ukraine, but I do not accept the decisions of the Ukrainian Orthodox Synod of 25-26 June 1992. Along with more than 20 other bishops, I have remained under the authority of Metropolitan Vladimir, and we have the support of our parishioners.

[Kalinichenko] Could this support be the result of the overt propaganda in favor of Archbishop Vladimir in most of the churches in Kherson? When members of the clergy do this, they intensify the rift in the church and provoke violent brawls. In fact, the witnesses of the unpleasant incident in the cathedral had an obvious bias against the united church and had been given only a partial account, to put it mildly, of the details of church policy in Ukraine today. When the preachers explained to them that the revived Kiev Patriarchate was a return to historical justice and that it professed the same Orthodox canons and the same beliefs, there were indignant shouts from the crowd: "But we were told something else. How gullible we are! We were raised in Ukraine, but we are defending Moscow." It seems to me that people approve of the recent synod's decision to reverse the anti-canonical transfer of the Kiev archbishopric to Moscow in 1686.

[Illarion] You know what? You should stop poking your nose into church affairs. It would be better for you to go to church and do penance for your sins.

[Panchenko] The incident was disturbing, of course. It cannot be condoned. The kind of offensive and unlawful methods to which the supporters of the united independent church resorted are unlikely to solve any problems. It is true that some people might make references to the official document from Kiev which dismissed Bishop Illarion from his duties and appointed Spiridon in his place, and to the decision of the previously mentioned synod that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate is the legal heir to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and that it is consequently the heir to all of its real estate and other assets, but it has not been easy to carry out the official orders. The situation in the southern region and in the whole Ukrainian Orthodox Church is quite complex. Until the people themselves understand the reasons for the events in the church, conflicts will be unavoidable. For now, we have two bishops, graphic proof of the schism in the church. Which should be regarded as the main bishop? We have what might be called the old church administration, headed by Illarion, in charge of church property. We have the new Bishop Spiridon, who views himself as the legal representative of the independent church, although he has no official residence and no form of sanctuary whatsoever, not to mention a telephone or any of the other usual conveniences. What will happen? Time will tell. The state, represented in this case by local government agencies, cannot impose any artificial solutions here.

From the editor: When this article was ready for publication, we learned that Bishop Spiridon had left Kherson.

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

Workers' Solidarity Plans Kiev 'Political Strike'

92UN2178A Kiev *VECHERNYI KYIEV* in Russian
14 Sep 92 p 1

[Article by Svetlana Sinyakova: "The Political Spectrum You May Not Wear Sneakers"]

[Text] Kiev public transportation will operate on 16 September as usual. And if you have to wait for a long time at a bus stop, do not be in too much of a hurry to scold strikers—it is simply that in the streetcar and trolley depots and motor pools from day to day there are fewer and fewer vehicles in good repair. Even those which do serve the passengers would be "laid up" if the requirements of the technical safety instructions were met. There are not enough spare parts for high-quality repair. This, incidentally, is one of the reasons for all the preceding strikes. And at the same time it is an indicator that the strikers' efforts have not yet been crowned with success.

It is no accident that after the meeting in trolley depot No. 2, where on 16 September they adopted a decision not to strike but to begin a Kiev-wide political strike on 19 October, the same decision was adopted by participants in the meeting at trolley depot No. 3, and the streetcar operators of the depots imeni Krasin and Darnitsa. They will work with automotive transportation enterprises headed by the combined worker committee. And the demands they are making are purely political: the immediate resignation of V. Fokin's Cabinet of Ministers and the formation of a national salvation government, the implementation of the decree of the Supreme Soviet of 17 October 1990 to hold a referendum on confidence in the existing Supreme Soviet, the withdrawal of Ukraine from the CIS, a ban on the appointment to leadership positions in all units of the national economy of representatives of the former Communist Party nomenklatura, an immediate termination of administrative price increases, and a rise in wages of all strata of the population to no less than twice the subsistence level.

Incidentally, these are the demands contained in the Appeal to Representatives of Free Trade Unions, Strike Committees, Movements, and Workers of Ukraine put out by the All-Ukrainian Association of Solidarity of Workers [VOST]. Calling for democratic forces to act with a unified front in defense of the interests of the working man, VOST proposes that these demands be included in the resolutions of the protest rallies and meetings that will take place in Ukraine under the slogan "We demand change." As is noted in the appeal, in the event that these demands are not met or are ignored "we shall consider that the president of Ukraine (the resolution will be sent to L. Kravchuk and the presidium of the VOST—ed.) is not fulfilling his campaign program and we will call for workers of Ukraine and all democratic forces to resort to more radical actions."

At the VOST headquarters we were told that everyone except the leaders of the Advisory Council of Free Trade Unions had agreed to the joint actions. But the lower structures of the free trade unions did not support the position of their leaders and decided also to join the Ukraine-wide movement: "Do not believe that the workers are incapable of rising above their narrow material interests."

The All-Ukrainian Association of Solidarity of Workers, which is frequently called "Ukrainian Solidarity," appeared after the miners' strikes. And it has learned all the lessons of defeat and victory. VOST has not signed any documents for cooperation with the government. But up to this point it has also refrained from resolute actions since it has thought that the president and his team needed time to make good on their campaign promises.

Patience has now grown thin. An analysis of the actions of the V. Fokin government during the period from January 1991 through July 1992 by the presidium of Ukrainian Solidarity showed that while "the wage level

of the worker increased approximately 10-fold during that time, prices of necessities as a whole increased 50-fold, that is, the standard of living of the population during the 1.5 years of Vitold Pavlovich's leadership dropped by 400 percent." And although at a news conference the prime minister blamed the International Monetary Fund, according to whose figures wages in Ukraine are growing more rapidly than prices, VOST's figures seem to me personally to be closer to the truth.

This impression may be subjective—we are basing it on the contents of our own pocketbook. While the IMF was able to assess, as they say, the overall situation. For instance, by adding together the wages of a teacher and the monthly income of the president of some firm. For it is no secret that about five percent of bank depositors have as much money as the remaining 95 percent all together. Just as it is no secret that the difference between the standard of living of a person who rides in a foreign limousine and the standard of living of a pensioner who has fainted from hunger is much more than 400 percent.

One can boldly state that the anti-nomenklatura revolution, which began in Ukraine with the battle against privileges, has ended. The nomenklatura not only led it but also made sure that they ultimately reinforced their privileged position in society. And not only for themselves but also for their children, grandchildren, and great grandchildren. The day is not far off when the present government bureaucrats and directors of plants and factories will be legalized as their legitimate owners. Although they have not invested a kopek of their own money either in constructing these plants and factories or in equipping them. And those whom the state has mercilessly exploited for industrialization, electrification, and chemization of the "entire country" will remain, as before, like "cattle" to be exploited. Therefore, in addition to the aforementioned demands, VOST is advancing the following: "Before reregistering the enterprises and inventorying their fixed and working capital, to repeal the Law on Privatization. To halt the artificial reduction of jobs at state enterprises."

It is known that the demands of Ukrainian Solidarity to do not please our powers that be. And they are taking advantage of the time remaining before 19 October to discredit the worker movement and its leaders and to do "explanatory" work in the collectives and among the population. But this will not alleviate the dissatisfaction with life that is increasingly gripping society.

Pylypchuk on 1992 Plans for Privatization of State Property

92UN2178B Kiev NEZAVISIMOST in Russian
19 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Vladimir Pylypchuk, chairman of the Commission on Questions of Economic Reform: "Deputy Tribune: 'For Some—Meat, For Others—Bones'"]

[Text] On 16 September the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine considered a question placed on the agenda under this heading: "On the list of enterprises (facilities) proposed for privatization in 1992..." The draft was sent to the commissions for further work. But the time for privatization is still approaching. We are publishing fragments from the co-report on this question presented by Vladimir Mefodyevich Pylypchuk, chairman of the Commission on Questions of Economic Reform.

According to the decree of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine "On Enactment of the Law of Ukraine 'On Privatization of Property of State Enterprises,'" the Cabinet of Ministers was obligated before 15 March to provide a list of facilities which were not subject to privatization, a list of those that were subject to privatization, and a list of those subject to privatization through certificates. And as of today what we have on this list of facilities is just a tiny part of what is subject to privatization.

If these are the only enterprises "relinquished" to privatization, problems arise: How are we to privatize? According to the branch principle, where the entire technological chain would be linked, or according to the territorial principle? Neither of these principles is without shortcomings.

The second thing. The psychological aspect. When, for instance, an item is sold in a store and the people know that three-fourths of the items are still in the warehouse, they all stand in line and wait. If we do not have a complete list of enterprises subject to privatization, the process of privatization will be held up in the same way. Because the people will wait; and when all this takes place...

Now about certificates. According to the same methodology for destatization which we adopted (the priority right of labor collectives and the right to lease), a large share of the people are excluded from privatization. As of today there are approximately 12-14 million people working in the sphere of production. But we have another 40 million people—children, school children, pensioners, disabled persons, physicians, medical personnel, the army, the militia, the courts, the procuracies, and so forth. As deputies and as politicians we must not allow the majority of the people not to be satisfied. Whatever decision we adopt, we still risk leaving people unsatisfied. But it is politically wrong for the majority not to be satisfied.

For example, this situation could arise. According to the Law on Leasing, hotels can submit an application for leasing and buy them. Say there are 200 people working in a hotel. If one takes into account that they can house people for hard currency, then (and we have made these calculations) in a month each one of them will become a millionaire (in coupons). That is, if only the labor collectives were granted the right to privatize, they would get the meat and everyone else would get the bones. Therefore before it is too late we must put on the

brakes and make changes in the methodology for destatization. All strata of the population and the entire budget sphere must have the right to select the facility they like best. In order for this to be possible, it is necessary to implement the Supreme Soviet decision to draw up a full list of facilities subject to privatization, those that are not, and those that are to be privatized for certificates.

Then the process of privatization would proceed much more rapidly. And you know that if it is spread out over many years this process will lead to a reduction of the rates of production. Concerned with the question of where to invest their certificates, the people will be taken away from production, if not physically, at least emotionally. The more rapidly we complete the process of privatization the sooner a competitive environment will appear and the more quickly the effectiveness of production will increase...

The process of privatization will not proceed also because the securities have not yet been manufactured as of today.

I wish to suggest that we include the following in the decree we adopt: not only to approve the list of proposed facilities but also to reassess their value in keeping with the Law on Indexation. Additionally, we should make it incumbent on the Cabinet of Ministers to submit within a month's time a list of all facilities which will be destatized, those which will not, and also a list of facilities with incomplete construction which will be destatized for freely convertible currency...

It is also necessary to allot a couple of hours of television time each day so that the commission of the Supreme Soviet and the State Property Fund can inform the population of laws on destatization and methodology and answer questions. So that we do not keep our people in the dark.

We should propose to the Cabinet of Ministers that they have the certificates manufactured before November. The Russian Federation is beginning mass privatization effective 1 October. Our documents were ready much sooner, but because of the fact that the Cabinet of Ministers did not fulfill the decisions of the Supreme Soviet it turned out that we have facilities for privatization, we have laws, we have a program, but we have no certificates, which could delay the process of destatization.

Council on Economic Reform Views Privatization Process

Mass Privatization Impending

92UN2141A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 16 Sep 92 p 2

[Article by Irina Ivanovna: "Ukraine on the Threshold of Privatization"]

[Text] How will privatization of state property occur in practice, and, moreover, will all of the managerial structures operate harmoniously as a unified system—these and other questions were discussed at the regular meeting of the Coordination Council on Questions of Economic Reform in Ukraine which was held Saturday in Kiev.

Vadim Vasilyev, acting chairman of the State Property Fund of Ukraine, presented a report to it. He said at a briefing for journalists:

"Massive privatization will begin in one and a half to two months. However, up till now, two mutually exclusive provisions have remained in effect in the Law on Leasing the Property of State Enterprises and Organizations and the Law on the Privatization of the Property of State Enterprises of Ukraine. The first document provides an opportunity for the labor collective of an enterprise to lease it with an option to buy, and the second states that all state property must be redistributed equally among citizens of Ukraine through a system of certificates. This certificate gives the right to acquire ownership free of charge of property that has a nominal value of 30,000 rubles. When you consider that lease with an option to buy is being taken up by the most efficiently operating enterprises, with a good inventory of equipment, it is not difficult to imagine that simply nothing will remain for students, pensioners, servicemen, and other categories of the population. But, after all, during last month alone 400 enterprises in Ukraine were leased, while today there are more than 3,000 of them. The process of privatization is also being held up by the fact that the Ministry of Economics has not yet resolved the question of the division of property into state and municipal.

List of Enterprises Composed

92UN2141B Moscow NEZAVTSIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 16 Sep 92 p 2

[NEGA report: "Privatization in Ukraine Postponed Until End of October"]

[Text] Devoted to questions of privatization, a meeting of the Coordinating Council on the Conduct of Economic Reform was held under the leadership of First Vice Premier Valentin Simonenko.

Bohdan Budzan, leader of a group of experts on questions of property and entrepreneurship under the Cabinet of Ministers, reported that a permanent conference of representatives of the Cabinet of Ministers, the National Bank of Ukraine, and the State Property Fund, which was specially set up under the Coordinating Council, had compiled a list of 1,018 enterprises and submitted it to the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine for review on 11 September. These essentially are small enterprises that are recommended for privatization in 1992. The list is not a directive, but, as Bohdan Budzan declared, the property is state property, and the state has the right to put it up for sale. The minimal package of normative

documents which are already enough to start the process of privatization has been developed, but the real process will not begin earlier than the end of October.

Academician Views Monetary Reform

92UN2069A Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER
in Ukrainian 4 Sep 92 p 6

[Article by A. Halchynskyy, doctor of economic sciences, professor, and head of the department of currency and financial relations of Kiev University, under the rubric "Opinion": "Monetary Reform Possible Variants"]

[Text] I know that many of my scientist-colleagues subscribe to a plan according to which monetary reform should be preceded by general stabilization of the economy. There is much that is rational in this plan, but I am convinced that it is not the best plan from the both purely economic and political points of view. The coupon system, which has without doubt played a positive role during the initial stages, has practically exhausted itself today. And thus any economic revitalization on its basis is simply unfeasible. We must also take into account the fact that in the social consciousness the reality of the sovereignty of Ukraine is to a significant degree connected with the introduction of a national currency. From this point of view reform simply cannot be postponed any more.

The opposite position, which also has many supporters, seems more attractive. It is a question of the performance of energetic measures with regard to preparation and performance of monetary reform no later than the beginning of the new year. Under these conditions, the entire system of revitalization of the economy bases itself on the new monetary unit. However, justifiable doubts arise: Do there exist opportunities to ensure the stability of the new monetary unit as of the moment of its introduction into circulation, because, of course, only under these conditions will it be able to serve as a stimulating factor for general economic revitalization.

And is there a solution to this situation?

It turns out that such a solution appears only under condition that we take the path of introduction of the hryvnya gradually and on the basis of the utilization, as a transitional structure, of the parallel circulation of two monetary units—the coupon and the hryvnya—with a gradual expansion of the functions and zone of application of the latter.

The system of parallel circulation is not anything new in the theory and practice of monetary relations. The classic form of utilization of elements of parallel circulation was the reform of 1922-1924 in Russia. At the beginning of the 1960's in France there also existed, in essence, two currencies—the old franc and the new, with relations between them in the proportion of 100:1. In the same fashion, in China beginning in 1980 a "gold" (hard-currency) yuan has been used together with the common yuan. Properly speaking, in our country as well

the coupon and the ruble have interacted in a system of parallel circulation. The system of monetary circulation in Belarus functions on these same principles today.

But the aforementioned does not mean when we give preference to reform of such a type that we have prepared recipes. Reform with the use of a system of parallel circulation is most complex in terms of substance. There also exist a great number of possible variations which require a considered and expert analytical evaluation and deeply professional decisions. I am convinced that it is for this very reason that the performance of such monetary reform has a proper support.

What are the advantages of parallel circulation?

Gradual introduction of the hryvnya is the least risky form of monetary reform. It offers the opportunity to ensure under conditions of economic crisis relative stabilization of the money and its convertibility as of the moment of introduction into circulation; it significantly speeds up the date for introduction of reform without preliminary accumulation of a mass of ready cash of the hryvnya in the amount of the entire monetary circulation; and it avoids stabilization measures of a confiscatory character.

In my opinion, success of reform will be decided by the skill with which we resolve two issues. On one hand, it should be organically linked with the process of privatization. The market is not filled with commodities as it should be, and we are missing the needed reserve fund and foreign currency accumulations. But we have assets of another order. These consist of state property that is subject to privatization and which we should use effectively as a commodity basis for the emission of the new monetary unit. On the other hand, we need to ensure convertibility of the hryvnya from the time of its introduction into circulation. Upon this will depend the stability of the national banknote, its purchasing power and authority, real influence on the state of market relations, and the integration of our economy into the world economy. Convertibility must be, in essence, the point of departure of monetary reform. There is no undertaking reform if this task is not attempted.

Implementation of the aforementioned trends of reform requires extraordinary decisions. I believe that, first and foremost, the Supreme Soviet must transfer the value of state property that is subject to privatization via free sale to the reserve assets of the National Bank of Ukraine. At the first stage a hryvnya formed on their basis may be used as privatization money which will serve for the purchase and sale of objects of state ownership. Such money, issued into circulation in the form of hard currency certificates or a hard currency hryvnya, could become convertible. It may be used in the creation of the necessary mechanisms and functional structures as well as in the application of preferential foreign exchange relations for payment of the obligations of the NBU [National Bank of Ukraine] with regard to the foreign debt, for corresponding transfers of hard currency

deposits that are located in banking institutions on the territory of the republic, for partial repayment (within the bounds of privatization accounts of the population in savings banks) of domestic debt, and for several other purposes connected with the privatization process.

The result of such actions is a dual one. The creation of a solid basis for the hryvnya in its preliminary forms on one hand, and an active influence of the new monetary unit on the process of privatization and the system of market relations on the other.

At the next stage the zone of action of the hryvnya may be expanded. It is a question of the possibility of its emission for noncash payment for goods and services, including procurement of agricultural output which is sold through the channels of wholesale trade via the system of state orders. For this it is advisable to use a mechanism of bill-of-exchange circulation, which will ensure financing of real trade operations and stimulate formation of auxiliary (credit) instruments of circulation. There also exist other spheres for analogous use of the new monetary unit.

As for payments in hryvni of wages and other income of the population, that is possible only at the final state of monetary reform. In this case there are two variants. A one-time or a partial transition to performance of the appropriate payments. In particular, the possibility of first-priority transfer to hryvnya-based circulation of the market of commodities (of basic consumer assortment) of the productive group requires special study.

The most sensitive facet of parallel circulation is the threat of premature depreciation of the coupon, which may become a serious destabilizing factor of the new monetary system. Thus it is necessary to observe in official settlements during the entire period of reform a fixed relation between the two monetary units—the hryvnya and the coupon; to use the coupon for purposes of privatization with corresponding conversion into the hard currency hryvnya; the bank must carry out strict cash emission of the coupon; to introduce the hryvnya into monetary circulation at first only in large denominations (the coupon could be used during the entire period of parallel circulation as an exchange monetary unit with regard to the hryvnya); and the NBU must redeem the coupon in full upon completion of the reform.

It should also be stipulated that upon the appearance of undesirable divergences in relations in the purchasing power of the hryvnya and the coupon the NBU will carry out a policy of monetary intervention on the open market. Nor should one rule out the possibility of the application of a system of insurance surcharges that will compensate for exchange-rate divergences between the coupon and the hryvnya. They may be financed at the expense of emissions profits received by the bank.

The questions that have been examined cover only a portion of the problems of a reform of parallel circulation, a program for which has been drafted by a group of

scientists with the patronage of a number of commissions of the Supreme Soviet.

Today's economic and sociopolitical situation in Ukraine presents the most optimum preconditions for an immediate commencement of monetary reform and its energetic implementation. I am speaking of a certain slowdown in the decline of industrial production and relatively satisfactory harvests in agriculture; the creation of the necessary base for the beginning of an intensive process of privatization and a corresponding restructuring of the forms of ownership; signs of stabilization of interstate economic and political relations within the bounds of the Commonwealth of Independent States and first and foremost with Russia; and a credit of trust received by the government of the republic.

As a result, we cannot continue to delay the performance of monetary reform.

Zaporozhye Officials' Business Dealings Cause Concern

PM0510095992 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
24 Sep 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Viktor Filippov report: "Statesmen in the Role of Businessmen"]

[Text] Zaporozhye—The Association of Business Circles [ABC] has been formed in Zaporozhye, prompting a contradictory reaction among local businessmen.

The ABC's founders—several firms well known in the city—have announced their intention to unite honest businessmen wishing to help the authorities in the implementation of social projects. Viktor Naumov, president of the Zaporozhye Oblast Amalgamated Union of Businessmen, has expressed a different view.

"I interpret the ABC's appearance as the legalization of secret ties between the authorities and business, with the aim of making the latter totally subordinate to officials," he said. "The ABC has been founded under the direct control of Yuriy Bochkarev, oblast administration deputy head. The top posts in this public association have been taken by businessmen recommended by Yuriy Bochkarev and by the heads of enterprises of which the city soviet executive committee is cofounder. This organization has clearly been founded with the intention of neutralizing the influence of our union, which arose on the initiative of 'ordinary' businessmen and does not suit officialdom because it is independent."

Viktor Naumov's opinion on the new rival can obviously be disputed. But it is hard to deny that the Zaporozhye authorities have rushed headlong into business. According to the city soviet, Zaporozhye has entered the phase of developed capitalism: Of 160 deputies, 75 have transferred to work in commercial structures. Hard on the heels of the people's representatives, the executive is now rushing toward a glorious market future. The city soviet executive committee has cofounded 15 small

enterprises, companies, and an exchange, contributing R1 189 million (i.e. last year's rubles) to their capital funds, and also real estate in the form of premises for offices in the city center.

To curious deputies who have not launched themselves into the world of business, Yuriy Bochkarev's explanation for this feverish entrepreneurial activity is a desire to swell the city coffers with the dividends. However, judging by the dividends (a mere R234,000), the city authorities in the role of businessmen are bankrupt. On the other hand, officials attached to the authorities have looked after their own interests.

Last year, when there was talk of raising automobile prices, the city soviet executive committee's deputy chairmen and their associates urgently bought up Tavria cars allocated by the Volga Motor Vehicle Plant Association for barter operations in the city's interests. This year, when the price of Zhigulis was about to soar, the same officials hastily replaced their economy cars with more prestigious vehicles produced by the Volga Motor Vehicle Plant, using for their own personal needs the Zhigulis allocated to the city soviet executive committee by an aluminum combine—also for barter in the interests of the entire city.

Incidentally, writing about ties between the authorities and business in Zaporozhye has become rather dangerous. Soon after I began collecting material for this report, I was approached in the street by two muscular young men and crudely advised to change the subject matter if I did not wish to become an invalid. I do not think it was a stupid joke. The editor of the trade union newspaper VYBOR was professionally beaten up at a bus stop in July, after daring to print a report on the shady dealings of a private trade firm whose activity has been sanctioned by special instructions from Vladimir Demyanov, head of the oblast administration. According to the editor, shortly before he was beaten up, VYBOR received a telephone call from a man who promised journalists a lot of unpleasantness because of the report.

Statute on Registration, Taxation of 1992 Foreign Economic Barter Activities

92SD0722A Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER
in Ukrainian 21 Aug 92 p 11

[Statute No 06-02. Issued by the Ukrainian Ministry of Finance. Dated 9 July 1992: "On the Procedure for Registering and Taxing Barter-Type Operations in 1992 in the Branch of Foreign Economic Activity"]

[Text]

1. This statute has been worked out in accordance with Decree No 2330-KhP, issued by the Ukrainian Supreme Council [Rada], dated 12 May 1992, and entitled "On the Procedure for Registering and Taxing Barter-Type Operations in the Branch of Foreign Economic Activity."

2. The registration of barter-type (goods-exchange) contracts shall be performed by the Administration for Export Development, Setting quotas, and Licenses under the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties.

3. In order to register barter-type (goods-exchange) contracts, the following kinds of documents shall be submitted:

- a letter-of-return from the subject or party engaged in the foreign activity to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties and Trade;
- a copy of the certificate of the above-mentioned subject or party engaged in foreign economic activity;
- documents which confirm the origin of the goods involved;
- a copy of the barter-type contract and the specifications relating to it.

In cases where the barter-type (goods-exchange) operations are being carried out in those categories of goods which require licensing the following additional items shall be submitted:

- a document which confirms the maintenance of a quota;
- the application for a license in three copies, filled out in the proper fashion;
- with regard to the designations of the commercial positions, additional or supplementary documents as provided for by the appropriate legislation.

3.1. Documents which confirm the origin of the goods involved are the following:

- a) a contractual agreement re buying and selling;
- b) a contractual agreement re commissions;
- c) a certificate attesting to the origin of the goods (work, or services) involved as being produced on Ukrainian territory, such certificate to be issued by the Ukrainian Chamber of Trade and Industry or the Ukrainian State Office of Standards.

3.2. In the specifications re the barter-type contract the following items must be designated:

- the name or title of the item;
- the code in accordance with the Commercial Nomenclature for Foreign Economic Activity;
- the unit of measurement;
- the quantity or number;
- the unit price of the item in VKV [freely convertible currency];
- the total sum in VKV.

4. A barter-type contract should be balanced as to exports and imports.

An imbalance in a barter-type contract shall be allowed in the sum-total of the customs or taxes being held for carrying out the barter-type (goods-exchange) operations in order to bind or obligate the foreign partner to pay the above-mentioned sum-total being held in accordance with the contract involved.

5. A review of the documents submitted for registering a barter-type (goods-exchange) contract shall be conducted over the extent of 10 business days for operations which have as their goal the import of technologies, engineering equipment, assembly units, spare parts, raw materials, or semifinished goods and 20 business days for all other items.

The time period for registering barter-type (goods-exchange) contracts which require licensing for certain isolated or particular categories of items in accordance with the Ukrainian Law "On Foreign Economic Activity" shall be 30 days.

6. A refusal to register a barter-type (goods-exchange) contract shall be possible solely in the following cases:

- the export of goods for dumping prices and the import goods at excessively reduced prices;
- the lack of the proper list of documents, as specified in Paragraph 3 of the present Statute;
- the lack of a contract filled out in the proper form as required.

7. Subjects or parties engaged in foreign economic activity shall pay the amount held for customs or taxes for conducting barter-type (goods-exchange) operations to the State Currency Fund in the currency provided for by the contract in question as follows:

- in the amount of 5 percent of the total sum of goods which are being exported in exchange as per the barter type contract for the purpose of shipping in (importing) technologies, engineering equipment, assembly units, spare parts, raw materials, or semifinished goods;
- in the amount of 10 percent of the total sum of goods which are being exported in exchange as per the barter-type contract for all other items (work or services).

In cases whereby the subjects or parties engaged in foreign economic activity are shipping in (importing) by means of barter-type (goods-exchange) operations technologies, engineering equipment, assembly units, spare parts, raw materials, or semifinished goods for the needs of their own production or manufacturing facilities, they shall be exempted from paying the amount held by customs or taxes for conducting barter-type (goods-exchange) operations.

8. Designating or setting the amounts to be held by customs or taxes for conducting barter-type (goods-exchange) operations shall be performed by the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties and Trade. For this purpose the subject or party engaged in foreign economic activity shall be obligated to provide in the letter-of-return information concerning the shipping in (importing) of technologies, engineering equipment, assembly units, spare parts, raw materials, and semifinished goods.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties and Trade shall issue a registration card to a subject or party engaged in foreign economic activity for registering the barter agreement or arrangement with the assignment of a registration number in accordance with the supplement. The registration card shall be issued to the subject or party engaged in foreign economic activity in triplicate as follows:

- the first copy to the subject or party engaged in foreign economic activity;
- the second copy to be turned over or transmitted to the organs of state tax control for the customs office in order to be on record for making up the freight-shipping declarations;
- the third copy to be sent to the tax inspector's office for the customs office at the place of business of the subject or party engaged in foreign economic activity.

10. Subjects or parties engaged in foreign economic activity shall pay amounts to be held for customs or taxes for conducting barter-type (goods-exchange) operations to the State Currency Fund no later than 60 days from the time of the original movement of the goods (work, or services) and their export through the customs posts at the Ukrainian border.

Subjects or parties engaged in foreign economic activity shall have the right to pay the state collection prior to their carrying out barter-type operations from their accounts or—with their consent and authorization—from the accounts of other national or foreign juridical or natural persons.

11. With regard to barter-type (goods-exchange) contracts which are carried out or performed without clearing through the banks, and which were issued permission or authorization by the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties and Trade prior to 12 May 1992, state collection of amounts for conducting barter-type (goods-exchange) operations shall not be paid.

With regard to barter-type (goods-exchange) operations which are carried out or performed with clearing through the banks, the state collection of amounts for conducting them shall not be paid in accordance with contracts concluded prior to 12 May 1992.

Decree on Protection of Ukrainian Interests in Foreign Economic Contracts

925D0708B Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER
in Ukrainian 4 Sep 92 p 11

["Decree No. 470 of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers Dated 12 August 1992 on Gross Violations in the Conclusion of Foreign Economic Contracts"]

[Text] Recently individual ministries and agencies have been exceeding the powers granted to them by legislation when concluding with organs of other member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States contracts concerning mutual deliveries of output and commodities of statewide significance.

For example, in July of this year the Ukrainian Ministry of Industry signed a contract with the Ministry of Industry of the Republic of Kazakhstan concerning the performance in 1993 of mutual deliveries of most important types of output of ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy.

Individual provisions of the contract, particularly with regard to determination of quotas for mutual delivery of output, performance at the governmental level of regulation and control over deliveries of output, conduct of coordinated policy in the sector of pricing, and definition of the contract as an integral part of the agreement on trade and economic cooperation between the governments of Ukraine and the Republic of Kazakhstan for 1993 go beyond the bounds of the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Ministry of Industry and may only be the subject of an intergovernmental agreement.

In addition, the agreement decreases the volumes of deliveries of several types of output to Ukraine and leaves them at the 1992 level to Kazakhstan, which does not correspond to the interests of Ukraine and will give rise to difficulties in the signing of an intergovernmental contract.

With the goal of defending the interests of Ukraine upon the performance of economic ties at the interstate level, the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers DECREES:

1. To direct the attention of the ministries and agencies to the need for strict observance of the powers granted to them by legislation when concluding foreign economic contracts.

Preparation of proposals for intergovernmental contracts concerning volumes and nomenclature of mutual deliveries of output and goods is to be performed exclusively by the Ministry of State Resources of Ukraine.

2. To give V.D. Hladush, minister of industry of Ukraine, an official reprimand for exceeding his powers upon the signing of a contract with the Ministry of Industry of the Republic of Kazakhstan on production and technical ties of cooperation between enterprises of the Republic of Kazakhstan and Ukraine for 1993 which

puts Ukraine under unprofitable conditions and complicates the process of concluding an intergovernmental contract.

Privatization of Electric Power Sector Proposed

924A2018A Moscow DELOVOY MIR in Russian
21 Aug 92 p 11

[Article by Yu. Titov, deputy chief of the Kharkov Oblast State Administration: "Who Will Purchase the Atomic Electric Power Stations"]

[Text] The PHB Central Europe Ltd Company (Washington, London) readied a proposal concerning the privatization of Ukrainian electric power engineering.

Yuriy Titov, deputy chief of the Kharkov Oblast State Administration comments on that fact.

Even the staunchest advocates of private ownership understand that in the economy there are branches for which privatization is contraindicated. Power engineering is one of them. There is not even a hint regarding changes in forms of ownership of anything pertaining to power engineering in any of the denationalization and privatization programs in the various regions of Ukraine.

Nevertheless the Ministry of Power Engineering and Electrification of Ukraine ordered and received from the "PHB Central Europe Ltd" Company (Washington, London) proposals concerning the organization of a period of transition to market relations and privatization of Ukrainian electric power engineering.

The inevitable approach of an energy famine is not felt in everyday life yet, at the enterprises, however, interruptions in the supply of energy is nothing new and they are occurring with growing frequency, becoming longer in duration with more harm to production. There are quite a few serious reasons for that. Up to a certain time everything in our national economy had promise only if it was planned for many years ahead. Power engineering, for example, was to develop in strict accordance with the All-Union program, which did not envisage reconstruction and building of large thermal electric power stations in the European part of the USSR—the emphasis was on atomic electric power stations.

Following the Chernobyl catastrophe the indicated program in essence failed. In the situation that developed it became necessary to shift huge sums from the atomic electric power stations to thermal ones. But time was lost and soon other important factors intervened: division of the inheritance from the disintegrating Union was started. Ukraine got a number of atomic electric power stations the construction of which was completed by the builders but they had not yet been placed into operation. They will not be placed into operation since parliament made the decision to halt the building of atomic electric power stations in the republic. Ukraine found itself in an unenviable position for another reason as well: energy

producers in the republic—the thermal electric power stations, more than half of which were constructed several decades ago, have simultaneously exhausted their resources by the present time.

What does this threaten? By way of an example let us consider the Kharkov region which has a combined power capacity of at least four million kilowatt hours. The Zmiyevsk State Regional Electric Power Plant, whose personnel are still proud of efficiency indices (of 82 percent) which are rare in world practice, accounts for three-quarters of it. Everything there, however, rests essentially on the high degree of professionalism which can rescue the situation only until the equipment wears out completely.

It will be a very long time before Ukraine becomes wealthy enough in order to allocate funds for a national program for the development of power engineering. The customary principle involving "the patching of holes" is unsuitable. A completely different and untraditional approach is needed in the immediate reorganization of the branch.

Until comparatively recently the entire energy system in Great Britain was the property of the state, which had total monopoly in the sphere of energy supply and was experiencing so many problems with this branch, that the famous British conservatism finally could not stand it any longer: the conversion of state property into private property was started in power engineering and free competition replaced monopoly. A tendency toward demonopolization of electric power branches of industry is observed in Japan, Germany, Italy, France, Denmark, and the Netherlands and a large part of the enterprises, and often all of them are becoming private property.

In America independent power companies are building electric power stations with expenditures up to 30 percent lower than those of enterprises producing electricity in a monopolistic fashion, at the same time, in shorter periods of time, and using 40 percent fewer operating personnel than a monopoly. Prior to the radical transformations in British electric power system the monopolistic company was planning construction of four large atomic electric power stations and two coal electric power stations. The reorganization and creation of two competing companies led to the appearance of an energy market and then to a review of the plans. As a result preference was given to stations operating with gas, and this measure alone, in addition to everything else, permitted an almost 25 percent decrease in the cost of electric power by comparison with what it could have been.

As a result of reorganization and privatization of electric power engineering there is a significant decrease in costs, which is of particular interest to us and should be attractive.

"PHB Central Europe Ltd" submitted concrete plans for resolving two problems. The first one—reorganization of power engineering in Ukraine in such a manner as to

allow it to function under market conditions and so that market mechanisms would be working within the branch itself. The second one—preparation of electric power engineering for the forthcoming privatization in accordance with the government policy.

It is necessary to stress in particular that British and American specialists do not recommend starting with privatization. It is most important to first organize competition, and only then sell the energy complexes to private owners. Otherwise power engineering may lose the existing technical level, while splintered private firms will be unable to organize the efficient processing of energy.

It is planned to create independent joint-stock companies on the basis of such structures as the Ministry of Energy, auxiliary electric power producing enterprises, and electrical supply and marketing organizations. In the opinion of foreign specialists there must be not less than five electric power companies in operation in the sphere of electric power generation. Inevitable competition among them will force the power engineers to work much more efficiently than previously. Demonopolization is the best method for improving the quality of service offered to consumers. In the past ten years changes of this type in various forms were carried out and brought the anticipated results in many countries of the world.

All this is fine but power engineering is a special branch. Electric power cannot be stored so complete coordination of demand and supply is necessary every minute. In other words without centralized management it will not work. But we are actually talking not about management as such, but about a system of centralized coordination, or a dispatching mechanism.

It will be necessary to create a central dispatcher service. This dispatcher service must supply enterprises with energy from any electric power station selected by it. Everyone, naturally, will select the cheapest one, but it will also be necessary to pay for transmission. Freedom of selection of the electric power station must be ensured by legislation.

What about those stations with a high cost of production? Who is going to purchase electric power from them if there is freedom of choice? The system provides for a change in the tariff for electric power each half hour. The highest tariff will be at the peak hours. Practically all the stations will be profitable at that time. At night only those stations with the lowest production cost will be profitable. In this manner one of the principal laws of the market will start operating—if you want to raise your income, then lower your production cost. The consumer is extremely interested in the latter.

After the creation of share capital at one or the other enterprise it will be possible to undertake its privatization by various methods. That may include the sale of energy companies to other joint-stock companies or the sale of shares to small investors and participation of private firms in the marketing and building of new

capacities, or the acquisition of older stations with their subsequent modernization. It also includes the sale of their individual stations by electric power companies and the establishment of joint ventures with foreign partners for the purpose of building or modernizing electric power stations.

The foreign specialists submitted a sensible and sufficiently detailed program. A meeting of the board of the Ministry of Power Engineering of Ukraine took place not too long ago at which a program of transformations in power engineering was discussed. The speakers expressed admiration for the concise nature of its logical structure and the faultless way in which market laws were utilized. But the logic of the market must work in a market country and Ukraine is not one of them at the present time. For example, according to market laws tariffs for electric power are higher the smaller the portions of it received by the consumer. In our cases it is the reverse.

If something from a market economy is tried in ours, which is who knows what, there would be a lot of misunderstandings. In other words, a closed circle is ensured. But some day it must be broken. Perhaps power engineering will become the first to do so.

Oil, Gas Reserves, Prospects Examined

924A2005A Kiev *RABOCHAYA GAZETA* in Russian
14 Aug 92 p 2

[Article by D. Yaroslavskiy: "Can Our Oil Hunger Be Satisfied?"]

[Text] There have been several reports in our newspaper (in particular, see *RABOCHAYA GAZETA*, No 167, 1991 and Nos 65 and 66, 1992) about the prospects for oil and gas production in Ukraine and the means of satisfying the hunger for them. The topic is so crucial and relevant and so detailed, however, that it cannot be covered in just a few reports. After all, oil and gas produce two-thirds of all the energy used in the world today. This alone is enough to make us wonder whether Ukraine has enough of its own reserves of these important sources of energy. Furthermore, oil is not only important as a fuel: It is being used extensively in the United States and Japan, for example, for the manufacture of polymers, and the market prices of these are from 10 to 20 times the value of the oil itself.

The former Soviet Union was known as a major oil power, but not everyone knows that nine-tenths of all the oil extracted comes from Russia. Ukraine, with its strong industry and its growing supply of motor vehicles, needs large quantities of fuel. Our rural communities have become the main consumers of fuel. Today we send 60 percent of our gasoline and 65 percent of our diesel fuel there. This is why we simply cannot get along without imported fuel today.

Russia, once known as our "big brother," is taking advantage of this forced dependence in every way possible. Just a few years ago a tonne of oil from Russia cost us 30 rubles. This spring the price had soared to 3,500 rubles, and in the Universal Ukrainian-Siberian Exchange it was being offered at 6,600 rubles. Our "big brother" is frequently not satisfied with bank notes and also demands barter shipments of the pipe, metal, sugar, meat, vegetable oil, butter, and other commodities we need ourselves. We have learned what a bitter taste someone else's bread produces in our mouths, but it is not only that we are being skinned alive like the proverbial goat: Taking advantage of its monopoly, Russia often neglects to abide by the terms of its own contracts.

The constant shortage of "black gold" has understandably forced the radical reduction of the amount used for the manufacture of polymers. In contrast to the leading countries, we only use around one-tenth of the total for this purpose. Has anyone calculated how much foreign currency we are losing by doing this?

Ukraine, however, is known to have had its own liquid fuel since bygone days. More than 260 million tonnes of oil were extracted in the more than 100 years of our industry's history. Even today, the republic's reserves are not scarce. According to the estimates of the Ukrainian Geological Research Institute, projected reserves exceed 400 million tonnes. Geologists are constantly discovering new deposits in the western and eastern regions of the republic. It is true, regrettably, that they are not that big.

It is indicative that the increase in output in recent decades has come mainly from deposits in Sumy, Chernigov, Poltava, and Kharkov oblasts. The oil boom reached its peak in Ukraine when the new large deposits were discovered in this region. In 1972 the output of "black gold" exceeded 14 million tonnes. There has been a tendency toward reduction ever since that time. Now we produce around 5 million tonnes, counting condensate. What is the reason for this decline?

First of all, there are objective reasons. Even with the best equipment, it is impossible to remove all of the oil from the different layers of deposits. Some has to stay underground. The amount used and the amount lost, however, depend on several factors. They include the geological conditions of deposit strata and their properties—solidity, permeability, etc. Obviously, they also include the extraction technology in use. Suffice it to say that the yield of oil from the deposits we are working now ranges from 12 to 60 percent. Consequently, whereas geological factors are God's decision, as the saying goes, and cannot be changed, everything else is in human hands. Wherever the technology is more advanced and the equipment is better, the yield is higher. The following example illustrates the existing possibilities in this area. Several modern technologies, developed by scientists in Ukraine and other CIS states, were tested on small experimental sites in the Ukrneft Production Association. As a result, the strata yielded up to 15

percent more oil. It is easy to calculate how much richer we could be if this kind of technology could be used everywhere, instead of only on isolated test sites. What is keeping us from doing this?

"Above all, it is the shortage of money and the appalling confusion with prices in our state and in the Commonwealth," said Chief Engineer G. Lesovoy of the production association. "The use of advanced technology requires adequate financial backing, including hard currency resources, because some of the equipment and pipe we need is not produced in our republic and, regrettably, has to be purchased abroad. Just recently we were receiving 20 million dollars for this purpose, but now we are not getting any allocations. Under certain conditions, we could earn the money ourselves and, in general, supply ourselves with everything we need. After all, Ukrainian oil is highly appreciated because it contains no sulfur, it is light, and it is easy to refine. Nevertheless...."

Then Georgiy Antonovich told me a sad story. By the terms of current statutes, 80 percent of the oil and gas the association extracts is used to fill state orders. In other words, it has to be sold at prices regulated from above. Whereas these prices are 4.7 times as high as they were in 1991, the prices of the resources essential to the work of extractors are from 14 to 65 times as high as they were. This radical discrepancy has put producers in a difficult financial position.

Just imagine: The Ukrneft enterprise fulfilled all of its contract obligations. The result of all this was...a loss of 250 million rubles. It has no money to buy the equipment and materials it needs for its normal everyday operations. To avoid the inevitable work stoppages, the production association had to borrow 160 million rubles from the bank. In this day of the impending market, however, there are no benevolent rich uncles. The oilmen were charged interest of 25-30 percent on the loan, and this put them in an even more difficult position.

At one time part of the loss could have been covered by the production of liquefied gas, a by-product of oil refining. Three enterprises produced it and had no shortage of customers—almost the whole rural population of the republic. Now these plants are on the verge of closure. Their normal operations require around 1,800 tonnes of aviation lubricating oil a year, and they cannot get it. The result is another increase in losses and liabilities.

Even the loans acquired on such shackling terms have not been enough. This has caused delays in settlements with budget-carried organizations and the payment of wages to industry workers. Any significant rise in their wages is out of the question. They work under difficult conditions and often earn less than seamstresses. The replacement of equipment is also out of the question. The shortage of funds has forced the association to miss payments to many suppliers. They have responded by

holding up shipments of the necessary pipe, pumps, and other items. Unsatisfactory material and technical supplies have forced around 10 teams to stop working. The addition of service personnel brings the total up to hundreds of people. The resulting quantity of oil that has not been extracted can be calculated in thousands and thousands of tonnes.

We asked L. Shevchenko, chief of the Administration for Production Supplies and Equipment Orders, a question: "You long for the days when you were allocated 20 million dollars to purchase pipe and equipment abroad. Is it possible that the former Soviet Union, which was a great oil power, never established its own strong base in all those decades for the production of their domestic counterparts?"

"Believe me, in terms of quality, there is no such base. I have good reason to regret the lack of opportunity to buy what we need abroad. Here is an example. We get deep-well pumps from the Baku Machine-Building Plant imeni F. Dzerzhinskiy. They are only good for 2 kilometers, but our wells can be from 4 to 4.5 kilometers deep. They are not suitable for work in boggy conditions. They work for a year, but the foreign ones work for three years. We have complained to them, but our complaints have had no effect on the people in Baku. They are monopolists, and they know that we have nowhere else to turn. For this reason, they raised the price of these pumps from 300 rubles to 15,000 without improving their quality."

Leonid Yevgenyevich said that they have approximately the same problems with pipe. The wells are sunk in terrain with complex geological conditions and at great depths. The pipes used in this work have to be highly durable and leak-proof and must have other specific properties. Unfortunately, our own pipes, some of which are also manufactured in Ukrainian plants, are inferior to foreign pipe in many respects. This is why workers in the oil industry prefer to use the latter and to avoid all types of problems.

Today the people at Ukrneft are not thinking of ways to increase output, but of ways to stop the continued decline and to stabilize the situation. After all, even if many of the shortcomings listed above are eliminated, there can be no dramatic increase in output. It takes a year and a half, for example, to drill a test pit. The interval between the discovery of the deposit and the achievement of the optimal production level is usually from six to eight years. This is a long time.

Nevertheless, and everyone is well aware of this, the young state needs oil today. What is the solution? One possibility is the formation of joint ventures with firms in the United States, Canada, France, and other countries. This is already being done. This provides an opportunity to attract foreign capital, acquire new equipment, and thereby increase the current output and the yield of oil from deposit strata. The association is now made up of more than 30 enterprises. In addition to

them, several dozen "firms" which were once under the jurisdiction of the former union Ministry of the Oil and Gas Industry, are engaged in the oil business in Ukraine. There are plans to unite all of these subdivisions and establish a single concern. This would eliminate parallel projects and allow the different parties to solve their problems together and to operate more efficiently.

Because the quality of equipment is of colossal importance in increasing the yield of oil, we should return to this subject. The plants which produced large pieces of petroleum industry equipment in the former Soviet Union were located outside Ukraine. Today the workers of our oil industry have to acquire most of this equipment from other CIS republics. The cost of this and its impact on our oil production can be judged from the practices of the Baku plant. This brings up the valid question of whether we have to put up with this kind of tyrannical behavior. Ukraine is rich in metal, thank God, and is sharing its supply with the same CIS republics. We also have manganese and other components responsible for the durability of steel. We could convert a couple of large military plants, where we have available facilities and personnel with excellent qualifications, for the production of petroleum equipment.

The situation with regard to pipe is somewhat better. There are several pipe plants just in Dnepropetrovsk and the oblast. The only problem is that the people there do not always listen to the requests of oil industry workers. They have the metal and the experience, but why are they not producing the high-strength pipe for which foreign producers are now demanding hard currency and for which our oil industry workers are yearning?

Obviously, there are many problems. There are old ones, with "long beards," and new ones, both on the scales of the whole CIS and of republic "caliber." We who live in Ukraine can no longer rely on anyone else to solve them. And we have to solve them today. Otherwise, the already weak flow of oil could dry up completely tomorrow.

Minister for State Resources on Development of Paper, Pulp Industry

92UN2160A Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian
10 Sep 92 p.6

[Article by Anatoliy Minchenko, Ukrainian minister of state resources: "Paper Is Not the Least Important Commodity: Prospects for the Development of the Ukrainian Pulp and Paper Industry"]

[Text] The unsatisfactory state of the Ukrainian national economy's supply of cardboard and paper products will necessitate immediate measures to develop the republic pulp and paper industry.

The level of paper and cardboard consumption of only 20 kilograms per person, of which only 55 percent is produced here, is having a particularly adverse effect on

the work of enterprises in the food and printing industries. The national economy's need for such paper products as newsprint, labels, offset printing paper, paper bags, and waxed paper is being satisfied by importing them from other CIS countries. The work of paper enterprises in Ukraine depends wholly on shipments of pulp and timber from Russia. Furthermore, the rate of timber use in the Ukrainian pulp and paper industry is the lowest in the world and has been calculated at only 1.7 percent of the total amount of timber consumed, whereas it ranges from 25 to 60 percent in developed countries.

At the request of the Ukrainian Government, the Ukrbuvtorprom Corporation is drawing up a comprehensive development program, envisaging the construction of new enterprises and the remodeling of existing enterprises in this industry.

The construction of a pulp and paper combine capable of producing 160,000 tonnes of pulp and 200,000 tonnes of typing paper and newsprint a year has been scheduled for 1993-1996. The new capacities of this combine could provide republic paper enterprises with more bleached pulp, and the resulting output of printing paper and newsprint could preclude Ukraine's political dependence on other countries. Technical and economic feasibility studies of this project have already been completed, a construction site is being chosen, and deliveries of technological equipment are being negotiated with foreign firms.

The program calls for the construction of a plant in the republic for the production of 80,000 tonnes of corrugation paper a year using straw. This would considerably reduce imports of this product from Russia and secure the steady work of enterprises producing cardboard shipping containers.

The presence of available supplies of straw in Ukraine could also justify the construction of a pulp plant capable of producing 45,000 tonnes of bleached commercial pulp a year from annual grasses, which is scheduled to start in 1994. Besides this, there are plans to build a pulp and packaging materials combine for the production of 70,000 tonnes of commercial unbleached pulp, 300 million paper bags, and 148 million square meters of corrugated boxes a year, which should completely cover the demand of republic consumers for these products.

The Kherson Pulp and Paper Combine will begin to be remodeled in 1993 on credit from German and Austrian banks for the purpose of increasing our own output of pulp and simultaneously solving some ecological problems. The necessary documents for the confirmation of state guarantees are being processed by the Monetary Council of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers. A similar renovation project has been scheduled for 1994-1997 at the Izmail Pulp and Cardboard Combine.

In view of the need to supply enterprises in the Ukrainian food industry with different types of paper for packaging materials, the Ukrbuvtorprom Corporation has taken the first steps to organize the production of labels, wrapping paper, butcher paper, and oil paper at existing facilities. The incorporation of the projected capacities of the Rubezhanskiy Cardboard Combine, established by the Ukrainian Ministry of State Resources, and the production of more packaging materials at the Zhidachev Pulp and Paper Combine will increase the output of cardboard shipping containers. Purchases of imported equipment for the production of butcher paper, for which there is such an acute need at enterprises of the agroindustrial complex, are being considered. The establishment of capacities for the production of fine grades of paper in the republic has begun.

Specialists from this sector have established business contacts with leading firms in Canada, the United States, and Germany in the hope of stepping up the development of pulp and paper enterprises during the transition to market relations. Agreements on international intellectual aid to Ukraine include one on the Italian government's financing of plans for the retooling of the republic's pulp and paper industry with local crude resources and the resolution of ecological problems.

These undertakings should lead to the considerable improvement of this industry, which is so important in the Ukrainian national economy, and consequently to a better supply of cardboard and paper products for enterprises of the agroindustrial complex and the printing industry. The work on the program, however, will also call for the understanding and support of republic government agencies, particularly in the efforts to gain priority rights to foreign bank credits for the completion of planned measures, the efficient distribution of timber resources among consumers, and the planting of trees for special purposes.

MOLDOVA

Impact of Romanian as Official Language

92UN2194A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Sep 92
Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Eduard Kondratov: "Passions in Moldova Once Again Starting To Seethe Around Languages"]

[Text] Chisinau—An ukase of President Mircea Snegur has established that the general certification of personnel, the criterion of which will be the extent of knowledge of the official language, will commence as of 1 January 1994.

Thus the corps of executives of all ranks, civil servants and employees of public education, health care, trade, and services are reminded that they have left little more than a year to master the official language to the extent established by law. The coming examination will undoubtedly change the alignment of personnel in the republic appreciably. The president intends to put implementation of the law on the functioning of languages under his personal supervision.

The last shots on the banks of the Dniester had hardly died away before language problems once again emerged at political front stage, having become for the press a most urgent topic. Officials and journalists are maintaining that in the three years of operation of the language laws, there have been no appreciable changes. Very many executives and specialists do not, as before, have Romanian, and, generally, "the enthusiasm displayed three years ago has come to be replaced by passivity." As a rule, the standard of instruction in the language is low, and courses have been farmed out by the state to cooperators and dubious individuals making a business out of this. On the other hand, the Russian-speaking population, not perceiving government stringency, is ignoring study of the language. For this reason it is now essential, the newspapers write, to call to account the executives who are ignoring the prescriptions of the law, and employees of trade and services are being advised to respond to anything said to them in Russian only in Romanian.

Passions surrounding the situation involving study of the language of the indigenous nationality are not subsiding in areas of the Dniester left bank. The government of the unrecognized Dniester Republic has prepared the bill "On Languages in the Dniester Moldovan Republic". According to this, three languages—Ukrainian, Russian, and Moldavian, which, as distinct from Romanian, uses the Slavonic (Cyrillic) script—are declared the official languages, and use of the Roman script will be prosecuted by law. An exception has been made for lessons in Romanian, which schoolchildren may, having obtained their parents' written consent, learn in the Roman alphabet.

The unnatural aspect of the situation, where a language is studied in parallel in two ways of writing, is evoking the protests of many teachers and parents. Chisinau

newspapers are publishing the appeals of inhabitants of Grigoriopolskiy Rayon and the city of Ribnica, protesting against the forcible Russification of writing. National radio has reported that teachers and students have not attended school, having declared a strike, in Grigoriopolskiy Rayon's village of Delakeu.

Uneasiness Lingers in Dniester Region

92UN2194B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 23 Sep 92 p 3

[Report by Aleksandr Tago: "Military Operations Terminated: But Peace in the Dniester Region Is Still Far Off"]

[Text] The Joint Control Commission, with the participation of representatives of Moldova, the Dniester Republic and Russia, which has for two months been monitoring the situation in the Dniester Republic and the disengagement of the parties to the conflict, is summing up the results of its work. An official statement presented by all 18 members of the commission is testimony to this. The document observes that the Joint Control Commission has formulated and implemented specific measures permitting a cease-fire, the withdrawal of the Armed Forces and other formations to agreed lines, the concentration of military equipment and arms in places of storage, and the creation of a security zone. The efforts made by the military command and the peacekeeping force Army contingent have permitted the creation of practicable prerequisites for a just political settlement of the Dniester conflict, in accordance with the commonly recognized rules of international law. Expressing concern at the delay in the start of the second stage of a final settlement of the conflict by political and parliamentary methods, the Joint Commission appeals to "all the parties' politicians to commence negotiations on the formulation and implementation of measures for the conclusive normalization of the situation in the Dniester region of the Republic of Moldova and the assurance of lasting peace on earth." The Control Commission thus makes it understood to the politicians that their hour has struck and that the time has come to take the next step in the loosening of the tightly tied Dniester knot. Without this, the efforts of the peacekeeping force could be reduced to nothing overnight, and it cannot perform miracles; nor is there any reason for it to remain an eternal buffer on the Dniester.

It should be noted that shots are still being heard on the banks of the Dniester, although there are no combat operations. As a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent—an employee of the Dubesar District Hospital—reported, hardly a day goes by without children hurt by mines or people injured as a result of the careless use of weapons being brought in. Small wonder, since the edicts of Snegur and Smirnov on the voluntary surrender of weapons have not had the desired effect. The population continues to hold a large quantity of various kinds of firearms. The military says that even a stick fires once a year, and inhabitants' weapons could result in a new

tragedy for them. The politicians, primarily the Moldavian members of parliament, who will shortly assemble for their fall session, should remember this. There have been no emergencies during the recess. The fragile peace on the Dniester has been preserved—now they have to consolidate it and determine the political status of the Dniester region. President Mircea Snegur has been talking about this repeatedly of late. True, the main problem is not a shortage of draft legislative instruments on the status of the Dniester region but the mood of the deputies themselves. By all accounts, the representatives of the Dniester region have no intention of going to Chisinau to participate in the formulation of the status of their region, preferring the role of detached observers and fierce critics of Chisinau's position, whatever revisions it undergo. The leaders of Russia, whose influence in the Dniester region is considerable, could be the reconciling party here, and if they so wish, they could, most likely, force the emissaries of Tiraspol and other deputies of the Left Bank to participate in the Moldovan parliament session. The likelihood of this version being realized is not great, it is true. Nonetheless, given certain conditions, it is realizable, since it is virtually the sole option opening the way to reasonable compromise. It would in this case, it is true, be necessary to overcome in addition the current appreciable differences within the parliament itself. The opposition, in the shape of the

thinned-out Christian Democratic Popular Front faction, has no intention of surrendering without a fight and will try to ensure that no concessions be made to the "Dniester separatists." This could evoke an unpredictable political reaction in parliament. With the support of the Independence faction the agrarian deputies are attempting to strike a blow at their colleagues representing the Popular Front. It is known in parliamentary circles even now that representatives of the majority intend on demanding the termination of the deputy's authority of Mircea Druc, leader of the Christian Democratic Popular Front, who is now running for the office of president of Romania, the elections for which are to be held on Sunday. Although his chances of winning the presidency are put at one in 10, many people in the Chisinau parliament consider it altogether abnormal for their colleague to be running for the presidency of another state, considering Moldova a temporary and artificially formed state. Forecasting the further development of events now is quite difficult. It is obvious that Moldova is on the threshold of a new political stage. Either the members of parliament and politicians of both banks of the Dniester manage to strengthen peace and independence in their state, or they take the path of further confrontation, and new bloodshed will be inevitable.

ESTONIA

Veering, Border Official on Russian Troops, Border Patrols

WS2309130092 Tallinn ETA NEWS BULLETIN
in English 1545 GMT 21 Sep 92

[From 21 September RAHVA HAAL, PAEVALEHT, pp 8, 2]

[Text] Monday, September 21—Minister of State Uno Veering and General Director of Border Guard department Andrus Oovel held a news conference yesterday. According to Veering there are less than 15,000 Russian troops in Estonia. "We have asked at each of the six rounds of the negotiations, how many troops are here. Our negotiations partners have never answered", Veering said. Estonian government and delegation hold on to the deadlines mentioned earlier: assault units and troops based in Tallinn will have to leave within this year, the rest during the first half of 1993, Veering assured. The border discussions have been hindered by both sides' different understanding of the succession of the negotiating states. "The Russian side claims that two totally new states were formed in 1991—Russia and Estonia, whose relations must be determined by new treaties. Our position has not changed: the Republic of Estonia, formed in 1918 was meanwhile incorporated in the USSR against the will of the people, but the legal status of our state has not been interrupted", Veering told the news conference. He stressed that the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920 is the only international document determining Estonian-Russian border. Yet Veering admitted the possibility of "certain compromise". According to PAEVALEHT, Russia has also shown some willingness to compromise. The new border line is expected to run between the present economic border and the one determined by the Tartu Peace Treaty. The Treaty will be observed by the new delegation as well as it has not been invalidated by any legal acts, Veering added.

Andrus Oovel stressed the lack of personnel that makes normal border service impossible. Instead of 3,048 men necessary there are only 1,100, he said. "The state will have to consider the necessity of all defence expenses", Oovel said. "Are we afraid of a foreign aggression or trying to hinder the entry of organized crime, drug trade and illegal refugees into Estonia?" he asked. He also mentioned lack of equipment and insufficient legislation which makes it difficult to punish lawbreakers.

2.2 million persons crossing Estonian border have been registered since July 1 when the visa regime was introduced. 12,000 have been turned back at the border, 3 wanted criminals and 582 owners of forged passports have been arrested. Border Guard has presented 31 cases to court but no one has been tried yet, Oovel pointed out. Estonian Border Guard has registered 143 cases of Russian troops violating Estonian laws. The Foreign Ministry has protested in four cases.

Estonian Border Guard uses one patrol boat presented by Sweden, three more are to arrive from Finland. Estonian Border Guard has taken over 18 former Russian guard posts, most of which have been looted and need repair. Oovel stressed as exceptions the guard stations in Baaremaa and patrol boat base in Haapsalu which were handed over in excellent order. 8 Estonian border guards are presently stationed in Paldiski, Oovel said.

KGB's 'SOSNA' Profiled

92UN2179A Tallinn EESTI AEG/KODUMAA
in Estonian, 19 Aug 92 p 6

[Article by Juri Lum: "Spy Nest"]

[Text] There are quite a few military structures on the soil of the Republic of Estonia that have a forest of aeries sprouting out of them. Some of these structures, whose purpose and activity are kept super-secret, are especially important, which is particularly true of surveillance objects. Naturally, such nests of espionage are concealed as much as possible, but often turn up at some well-known and rather unexpected places. **One of those extremely important surveillance centers is located at MERIVALJA, AT THE VIIMSI ESTATE OF GENERAL LAIDONER** [General and Supreme Commander of Armed Forces during Estonia's independence period—Translator's note]. The estate, like many other cultural objects, has been remodeled to meet the needs and tastes of military designers. The recurring decorative element is a boarded fence wreathed with bundles of barbed wire. The mansion itself is badly trashed, as the interior is crammed full of special purpose offices. The commander's office, by the way, is located in what used to be Mrs. Laidoner's bedroom. This, as far as I can tell, is the only room where one can still see some of the original woodwork used for the interior. **The basement rooms, however, are totally taboo—this is where the "treasure" of the object is, consisting of special equipment.** In addition to what I saw from the front of the estate, I also managed to move about the grounds and take a look at some of the buildings there.

Two "sputnik" aeries were located behind the estate.

A receiving "dish" measuring several meters in diameter is still in the yard of the estate.

Electronic surveillance center

The estate is used to house the ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE UNIT Number 31181 OF THE NORTH SEA FLEET. The commander is (was) Captain First Grade STEPAN FEDOSEYEVICH OSIPCHUK, an intelligent-looking man. The task of this surveillance unit is to scan the northern part of the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. It tracks the movement of all submarine and surface vessels belonging to NATO and other states, and the takeoff of airplanes, helicopters, rockets, etc. To carry out this task, the unit has two supplementary objects in addition to its main base.

1) A transmitting center on the peninsula of Viimsi, where numerous aerials and wires are spread over quite a large area. The center maintains communications with two similar centers located at Severomorsk and Kaliningrad. Staff headquarters of the Soviet Navy are in Moscow.

2) A radar center at Merivalja, at the end of Hõbekuuse Street (not to be confused with aerials on top of house number 8 on the same street). This object is located on a much smaller area than center 1, and its tasks are slightly different. Once the range has been established, the location of the signal can be determined. The respective ranges will also have to be checked out individually.

Objective of the surveillance center's work

The unit has close to 20 guards, all of whom handle, in addition to locating the objects mentioned, searching, picking up and storing other necessary signals from a given range transmitted by telephone, Morse code, teletype, coded telegrams, radio communications, etc. All verbal information is translated and sorted. Close to 80 percent of the information is received via the **sputnik aerials** located behind the mansion of Viimsi. There are two of these domed aerials that measure 2.5 to 3 meters in height. One of them is silver, the other one green. As mentioned before, all of the locating equipment is kept in the basement of the mansion.

Operations building of the transmitting center.

The range of the signals detected is sent, via the transmitting center, to the locating center, and also to the two other units. This is where the source of a detected signal is determined. Thanks to such cooperation between the three units, the object is located fairly accurately (within 0.5 to 2 nautical miles). On the mansion grounds, in addition to the "space-domes", there is also the grid of a large, round "dish" for reception. Both the main unit and the two supplementary objects are equipped with mobile auxiliary power stations (diesel motors) which make it possible for the work to be continued in case of a power failure. All necessary equipment is duplicated and placed on appropriate means of transportation. These make it possible to continue the activity somewhere else, radio waves permitting. There were some 50 different pieces of machinery at the beginning of this year. Out of those, more than 10 were outside on the castle grounds. By now, most of them (basically trucks) have been sold off to "cooperators." By the way, training for the technology mentioned here is conducted on the Aegviidu-Tapa testing grounds.

As the "castle spirits" of Viimsi have revealed, they could get three times as much information out of the "cosmos" than they actually do. Only if they take the trouble, of course. One reason for not taking the trouble may be that, by spring, there were only 200 seamen left in the unit, in addition to 50 officers, 15 midshipmen and 15 employees. The number of seamen, in particular, has dried up even further.

Actually, there are some very good reasons why the aerials are placed specifically at Merivalja. Namely, radio waves are concentrated here. To the delight of UFO fans, let's recall the **mysterious accumulation of metal** said to be embedded in the earth at Hõbekuuse Street which, according to one version, is thought to be a hidden space object—a beacon to the comers. Whether it is this, or some other reason, that accounts for the concentration of radio waves, will probably be known at some future time. We can say that the surveillance center located in Estonia is not the only one of its kind. A similar center for Europe is located in **Latvia** and in **Russia**, near our borders.

I did a more thorough study of the conditions described here in the latter part of winter this year. It had to be kept quiet in hopes that Estonia may get possession of the equipment. Besides, disclosure would have caused anxiety among the military, and forced them to secrecy. By now, the situation has changed. Despite assurances about the indispensable nature of the object, and the impossibility of returning the estate because of the high cost of relocation, surveillance aerials are starting to come down. Dismantling of the SOSNA radio detection center at Merivalja was started some time ago. By now, there is no scrap of iron left. Barns, as usual, are reduced to splinters—the stone building for the equipment is still standing. As is typical of such abandoned objects, the military has sold it off to some "cooperative." For the time being it is hard to tell and, God only knows, what will be in its place.

The other field of aerials at Viimsi is still standing, but has not been functioning for the past few days. The space aerials have also been taken down at the estate. Where this property is taken, or what will be done with it, only time can tell. I can assume, however, that these contraptions are (were) being taken out of Estonia under the protective authority of our men at **Toompea**. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO TELL WHEN, AND IN WHAT CONDITION, THE LAIDONER ESTATE WILL BE RETURNED TO US.

Estonian Aviation Reorganized

92UN2179B Tallinn EESTI EKSPRESS in Estonian, 19 Aug 92 p.c

[Article by Tarmo Vahter: "Competition Sprouting in Aviation"]

[Text] After extensive screening, Estonia's Office of Aviation has issued licenses for aviation activity to four companies.

"First, we issue a licence for a few months, then a new license will have to be applied for. Estonian Air, a state firm, first got its license for six months. But now it was issued for two months only, because airports are splitting off from Estonian Air, and the work will have to be reorganized," says Rein Jarv, head of the flight operations department at the Office of Aviation."

Estonian Air is dreaming of Western planes. The dozen TU-134's belonging to Estonia's national aviation company are not long distance planes. According to aviation director Mr. Vaks, they have also been in service for too long. This is why Estonian Air would prefer to fly Western passenger planes in the future. "They consume less fuel and require fewer crew members," Mr. Vaks added.

Estonian Air also has four JAK-40's, which fly on foreign routes to Latvia, Lithuania and Belarus. Out of the 12 AN-2's, only those making flights from Tartu to Pärissaar and from Pärnu to Kihnu are being used. Earlier, several of the the AN-2's were used for insecticide dusting of fields at collective farms. As collective farming disappears, so will agricultural aviation.

As of September 1, airports will split off from Estonian Air to form an independent state enterprise called Estonian Airports. It is thought at the Aviation Office that this will eliminate the fears of having a state aviation company monopolize the industry.

Estonian Aviation Company hauls pilgrims

The ELK [Estonian Aviation Company] takes due pride in its three new long distance planes TU-154M. The company flew the Estonian Olympic group to Barcelona in one of them. And from Dagestan, it took 3,000 pilgrims to Saudi Arabia and back.

Priit Lõuk, chairman of the ELK board, hopes that the company will get on its feet by offering its services to the tourist trade. "We'll probably be able to fly to Mallorca cheaper than Estonian Air."

ELK flights are licensed from CIS. Partnership in the company is divided, more or less equally, between the airplane factory of Samara, the Tiivik corporation and Estonia's Civil Aviation. The latter has become Estonian Air by now.

Aeroco has Estonia's only helicopters

The Aeroco company, founded in January of 1991, has at its disposal three MI-2 helicopters, one charter plane, and several recreational planes. The firm was founded by six enterprises, Flora, Pioneer and Vasar among them.

Estonia's aviation firms and planes used by them

ELK	three TU-154M's
Estonian Air	twelve TU-134's
	four JAK-40's
	twelve AN-2's
Aeroco	three MI-2 (helicopters)
	one charter plane
	several recreational planes
Avies	two Piper Chieftain type charter planes (U.S.)
Ergon	two Cessna 152's (U.S.)
	two Cessna 172's

Aeroco has the only Estonian helicopters that are put to commercial use. They have been used for special projects and for putting out recent forest fires.

Avies transports businessmen

Private corporation Avies makes charter flights to Europe and the former Soviet Union with two planes of the Piper Chieftain make. These used planes of U.S. origin made their first flight to Estonia in March of this year. Avies can arrange a flight within two hours from the time an order is placed.

The fourth to get a license in July was the Ergon corporation. On four Cessna's leased from Sweden, the firm teaches flying to students at the Nõo flying school.

Sales and contracting activity in aviation is not subject to licensing by the Office of Aviation. This is handled by the Tallinn Aviation Company, who has no planes of its own.

Training of Estonian fliers was started on small planes. Students at the flying school at Nõo log their flying hours on JAK-52 planes.

Ministerial Reorganization To Take Place

92UN2179C Tallinn PAEVALEHT in Estonian.
1 Sep 92 p 1

[ETA release: "Beginning With the New Year, Only 11 Ministries To Be Left Out of 18"]

Police to be placed under Ministry of Justice

[Text] TALLINN (ETA). The bill of legislation on the government was completed at the end of this week.

The bill was prepared by the Supreme Council task force. Its vice chairman Ilmar Hallaste said that they were the first to finish among the task forces preparing bills for the implementation of constitution. The bill had to be ready by September 1, but was already turned over to the Ministry of Justice on Friday.

"Our goal is to have the bill ready before the State Assembly convenes, so that after the chairman of the State Assembly is elected, discussions on the government bill could start, and the new government formed accordingly," Hallaste said.

Hallaste said that the bill on the house and operating procedures of the State Assembly is the most urgent one "so the State Assembly would not have to start forming the government according to the laws of the Estonian SSR."

The main objectives of the government reform to be completed by January 1, 1993 are: To reduce the number of ministries; to strengthen the ties of central government offices, state offices and inspections to ministers in

charge of their respective areas; and to consolidate armed formations now reporting to different ministries.

The bill calls for reducing the number of ministries from 18 to 11: The Ministry of Education and Culture should become the Ministry of Education; the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs should become the Ministry of Finance; the ministries of Construction, Trade, Industry and Energetics should be combined into one Ministry of Economic Affairs; and the ministries of Labor, Social Welfare and Health made into one common ministry of Social Services.

Hallaste said that state and inspection offices have too much independence right now and are, in effect, behaving like ministries, without having any political accountability to the parliament.

In the course of the reform, police is to be brought under the Ministry of Justice.

"Up until now the Ministry of the Interior has, in effect, been the ministry for the police or the militia, and that has been considered its most important function. The task force deemed it necessary to sever the administrative ties of different armed formations to different ministries, and place all agencies dealing with law enforcement under one ministry. Reporting to the same ministry will also be the offices for Detention Centers, Police Administration and Criminal Investigation," Hallaste said.

He added that the new constitution will also do away with the Prosecutor's Office. Prosecutors remaining at the courts, who file complaints on behalf of the state, do not deal with investigation and represent the interests of the state," Hallaste said.

Need for Patent Law Emphasized

92UN2179D Tallinn ARIPAEV in Estonian, 13 Aug 92
p 3

[Article by Jaak Ostrat: "Lawlessness Should Be Curbed"]

[Text] After the State Patent Office was created in March of this year, we expected it to disclose its views on the future of Estonia's patent system, the underlying principles for future laws, etc. Such information is vital for the development of entrepreneurship.

A secretive patent office

Instead, the opposite happened. The Patent Office started being secretive about its activity from the very beginning. Neither entrepreneurs nor specialists have been getting the necessary information on these matters. Such secrecy could hardly add to the quality of legal regulations to be worked out by the Patent Office. And the result—with no official information available, is that all possible rumors will start circulating, and in foreign countries as well.

However, there is a "justification" that has been offered for this secrecy. Two members of the Patent Office management team have told the media that their office is involved in a struggle to prevent Estonia's intellectual property from getting within the reach of the European Patent Office and Russia, since both of these have shown a strong and continuing interest in taking over Estonia's industrial property. This is why it is supposedly not possible for the Patent Office to disclose its activity prematurely.

In conflict with Europe and Russia

It is hard to imagine a more ill-conceived statement, or one that could be more unpleasant in its consequences. It would take a whole article to analyze just that, but I would merely like to point out that the infantile accusations made, attributing unfriendliness, if not outright enmity toward Estonia, to the mighty international patent organization (our future partner for cooperation), and to a super-state, could precipitate an international scandal on the highest level. What would be the response of our government if the administrative committee of the European Patent Convention and the government of Russia would officially demand an explanation?

Resolving scandals is a job best left to diplomats. Our job is to see to it that Estonia will finally get its laws covering industrial property. Especially the trademark law, because the legal protection of symbols identifying the entrepreneur constitutes the first significant step toward regulating relations dealing with industrial property and toward curbing unethical competition.

New trademark law

For the trademark law to function effectively, it will have to meet the following criteria:

1. Considering Estonia's reality, it would have to be coordinated closely with the corresponding international conventions and agreements. Such coordination would have to:

a) prove to the world that Estonia has created the legal basis for entering international cooperation and is not planning to be encapsulated within its national boundaries;

b) guarantee that in future attempts at cooperation the state's internal legislation would not turn out to be an inhibiting factor (even though I dare predict that in relations with other small, and significantly more developed states than ours, the benefits derived from this cooperation will accrue more to foreign applicants in Estonia than to Estonian applicants abroad. But this is by no means fatal.)

2. We should rely on results that developed industrial countries have already achieved in standardizing the concepts for the legal protection of trademarks. Most of the results are already on a level to be confirmed by international agreements, and the degree to which we

rely on them determines, by and large, how well our law is going to be understood in other states. But what is to be done with the 30,000 or so trademarks registered in the Soviet Union and valid, to this day, also in Estonia, many of them belonging to Estonian entrepreneurs?

But what about the previous trademarks?

We could, of course, declare them invalid, one and all. This, however, would be a violation of property rights (since it would be tantamount to expropriating material property), and this is how it will be perceived by the world. The greatest damage, of course, would be done to Estonian entrepreneurs and the image of the state.

The other option would be to keep all these trademarks valid until the Soviet Union's registration period expires. This legally clean solution, however, could cause serious difficulties to our Patent Office and undermine the development of our business ventures.

The most acceptable solution, in my opinion, would be one that gives the holders of Soviet Union trademarks a certain time period (six or 12 months, for example) to re-register their trademarks in Estonia. If the holder of the trademark takes advantage of this opportunity, the trademark will remain valid without interruption; if not, the trademark will no longer be valid here. Clearly, this will be used primarily by our entrepreneurs and foreign firms; entrepreneurs of the former Soviet Union would probably not bother to take that extra step.

It is of utmost importance (primarily to Estonian entrepreneurs) that re-registration not interrupt the validity of the trademark. Let me give you an example: In Estonia we have Flora, in Finland Kemiflora. Should the validity of the trademark be interrupted in the process of re-registration, it is conceivable that the application for the Kemiflora trademark is received at the patent office before the application to re-register Flora. What this would mean to Flora, should be clear to everyone. This is not only a hypothetical question, since it is common knowledge that there are dozens upon dozens of trademark applications from foreign firms ready to be filed by Estonian patent specialists. One way or another, Estonia needs its own law for industrial property. Business without a law for industrial property is like traffic without rules—everything unethical is permitted. Or, putting it another way—like life in the Wild West before the time of sheriffs.

LITHUANIA

Weapons Purchases From Russia Alleged

92P50130 Vilnius RESPUBLIKA in Lithuanian
18 Aug 92 p 1

[Article by Audris Kutrevicius: "And Again New Weapons"]

[Text] It has been learned from unofficial sources that Lithuania has once again acquired a large consignment

of weapons. This is what was being discussed Saturday behind closed doors at the congress of volunteers. This time it was Russia selling weapons to Lithuania. Well-informed officials affirm that about 10,000 AK-74 assault rifles were purchased. The cost, \$225 dollars (that is cheaper than the Uzi), was also mentioned at the congress of volunteers. So far it is unclear whether the entire consignment of weapons has already reached Lithuania. Although it is known that some of the first assault rifles have already found their way to the Ministry of Defense forces. The AK-74 is one of the most widely used weapons in the Soviet army and it requires 5.45 caliber bullets.

Yesterday no one could either confirm or deny this information. Minister of Defense A. Butkevicius was in Moscow and his first deputy E. Nazelskis declined to comment, declaring that the press should not be reporting such things.

It is supposed that this is how the 9 July 1992 decree by Russian government leader Ye. Gaydar, which provided for the sale of large consignments of weapons to Lithuania, is being implemented. The AK-74's were specifically mentioned in the listing of weapons. According to this decree, Lithuania should receive 10,000 of these weapons. Along with these, the decree also lists AKC-74U and AKM assault rifles, machine guns and other equipment. Ten thousand assault rifles would have cost the purchasers more than \$2 million dollars, and the cost of the entire contract would be \$52.4 million dollars.

Quite frequently, when journalists ask high officials to comment on such information, they are told that it is a state secret. Unfortunately, the government has not yet ratified the state secrets list. Therefore, refusal to provide information has no legal basis. True, the most recent state secrets list was ratified by Soviet Lithuania's Council of Ministers in 1956.

According to RESPUBLIKA's calculations, Lithuania's military forces have already purchased up to 20,000 assault rifles (there are 7,000 servicemen in the regular army). It would be interesting to know how many more weapons purchase contracts there are and where the money will come from.

Pre-Election Mood in Lithuania

93P50001 Vilnius LITHUANIAN WEEKLY in English
No 32, 11-17 Sep 92 p 1

[Article by Robertas Jankus: "Elections: Full Speed Ahead"]

[Text] Although more than a month is left until early elections to the Lithuanian Seimas (Parliament), a pre-election mood is already felt everywhere throughout Lithuania.

The leaders of the Lithuanian Radio and Television have published an open letter to Vytautas Landsbergis and MP's expressing their concern over the quality of TV

programs since five daily broadcasting hours must be allotted to various parliamentary nominees and political parties during the elections campaign. The letter says that it is impossible to diminish the amount of campaign speeches and statements because the Law on Elections provides even the smallest political force with the right to a broadcasting time-limit. The Radio and TV authorities call on the MP's to amend that article of the Law which specifies the pre-election speeches on the state-run TV.

On the other hand, in his Sunday TV speech, Vytautas Landsbergis remarked that "strange things were happening in the mass-media institution." He also noted with a tinge of irony in a recent radio interview that the broadcasting regulations designed by the Radio and TV leadership for the elections campaign would not allow state and government leaders running for the Seimas to take part in traditional TV and radio programs. Meanwhile, various political parties and movements held conferences last weekend to discuss and approve their candidates to the Seimas.

The right-wing Sajudis Coalition for a Democratic Lithuania, staged a conference with delegations of the Sajudis, Citizens' Charter, Political Prisoners' Union, Farmers' Sajudis, Green Party and Workers' Union taking part. The coalitions list of parliamentary nominees for proportional elections includes over 90 names.

The Christian Democrats, with 5,000 party members (Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas among them), have made a joint list of nominees with the Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees and the Democratic Party.

Last Saturday, the Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party approved a list of 72 candidates to the Seimas. According to its leader Algirdas Brazauskas, the Democratic Labor Party has more than 15 thousand members.

Saulius Peceliunas, who leads the Lithuanian Democratic Party, stated at a recent news conference that the Democrats had made up a list of 27 names—not a single former communist among them—for the upcoming elections.

Election Campaign Takes Shape

93P50002 Tallinn THE BALTIC INDEPENDENT
in English 25 Sep 92-1 Oct 92 p 8

[Article by Edward Lucas: "Lithuanian Election Campaign Gears Up"]

[Text] The battle lines in Lithuania's first post-occupation general election are becoming clearer, while an inconclusive outcome looks increasingly more likely.

At the heart of the October 25 poll is the question of whether the Sajudis coalition can win an overall majority in the parliament, and thus reelect its leading candidate, Vytautas Landsbergis, to the country's highest office.

With the campaign's official start imminent, Sajudis's well-worn themes of patriotism and anti-communism seem certain to make it the largest grouping in parliament, but rather unlikely to gain it an overall majority. The crucial centrist voters seem more likely to be repelled than wooed by high-volume attacks on "traitors" and "dark forces."

If Sajudis indeed fails to gain control of the new parliament, it is hard to see any of the other parties uniting around a replacement. Despite negligible ideological differences, the Liberal and Centrist factions appear set on contesting the election in fierce opposition to each other, rather than uniting against the extremes of left and right. The ex-communists, led by the popular former leader of Soviet Lithuania, Algirdas Brazauskas, seem set to poll well, but attract such intense hostility from other parties that they seem unlikely to gain even a sniff of power.

The level of political debate strikes outsiders as shallow and populist. The ex-communists, (now the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party or LDDP) are demanding lower energy costs, a freeze on prices and higher wages. Even Sajudis has said it does not support the wage freeze backed by the IMF until the introduction of the litas.

The Lithuanian currency is likely to be one of the most potent weapons in the campaign. "It would be very regrettable if political rather than economic considerations dominate this issue," warned a senior Bank of Lithuania official.

No opinion polls may be published in Lithuania during the course of the campaign, making it hard to assess whether or not the smaller, mainly centrist, parties will be squeezed by the two giants. Only Sajudis and the LDDP have serious political machines, but how these will be affected by widespread voter apathy, and a generalised disgust with politicians, remains to be seen.

There is little in the way of an electoral arena. Two newspapers, RESPUBLIKA and LIETUVOS RYTAS, are strident critics of Mr. Landsbergis. The state-owned LIETUVOS AIDAS (which also publishes EKHO LITVY in Russian and KURIER WILENSKI in Polish) fulfills its duty, as does the much-criticised state television service.

On September 20, however, viewers watching Mr. Landsbergis's regular Sunday evening homily were interested to note a lengthy and plaintive complaint that he was being "taken off air" for the duration of the election campaign. Mr. Landsbergis, whose leadership style involves frequent oscillation between statesman-like detachment and intense partisan engagement, is not running as a constituency candidate, pleading burdens of office. Half the candidates will be elected from national lists composed by their parties, the rest from constituencies by the first-past-the-post system.

Upcoming Election Rivalry To Be Among 'Coalitions'

92UN2133A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 36, 6-13 Sep 92 p 5

[Article by Galina Afanasyeva: "An Election Race Around the Clock"]

[Text] It looks as if the concerns over a decline of the political activity in Lithuania have been somewhat exaggerated. According to the findings of the sociological laboratory at Vilnius University, 63 per cent of respondents have voiced their readiness to take part in the parliamentary elections set for October 25. And though the election campaign is just beginning, it is already clear that it will be neither easy for the candidates nor the electors.

On August 25 the Ministry of Justice ended registering the political organizations trying to compete in the elections. All in all, it registered 40 parties, movements and political associations like, for example, the Union of the Poles of Lithuania which was set up as a socio-cultural association but managed to introduce amendments into its programme and rules enabling it to be registered as a political force (something which similar "Russian" organizations were unable to do). In this way the Polish people of Lithuania will be able to take part in the elections as an independent party. The law grants certain benefits to political organizations representing ethnic minorities: for example to have their candidates elected to Seimas, it is enough for them to poll 10,000 votes, while all the other parties and movements must ensure the support of at least 4 per cent of the electorate.

A rather restrained response has been sparked by the questionnaire for the candidates, which was approved the other day by the Main Commission on Elections. It contains 26 questions, ten of which must definitely be answered. This concerns, among other things, the membership of the CPSU (CPL) with the indication of the post once held, as well as collaboration with the KGB and other special services.

Actually, the admission of "discrediting ties" cannot serve as a basis for denying registration to him. Everyone understands, however, that not only the popular leaders of the Democratic Party of Labour (the former CPL) may find themselves "marked" by their communist past, but also many representatives of the Sajudis. It is not ruled out, that new KGB agents will be exposed as the elections draw nearer. And although the investigation of their activities does not have the character of prosecution on criminal charges, the reputation of "suspects" often happens to be thoroughly ruined. The Supreme Court has not yet finished the hearing on Kazimiera Prunskiene's case, but according to the latest opinion poll, she already figures among the three most unpopular political leaders.

Of the 40 registered political organizations only 29 have so far voiced their intention to take part in the elections.

All the others will have to make up their mind before September 20. It appears, that the rivalry will unfold not among parties, but among coalitions. The Union of Liberals and the Union of Peasants—two sufficiently influential parties—have already come forward with a single programme. There is no doubt, that other alliances will spring up as well. Hardly anyone will venture to contest a seat in Parliament single-handed: the population's political sympathies are very general in character. The sociologists of Vilnius University say, that most respondents have only a vague idea of the system on voting on party tickets and will set their sights on specific candidates. Moreover, about 50 per cent say they will be guided by their moral qualities, 15 per cent—by their biography, and only one in ten—by the programme they stand up for.

As estimated by political scientists, the bloc of the left-wing forces (the DPLL and the Forum of Lithuania's Future) will be able to poll about 22 per cent of the votes, the bloc of right-wing forces (Sajudis coalition)—42 per cent, and the "moderates"—nearly 36 per cent. If those forecasts come true, none of the groupings will get a stable majority, and the new parliament may become even less efficient than the one existing now.

Moderate Movement States Goals

92UN1919A Vilnius LIETUVOS RYTAS in Lithuanian
29 Jul 92 p 1

[ELTA report: "The Moderates Movement: 'We Are the Leftists of the Right'"]

[Text] In a briefing to the journalists on 28 July, at the Supreme Council, members of the initiative group of the Lithuanian Moderates' movement met with journalists.

A faction of moderates has been active in the parliament for some time. Now some of its members have created a moderates' movement of Lithuania, which was officially registered at the Ministry of Justice. One of the movement's chief principles is objectivity, which, according to Supreme Council deputy E. Gentvilas, is a must for every movement.

According to the minister of economy, A. Simenas, "our movement is a certain portion of the movement of the Right, in other words—'we are the leftists of the Right'." But, he said, we do not recognize the special monopolistic rights which the rightists claim to possess as fighters for Lithuania's independence; we do not recognize the two-color "black and white" theory. In economic policy, the moderates propose only such social guarantees that correspond to the state's level of development—which means that they are in favor of more moderate taxes and smaller social guarantees. The movement also disagrees with the very strict procedures for the return of former property.

The initiators of the new movement declared that the movement of the moderates will not be a political prop for eastern designs, although it is clearly in favor of

economic relations with the East. Additionally, they do not intend to accept high officials and activists of the former Communist Party of Lithuania into their ranks.

Supreme Council's Legislation Initiation Process Examined

92UN2018A Vilnius ATGIMIMAS in Lithuanian
5-12 Jul 92 p 6

[Article by Petras Vaitiekunas: "How Laws Are Born"]

[Text] The Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania has 13 permanent commissions in which 132 deputies are active. Although the split dividing the Supreme Council has also paralyzed the activity of the commission, it is worthwhile to review their activity during the period before the crisis.

The five factions that are continuing their work in the Supreme Council have been officially branded as "pro-communist" and their activity has been called "a creeping coup d'etat."

The formal activity of the Supreme Council commissions has been continuing for a whole year under the Supreme Committee's regulations. The commission's approval or disapproval of the draft law has formally no influence on the presenting or the discussion of a draft law. Everything is determined by the Supreme Council.

Let us examine how laws were born in the Supreme Council. Until the commissions were restructured on the basis of the faction principle (the second half of 1991), most of the laws were drafted by the commissions themselves and by the working groups of experts under the leadership of those commissions. Laws were being passed comparatively quickly. The experts set the tone for the work of the commissions. Most of the laws were simply relegated by the Supreme Council to the government whose job was to carry them out. This was the limit of the Government's role at the time when the basic laws of economic reform were being drafted. A typical example is the activity of the present prime minister and deputy prime minister before they became Government leaders. A narrow group of several experts under their leadership wrote the main laws of economic reform. The Supreme Council passed the laws by "its own" majority. The political differentiation in the Supreme Council had not yet happened, it had only begun. The hammer of mechanical majority was forging the laws with lightning speed, doubts were being rejected, and there was only one request—"do not disturb our work." A nostalgia for such a style is still palpable in the Supreme Council to this day.

Factions began forming themselves in the Supreme Council in the second half of 1991. All the commissions were restructured on their basis. Special interests emerged and divided themselves. Politics assumed a larger role in the work of the Supreme Council. But it is doubtful if this meant a better representation of the interests of the society. Most of the Supreme Council

factions frequently established themselves in a voluntary manner, guiding themselves by sympathy or antipathy about the methods of the activity and without any firm support beyond the walls of the Supreme Council. As the Supreme Council and its commissions became politically variegated, we entered the stage of political splintering. The former majority of the Supreme Council became divided and became a minority. But power remained in its hands: both in the Supreme Council and in the Government. Feeling the impermanence of the situation after the failed referendum on presidential empowerment, the minority began dismantling the Supreme Council and demanding new elections to the Supreme Council in August as the only chance to retain power in its hands. This is how the present crisis came about. Nevertheless, a Supreme Council that is divided into factions was able to accomplish things. The activity of a Supreme Council without factions would resemble an attempt to construct a clock by using a hammer. That is hopeless. The situation of the Supreme Council with all its factions resembles a handful of clock parts that are not always in harmony. And the clock in this case still does not exist.

Having benefitted from this experience, we may inquire from where proposals for new laws should come. Laws could be initiated by industrialist and businessmen associations, trade unions, organizations of invalids, women, etc. All interested strata of society should have the possibility to propose them. They should address themselves to the Supreme Council commissions. Law projects prepared by scientific and scholarly organizations are also worthy of consideration when they desire it or when they are commissioned by the Supreme Council commissions or the Government. Draft laws prepared by the Government should be presented to the Supreme Council.

The deputies themselves, obviously, should prepare draft laws only in exceptional cases.

The Ministries, the Government, the working groups should all contribute to the drafting of laws as experts. The political aspect of the laws should be evaluated by the factions. The trouble today is that the factions are not interested in the laws and work without any strategy of legislation. Members of a faction often cannot answer questions about their point of view (e.g., the law of commercial banks). At best, a primitive professional lobbyism prevails. And the issues are often much too important to entrust them to specialists alone, without first having evaluated their political consequences and their impact on society.

The commissions should perform the function of coordinating the political and the expertise aspects. The commissions should examine, analyze and evaluate the laws. However, the questions of cooperation between the factions and the commissions are not yet clear. This is sufficiently defined in our regulations. It is clear to us

that the commissions must control the law, i.e., it must determine if it will be possible to put the law into practice.

The commissions must coordinate the laws among themselves. Yet the mechanism of this activity is not yet clear. It is especially important that we find a proper mode of cooperation between the Supreme Council and the Government as they create the laws. As long as that does not exist, their mutual distrust is "programmed" in advance. That also harms the quality of the laws themselves: they are either remote from life, or are focused on short-term economical or political goals.

Deputies' Group Views Relations With Kaliningrad

92UN2017A Vilnius ATGIMIMAS in Lithuanian
5-12 Jul 92 p 7

[Article by Romualdas Ozolas: "Kaliningrad and Lithuania Seek To Coordinate Their Interests"]

[Text] On 3 July, a group of Lithuania's Supreme Council deputies and the commission on regional problems went to Kaliningrad to discuss the execution of the agreement between the Republic of Lithuania and the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation. Romualdas Ozolas, Supreme Council deputy, told about the meeting.

This is one of the meetings arranged by the regional commission with our nearest neighbors—Belarus, Russia and its individual regions, Latvia, and Poland inasmuch as it was represented in the congress of the Lithuanians living in Poland which we attended as guests. Such meetings are indispensable in order to make it possible to discover new factors structuring our relations with the neighboring states as we seek for the best solution of problematic issues on the level of state institutions. This helps us to discover and define new geopolitical dimensions of the state of Lithuania.

After some statements by our politicians about the potential relations with the Kaliningrad region (I have in mind above all the statement of our ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary in the United States, Stasys Lozoraitis, which had extensive reverberations, and the statement by Supreme Council chairman V. Landsbergis on the withdrawal of the army from Lithuania), the people of Kaliningrad had formed a rather angry impression about us. Therefore we were able to give them a broader explanation of these statements. We were trying to find a perspective for a positive solution of the problems that were raised in these statements. The leaders of Kaliningrad are very much interested in economic cooperation with us, a fixing of the boundary, the possibilities of transit through Lithuania, and cultural exchanges. Since the questions were many and we did not have time to discuss them all, we agreed to meet again.

The foundation of our relations has been determined by the treaty with Russia and a separate agreement with the

Kaliningrad region. The subsequent meetings of ministries and agencies were, nevertheless, insufficient. Prime Minister B. Vagnorius had written a letter that included an appeal to take care of Lithuanian schools, churches and some social needs of Lithuanians who are living there. However, no reply to the letter was received. Therefore we raised these questions again in our meeting. We also discussed the establishment of a consulate in the Kaliningrad region. Its leaders did not oppose it. Now this question will have to be resolved in the near future by the Lithuanian and Russian foreign ministries. We also decided to establish a group of Supreme Council deputies who would constantly pay attention to the development of the relations with the Kaliningrad region and to the affairs of the Lithuanians who are living there. There are also plans to establish an analogous group of deputies there. It has also been proposed to establish working groups that would also look after the activity of the executive power in the areas of international, economic, social and cultural relations, communication, demilitarization and protection of the environment.

We had a wide-ranging discussion on the affairs of the Russian television (RTV), and the possibility of renting rebroadcasting towers.

The problems of cultural, educational and religious services for our compatriots in the Kaliningrad region attracted the greatest attention. It was agreed that concrete efforts to solve the problems of establishing Lithuanian schools will be made still prior to the meeting in Vilnius. I think that one Lithuanian school, at least for primary school students, could be opened in Kaliningrad this year already. Taking care of the Lithuanian cultural heritage was discussed. The Kaliningrad authorities have promised to move out a scientific research institute from a chapel so that the Lithuanian community could set up its house of prayer there. This, of course, does not satisfy the needs of the Lithuanian community there, but a beginning must be made immediately.

Until the meeting we did not have sufficient information about the attitudes of the Kaliningrad authorities toward us, but now we can say that there are sufficient possibilities for cooperation. If we succeed in establishing a favorable border arrangement, which would not harm the Republic of Lithuania but would allow for a sufficiently intensive promotion of our cooperation, then new possibilities will arise. Perhaps Lithuania's farmers could settle there under a lease arrangement, our specialists in land-reclamation could find work, and joint enterprises could be established. I have the impression that the people of this region are interested in the greatest autonomy possible. They are making big efforts to attract Western capital and are going beyond Poland or Germany. For instance, even the Japanese are interested in the building of the new harbor in Primorsk. These are significant projects and Lithuania should participate on the broadest scale in their realization. It is

on this base that we could hope for a positive acceptance of our compatriots in Kaliningrad and of Lithuania's interests in general.

Supreme Council Responds to Russian Human Rights Accusations

92UN1919B Vilnius LIETUVOS AIDAS in Lithuanian 24 Jul 92 p 2

[Statement of the Supreme Committee Presidium: "On the Rights of Russian Residents in Lithuania and on the Reflections and Documents of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation"]

[Text] The Republic of Lithuania, since 1 March 1990 consistently recreating Lithuania's independent statehood that had been annulled by the USSR annexation in 1940, has sought and will go on seeking to establish a civic society, in which human rights and freedoms are guaranteed by the Constitution, other laws and the activity of the state institutions. The laws of the Republic of Lithuania on citizenship and on the rights of national minorities as well as the treaty between the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Federation on the foundations of their interstate relations are well known and have met with international approval. They have assured the civilian inhabitants of Lithuania, irrespective of their nationality and origin, the possibility of choosing the citizenship and the ways of participating in the life of the state and society. Therefore we are astonished by the declaration of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation "On the Human Rights in the Baltic States," issued on 17 July 1992. It states, or rather incites, "a sharpening of the relations among the nationalities in the Baltic states, in which there are two and a half million ethnic immigrants from Russia," it declares "violations of human rights in the Baltic states and voices similar concretely unfounded accusations, while totally ignoring that violation of all kinds of rights which is the illegal stationing of the Russian army in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia without the consent of those states.

It may be that the above-mentioned accusations are specifically aimed at diverting international attention from the unanimous exhortation by the members-leaders of states at the Helsinki Conference: to withdraw the Russian army from the Baltic states "promptly, in an orderly manner and completely."

The assertion of the declaration that the previously mentioned inhabitants "have been deprived of their citizenship" has to do with the disappearance of the USSR, since it was not the Baltic states that did it. The declaration also mentions Russia's proposals to supplement the interstate treaties with more concrete bilateral agreements. Bilateral agreements between Lithuania and Russia are being concluded from 29 July 1991, to this very day and therefore the reproach that Russia's efforts allegedly "remained not understood" is totally unfounded.

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania regrets that the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation has adopted such an improper statement with regard to the three Baltic states, including Lithuania.

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania believes that another document-resolution "On Human Rights in Estonia," issued on 17 July 1992, is an example of an exceedingly rude pressure of a large state against its small neighbor and, among others, contradicts paragraph 23 of the Helsinki Declaration of 9 July 1992. It is doubtful whether a decision adopted in such a spirit will help to solve a single outstanding problem; on the contrary, it may aggravate them and create new ones, and therefore the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania expresses its grave concern.

Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania.

Vilnius, 22 July 1992.

Polish Newspaper's Divisive Actions Scored

92UN1919C Vilnius LIETUVOS AIDAS in Lithuanian 24 Jul 92 p 3

[Article by Lina Peceliuniene: "A State Newspaper—Against the State"]

[Text] On 31 December 1991, KURIER WILENSKI published an article by its editor Z. Balcewicz, "The Year of Lost Opportunities." In it, the editor takes a critical look at the Salcininkai and Vilnius rayon councils, which were drawn into the political machinations of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). At the Mostiskes conference, the coordinating council adopted a provocative statute of a national-territorial Polish land. The editor recalled the CPSU activists and the newspapers that assisted them. But he forgot that one of the active helpers in the carrying out of the CPSU-KGB goals was KURIER WILENSKI, the newspaper he was editing. The General Prosecutor's office reminds of this in its statement to the Supreme Council and the Government.

KURIER WILENSKI is a state newspaper. Its subordination to the Supreme Council and the Ministers' Council was set in 1990, before the elections to the Parliament. Z. Balcewicz was appointed editor in 1981, by the decision of the bureau of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party (LCP). At that time the newspaper was called CZERWONY SZTANDAR (The Red Flag). Following the declaration of Lithuania's independence, only the newspaper's name was changed. The founders never discussed the questions of the editorial board or of the newspaper's general concept. Everything remained in the editor's hands. In 1991 the founders gave the periodical a grant of 852,000 rubles, without a single reproach that the newspaper is helping the anti-state forces that were seeking to destabilize

southeast Lithuania. (Antanavicius limited his attacks on subsidies to LIETUVOS AIDAS.)

During two years of independence, the Polish reading portion of Lithuania's society was routinely fed with Communist designs to tear away the Vilnius territory from Lithuania and with hostility to the state.

On 17 October 1990, Z. Balcewicz published his article "What the Poles Want." It launched a campaign that was declaring in an ultimatum-like fashion: Lithuania will become part of Europe only if it will meet the demands which were raised in the name of the Poles. Since no anticommunist Polish organizations were created, the CPSU structures entrenched in the self-governments of the Vilnius and Salcininkai raions were speaking in the name of the Poles. KURIER WILENSKI gave complete support to the idea advanced in the CPSU plenary meetings: the Poles will be able to flourish in Lithuania only if they will have a territorial autonomy.

The newspaper refrains from analyzing the Communist activity. On the contrary, it indicates that the economic backwardness of these two regions of Lithuania was caused not by the Communist Party's policy of 50 years and is constantly fingerpointing that it was the Lithuanians' fault.

The history of this territory is presented in a distorted manner, with P. Losowski serving as the chief authority. It is asserted that Zeligowski's action was not an occupation or an annexation, but an expression of the yearnings of the Polish inhabitants of the Vilnius region. The readers are being instructed that the Vilnius region does not belong to Lithuania's ethnic lands. (P. Losowski, "The Nature of Vilnius' Belonging to Poland During 1919-1939"—8 March 1991; "A Pole and a Lithuanian Are Two..."—28 March 1991; etc.)

The state newspaper has been methodically preparing its readers for the declaration of autonomy, which was a stratagem of the CPSU-KGB. The article by J. Garniewicz, "Why Lithuanians Need a Polish University in Vilnius," (23 March 1991), ends with a threat: The Lithuanian society may live to see a time when Burokevicius or an OMON sergeant will open the doors of the Cathedral of Vilnius for the Poles.

The articles on economic matters focus their greatest attention on the kolkhoz association "Wilenszczyzna," which sought to orient itself to the Polish market and to separate the Vilnius and Salcininkai raions from Lithuania economically (D. Danowska, "A Tiny State Within a Tiny State," 7 December 1990). There is a silence about the Citizenship Law and the procedure for privatizing the primary state property.

A lot of attention is being paid to the unregistered Armija Krajowa club, and the historic activity of Armija is remembered with nostalgia (there are two columns on this subject: "The Armija Krajowa Club Invites" and "The Chronicle of Remembrance"). The Lithuanian organizations that were active during the war are treated

as collaborationist. The readers are urged to slavify Baltic place names and the state is reproached for the difficulties facing the creation of the Polish national school system.

Even the editor Z. Balcewicz, a seeker of the "middle road," speaks out in the pages of KURIER WILENSKI in favor of an administrative-territorial Vilnius land unit with its own status ("Let Us Not Harm Each Other," 29 December 1990; "What Must Be the Vilnius Land," 29 March 1991). So do the extreme autonomists. Supreme Council deputy S. Peshko, former deputy chairman of the coordinating council of the Vilnius Polish administrative-territorial land, which was being founded by the Communists, gives an interview on the eve of the conference ("This Is Our Proposition," 21 March 1991, in the column "A Conversation on the Status of the Vilnius Land"). The ways to achieve territorial autonomy are also discussed by former USSR Supreme Council deputy A. Brodawsky and Lithuania's Supreme Council deputies L. Jankelewicz, E. Tomaszewicz and R. Macejkaniec.

Already since the fall of 1990, KURIER WILENSKI has been regularly publishing information about the speeches and decisions of the coordinating council of the autonomy seekers. Next to it is a report on the conference of citizens who are loyal to the Republic of Lithuania, which is treated as anti-Polish.

When the Supreme Council dismissed the Vilnius and Salcininkai rayon councils, KURIER WILENSKI began publishing the most strident statements and views about "doing away with the Poles" and a "violation of human rights." Fabrications are printed on the alleged firing of Poles from work because of their nationality or on their not being allowed to take advantage of the privatization laws. Again, not a word about the criminal activity of the local self-governments in trying to put into effect the CPSU-KGB designs to tear this land away from Lithuania.

The editors smuggle in the idea of the separateness of this territory even when they write about subscriptions: they are glad about the readers' comments from Vilnius, Wilenszczyzna, Lithuania and Latvia.

Supreme Council deputy C. Okinczyz informed the general prosecutor's office that on 19 August 1991, K. Adamowicz, deputy editor of KURIER WILENSKI, was calling for support of the organizers of the putsch. Since these charges were not confirmed, criminal prosecution of Adamowicz has been suspended.

On 20 January 1992, however, general prosecutor A. Paulauskas reminded the parliament and the Government that the editor and the editorial board of KURIER WILENSKI are consciously disregarding the demands contained in Articles 3 and 6 of the Republic of Lithuania's law on the press and other mass information media.

It is strange that the founders, even after having received the conclusions of the prosecutor's office, are putting no

demands on their own newspaper. According to J. Jucys, Government counsellor on education, art and culture, they do not know what measures they should take.

Having heard how Polish farmers are cursing the former Communist rayon self-governments, we hope that Lithuania's Polish society will itself demand another newspaper.

Former Agent Claims KGB Plotting in Seimas

PM0210134592 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian 30 Sep 92 First Edition p 7

[Own Correspondent Yu. Stroganov "Viewpoint": "If a Putsch is Being Prepared, By Whom? KGB Agent 'Pranas' Has Predicted A Potentially Disastrous Development of Events for Lithuania After Elections to Seimas"]

[Text] Vilnius—"It is probable that after the elections, the centrist, liberal, moderate, and social democratic forces will unite with the Democratic Labor Party, that is, with the former communists, and with the help of some rightwing turncoats will secure a small majority in the seimas. A head of state will be elected with a different political orientation from that of Landsbergis. Discontented voters will begin a fierce picket of the seimas. It is possible that to keep order they will use not only the police but also volunteer forces and riflemen. There are enough weapons. Extra Russian army units will be brought in to protect the Russophone population."

Certain academics also warn about the likelihood, albeit faint, of the Lebanization of Lithuania. Admittedly, they cite distrust and a split in society as the main cause. According to agent "Pranas," such a development of events is possible because a powerful section of so-called KGB infiltrators has driven a wedge between V. Landsbergis' supporters and their voters. Generally speaking, if a problem occurs, as usual it will be the handiwork of the enemies of the peoples and, of course, the Kremlin.

The prediction is sensational because unlike other former agents, this one admits to collaboration himself and furthermore was nothing less than Sajudis' treasurer and a member of its first seimas, that is, he was an initiate of the inner sanctum of the organization which undermined the USSR. Now it is that man's, Kiastutis Urba's view of the situation which has been broadcast to the whole republic.

Such an action takes courage. But what made him so courageous? Presumably it was a sense of incipient patriotism, because K. Urba exposes a number of possible KGB and GRU intrigues against Lithuania and hints that the republic's "independent" press is acting in line with their aspirations and the KGB and the GRU are working against... elections to the seimas.

"First of all I would like to congratulate General Eismuntas (one of the last leaders of the USSR KGB Lithuanian department—Yu.S.)" K. Urba said. "Let us recall his words: 'I will destroy this parliament from

within.' The splitting of factions, the maneuvering on parliamentary commissions, the clashes over standing orders, the automobiles, the Chepaytis affair, the Berезov affair, the 'Jurgis' and 'Henrikas' affairs, and eventually... parliamentary crisis. Bravo, general!"

R. Martsinkus, the last chairman of the Lithuanian KGB, who resigned just before 13 January 1991 when he felt that he could not control the situation, gave an interview in the newspaper LIETUVOS RITAS, an interview which agent "Pranas" considers a direct part of the KGB's Operation "Cover Up."

"He asserts that the recruitment of deputies and workers of the Supreme Soviet was banned. However, no one banned the recruitment of candidate deputies long before elections. The activity of the KGB and the GRU in recent years, in my view, will go down in history but, regrettably, as one of the most glaring episodes. How can a few hundred professional agents 'outwit' the majority of supporters of independence and set them against one another?" "Pranas" said, to prove his point. He went on.

"Ever since Colonel B. Baltin suggested to me in October 1990 the idea of suggesting an anti-KGB resolution to the coalition of rightwing parties in a bid to win their confidence I have been studying everything scathing of the KGB virtually with a magnifying glass," K. Urba claims. "The most important assignment which the KGB entrusted to me was to split ATGIMIMAS (a Sajudis newspaper—Yu. S.) from Sajudis itself."

However, "Pranas'" opinion of the "most glaring episode" in the activity of the KGB and GRU in Lithuania diverges from the position of the professional, R. Martsinkus, a career intelligence officer and major general who worked abroad and in the central apparatus as chief of an intelligence section.

"No service can operate without a network of agents," he said. "In my view, however, this work was not done professionally in Lithuania."

"Pranas'" admissions are the culmination of a series of revelations entitled "The Spider's Web" provided by the state newspaper LIETUVOS AIDAS. Its victims are for the most part representatives of the opposition. The far right mainly approves of this action. But not all of the prominent political leaders support it.

"From the ethical standpoint, the "Spider's Web" revelations do not stand up to criticism," E. Gentvilas, former head of the Lithuanian Supreme Council and a centrist with a rightist bent, believes.

"My own rights have been violated: For more than six months now they have been portraying me as the super-agent 'Ivanauskas'," the eminent Lithuanian sociologist A. Matulenis says indignantly. "I was a pawn in a political game."

"Pranas'" admissions are hardly going to clarify things in the voters' minds. They are utterly confused. Who is in fact an agent of the former USSR KGB? The

rightwingers point to the left, while the left are hinting that the radicalism of some rightwingers is a ball and chain shackling a free Lithuania strung up by the special services.

There may be quite a few more sensational revelations before the seimas elections. People are playing for big stakes here.

LDLP Denounces KGB Agent Investigations

*WS0110130692 Vilnius ELTA NEWS BULLETIN
in English 1844 GMT 30 Sep 92*

[From ELTA "NEWS BULLETIN" No. 90]

[Text] 30 September 1992—The official organ of the former Communist Party of Lithuania, now calling itself the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDLP), "Tiesa" (The Truth) has published a declaration of the Presidium the LDLP Council denouncing the recent publications of the Supreme Council Commission investigating into the ex-USSR KGB secret agent's activities in Lithuania. The declaration says: "Various insinuations and fabrications are disseminated slandering well-known honourable persons in Lithuania who were nominated as candidates to the Sejm of Lithuania in the electoral list of the LDLP". The declaration brands the chairman of the aforesaid commission Mr. B. Gajauskas and its member P. Varanauskas who publicize the data of the KGB archives under the common heading "Cobweb" as "instruments of dirty political struggle in the hands of the right radicals". The "well-known honourable persons" mentioned in the LDLP declaration include Dr. Jonas Kubilius who served as rector of Vilnius University for 33 years (1958-1991), that is through the greater part of the 47 year long period of the Soviet occupation, the journalist Ceslovas Jursenas and the former political prisoner Aleksandras Bendinskas, now candidates to the deputies of the Sejm promoted by the LDLP. The records found in the KGB archives evidence these individuals' longstanding conscious collaboration with the secret service of the collapsed empire.

The LDLP declaration pledges that the Presidium of the LDLP Council will do their utmost by all legal means to protect their party members and supporters against the attacks of the political persecution.

The same issue of "Tiesa" (No.190) publishes a long article by Vytautas Skuodis in defence of Dr. J. Kubilius. V. Skuodis enumerates Dr. J. Kubilius' services to Vilnius University without, however, presenting a single fact which would refuse his long collaboration with the former USSR KGB secret service as testified by the data of P. Varanauskas' publication. On the contrary, V. Skuodis confirms the fact of the collaboration admitting that those who travelled to "the capitalist world" during the Soviet occupation had to make written and oral account to the queries of the KGB officials. Besides, V. Skuodis adds in his article that "state security officials

would sometimes call at chiefs' offices for confidential conversations about those chiefs' subordinates".

In the 29th of September issue of the "Lietuvos Aidas" (Echo of Lithuania) deputy of the editor-in-chief, candidate to the Sejm from the Christian Democratic party Valentinas Ardziunas writes on the same subject from a different standpoint. He responds to those who resent the disclosures of the former KGB agents on the plea that this is done in pursuit of political considerations. He writes: "Well, how can we surrender our political considerations when such a political organization as the LDLP which seeks to influence the life of the Republic and ultimately to regain the power stuffs its electoral list of candidate with the names of individuals who could be easily subjected to blackmail by a foreign power. If the list of the LDLP comprises a number of the former KGB agents, we can rightfully conclude that this party may also be subject to the influence of the masters of that foreign secret service.

The author further writes that the parties and organizations of the coalition "For Democracy in Lithuania" will also check their lists of candidates in order to eliminate the danger. All the parties and movements should, in his opinion, act likewise so as to prevent the former KGB collaborators from penetrating into our legislature and obstructing the restructuring of our state.

New Director Discusses Plans for Lithuania's Security Service

*92UN2104A Vilnius LIETUVOS AIDAS in Lithuanian
14 Aug 92 p 3*

[Interview with Petras Plumpa, director of Lithuania's Security Service by Valdas Sutkus: "A Tree That Does Not Like Transplanting"]

[Text] *Several days ago, Prime Minister A. Abisala appointed the well-known dissident and former political prisoner Petras Plumpa as director of Lithuania's Security Service. He is interviewed by Valdas Sutkus, correspondent of LIETUVOS AIDAS.*

[Sutkus] You are an old dissident, a political prisoner. As far as I know, you began your anti-soviet activity, as it was called then, still in high school.

[Plumpa] Yes, we founded an underground organization already in 1954, in the Pandelis high school. We published a newspaper, LAISVES BALSAS (Voice of Freedom), and distributed proclamations. Later on, these former student underground activists congregated in Vilnius, Kaunas and continued their activity. In November 1957 we took an oath to fight until Lithuania obtained freedom and independence. I feel this oath to this day.

[Sutkus] The first stage of your underground activity ended with your arrest and sentencing in 1958. What crimes were you charged with?

[Plumpa] Three crimes: anti-soviet agitation and propaganda, organizational activity and possession of weapons. According to our program, we collected weapons, ideological materials, and old books to be able to balance at least to some extent the inimical ideology that was being dissiminated. And so I was sentenced and sent to the Mordovian camps. Returning in 1968, I found a job in Kaunas, at the "Zemprojektas," as a printer, because that made it possible to publish the underground press. I learned how to operate an offset press and started printing illegal literature, but half a year later I had to leave this job because it was found out that while applying for it I had concealed my sentence. Then I moved to another department and started working as a forwarder. It was still possible to do some illegal publishing but it was becoming more and more difficult, and so in 1969 I had to submerge myself completely in the underground. Some engineers I knew constructed an electrographic multiplication apparatus, which we used to publish books in various hiding places in Raudondvaris and Kaunas. Otherwise I led a legal existence, in a dormitory, although from time to time I would leave for several months to work in my hideaway. Frequent trips were dangerous because one could get caught. Nevertheless, the security people became suspicious and for the last two years until my arrest I was constantly watched. At the dormitory I was watched by the neighbors, while professional security agents would shadow me on the street. It would take several hours to lose detectives since one must not enter the hiding place while being shadowed because this way one would ruin the coworkers and the cause itself. This is how things continued until the fall of 1973. At that time we were publishing the "Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church." Father S. Tamkevicius prepared the copy and I helped to edit it. We usually published and distributed about one hundred copies of each issue. Others sent copies abroad. This way we published six issues. Other people took over the publishing with the seventh issue. They did not maintain conspiratorial discipline and were detected by the security agents. This is how I also got caught in that net. I was charged with helping to prepare the seventh issue and with teaching those people how to operate an electrographic apparatus. Since I revealed nothing during the interrogation, I was threatened with being punished twice as severely as the others. This is exactly how it happened. The court sentenced me to eight years of imprisonment while the other four defendants also received eight years—collectively. And so the examining magistrate's promise, given more than one half year earlier, was fulfilled. It seems that the various punishments were determined in advance. After the verdict, the security agents again tried to persuade me to give evidence. I refused, but a year later the examining magistrate came to Perm for the same purpose and offered to allow me to go back home as a reward. I had to answer him that I did not want to go home. Thus their efforts ended.

[Sutkus] During the many years of your dissident activity, you had an opportunity to become thoroughly acquainted with the methods of the security agents.

[Plumpa] I did, but mainly on the outside. That mechanism was like a watch, which one sees and observes daily, but only from the outside. I had no possibility of entering the internal structure, although I was naturally interested. By the way I found out, and the security agents themselves had told me, that some of their operators got into trouble thanks to me, because they were not able to uncover our hiding places, although they had bragged that they could do it in one day by simply following my traces. This indicates that their methods were imperfect or that my own were effective. Having worked calmly the whole time, they seemed to be panicking during the last year. They would literally tread on my heels and made no more effort to conceal themselves. I used to notice and recognize the agents; sometimes I let them know it. They would become confused, but it seems that they failed to report this to their superiors because the same people kept shadowing me. Of course, this has helped me very much to save myself. My intuition, the very highly developed sense of caution were also of great help, because on this road one seems to be always walking on the edge of the precipice. A single careless step, and all is lost: one perishes and drags the others down, too. As in a game of chess, I had to plan everything meticulously and to foresee far into the future. My predilection for chess may also have been helpful. In addition, I was under a certain protection. I believe in it.

[Sutkus] Several days ago you were appointed director of Lithuania's security service. How do you envision Lithuania's security system?

[Plumpa] A comprehensive answer is still difficult at this time. We need a law on security and a Statute which do not exist yet, but I am convinced that the most important task of this service is to protect Lithuania with its most valuable treasure—its inhabitants. I mean all the inhabitants—of all nationalities, all convictions, all political views. Otherwise, if a trend prevails that only one group's interests should be safeguarded, our structure will not be stable. Then the structure of the Security Service and its personnel will be changed after every election or even after every change of government. Meanwhile, the secret service is like a tree that does not like being transplanted. It should be fostered and nurtured for many years. If we were to transplant it after each change of government, that tree will wither away or will constantly languish. Therefore, the Security law and the activity of this service must reflect a solicitude toward all the citizens of Lithuania. We must rise above parties, political views and nationalities. We cannot allow political storms to uproot the state institution.

[Sutkus] How will you select the personnel for the Security Service?

[Plumpa] I have not yet become acquainted with all the present employees. I have had a chance to talk with some

department chiefs. We will have to collect information about the present employees and the applicants; attention will have to be paid to our possibilities and needs. An imperative task is to establish security priorities for Lithuania as a state.

[Sutkus] What, in your opinion, are the greatest dangers to Lithuania's security at this time?

[Plumpa] I think that at present the most important danger to the Lithuanian state arises from the political instability of the society, from the confrontations that are sometimes excessively vicious and foment despair among some people. The forces that are inimical to Lithuania can easily penetrate into such a milieu and to create a mortal danger for the state. That is why it is important that we find out the causes of the confrontation and political instability, and that we ascertain how much and how it is possible to improve the situation. Doubtlessly, some processes of differentiation and splintering are natural and normal. If one compares the development of a state with a tree, one may say that the already finished singing revolution was like a tree trunk, because it had a single goal and was not branching out. The differentiation according to the needs and interests came later. One may say that these are the branches of the tree, which grow and develop naturally. The security service cannot consider this branching as dangerous to the state and try to stem it by force, because this would inhibit the growth of the tree itself. Therefore, it is important to have a depoliticized Security Service. At

the same [time] it must determine which phenomena and which growths of the tree are unnatural and harmful viruses brought from somewhere else. I understand that this is difficult to determine, but much depends on the laws, the leaders and the state philosophy.

[Sutkus] It is probably logical to think that your becoming director of the Security Service will attract more former political prisoners and deportees to work for it.

[Plumpa] I think that honest men and women who want and know how to work must join the Security Services. Those who know how to work well. Traitors may be found even among deportees and political prisoners. I have experienced this personally. Therefore, in a work like this one cannot automatically trust any party or movement. Each person must be checked. Of course, I deeply sympathize with political prisoners, my brethren, but most of them are already rather old and not strong enough, their health does not permit them to work. Therefore, we must look for younger people and that is a rather difficult matter. The moral issues are especially complex, because if someone can be bought for money then he is not reliable. Unfortunately, it is not easy to check someone's trustworthiness. We will have to talk to people, to have consultations, perhaps even to create special investigative commissions. There is hard work ahead for us.

[Sutkus] My thanks for the conversation and best wishes for success.

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